WELT- UND LEBENSANSCHAUUNGEN,

HERVORGEGANGEN AUS

RELIGION, PHILOSOPHIE UND NATURERKENNTNIS

WORLD AND LIFE VIEWS

EMERGING FROM

RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, AND PERCEPTION OF NATURE

BY

PROF. DR. **MAX B. WEINSTEIN**

TRANSLATION BY DEBORAH MOSS

FOREWORD BY PROF. HELGE KRAGH

Welt- und Lebensanschauungen, Hervorgegangen aus Religion, Philosophie und Naturerkenntnis (World and Life Views, Emerging From Religion, Philosophy and Perception of Nature).

Translation by Deborah Moss, UK
Foreword by Professor Helge Kragh, Denmark

ISBN: 9798479353567

© 2020
All rights reserved.

A Pandeism Anthology Project Publication

Preface

The year 2020 marked the one-hundred-and-tenth anniversary of the publication of this, the theological opus of Professor Max Bernhard Weinstein, who was probably best known as a physicist teaching at the prestigious University of Berlin, and as an early skeptic of Albert Einstein's Theory of Relativity. But in addition to these activities, he carried a strong interest in theology and the history of religion, delivering several lectures on the relationship between those topics and the study of physics, culminating in his 1910 publication of *Welt- und Lebensanschauungen, Hervorgegangen aus Religion, Philosophie und Naturerkenntnis* (*World and Life Views, Emerging From Religion, Philosophy and Perception of Nature*).

Researchers for the Pandeism Anthology Project became familiar with Professor Weinstein's theological work while drafting the collection, *Pandeism: An Anthology of the Creative Mind*, which contains an excerpt from this book. Professor Weinstein engaged in a meticulous degree of analysis of the history and nature of theological models, with extensive excerpts from the history of philosophy, and so was able to cover concepts such as Pandeism, Panpsychism, Parallelism, and Emanationism in greater singular depth than the great bulk of those who had come before him.

As a physicist, Professor Weinstein's work maintains respect for the sciences, even while flirting with certain religious concepts (such as the idea of the soul) having the possibility of playing a role in scientific processes. Based on an extensive ethnographic literature and religious history, he leads the reader to understand the views of many natural and cultural worlds. From Ancient Egypt to the Jewish Kabbalah, to ancient Indian and modern Western theosophy, Professor Weinstein covered the ground of his time, and developed new ground to cover as well.

And so, this book is something of a lost classic, one able to be thoroughly eyebrow-raising to the German reader, and prospectively equally so to the English reader. Translating this fascinating book to a more widely spoken language—and enabling its republication in that form—has been a step towards preserving an almost-lost treasure chest of knowledge and analysis for a vast swath of the world. We hope to regenerate Weinstein's forward-thinking observations, keeping them and their context alive for a new generation of the world.

Translator: Deborah Moss

Deborah Moss is a Language and Linguistics graduate of the University of York, and a translator of German and Hungarian. Deborah previously translated a chapter of Professor Weinstein's work for the collection, *Pandeism: An Anthology of the Creative Mind*, and accomplished the task admirably and intelligently.

Professor Weinstein is a challenge to translate. His vocabulary was expansive and fluid, and he did not hesitate to use rare terms, coin new words and enunciate ideas in imaginative new ways. He carried forth an examination of the history of the great proportion of human religion known in his day. With nearly 500 pages of scholarly text, thoroughly packed with information, and readily sprinkled with passages in Greek and occasional other languages, Deborah had to work studiously to bring to life the translated word. But with diligent effort, we are confident that this challenge has been well meet.

One unusual feature of this translation is the precise pagination. Every effort has been made to match the content to the pagination of the original, so that when you cite to a passage in this translation, the page holding that content will exactly correspond to the page in Weinstein's original work. With a few exceptions made necessary by typesetting conventions, even the sentence breaks match those of the original. Naturally, this has led to some unusual points of division between the pages, but we feel this is worth it to fully replicate the feel of reading Professor Weinstein's original work as it was originally laid out.

Foreword: Helge Kragh

In addition to the translation of Professor Weinstein's text, an excellent and enlightening Foreword has been provided by the esteemed Danish historian of science, Professor Helge Kragh, currently Professor Emeritus at the Niels Bohr Institute. Here, Professor Kragh—who has previously examined Professor Weinstein's philosophy in his own 2008 book, *Entropic Creation: Religious Contexts of Thermodynamics and Cosmology*—has painted in a few pages an encapsulating picture of the scientific milieu of Professor Weinstein's day, vital to understanding a book drawn from that period.

Foreword to the Translation

Max Weinstein: Physics, Philosophy, Pandeism

Helge Kragh∗

Abstract: This is a brief introduction to the life and ideas of the Lithuanian-German physicist, philosopher and religious thinker Max B. Weinstein, who is today best known for his thoughts concerning so-called pandeism. An accomplished theoretical physicist and characteristic figure in the *fin-de-siècle* transition of the physical world view, Weinstein contributed to a wide range of physics. He was an early if not unsympathetic critic of Einstein's theory of relativity and Minkowski's formulation of it. In this respect he was unoriginal, but in the broader context of science and humanist culture he was an original thinker. He argued in favor of what he called pandeism, a religious-philosophical view according to which the physical world and the cosmic deity are one and the same.

1. Introduction

Max Bernhard Weinstein was born 1 September 1852 in Kaunas, Lithuania, by Jewish parents at a time when Lithuania was under Russian rule. He died in Berlin on 25 March 1918. After been adopted by an uncle, in 1865 Weinstein attended a Gymnasium in Insterburg (now Chernyakhovsk in the Kaliningrad region) from where he graduated in 1874. He subsequently matriculated to the University of Breslau, soon to move on to the Friedrich-Wilhelm University in Berlin. In 1878 he was naturalized as a citizen of Germany. For details on Weinstein's life and career, see Starikov 2019.

Weinstein spent most of his life and career in Berlin, which at the end of the nineteenth century was not only the capital of Germany but also the capital of international physics. In 1880 he was awarded the doctoral degree which opened up for a position as untenured lecturer (*Privatdozent*) at the famous University of Berlin.

∗ Niels Bohr Institute, University of Copenhagen.
E-mail: helge.kragh@nbi.ku.dk.

Max Bernhard Weinstein in 1910

Six years later he passed his *Habilitation* exam under Helmholtz allowing him to teach at the university. During a period of more than three decades he taught courses in physics and geography while at the same time contributing to the research literature in physics and its allied sciences. Apart from several monographs and chapters in recognized handbooks he wrote a series of research papers in *Annalen der Physik*, *Zeitschrift für physikalische Chemie*, *Elektrotechnische Zeitschrift* and other journals. The topics of these papers covered a broad range of areas including thermodynamics, capillarity, electrochemistry, electromagnetism, solid-state physics, meteorology, and terrestrial magnetism [Poggendorff 1898-1926; Starikov 2018].

Although Weinstein's research interests spanned experimental as well as theoretical physics, he was particularly occupied with the latter aspects such as represented by the theories of classical mechanics and electrodynamics. Still in the early 1880s J. C. Maxwell's fundamental field theory of electromagnetism was little known and appreciated in German physics, where it faced opposition by rival theories based on directly interacting electrical particles. When Weinstein in 1883 made an authorized German translation of Maxwell's important *Treatise on Electricity and Magnetism* from 1865, it made the theory better known in Germany, where it soon was generally accepted and paved the way for the electron theory [Maxwell 1883]. Of more historical than scientific interest, the following year he prepared a German translation of Fourier's classical treatise *Théorique Analytique de la Chaleur* dating from 1822. As yet another example of Weinstein's interest and competence in theoretical physics may be mentioned an introductory textbook on advanced mathematical physics [Weinstein 1901].

2. Relativity physics

When Weinstein turns up in the history of physics it is most often in footnotes and as a peripheral figure in connection with the early response to Einstein's theory of relativity [e.g., Pyenson 1987; Crelinstein 2006]. By heart and training a classical physicist he responded critically if not dismissively to Einstein's theory, which around 1910 attracted much attention in the German physics community. Although he understood the theory from a technical point of view, he doubted that it represented a valid physical description of nature. For example, like many other physicists at the time he was unwilling to abandon the concept of the ether as a foundation of physics. In monographs and articles between 1911 and 1914 he spelled out his objections and, at the same time, provided useful summaries of the theories of Einstein and Minkowski [Weinstein 1913b; Weinstein 1914a; Weinstein 1914b]. His book of 1913 was reviewed by Max Born [1914], a rising star in German theoretical physics and a specialist in relativistic mechanics. Apart from Max von Laue's *Das Relativitätsprinzip* from 1911, Weinstein's book was the first monograph covering the theory of relativity [see Goenner 1988].

Weinstein's objections to relativity theory were in part conceptual and in part mathematical. In 1911 he denied that quantities such as length, time and mass were relative in a physical sense, arguing that the mathematical constructions of the theory of relativity were illegitimately interpreted in physical terms. "In a nutshell, no physical implications follow from this theory, but only formal-geometric

implications" [Weinstein 1911, p. 156]. He found it hard to believe that whereas in Einstein's theory a moving sphere of matter appears as a flattened ellipsoid, the form of a spherical light sphere is invariant. Although Weinstein's own exposition of relativity theory was an orgy of mathematical manipulations, he was worried of the "mystical symbolism" that threatened to replace physical reality with an unintelligible mathematical formalism [Pyenson 1985, p. 150]. Concerning the meaning of the relativity principle, Weinstein [1914c, p. 1] expressed the view that it "has often been extended so far and without reflection that an intolerable intolerance of other opinions has developed to the most silly assertions, which is almost comparable to a medieval constraint of belief."

Although Weinstein did not accept the theory as a physically valid description of nature, on the other hand he [1914b, p. 929] admitted that "Einstein's introduction of the theory of relativity will always count as one of the most important achievements in science ever." His rather critical attitude to Einstein's theory was by no means exceptional as the theory was widely considered controversial not least because of the privileged status it ascribed to light signals. More concretely, the main point of Weinstein's informed critique was that the valid deductions from the relativity principle were only concerned with "the mathematical form of the course of events, but not with the events themselves." From this and other objections he concluded that it was "questionable whether the relativity principle could be justified also in some purely physical sense" [Weinstein 1913b, p. 341; see the translated excerpts in Starikov 2015].

Although there is no indication that Weinstein and Einstein ever met, the latter was aware of Weinstein's work. In a letter of March 1916 the astronomer Wilhelm Förster called attention to a newspaper article in which Weinstein [1916a] reflected on Einstein's new theory of gravitation as expounded in his general theory of relativity. According to Weinstein, general relativity had turned gravity into a "world power" that controlled all laws of physics and necessitated a revision of physics as well as mathematics. Referring to the anxiety that Einstein's theory had caused in parts of the German populace, Förster mentioned that it was perhaps from "some recent popular explanations by our colleague Weinstein … that this unease was amplified and disseminated" [Einstein 1998, p. 275].

As regards the mathematical language of relativity theory Weinstein focused as much on Minkowski's innovations as those of Einstein. He tended to consider Einstein's special theory of relativity to be merely a particular case of Minkowski's more fundamental theory. On the one hand, he was concerned over Minkowski's mathematical

formalism, which he found was "unspeakably difficult to understand." On the other hand, he dedicated his book of 1913 to Minkowski, who had passed away four years earlier, and praised him as "a man of genius" [Weinstein 1913, p. vi; Walter 1999, p. 104; Weinstein 1910b, p. 929]. Weinstein was skeptical with respect to the use of complex quantities in physics because imaginary terms could not correspond to something observable. He consequently preferred to write the formulae of relativity theory in terms of either three-dimensional vectors or components, which to his mind made them more comprehensible.

Despite his dislike of complex four-dimensional quantities, Weinstein considered Minkowski's use of them to be "one of the greatest revolutions in our accepted views" [Weinstein 1913b, p. vi]. Indeed, he was skeptical with respect to the theory of relativity, but he was neither an anti-relativist nor merely a "popularizer" of the theory [Crelinstein 2006, p. 102]. In some respects his attitude to relativity was similar to the one held by other sceptics such as Emil Wiechert and Max Abraham, who mastered the theory's mathematical apparatus without accepting it as physically true. It was only after World War I that Einstein's theory became truly controversial, attracting massive criticism from scientists, philosophers and the general public in Germany as well as abroad. By then Weinstein had passed away and his earlier objections were largely if not completely forgotten. Thus, he was post mortem included as an anti-Einstein author in a notorious anthology with the telling title "One Hundred Authors against Einstein" [Israel, Ruckhaber and Weinmann 1931, pp. 100-101; for this work, see Goenner 1994].

3. Other works in physics

In many respects Weinstein was an average German *fin-de-siècle* physicist, an able researcher but of no particular originality and in no way comparable to giants such as Max Planck, H. A. Lorentz and Ludwig Boltzmann. Nonetheless, he had a solid reputation and was, for example, invited to contribute to the festschrift published on the occasion of Boltzmann's 60-year's birthday. The subject of his contribution was entropy changes in viscous physical systems, a topic he also dealt with in later publications [Weinstein 1904; Weinstein 1916b].

As seen in retrospect, his most important scientific works were within areas such as solid-state physics and physical chemistry, where he contributed to frontier research by making advanced use of quantum theory, thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. His work in this wide area included four volumes on the thermodynamics and kinetics of substances published between 1901 and 1908 [Weinstein 1901-1908]. The first volume was reviewed by the noted experimental physicist Ernst

Pringsheim [1902], who found it to be generally valuable but unsuited as a textbook. One of Weinstein's papers was a critical examination of Walther Nernst's heat theorem also known as the third law of thermodynamics. In this paper Weinstein [1917] commented on the status of Nernst's theorem as compared to Einstein's theory of relativity:

> It is better to designate Nernst's theorem as a law of approximation … which ultimately all laws of nature arguably merely are – with the possible exception of the law of relativity, should it turn out to be true – than to burden it with a prediction, whose truth already now is being put into more than doubt by experience.

According to Evgeni Starikov [2018], Weinstein was an "outstanding theoretical physicist" who contributed significantly to the foundation of thermodynamics and statistical mechanics.

4. Philosophical views

Weinstein lived at a time when science, art and culture were to some extent in a state of turmoil characterized by a zeitgeist favoring alternatives to the traditional mechanical world view. The *fin-de-siècle* period from about 1890 to 1910 is in retrospect the revolutionary phase during which the new theories of relativity and quanta changed the foundation of physics but from a contemporary point of view, things looked different [Kragh 2014]. While relatively undistinguished as a physicist, Weinstein was an original thinker in the broader context of science and humanist culture, perhaps a natural philosopher rather than a physicist in the more restricted meaning of the term. He clearly had an unusually broad and deep knowledge of philosophical streams of thought through history, a desire to understand the world in the sense of Weltanschauung (world view) and not merely as a complex mechanism describable in terms of mathematically formulated laws of physics.

In 1904 Weinstein was appointed titular professor in philosophy and over the following years he gave a series of lectures on natural philosophy and the philosophical foundation of science to students at the University of Berlin [Gerhardt, Mehring and Rindet 1999, p. 108]. The published version of the lecture series, a comprehensive volume of more than 500 pages, indicates the breadth of Weinstein's philosophical interests and how different his views were compared to the predominant philosophy of science of a more positivistic orientation. For example, he spent three lectures dealing with the soul and spiritual capacities. Other of his lectures dealt with perception psychology, epistemology, idealism versus realism, consciousness, substantiality, infinity, and causality. While philosophers of the naturalist and positivist schools tended to disregard the human soul or deny its existence, according to Weinstein the soul was all-important and no less real than immaterial physical forces such as electricity, magnetism and gravity.

At the end of his book Weinstein [1906, p. 528] emphasized subjectivism over objectivism: "Truly, ultimately man lives only in his inner world; what man put forth from himself into the outer world is his own proper life-content." Coming from the pen of a physicist, this is a remarkable claim. It may call in mind the later views of Arthur Eddington [1920, p. 200] according to whom, in advanced science "the mind has but regained from nature that which the mind has put into nature."

Weinstein's book on natural philosophy was briefly reviewed by the eminent physical chemist Wilhelm Ostwald [1908] in *Annalen der Naturphilosophie*, a journal he had founded in 1901. In another review, which was longer and generally positive, the American philosopher Wilmon H. Sheldon pointed out the subjective character of the author's philosophy and how it thoroughly denied the mechanical view of the soul. According to Sheldon [1908], "The author regards the soul as a good concept … proof of its existence lies only in its inner conviction."

5. Cosmological speculations

Among the many issues in *Die philosophischen Grundlagen* was also the much-discussed question of the so-called heat death (*Wärmetod*), which Weinstein dealt with in the 29th lecture. To put it briefly, although the energy of a closed system is conserved, according to the second law of thermodynamics the free or useful energy decreases continually or, in the formulation due to Rudolf Clausius and dating from 1868, the entropy of the system increases irreversibly. Since the entropy is a measure of the system's lack of order or lack of degree of organization, the second law implies that any closed system will

eventually reach a state of thermal equilibrium in which life and other forms of molecular structures are ruled out. If applied to the universe or world as a whole it means that in the far future all life and all activity will cease to exist.

Since the 1870s the question of the cosmic heat death had been discussed endlessly by scientists, philosophers, theologians, and social critics. Far from being merely a scientific question related to thermodynamics and cosmology, it was a central issue in the cultural, ideological, and political struggle which in a German context is known as the *Kulturkampf*. The heat death was not only controversial because it predicted an end of the living universe but also because it suggested a cosmic beginning, a kind of creation [Kragh 2008]. After all, if the entropy increases continually, it seems to imply that it cannot have increased during an infinite span of time, for then we would live in a high-entropic world without any order at all. A beginning of the world does not necessarily require a supernatural or divine creation, but to people of a Christian orientation this was a tempting apologetic inference and one actually suggested in the period [Kragh 2008, pp. 60-93].

Weinstein examined the heat death and its consequences in detail in another book on philosophy of science published a few years later. From the point of view of what he called "spiritual monism" he reviewed the possibilities that after all the ultimate heat death might not occur. For example, he speculated that perhaps the end of the material world would result in a complete transformation of matter into a uniform sea of ether which might subsequently, by means of an as yet unknown mechanism, re-condense into particles of matter. Speculations of this kind were not quite new, but as an expert in thermodynamics Weinstein [1911] realized that they had no foundation in physics and hence that the entropic end of the world was probably a reality of the future. "All of life is a fight against the entropic death," he declared, and it was a fight that life, in so far it is a manifestation of matter, was doomed to lose.

And yet, as seen from Weinstein's spiritual and subjectivist point of view, the end of organic life might not be the end of the living universe. He suggested that "psychic energy" was even more primary than heat and ether, and that a maximum-entropy world would ultimately consist of this form of energy unknown to conventional physics. "That would correspond to the Indians' thoughts of Brahma and Buddha's nirvana," he commented, adding the rhetorical question, "Would we call such an end in an absolutely spiritual being death?" According to Weinstein [1911, p. 272], this kind of cosmic end was "certainly not death, but probably a dreamless sleep from which there is no awakening." Elsewhere in his book (p. 248) he reasoned that if the world comes to an end, it must have a beginning:

> The world cannot emerge by itself from the entropic death. If the world, understood as matter, substance or energy, is finite, … the entropic death must occur within a finite time. But then the world and its processes in particular, must also have begun a finite time ago. This cannot have happened by itself, … [and] a supernatural cause must consequently have been active. If one is forced to admit such a cause in the beginning, one can also let it govern the end, so that a beginning follows the end, and so on in all eternity.

In other words, if a divine being is called into action to create the world, why not let it perform the cosmic miracle more than once? Why not an infinite number of times? In yet another book Weinstein [1913a, pp. 102-118] returned to the problem of the heat death and its corollary in the form of entropic creation. He critically reviewed 9 contemporary attempts to avoid the heat death by means of hypotheses of antientropic cosmic mechanisms, but found none of these attempts to be satisfactory.

Notice that Weinstein's argument rested on the assumption that the universe is spatially finite. In the discussion of the heat death and the origin of the universe during the late nineteenth century it was often taken for granted that the entropy law only applies to a finite universe. Weinstein apparently agreed, stating that only in such a universe would a cosmic beginning be inevitable. But is the universe actually finite in space and matter? Although Weinstein readily admitted that there was no scientifically valid answer to the question, he argued that an infinite universe was less probable than a finite one. Consequently, a cosmic beginning was more probable than an eternal past.

6. Pioneer of pandeism

Weinstein did not accept the theistic version of the entropic creation argument, but he agreed that the beginning of the universe was a problem inaccessible to conventional science just as the end of the universe was. "As far as I can see, only Spinozist pantheism, among all philosophies, can lead to a satisfactory solution," he wrote. And yet Weinstein did not fully subscribe to either Spinozism or pantheism.

"If only differing by a letter (d instead of t), we distinguish fundamentally between *pandeism* and pantheism." Thus wrote Weinstein [1910] in a book in which he discussed from a historical perspective the idea of pandeism, the doctrine that although the world is divinely created there is no God beyond or except the world itself. In a sense, by his act of creation God transformed into the world leaving

nothing behind. As regards the term "pandeism" it became better known with Weinstein's *Welt- und Lebensanschauungen*, but he did not coin the word, which probably dates from at least as early as 1859. The book attracted some attention in theological and philosophical circles, with a critical theological review appearing in [Kirn 1910].

According to Weinstein [1910, pp. 227-228], while pantheism was a metaphysical view, pandeism shared with deism that it belonged to the realm of religion. He explained: "The entire world is filled with mental deities [Seelengottheiten] and these deities have coalesced into a single … cosmic mental deity which permeates everything and has no meaning outside the world." There are certain similarities between the view of pandeism and the one of so-called panentheism as it appears in the process theology inspired by the metaphysical theories of A. N. Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne. But given that panentheism operates with an interacting God-world dualism, while at the same time it retains the distinct identities of both God and the world, there are
also important differences. There is no such dualism in pandeism, which on the other hand shares with pantheism the monist view that the deity and the world are one and the same.

The idea of filling the universe with a kind of divine psychic or mental energy was not in itself very original as it was known from earlier idealistic philosophers such as J. G. Fichte and G. W. F. Hegel. In 1910 Felix Auerbach, a physics professor at the University of Jena, argued that there exists a vital "ectropy" in the universe able to counter the growth of entropy and thus to secure mind and life in an indeterminate future [Auerbach 1910]. In a vaguely similar way the British engineer and physicist Georg W. de Tunzelmann [1910] suggested the same year the existence of an all-pervading mind, which he likened to an entity even more refined and even more fundamental than the ether. Weinstein was aware of Auerbach's work but not, apparently, of Tunzelmann's.

In his *Welt- und Lebensanschauungen* Weinstein discussed extensively earlier philosophers and theologians whose views included elements of pandeism, trying to trace the concept as far back in time as possible. He paid particular attention to Giordano Bruno as an early pandeist. It is perhaps for his comprehensive investigation of the historical roots of pandeism, and of religious thoughts generally, that Weinstein is best known today. He has a place in the history of ideas more so than in the history of physics.

Acknowledgments. I thank Evgeni Starikov for information about Weinstein, and Christian Joas for help with translating passages in Weinstein's papers.

References

Auerbach, F. (1910). *Ektropismus oder die physikalische Lehre des Lebens*. Leipzig: Engelmann.

Born, M. (1914). [Review of Weinstein 1914a]. *Physikalische Zeitschrift* **15**, 676.

Crelinstein, J. (2006). *Einstein's Jury: The Race to Test Relativity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Eddington, A. S. (1920). *Space, Time and Gravitation: An Outline of the General Relativity Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Einstein, A. (1998). *Collected Papers of Albert Einstein*, Vol. 8, Part A, eds. R. Schulmann, A. J. Kox, M. Janssen, and J. Illy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gerhardt, V., R. Mehring, and J. Rindert (1999). *Berliner Geist: Eine Geschichte der Berliner Universitätsphilosophie bis 1946*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

Goenner, H. (1988). "The reception of the theory of relativity in Germany as reflected by books published between 1908 and 1945," pp. 15-38 in J. Eisenstaedt and A. Kox, eds., *Studies in the History of General Relativity*. Boston: Birkhäuser.

Goenner, H. (1994). "The reaction to relativity theory in Germany, III: 'A hundred authors against Einstein'," pp. 248-273 in J. D. North, ed., *The Attraction of Gravitation*. Basel: Birkhäuser.

Israel, H., E. Ruckhaber and R. Weinmann, eds. (1931). *Hundert Autoren gegen Einstein*. Leipzig: Voigtländer's Verlag.

Kirn, O. (1910). [Review of Weinstein 1910]. *Theologische Literaturzeitung* **35**, 825-827.

Kragh, H. (2008). *Entropic Creation: Religious Contexts of Thermodynamics and Cosmology*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Kragh, H. (2014). "The 'new physics'," pp. 441-455 in M. Saler, ed., *The Fin-de-Siècle World*. London: Routledge.

Maxwell, J. C. (1883). *Lehrbuch der Electricität und des Magnetismus*, 2 vols., trans. M. B. Weinstein. Berlin: J. Springer.

Ostwald, F. W. (1908). [Review of Weinstein 1906]. *Annalen der Naturphilosophie* **7**, 190-191.

Poggendorff, J.C. (1898-1926). *Biographisch-Literarisches Handwörterbuch*, vols. III-V. Leipzig: J. A. Barth.

Pringsheim, E. (1902). [Review of Weinstein 1901-1908, vol. 1]. *Archiv für Mathematik und Physik* **3**, 66-67.

Pyenson, L. (1985). *The Young Einstein*: The Advent of Relativity. Bristol: Hilger.

Pyenson, L. (1987). “The relativity revolution in Germany,“ pp. 59-112 in T. F. Glick, ed., *The Comparative Reception of Relativity*. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Sheldon, W. H. (1908). [Review of Weinstein 1906]. *Philosophical Review* **17**, 97-98.

Starikov, E. B. (2015). “The interrelationship between thermodynamics and energetics: The true sense of equilibrium thermodynamics.” *Journal of Applied Solution Chemistry and Modelling* **4**, 19-47.

Starikov, E. B. (2018). “Bayesian statistical mechanics: Entropy-entalphy compensation and universal equation of state at the tip of the pen.” *Frontiers of Physics* **6**.2. doi:10.3389/fphy.2018.00002.

Starikov, E. B. (2019). *A Different Thermodynamics and Its True Heroes*. Singapore: Pan Stanford Publishing.

Tunzelmann, G. W. de (1910). *A Treatise on Electrical Theory and the Problem of the Universe*. London: Griffin and Company.

Walter, S. (1999). “The non-Euclidean style in Minkowskian relativity,” pp. 91-127 in J. Gray, ed., *The Symbolic Universe: Geometry and Physics* 1890-1930. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Weinstein, M. B. (1901). *Einleitung in die höhere mathematische Physik*. Leipzig: Dümmler.

Weinstein, M. B. (1901-1908). *Thermodynamik und Kinetik der Körper*, 4 vols. Braunschweig: Vieweg und Sohn.

Weinstein, M. B. (1904). “Entropie und innere Reibung,” pp. 510-517 in S. Meyer, ed., *Festschrift Ludwig Boltzmann*. Leipzig: J. A. Barth.

Weinstein, M. B. (1906). *Die philosophischen Grundlagen der Wissenschaften*. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner.

Weinstein, M. B. (1910). *Welt- und Lebensanschauungen hervorgegangen aus Religion, Philosophie und Naturerkenntnis*. Leipzig: J. A. Barth.

Weinstein, M. B. (1911). *Die Grundgesetze der Natur und die modernen Naturlehre*. Leipzig: J. A. Barth.

Weinstein, M. B. (1913a). *Entstehung der Welt und der Erde nach Sage und Wissenschaft*. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner.

Weinstein, M. B. (1913b). *Die Physik der bewegten Materie und die Relativitätstheorie*. Leipzig: J. A. Barth.

Weinstein, M. B. (1914a). *Kräfte und Spannungen das Gravitations- und Strahlenfeld*. Braunschweig: Vieweg & Sohn.

Weinstein, M. B. (1914b). “Zu Minkowskis Mechanik. Die Weltkonstante, die Systemmechanik.” *Annalen der Physik* **348**, 929-954.

Weinstein, M. B. (1914c). “Die Relativitätslehre und die Anschauung von der Welt.“ *Himmel und Erde: Illustrierte Naturwissenschaftlich Monatsschrift* **26**, 1-14.

Weinstein, M. B. (1916a). “Eine deutsche wissenschaftliche Grosstat während des Krieges.“ *Berliner Tageblatt*, 28 February.

Weinstein, M. B. (1916b). “Über die innere Reibung der Gase.“ *Annalen der Physik* **355**, 601-54, 796-814.

Weinstein, M. B. (1917). “Das Nernstsche Theorem und die Wärmeausdehnung fester Stoffe.“ *Annalen der Physik* **357**, 218-220.

[This page intentionally left blank]

-----File: 001-----

WORLD AND LIFE VIEWS

EMERGING FROM

RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, AND PERCEPTION OF NATURE

BY

PROF. DR. **MAX B. WEINSTEIN**

LEIPZIG

PUBLISHED BY JOHANN AMBROSIUS BARTH

1910

-----File: 002-----

Edition printed by the Spamer Printing Works, Leipzig

-----File: 003-----

Foreword.

Anyone who has enthusiastically occupied himself with a subject for any substantial time will instinctively harbor a desire to arrange the findings of his studies and deliberations and to retain them for the long term. Therefore, I have written this book not only for the reader but also for myself, and for this reason it will, alongside all the objectivity that must naturally distinguish a scientific publication, also give the reader the impression of the personal. Much has been written on views of the world, and also on views of life; this subject certainly bears sufficient importance and interest for layman and scholar alike. However, I do not believe there so far exists a book that deals with this task from such universal viewpoints, and in such a comprehensive portrayal, as this present one does. It comprises mostly extracts from individual fields of thought of peoples and scholars, presented from the viewpoint of either the anthropologist, or the theologian, or the philosopher and the naturalist. I have attempted to bring everything together into one: anthropology, religion, philosophy and science, as it is only through a description of the whole that one will be in a position to gain a clear view of what is significant in the subject and to appreciate the particular. And it is not only the thoughts and utterances of great individuals that are of interest, but also what peoples, even in their primitive natural state, think up and then make into the guiding principle of their lives, both within themselves and together with others. These are peculiar, wondrous images moving by us, as they do in a kaleidoscope. But to avoid any misunderstanding I must emphasize that this book does not present a story,

but rather revolves around a portrayal of these approaches to life and the world themselves. For this reason, as a glance at the table of contents will tell, the subject matter is ordered throughout purely by subject, and in places where space and time appear to be the determining factor, this has arisen solely of its own accord in the course of actual events. Therefore, only the main elements are dealt with; should a reader notice that one term or another is missing, this is because the author has not been able to ascertain anything in particular linked to this term for his present task. Some think that if an author has not said something, he knows nothing about it and has not considered it either. It would be a disgrace if an author did not know and think infinitely more than he had set down in his books, however numerous they might be. But it is not feasible to pass on everything one knows and thinks, as one must also consider the reader. In fact, very often life is long enough for us to learn what is most important, but alas far too brief to accomplish what one would like to achieve.

I have opted for a purely scientific presentation of the various approaches, in which they are not merely described, but analyzed to the most meticulous degree and scrutinized for their merits. They are also considered from the elevated viewpoints of the common human spirit and the great knowledge of our time. Anyone intending to write comprehensively about views of the world and of life must not only become accustomed to the work of the past, but also be able to become engrossed in the currents of the present, and needs exceptionally detailed knowledge in all areas of human activity. The reader will in fact be become acquainted meticulously and correctly with this subject matter, and not, as unfortunately happens with so many mainstream works, in a cursory manner or even incorrectly. He should also be stimulated and guided towards his own further thought. Enrichment with knowledge and ideas, and through intellectual effort, is the function of a scientific book. Despite the deeply serious

-----File: 005-----

nature of this treatment of the subject matter, which is of very considerable intricacy, this portrayal will, I hope, be deemed to be clear and in keeping with good prose. I have not shirked such an in-depth study; however, where special knowledge was required, I have invariably said so. Critique is exercised on almost every page, and I have endeavored to maintain objectivity and calmness of judgement. This book has been written for the expert and the scholar, and, in fact, for anyone who wishes to become acquainted with the most important area of human thought and writing. The personal aspect emerges in the manner of presentation and in the putting forward of one's own suppositions and approaches to the world and to life. A long time ago I wrote two books, to which I often refer: 'Philosophische Grundlagen der Wissenschaften' (*Philosophical Foundations of the Sciences*) and 'Die Entstehung der Welt und der Erde nach Sage und Wissenschaft' (*The Emergence of the World and the Earth in Legend and Science*). Even though each represents an independent entity in its own right, these books, together with the present one, form a whole at a higher level; I would certainly still like to complement these with a book on life itself. Even with all diligence, it is not always possible to avoid slight irregularities and oversights in extensive works. A gentleman from France drew my attention to a point in 'Philosophischen Grundlagen' (*Philosophical Foundations*) which I would really have preferred not to have written with regard to such an elegant and amiable nation as the French.

The more important works used in drafting this book are specified in the book itself. Wherever at all possible, I have kept to the original texts; where, for the sake of ease, I have used translations of texts from other languages, I have adapted these as closely as possible to the wording of the originals. It is a melancholy business to summarize the works of others, but also disgustingly tedious to select extracts from these. I have done the latter

-----File: 006-----

only where necessity dictated, where the originals were not at my disposal or the language really was a closed book to me. Only the first part of the book contains illustrations; the remaining parts offered no grounds for embellishment. A comprehensive table of contents, nomenclature and a subject index will, I hope, make the book more useful as a reference work. My friend Dr Levy, a tutor at the Berlin School of Architecture, has provided me with formal and objective support in the proofreading. To him and to the publishing house, which has devoted great care to the book and provided a design worthy of it, my greatest thanks. May the reader enjoy reading this book as much as the author has enjoyed writing it, from within outwards.

Charlottenburg, May 1910

Weinstein.

-----File: 007-----

Contents.

Foreword.....III

Preliminary Remarks. Characterization, principles and classification of views of the world and of life.

1. The significance of views of the world and of life..... 1
   Origin 1. — Behavior of People 2.
2. Primitive people and civilized peoples..... 4
   Difficulties among primitive peoples 4. — Difficulties among civilized peoples. 6.
3. Principal questions and basic assumptions..... 7
   Formulation of the main questions 7. — List of basic assumpti9.
4. Comparison of concepts; parallels.....10
   Uniformity of humanity 10. — Examples of parallels 12. — International relations 13.
5. Classification of the views of the world and of life.....13
   Formal classification 13. — Material classification 14.

First Book. Psycho-religious world and life views.

First Chapter. Views of primitive people.

6. Approaches related to the Earth and humans.....16
   Earthly standpoint of natural humans 16. — Transfer to the Celestial and Cosmogonic 17. — Natural Human Egoism and Incomprehension 22.
7. On the origin of religions; preliminary observations.....23
   Meaning and origin of religion 23. — Origin from language 24. — Religious levels 27. — Origin from power 28. — Origin from the categorical 29. — Origin from revelation 30. — Origin from teaching 31. — Different origin possibilities 31.
8. Enduring of objects in general with life.....32
   How nature sees life everywhere 32. — Treatment of objects as living 35.
9. The soul and soul-endowed objects; animism and fetishism.... 36
   Discovery of the soul 36. — Types of souls 37. — Animate objects, Fetishism, Animism 39. — Behavior of the soul 40. — The souls of the dead 41.

-----File: 008-----

10. Shamanism; totemism; cults of souls and ancestors ... 43
Freedom of the soul from the body 43. — The soul as an object 44. — Cults of souls and ancestors 46. — Animal souls 47.
11. Belief in spirits and daemons; idol worship.....48
Tabuism 48. — Idols and idolatry 48. — God-items 50. — God-men 52.
12. Magical beings 53
Summonings 53. — Hauntings and survivors 55.
13. More elevated approaches among primitive peoples.....56
Belief in gods, mythology 56. — Higher deit57. — Higher theogonic and cosmogonic ideas of the Oceanic peoples 62.
14. The soul and the hereafter among primitive peoples.....71
Entertainment and annihilation of souls 71. — Residence of souls, beyond 72. — Birds of death, barges and the like 73 — Migration of the Dead 75. — Polynesian Hell 76. — Fate of the Soul 77. — Resurrection 79.

Second chapter. Religious views of the world and of life among the highly civilized peoples.

15. The highly civilized peoples seen as primitive populations.....-80
When did culture start? 80. — Difference between highly civilized peoples and primitive peoples 82.
16. Universal religious approaches among highly civilized peoples within the domain of mankind.....83
Concept of the wild 83. — Higher views from nature views 84. — Views of the Lithuanians, Prussians and Slavs 85. — Views of the Germanic tribes 88. — Views of the Celts 94. — Views of the Greeks and Romans 95. — Views of the Egyptians 100. — Views the Hebrews 106. — Views of the Phoenicians 108. — Views of the Babylonians and Assyrians 108. — Views of the Iranians 110. — Views of the Indians 113. — Views of the Chinese, Tibetans and Japanese 120. — Views of the American civilizations 124.
17. Polytheistic, henotheistic and antagonistic views of life and the world .127
The deities of polytheism 127. — Object deities and deities over objects 128. — Creators and leaders 131. — Deity deities 136. — Ethical deities 138. — Conceptual deities 140. — Henotheism 144. — Antagonistic deities 148.
18. Monotheistic approaches..... 151
Origin of monotheism 151. — Monotheistic undercurrents 153.
19. Approaches relating to the world, humanity and global catastrophes.155
Origin of the world and humanity 155. — Paradise and Fall of Man 159. — Flood sagas 161. — End of the world 166. — Idea of the Messiah 169.

-----File: 009-----

20. Construction of the world.....170
Position of the Earth 170. — Shaping the World 171.
21. Living and deity..... 182
Chance, freedom, etc. 182. — Human destiny and God's envy 184. — Wisdom of life 186. — Oracles and incantations 189. — Happy and unhappy days 191.
22. The afterlife and the hereafter (eschatology) among the highly civilized peoples 192
Natural men 192. — Eschatology of the Hebrews 192. — Eschatology of the Babylonians and Assyrians 196. — Eschatology of the Egyptians 198. — Eschatology of the Iranians 202. Eschatology of the Greeks and Romans 203. — Eschatology of the Teutons 206. — Eschatology of the Celts 208. — Eschatology of the Mohammedans 208. — Eschatology of the Chinese and Japanese 210.
23. Transmigration of souls and reincarnation; saṃsāra and nirvana.....211
Views of the Indians 211. — Views of Buddhism 214. — Views of the Iranians 216. — Views of the Celts 216. — Views of the Pythagoreans and Platonists 217. — Views of Lao-tse 220.
24. The soul and immortality; the succession of lives.....220
Subdivision of the soul 220. — What immortality refers to 223. — Succession of lives 224.

Second book. Philosophical deistic and theosophical approaches.

Third chapter. Pandeistic and panpsychist approaches.

25. Pandeistic approaches.....227
Egyptians 228. — Indians 229. — Ionic natural philosophers 231. Stoics 232. — Pythagoreans and Platonists 234. — Japanese 235.
26. Panpsychist approaches; hylopsychism and hylozoism.....235
Ionic Natural Philosophers 236.

Fourth chapter. Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle.

27. Intuitions of law, harmony, world reason, ideas and forms.....239
Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans 239. — Anaxagoras, common sense 243. — Socrates and Plato, theory of ideas, academy 244. — Aristotle and the peripatetic 249.

Fifth chapter. Approaches from theosophy, Deism and Emanationism

28. Orphics and Neopythagoreans.....255
Orphics 255. — Neo-Pythagoreans 256.
29. Theosophy and Sufism in India.....258
Indian Theosophy 258. — Sufism 260.

-----File: 010-----

30. Philo of Alexandria 261
31. Logos and Sophia 265
The Logos 265. — The Sophia 266.
32. The Gnostics and Manicheans 267
Dualistic Gnosticism 267. — Monistic Gnosticism 271. — Goethe's Gnostic Poetry 275.
33. Neoplatonism..... 277
Plotinos and his teaching 277. — Dionysios the Areopagite 280.
34. Transition to the Middle Ages 281
Pushing back the deity 281. — Augustine 282. — Scotus Erigena, predestination and double truth 283.
35. Islamic and Arabian theosophies..... 286
Quran and Philosophy 286. — Muatazile and Motakhallim 287. — Avicenna and Averroes 288.
36. Jewish Theosophy and Kabbalah 290
Salomon Ben Gabirol 290. — The Kabbalah 291. — Maimonides and Yehuda Halevi 293.
37. The medieval theosophy of the Christian scholastics and mystics 293
Scholastics, nominalists and realists 293. — Albert the Great 294. — Thomas Aquinus 296. — Dante 297. — Duns Scotus 298. — Roger Bacon 299. — Anselm of Canterbury 300. — Hugo and Richard von St. Victor 300. — Alanus, Bonaventura, Gerson 303. — Meister Eckehart 303. — Ruysbroek 304.
38. Theosophy and Emanism in recent times 305
Fall of Scholastics 305. — Nicolaus Cusanus 306. — Gemistos Plethon 309. — Marsilius Ficinus and Giovanni Pico 309. — Reuchlin and Agrippa 311. — Pomponatius 313. —Reformers and Successors 314. — Paracelsus 316. — Telesius and Patritius 317 — Giordano Bruno 317. — Campanella 322. — Jakob Böhme 323. — Schelling and Krause as Bohemians 327. — Baptist van Helmont u. a. 328. — Exit to modern theosophy 330.
39. Deistic rationalism 333
Descartes and the Cartesianism 333. — Geulincx, Malebranche and the Occasionalism 336.
40. Pre-stabilized harmony, determinism, monads, corpuscles, reals and seeds 338
Mercurius van Helmont 338. — Leibniz, monadology and pre-established harmony 340. — Christian Wolff 345. — Moses Mendelssohn 345. — Lessing 346. — Herbart and the Real 347.

Third book. Metaphysical and physical approaches to the world and life.

Sixth chapter. Views of the world and of life within idealism.

41. Phantomization (illusionism), Eleatics and sceptics.. . 350
Phantomism and Illusionism of the Indians 350. — The Eleaten 351. — The Skeptics 355.

42. Idealism of phenomena 356
Berkeley 356. — Fichtes phenomenalism 358. — Hume's phenomenalism 358.
43. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism; organized beings and natural purpose..... 359
Kant's transcendental idealism 359. — Forms of intuition and categories 360. — Antinomies and paralogisms 362. — Ideas and ideals 364. — Regulatory principles 365. — Teleology 367. — Organized beings and natural purpose 369.
44. I and non-I; thesis, antithesis and synthesis; natural philosophy..... 373
Fichte's first philosophy 373. — Schelling's idealism and natural philosophy 375. — Hegel 376. — Schleiermacher's Spinozist idealism 378.
45. The world as will and representation; Pessimism, philosophy of the unconscious, and modern Idealism 379
Schopenhauer and the world as will and imagination 379. — The will to live, pessimism 384. — Nietzches doctrine of will and idealism 385. — Eduard von Hartmann and the philosophy of the unconscious 386. — End of the world 390. — Other idealists 390.

Seventh chapter. Spinozism and Neo-Spinozism; Neo-Idealism.

46. Spinozism 390
Spinoza and the Pantheism, Substance, Attributes and Modes 391. — The System 392. — Parallelism of Mind and Body 393. — Transcendentality 394. — Ethics and Immortality 395.
47. Neo-Spinozism and Neo-Idealism 396
Lotze 396. — Fechner, psychophysics 398. — Wilhelm Wundt, associative psychology 399. — Riehl, Lasson u. a. 401.

Eighth chapter. Empiricism, Sensationalism, Realism, Naturalism and Positivism.

48. The English triad: Bacon, Locke, and Hume 402
Bacon von Verulam and the Empirism 402. — John Locke and the Empirism, Sensualism and Positivism 402. — David Hume's Sensualistic-Positivist View, Association Principle 407.
49. Further development 411
Condillac, Montesquieu, Rousseau u. a. 411. — Beneke and Predetermination 413. — Comte and the Positivism 415 — Eugen Dühring's Philosophy of Reality 416. — Ernst Mach's Sensualistic Posivitism 417. — Herbert Spencer and the Agnosticism 420.

-----File: 012-----

Ninth chapter. Views of the world and of life in physical terms.
Definitions 421.
50. Materialism and Mechanism; Atomism 422
Greek materialism and Greek mechanics 422. — Atomic, also Indian and Arabic 423. — Epicurus, Lucretius Carus 425. — Materialism and Mechanism in the Middle Ages 428. — Mechanistic Monism 428. — Gassendi 431. — Hobbes 432. — Boyle, Newton 434. — Enlightenment philosophy 434. — Baron Holbach and the Système de la nature 435. — Lamettrie 437. — Ludwig Feuerbach u. a. 438.
51. Universal and specific laws of nature; theory of evolution.... 439
The world laws 439. — The special laws 443. — Inheritance law 444. — Ancestry 445. — Primal beings 446. — Evolution and epigenesis 447. — Panspermia 447. — Phylogeny and ontogeny, basic biogenetic law 449. — Morphological-biological inheritance laws, morphological potency 450. — Phylogenetic evolution 452. — Restitution and regeneration 453. — Biological-harmonic laws, regulations 453.
52. Approaches in Energetics; Ostwald and Häckel. . . 454
Ostwald's physical and psychic energetics 454. — Ambiguity of energy 457. — Scheinmonism 458. — Energetics and mechanics 459. — Häckel as Spinozist 461. — Psychom and Psychoplasma 461.
53. On physical world and life views in general; the end of the world and immortality 463
Course of the physical world and end of the world 463. — Beginning of the world and creation 464. — Finiteness of the world 466. — Zehnders picture of life mechanics 467. — The psychic energies as triggering 468. — Interaction of the physical and psychic energies 470. — Difficulties from the regulating psychological activities 473. — What a physical theory of life would have to do 477. — Impossibility of a physical theory of life 479. — Immortality from a physical law of the world 479. — Auerbach's ectropism 480. — Du Bois Reymonds world riddle and Ignorabimus 483. — Last View 484.

-----File: 013-----

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Characterization, principles and classification of views of the world and of life.

1. The significance of views of the world and of life.

It is in the nature of human beings to form their own view of themselves and of everything that surrounds them and has a bearing – whether disturbing or supportive – on their lives. The significant questions posed in this are manifold, and ever since humans have been conscious of themselves and have learned to apply the faculties of their souls intellectually, they have striven and struggled greatly to find a response to these questions. And this response forms a view of the world and of life: a complete one when it relates to all the questions asked, but a fragmentary one when it penetrates only as far as the particular. There are indeed approaches to the world and to life that emerge only from torpid lack of thought, or defiant embitterment, or even a pathological mode of thinking. We shall disregard these. The world views with which we are exclusively concerned here can be based on unsophisticated contemplation of nature and innocent egotism, on cult practices and religious teachings, on philosophical studies and views, and finally on scientific and sociological discoveries. All these basic elements may stand separately or be associated with each other. For a very small number of people, approaches to the world and to life have only one significance, which is objective and purely scientific. Most want to gain not only realization but also some reassurance for their

existence and what lies beyond. However, only very few people form for themselves an approach to the world and to life that is all their own. Others are indoctrinated with a particular approach through their upbringing or the rules of religion. The latter did indeed previously bear such compelling authority for the civilized peoples in particular that any other way of thinking than the only one permitted by the religion could not be harbored at all, let alone expressed. Many have remained under this compelling authority of their own free will, and still do today, in that, for them, the dogmas of religion are elevated above every uncertainty. Others have bowed, and still bow, to this authority out of worldly wisdom, or because an instance of resistance has frightened them. Even doctrines that are currently expressed with particular force, or are fashionable, find willing takers. For if one wants to form one's own view of the world and of life, a profound and difficult thought process and sometimes a hard struggle with oneself and with others is always involved. And with the lack of certainty in knowledge and cognition an individual will descend from doubts to more doubts and therefore willingly accept whatever is conveyed to him with authority. Sometimes a name has to stand as a substitute for a subject. How few people in a religious community know what the teachings of this religion actually are, particularly if these doctrines are presented as 'revealed' from the outset. Many do not even want to know these doctrines; the symbolic formulae suffice for them and the minister of religion can take responsibility for the rest. And what did Nietzsche actually teach for the majority of Nietzscheans? One cannot not ask without being met with the hollowest phrases, if one receives a reply at all, and not a counter-question or a rejection. With primitive people and immature youths, one will most likely encounter a certain matter-of-fact view of the world and of life, except that at the same time it contains absurd expressions in some parts and foolishly rash ones in others. Later we shall pursue this in detail with regard to primitive peoples, as it is of anthropological interest. Anyone who wants to eavesdrop on the young civilized world needs only to read their modern works of literature, which, with beautiful words and charming phrases,

-----File: 015-----

often contain quite errant nonsense in intellectual terms and convey, or give an inkling of, approaches to the world and life that will even cause someone of lenient judgement to be seized with harsh impatience. Those who think seriously and independently seek to struggle gradually through to a view of the world and of life that will satisfy them. As knowledge also belongs to this, as does particularly discipline of thought, only very few favored individuals arrive at a serviceable approach of this kind at an early stage. Many do not attain it until their later years, while still more will toil throughout their lives in vain and still have to be content with part of an approach or with a number of approaches, between which they are unable to mediate.

Thus far I have written in vague terms about a view of the world and of life. The view of the world and of life is something that does not yet exist. Even among the civilized peoples there are countless approaches in vogue: one approach will be met with opposition from the others, and proof can be provided that every approach must be erroneous in one place or other, but it can never be proved that any particular approach is correct. The most important things to be discussed in a view of the world and of life are beyond reach in terms of time, space and the senses. For example, no one was present at the creation; therefore, one person may deny it completely, while another may subscribe to it wholeheartedly with just as much certainty. Thus, it is almost exclusively views and opinions we are dealing with here. And the view that will have the greatest plausibility per se is the one in closest harmony with the processes at work in the universe, at present and previously. However, subjective points of view come into play here, just as they do in religion; something that seems to one person to be proven will be rejected emphatically by someone else. And we shall see, by way of many examples, how often something downright absurd is taken as certain. I once read in a booklet affecting to be very important and meaningful that our world is the waste or even the ejected matter from the fourth dimension. ‘How silly!’ the reader will exclaim. But there exist many more views that are even odder.

-----File: 016-----

2. Primitive people and civilized peoples.

First of all, we shall make a distinction between the approaches of primitive and of civilized peoples. Those living in semi-civilized cultures adhere substantially to the views of primitive peoples. Even a good many civilized human beings share quite the same viewpoint as the savage. If they find themselves there, they may take stock of themselves and wander over into the class appropriate to them.

Primitive peoples have approaches to life and the world that are simpler and yet more muddled than those of civilized societies. Just as it has taken an enormous amount of effort to obtain a little reliable insight into religion among the primitive peoples (as, when asked, not only almost every village questioned tells of something particular to itself, but in fact almost every person does so), the same is true of world views. Shared doctrines soon emerged, as it became directly evident that they had practical application. But views and approaches to life and the world were still something everyone had for himself. And yet it was not even always a matter of shyness of the person asking the questions and mistrust of him; those being asked simply lacked a view or had never really thought about it. How many civilized human beings could – or would – want to give a definite answer to questions about their view of the world? And where they do have such a view of life and the world, would those in states dominated by police or church authorities withhold their beliefs much more than a primitive person, or dig themselves out by talking around the subject, through fear of harm, or else in the uncomfortable feeling of saying something foolish? When I was occupied in the field of religion among the Oceanian peoples it struck me that, of the countless names for gods and heroes contained in Grey's 'Polynesian Mythology,' a major work on this, there are scarcely two to be found in the very many accounts of the seafarers of the eighteenth century (Cook, Wilson and Pocock, among others). By far the most important designation for gods and daemons in these accounts, Eatooa or Atoa or a similar name, is something we might search for in vain as a designation in the same capacity in Grey's book. A name beginning in the same way does occur,

-----File: 017-----

but it denotes an island or a district. Only the names Tāne and Māui seem to be occur very widely across space and time. In his book ‘Die Weltanschauung der Naturvölker’ (*The world view of primitive peoples*) [Leo] Frobenius has undertaken the work of tracing the name of one of the most well-known deities through the tribal lines of the African peoples. He starts out from the name Tshuka, believed to mean simply ‘God’ among the Ibo and in Calabar, and itemizes more than fifty names thought to correspond it, among them Rupe, Ndsakumba and other similar names that are by no means more reminiscent of the original names. This can, and will, be partly due to the divergent languages, just as even among Indo-Europeans we lack a similar-sounding term for our ‘God.’ But then it must come as a surprise that Hottentots and bushmen, who constitute a race quite different from the real Bantu Negroes of central Africa, have almost the same name for God as the Negroes of Upper Congo, who live so far from them: Touquo and Tuiko compared with Tuku (expanded to Tuku-Tuku). On the other hand, tribes of the same race and apparently speaking languages with the same root, living in areas almost contiguous with each other, demonstrate quite different names. For the Yoruba of the Niger Delta the name is Dso or Zo, as it also is in the faraway border area of east Africa. But in nearby Cameroon the same concept is said to be expressed as Loba, Lebe or Rubi, like Lubari in Uganda, where Dso or Zo is also reported to exist, and where Katonda is declared as the true name of the creator. Much must therefore be due to the different accounts given in the same district by different individuals to the same researcher or to different ones. Another factor is the childlike habit among primitive peoples of changing or distorting names at will. Anyone who compares travel writings, or looks for the names in atlases and other books, sometimes finds himself in utter desperation. What is more, nowadays most primitive peoples are already interspersed with civilized people and have heard through them much that is of a cultural, particularly religious nature,

and adopted it for themselves. For this reason, more recent accounts of viewpoints among primitive peoples can be used only with the greatest reservations, particularly where they are reminiscent of perspectives among cultured society. And since most of the travelers of the past neither had enough knowledge, nor were sufficiently interested, actually to obtain accurate information about the peoples they visited, and were much too willing to let themselves be taken in by the wildest falsehoods for the sake of being able to recount the most curious stories back home, the prospects are not at all good for studies on views of the world and life held by primitive peoples. In the fairy tales and accounts presented to us about the primitive peoples there are characteristics of the purest emotion and virtue and, alongside them, brutal acts of the most appalling bestiality. Just as there are in the legends of the classical Greeks. Who can reconcile the moving scene between Hector and Andromache with the hideous one of the sacrifice for the dead in honor of Patroclus? This brings us to a point of great significance that will occupy our minds.

For the civilized peoples our study seems simpler and more certain, as so much is familiar through tradition and documents. But the dreadful nature of the material has an oppressive effect. There was someone who boasted of his diligence and totted up so much activity that he came out with 26 hours of work in a day. Even this magician would not be capable of assimilating as much as a quarter of this material if he reached the age of Methuselah. We therefore have to restrict ourselves to the principal viewpoints and main works. And this is all the more likely to be the case when truly great beliefs have blossomed only sparsely, and when phenomenal numbers of people follow the paths of the great, consciously and unconsciously. This is no reproach; and anyone who, through arduous toil, has found what a great man before him came up with through a gift of genius, may quite justifiably be proud and reject silly criticism of plagiarism by reason of having garnered his learning from another source. Such an increase in our work is something we willingly accept. Another difficulty lies in the lack of certainty in so many beliefs

-----File: 019-----

and documents. We are pulled in opposite directions by two wild horses: reason and emotion. Some are torn to pieces inside; many surrender at least a little to one or the other. Should there also be added, for the sake of mere human life, people's commitment to a different view, such as that to state and church, there emerges a further source of vacillation. The great Kant was indeed reproached for inconsistencies in his philosophical system. And who knows exactly what Fichte's true philosophy was, or even Schelling's, as we have a number of quite divergent philosophies from each of them? And as most people by far are inconsistent – some out of predisposition, others out genuine uncertainty –a quite consistent man or a quite consistent viewpoint has an almost uncanny effect on us. We shall see that only very little of this exists in our area of study. One might almost say that this is fortunate for humanity sometimes. For total consistency is often associated with fanaticism, which in turn is associated with compulsive persecution; in the most consistent religion, Catholicism, this obsession with persecution has expressed itself in such atrocious acts, and makes a born leader such as Pope Innocent III, despite his great achievements, appear almost accursed by the murder of thousands of innocent dissenters.

3. Principal questions and basic assumptions (principia, ἀρχαὶ) in views of the world and of life.

The reader will see the manner of the extensive work we have to accomplish here, and how everything can be portrayed only in broad terms. But my intention is to go far beyond the narrow bounds of the particular reflections that always relate only to individual classes of humanity. I would like to demonstrate what humans have created universally with respect to views of the world and of life – not this school of philosophy or that, or this religion or that,

or this nation or that. Under such circumstances we cannot avoid following a system to a certain degree; otherwise, we will drift off in the profusion of all that is required and be in danger of allowing what we are expounding to be dissolved in empty talk. And nowhere is this danger so great, nor have so many writers succumbed to it, as in precisely the area with which we are to concern ourselves here. What Prince Heinz said about his stout friend in inspecting his calculations, and what I once heard a renowned political economist at a student society feast apply to university lectures, should serve as a warning to us. Thoroughness here, elaborate speech there – it is between these Symplegades that we must navigate our boat.

Almost every world view starts out from a common supposition or from a number of common suppositions. Hence it must be of great significance for the structure of this presentation of world views if these common suppositions are demonstrated above all. To do this in its entirety is not possible for a human of limited lifespan, as he would need to read a tremendous number of books. But after looking around for so many years, freely or by compulsion, in so many fields of science, I do not think any of the more significant aspects will be absent in the enumeration of world views to follow. Should the reader be familiar with one or other further supposition, he should be so kind as to add it; we are all willing carters of Queen Science. But these suppositions tread the ground of:

the universe and individuals,
the continued existence of the universe,
the nature of things,
the nature of and the reason for events,
the development of the universe,
the end of the universe,
the end of individuals.

That makes seven principal points. Is it not feasible to organize the general list totally according to these principal points; in many places the discussion would be forced into disarray and become entangled, giving rise to numerous

-----File: 021-----

unnecessary and disruptive reiterations. Nevertheless, the following list is grouped into subdivisions, in such a manner that it nestles against the essential points in some way. If certain main points seem not to be taken into account on the list, it is really only that this appearance is given. These essential points are also dealt with through appropriate examination of the stem suppositions and also particularly through association of two or more of them.

The list comprises four classes of suppositions: phantom-based, existence-related, existence-related/conceptual, and conceptual. Absolute correctness of these designations is not what matters; they need only prove on average to be true, and this is all they can do. Now let the list itself follow.

I. Phantom-based
1. Nothing
2. Dream
3. Appearance

II. Existence-related
4. This (Tad in Indian languages)
5. Something
6. Primordial being, thing in itself, substance
7. God
8. Gods (of all gradations)
9. World spirit
10. Creator (creation)
11. Destroyer, Satan, enemy of God
12. World soul
13. Individual soul
14. Reason of the world
15. Reason of the individual
16. Emanation
17. Chaos, primordial matter
18. Matter (and also elements and bodies)
19. energy, entropy
20. Psychoma

III. Existence-related/conceptual
21. Existence, non-being
22. Coming into being, decay
23. Calm, excitement
24. Attributes
25. Ideas
26. Forms
27. Modi (and also essences and images)
28. Monads (and also real objects)
29. Number
30. Space (and also emptiness)
31. Time
32. Harmony
33. Disharmony (and also inner division)

IV. Conceptual
34. Good
35. Evil

-----File: 022-----

36. Love (and also attraction)
37. Hatred (and also repulsion)
38. Dispute
39. Compulsion (absolute)
40. Necessity
41. Disposition (and also predestination and pre-establishment)
42. Absence of freedom, determinism
43. Causality
44. Restrictedness
45. Practicality for purpose (teleology, also instinct)
46. Development
47. Production and reaction (and also regulative forces)
48. Parallelism
49. Occasionality
50. Coincidence, association
51. Freedom
52. Unrestrictedness

The list seems to contain enough variety, but a general overview of views of the world and of life should indeed also be given. We could proceed further by simply taking the above stem suppositions individually, or in pairs, or in small batches; in this way we would obtain a large proportion of all the approaches that have developed so far. But this list is to guide us only in the detail. We shall conduct our reflection on world views at a general level.

4. Comparison of concepts; parallels.

We have three main tasks to accomplish: to present the approaches to life and the world individually or in classes, to scrutinize them for their theoretical and practical significance, and to compare them with each other. There remains nothing in particular to say about the first two tasks. But the third task gives occasion for an important observation. Such comparison can be performed for two purposes. One is to balance against each other the cultural conditions in which particular peoples lived, or the times in which particular views were expressed. The other is to decide on the priority of an established concept. The former has only very limited relevance here, as we are not compiling a cultural history of civilization, and for the most part it will be dealt with in the course of our demonstrations. We shall omit the latter, inasmuch as it concerns the priorities of individual persons. So discussions on this are of value

-----File: 023-----

only if the priority has attached to it the sense (p. 11) of the approach to life and the world, which we must always take at a level higher for a deep-thinking man than for a mediocre mind, if expression of the viewpoint gives scope for this. But such concepts are not merely concocted by individuals, but, like songs, emerge from an entire people, so that we are met with the shared concepts of individual tribes and races. Then peoples can enter into competition with one another and the question of priority is indeed of great significance. I need only remind the reader of the "Babel and Bible" dispute, which has been pursued with such exceptional vehemence recently. And I can pick up the thread of this very dispute. It arose from claimed similarities between the literature of the Babylonians,[1] and certain parts of the Bible, such that the former was thought to be a precursor to, and a model for, the stories and teachings of the Bible. Quite apart from the consideration of whether the similarities are really so significant that one might venture to divest a work like the Bible of originality in some of its most important parts, an astounding neglect of all the achievements of anthropology has asserted itself in this dispute. Anthropologists long ago recognized that humanity forms a remarkably homogeneous mass, and that customs, ideas and concepts are often encountered in the same guises at the most distant points on Earth. One odd, and repulsive, custom of this kind was the collection and use of the putrid fluid from a corpse, observed in the heart of Africa and on remote ocean islands. The emergence of humans from trees or stones is something recounted almost all over the Earth. Reinecke's tricks and wily acts, just transposed to hares and jackals, give even the most diverse Negro tribes cause for laughter. Fairy tales with almost the same content are found among peoples unconnected in either language or lineage. I have collated more than twenty such similarities, alike even down to detail. A very peculiar and important one, that the waters above the sky of the Bible reappear in Oceania,

is something I have highlighted in my book ‘Die Entstehung der Welt und der Erde nach Sage und Wissenschaft’ (*The Emergence of the World and the Earth in Legend and Science*). Here I can offer yet another similarity, not less significant, and perhaps even more meaningful. According to the Bible, God creates an expanse between the waters, through which the separation between heaven and Earth comes into being. For the people of New Zealand heaven and Earth originally also lie one on top of the other; the god Tāne Mahuta separates them, so that a gap emerges between them. Even if this takes place in a crude way (the god presses his head against the Earth, Papa, and his feet against the sky, Rangi, and thus forces this couple apart), the essential remains the same: the creation of the expanse between heaven and Earth. – In New Zealand Māui is thrown into the sea by his mother, wrapped in a roll of her hair, then washed ashore by the waves and discovered and brought up there. Compare this with the story of the childhood of Moses. The main difference consists only in that Moses is adopted by a daughter of the King, while with Māui it is a male ancestor. – The Polynesians have swan maidens, like us, and with almost the same stories. – In Oceania Ra denotes the sun god, just as he does in ancient Egypt. – Max Müller tells us of something almost more astonishing: a pair of twin gods in Indian mythology, Yama and Yami, have their Peruvian equivalents in another pair, Yame and Yama, who have the same significance. Now think what wild theories the Babylonians founded on the fact that in the Babylonian language, which was indeed related to Hebrew, there was a word that was reminiscent of ‘Jehovah’! And in India and Peru, ancient Egypt and Oceania! – Joshua’s miracle of the sun standing still at his behest is emulated by many in Oceania, e.g. until a house is finished or a walker has travelled his path. – The ship of the dead and spirit guides for the deceased are familiar not only to the Greeks, but also to the Polynesians and some African tribes and Indian peoples. – Māui steals the fire, like Prometheus. – The sun deities

-----File: 025-----

of the Negroes cause illnesses by throwing projectiles, like Apollo. – Like the Israelites, a Hottentot hero, Heitsi-Eibib, passes through the water, which parts before him and, as with the Israelites, closes over his pursuer. – I could quote much more, relating to the rainbow, the world egg, fortune telling, Jonah and other stories. But I think the brief enumeration above suffices to demonstrate how exceptionally cautious one has to be when drawing conclusions from similarities. This caution must be exercised; one can otherwise come to the most harmful conclusions vis-à-vis connections between peoples. Later we shall encounter much more that lies within the same domain, connects east and west, and north and south, and has its root simply in coincidence or in the homogeneity of the human race. It can generally be said that everything that is borrowed quite soon betrays itself through misunderstanding, inconsistency and unnaturalness. Anything genuine and indigenous proceeds freely, increasing in pace to the right and left and capable of development. But the difficulties encountered in distinguishing between the two are not to be underestimated.

5. Classification of the views of the world and of life.

The views of the world and of life are divided into two classes: monistic, and pluralistic or multistic (or dualistic, trialistic, etc.). The first class should contain approaches which, starting out from one angle, consider the entire universe, without any exception within it, to be a unified whole with the same characteristics unlimited in time and space. Hence, for example, the most well-known monism (which I intend to refer to here not with the inadequate and misleading epithet “materialistic”, but, more generally and fittingly, as physical monism) states that the entire universe, whether endued with life or without life, has always been, is and will always be filled and governed, constantly and in all places, only by the phenomena we know of in nature without life. By comparison,

dualism considers the world from two independent viewpoints, in that, for example, it divides the universe entirely into life and non-life, into body and spirit, into God and world and so on. This division would go even further in trialism, tetralism etc. Yet it would actually depend on the divisions in pluralism being absolute ones. Concepts of this kind do not really exist; we cannot avoid the fact that one meshes with the other. Meanwhile, as we shall see, there is not yet even a true monism thus far. Alongside this subject we see that none of the approaches to life and the world is thoroughly consistent even in theoretical terms, let alone in practical ones, at least when examined in an objective manner and not merely in line with what is claimed. Sometimes, particularly in their practical application, the concepts of the savages seem far more consistent than those of civilized humans. And this has its own good reason, with which we shall become acquainted.

We can consider the above classification only with respect to the individual approaches. In general, we shall distinguish between three main classes: psychological/religious, religious/philosophical, and philosophical/physical. The subclasses of these will be earthly/human, earthly/divine, religious, psychological (and also mental), philosophical (metaphysical) and physical (relating to the natural sciences) approaches; and also phantom-based, theosophical and mystical ones. The last three are deliberately separated from the others with a semicolon, as by comparison they denote a singular type of approach, in which imagination and meditation play a particularly important role. The reader will see from the interlinking designations in the main classes that there are no sharp distinctions here either. And how should such distinctions exist? Each approach to the world and life is governed by experience, desire, religion and contemplation. Experience presents us with the world as it is, or at least as it appears; this is the physical. Desire takes its cue from the pace of the world in regard to us and to others, as positive and negative egotism, and therefore represents the earthly and the human.

-----File: 027-----

For most, religion is concealed egotism, or to be precise natural egotism, which, justifiably, concerns the preservation of itself and of others, but which, even more hideously, summons to itself the deity or the world order for the purpose of humiliating, subjugating or even annihilating the other, to gain advantage or merely for the sake of Schadenfreude. For others, as noted above, and again for quite a large number, religion is just an unthinking adherence to certain statutes. It is proportionately the minority who interpret religion inwardly with deep feeling and firm conviction. Lastly, contemplation, the philosophical aspect, seeks to connect the immediate experience of the outer and inner world: to reconcile what is in conflict, to unify what is diverse and, out of all this, to bring the entanglement of the world and of life under a small number of viewpoints that also permit conclusions to be drawn on what is unknown and lies in the future. We can also safely add in the fantasizing and musing which both represent merely an encroaching of thought on to extrasensory or non-sensory objects. Here and there, one or other of these four rudders on the sea of approaches may not reach the point of being applied; they may even be taken out and discarded as unnecessary. This is unimportant and does not affect the significance of these rudders for the overall view.

Hence, names chosen for the individual approaches characterize only what is predominant in the approach in question. For, by way of example, the physical is not absent in any of the approaches, but there are approaches in which it is given particular emphasis. The situation is similar with the religious subclass, where only the purely materialistic approaches are an exception, and also with the philosophical and the earthly-human subclasses.

-----File: 028-----

FIRST BOOK.

Psychological and religious approaches to the world and to life.

FIRST CHAPTER.

Approaches among primitive peoples.

6. Approaches related to the Earth and humans.

These approaches will be dealt with quickly. In them, everything is exactly as it presents itself to the senses. Neither the nature of what exists nor the reason for its existence is considered. Everything is taken just as it is offered; all knowledge and range of vision are determined by what is perceived. Linked to this is the relationship each object and event has with its own particular person. This is a purely anthropocentric viewpoint, in that the self is the decisive content of the world, and good and evil are the things that serve the self, or harm the self. From the start the celestial bodies are regarded as objects the same as those on Earth or possibly in the self's immediate surroundings, i.e. as ordinary bodies, humans or animals or fruits. A civilized human being who has the scholars agonizing about the world will view the celestial bodies just as science has told him, even if this goes against his own purpose. But primitive peoples regard it as self-evident that the world is uniformly like the earthly one. Whatever is proven after much effort by research, even if only in part and in a quite different sense, is naively accepted. Nothing is more characteristic of this than

-----File: 029-----

the perception of the sky, and of what is to be found above it, which we encounter among so many primitive peoples. The sky is the roof of a tent, fastened to the Earth at the horizon by ropes, tendrils and similar things, or borne aloft by mountains, rocks, trees, humans or animals. A human being can thus also easily reach the sky. Tāwhaki, a New Zealand hero who later becomes a demigod, has a wife who has come down from heaven, Tangotango or Hāpai, and has a little daughter by her. As in our fairy tales, the woman disappears every day at daybreak, until, through love, she finally stays with him all the time. But speaking to the woman one day he insults the child, saying she smells foul, and the woman runs away with the child, back to her heavenly home. Then he seeks a way to reach heaven to bring them back. After a few adventures he gets to the place where the ropes that fasten the sky down meet the Earth. There he encounters an elderly aunt of his, and she advises him to climb up the secured rope. His brother Karibi, who has been accompanying him, grabs a rope that is not tight enough and he is then flung back and forth by the east and west winds. But Tāwhaki himself is cautious, climbs safely and reaches heaven. Humans who have somehow arrived in heaven and wish to return to Earth make a hole, tie on a cable and let themselves down on it. At other times someone might shoot an arrow into the air; this stays attached to the sky, and then he shoots a second one into the first, a third into the second and so forth. In this way the sons of Ajelen in North America made a ladder of arrows to climb up to heaven, and the Polynesian hero Quat also availed himself of a ladder of arrows created in the same way. In Australia a man throws his spear, with a rope tied to it, towards the sky; the spear stays there and gives him a way to climb up. This is achieved in an even easier way by Kasimbaha on the island of Celebes: he uses a tendril, once a field rat has gnawed off its thorns, to reach heaven. When a tree is not tall enough to reach heaven, magic is used to make it grow quickly. A cannibal called Quasawara is

pursuing Quat, mentioned earlier (as told in the Banks Islands), together with his brothers. They all flee to the top of a casuarina tree. Their pursuer climbs up after them, but Quat makes the tree grow higher and higher. In the end it stretches as far as heaven. Then Quat bends the tree down to Earth, quickly climbs off with his brothers, while he holds the top of the tree down, and when they are all down he lets the top of the tree go, the tree shoots up into the air and Quasawara, who has been left behind on the tree, smashes his head against the sky. Anyone who might be surprised by such childlike, almost childish things should bear in mind that the sky does not actually appear to be very far away, perhaps 20 to 80 meters, judging by air quality and the appearance of objects in comparison. Primitive peoples are guided by how the sky appears and accordingly imagine it arching over mountains and the mountains towering into it in places. One instinctively thinks of Astolfo's journey to the moon with the apostle John, to fetch back the wits of Orlando (Roland), which are kept there in a bottle, in Ariosto's fantasy poem in Orlando Furioso, On the Moon:

> Here other river, lake, and rich champaign
> Are seen, than those which are below descried;
> Here other valley, other hill and plain,
> With towns and cities of their own supplied;
> Which mansions of such mighty size contain,
> Such never he before or after spied.
> Here spacious hold and lonely forest lay,
> Where nymphs forever chased the panting prey.[2]

I have quoted this verse for the following reason: primitive people make the same inference. That is, everything in heaven is the same for them as on the Earth: forests, lakes, mountains, even people and houses. And the people in themselves do not differ in any way from Earth people; it is just that, as they live in heaven, they are judged to be somewhat higher. Tāwhaki finally finds his woman and child and stays with them, playing the role of a storm god, making thunder and lightning arise from his footprints. There is even greater naivety in the story of Rupe's ascent to heaven. He is searching for his sister and wants to ask his ancestor Rehua about her. But Rehua lives

-----File: 031-----

in the tenth heaven. (There are assumed to be a multitude of heavens, as elsewhere.) Rupe climbs through all the heavens: how, is simply not explained. He finds all these heavens to be just like Earth. He finally reaches the tenth heaven and there finds Rehua, whom he has been seeking. And the terribly mundane way in which it happens is described almost with humor. Rupe asks for something to eat. At this, old Rehua shakes his locks, and out fall many birds, which are roasted. When Rupe asks in surprise why the birds are nesting in his hair, Rehua replies that he has such a great mass of insects in there that all the birds flock to his head in search of food. Indeed, Rupe finds that Rehua has been treated shamefully by his slaves, and Rupe has to clean out a dreadful mass of dirt from his home. And all this in the tenth heaven! To add to it all, Tāne, the high god of the people of Oceania, seems to have gone out of his way to block the paths. In Borneo a man goes up to the Pleiades and has rice served to him, which is how mankind learns about rice. We find almost the same interpretations in Australia, in Africa, and among the Eskimo and other peoples. We know from Cooper's novels that the American Indians expect to find hunting grounds in heaven. But the following American Indian legend is even clearer; I have reproduced it in shortened form, after Frobenius's version. The coyote has a son and this son has two wives; the coyote desires one of these wives for himself. He wants to kill his son and prevails upon him to climb a tree to catch a bird. Then he makes the tree grow higher and higher, until it touches heaven, so that his son will smash his head on the firmament. (Compare this with the story of Quat and Quasawara from the Banks Islands, recounted above.) But his son jumps from the tree into heaven. What he finds there corresponds exactly to the interpretation of the Banks Islanders in Oceania: men and women, felling wood. He is taken in by a man and a woman. When he develops a yearning for Earth the woman spins a rope for him and lets him back down to Earth in a basket. It tells us a lot when a hero puts himself into the skin of a bird

and flies up to heaven. Heaven is generally so near and so mundane that even humans push it away, as told in many parts of Oceania and Australia. At the same time heaven is so rough and solid that, when it comes plunging down, it smashes everything to pieces and kills people. Heaven crashing down is something about which African, Oceanian and Australian tribes have many tales to recount.

Heaven is either held aloft or, as described above, attached to the Earth in the form of a tent with ropes or tendrils. According to Stuhlmann the Wanyamwezi people tell of how a giantess, Fumyahólo, supports the sky like Atlas does. Her husband, Niamtitinwa, also a giant, holds the Earth on one side; the other side of the Earth rests on a mountain called Lugula or Lugiya. When this giant goes over to his wife, the Earth shakes. Other African races have the Earth resting on the horn of a cow. Whenever the cow moves the Earth to the other horn there is an earthquake. People in Oceania imagine the Earth heaped up on a net which is swimming in the sea, or as clods of soil which the hero Māui has pulled up out of the sea with a net. It is a widespread assumption that Earth and heaven are supported by pillars. Apart from this, as we know, no great attention is devoted to considering how much the brightest people in antiquity have racked their brains in the search for something to support the Earth, and what monstrous contraptions the intellectually eminent people of India have found to hold the Earth up (p. 176). And I may also refer to my book ‘Die Entstehung der Welt und der Erde in Sage und Wissenschaft’ (*The Emergence of the World and the Earth in Legend and Science*). Below I quote, after the work of Max Müller, a verse from the Rig Veda, which is known to be the oldest written memorial to the peoples of India: ‘Unsupported, not attached, how does he manage not to fall when he rises?.’ ‘He’ is the sun.

As regards the celestial bodies, these also tend to be grasped in purely earthly terms, often as humans or animals. In the book cited above I also give examples for this, and I may now complement these examples with just one or two more. Some American Indians consider the sun and moon to be so human,

-----File: 033-----

that they have children. A hero makes his way on the customary route to heaven and into the house of the sun, where he marries one of the sun's daughters. Having been let back down to Earth in a basket with his wife, he has to keep her hidden in a cabin, as she shines too brightly. In Oceania it is believed that the moon can be devoured by an eagle. But then, the sun and the moon being devoured during eclipses is something recounted and believed in almost every part of the world. We know there are many peoples who make tremendous noise towards the sky during eclipses to scare the dragon, snake or whatever kind of animal it might be away from its victim. In Polynesia the sun itself is believed to be a monster. Māui, the Hercules or Samson of the Polynesians, finds the sun is too hot and moves too fast for him, so he lies in wait for it at the place where it rises, throws a noose around its neck, then throttles it, while at the same time inflicting wound upon wound with his club. Hence, the monster loses most of its heat through its wounds and now, in its infirmity, it languidly crawls its way slowly round. Belief in the moon being an ordinary light, i.e. a lamp, is often recorded; it appears even more frequently as an old woman. It sounds beautiful, but is still in the same vein, when American Indians interpret the red of dawn and dusk as the reflection of the wing of a red swan:

> Can it be the sun descending
> O'er the level plain of water?
> Or the Red Swan, floating, flying,
> Wounded by the magic arrow,
> Staining all the waves with crimson,
> With the crimson of its life-blood,
> Filling all the air with splendor,
> With the splendor of its plumage?

These lines are sung in Longfellow's 'The Song of Hiawatha,' based on a legend of the Ojibwe Indians.[3] Something associated with concepts of this kind is a naive belief in miracles that strips the miracle of all that is miraculous. How natural it is for rocks to open up, even at the command of an animal, trees to grow until they reach right up to the sky,

the sun to stop upon request, and blocks of wood and houses to come to life. Some will say these are fairy tales (and one can read a fine assortment of such stories about the Negroes in the attractive Fräulein von Held book and in numerous descriptions of journeys and anthropological works), but if it is not made up just for the purposes of storytelling, a fairy tale has the same meaning for an unsophisticated person as it has for a child – or rather, as it once had, before ultramodern realism taught children to see fairy tales as nonsense. Add to this an instance which will be considered in a section to follow, and which bestows a quite different complexion on 'fairy tales' of this kind and associates them with myth and religion. But this presumption by savages that miracles are a matter of course is one of the greatest obstacles, apart from force, to the spread of Christianity among the primitive peoples, as savages only rarely have an understanding of the higher doctrines. The struggle for existence and naive absolute egotism take up their entire life, behavior and endeavors. In the accounts given to us by travelers there do actually occur strokes of magnanimity, albeit only rarely, while instances of love of humanity, as interpreted by the religions linked to culture, scarcely exist, even among primitive peoples in contact with civilization. This virtue seems to be the very last one people learn. It is admittedly the most difficult of all, not only because it demands that we overcome our egotism totally, but also because the object of love only very rarely presents itself in an amiable guise where compassion does not come into play at the same time. And primitive people have no real opportunity to learn about love from us, even merely out of compassion, let alone from feeling. Characters such as Livingstone are unique. Meanwhile, the violence – in many cases harshness and brutality – with which the primitive peoples were so often treated is certainly not the real reason for their lack of our cardinal virtues. The purely egotistic basis of their existence has been striking to those who have come into contact with them: this is observed not only in regard to strangers,

-----File: 035-----

but also with their closest relatives. They lack the school which has now prevailed among the civilized peoples for thousands of years, and their surroundings in particular exert a compelling pressure on them. A savage who is moved to a new environment where people live according to such high doctrines can adopt these very well and also absorb them, as experience has demonstrated to a sufficient degree. Even so, for such is our pleasure (*car tel est notre plaisir*), a Negro chief, for instance, forbids any of his people to cultivate the bare necessity of grain for several years, while the custom of abandoning or killing old or sick people prevails in entire tribes, among still others the number of people murdered, shown in skulls worn in a row on a string, fashions the supreme glory of the hero – and what other atrocities there are that do not bear thinking about, and that as boys we used to read of, with a certain horror, in Cooper's novels, while, due to lack of any kind of nobler reason, they would have an even more terrible impact in reality. If only there were not a motif here that is familiar worldwide, has led to the most abominable acts all over the world, and still today stands in finest array in the nations of greater cultural history, often with the anathema of absurdity attached to it, but fulfilling and guiding the entire life and deeds of the primitive person: superstition. Our reflections will interweave with this for the next class of approaches to life and the world. Particular consideration will be needed to provide an introduction to this.

7. On the origin of religions; preliminary observations.

The word 'religion' will be understood in its widest possible sense here; thus, it also includes opinion, narrative, legend and myth, inasmuch as these terms relate to forces and manifestations not available to everyone. We need to go to this extent when speaking of religion among primitive peoples.

-----File: 036-----

Religion originates in the concept of causality in humans, i.e. the characteristic of the soul by which everything is essentially viewed as the consequence of something else. There can be a concept of causality without religions, but no religion without this concept of causality. This is also true of revealed religions, as, in order for a revelation to be understood, the concept of causality must be present, since without this nothing can be connected with anything else. There is probably no living being that lacks the concept of causality, no matter how faint this may be in some creatures. But alongside this concept of causality the life instinct might also have contributed something significant to the emergence of religions. And in such cases, this instinct manifests itself chiefly in desire and fear; hence, these emotions will be critical to the course religions take right from their origins. Even today there are still a tremendous number of views among scholars as to how, when and where the religions originated. Some regard religions as a consequence of language. Since even animals can ‘speak’ in their own way, and we would not want to ascribe this to a concept of religion, the language in question must be one that distinguishes humans from animals. Sadly, we do not know exactly where this distinction begins. But if we ourselves wish to draw conclusions in retrospect, we will arrive at the view that the formation of names and other terms constituted the critical moments in the development of speech. Max Müller, who is the most consistent representative of this viewpoint, describes as fact the proposition that the word roots served this purpose, that they alone could serve it, and – most fundamentally – that these roots, ‘owing to the manner in which they initially came into existence, expressed acts, the ordinary acts that were performed at an earlier level of society. The sky was the thing that covers the Earth, the sun the thing that warms, the moon the thing that acts as a measure, the cloud the thing that rains’ and so forth. If people saw fire, for example, it was of such eminent importance to them:

-----File: 037-----

the restlessness of this element was so particularly striking to them, the blazing, flaring, licking, leaping and so forth of the flames. So they referred to it with the word root in ‘to move,’ ag- in the Indo-European languages. But since this root expresses a behavior that is characteristic of humans, ‘moving,’ they gradually arrived at the idea that there is something in flames that moves things, an agent that belongs to their nature, ‘mover here, ‘mover there,’ the Sanskrit ag-ni-s, and thereby, for example, Sanskrit would form Agni, the ‘mover.’ In the course of the centuries there ensued an ever-continuing spiritualization: at first it was a mover endowed with a soul, like a human being, and then a divine mover and so forth, until for some sects the idealization of Agni eventually turned it into the highest god and creator. This theory by the great scholar of language and religion undoubtedly has something very engaging about it. Actual language is not even needed; it is perfectly sufficient if people comprehend acts within their own minds, even if they do not give outward expression to this. They will then inwardly regard fire in the way they express it outwardly through the language roots. But if even the first language roots denote nothing but actions of humans, is this also the case with the first definite inner thought impulses? Will even these only relate to actions? One might almost believe it, as the life of humans is spent in actions, and nature is indeed also contained in incessantly occurring events. Therefore anything at a standstill would give no occasion for the emergence of religious concepts. This conclusion is also drawn by Max Müller, as he will hear nothing of the familiar fetishism, animism and personification as primary elements of religion. In such an area, where any tradition and any experience is absent, it is difficult to say something definite; among the peoples we are aware of, there is – and always has been – nothing further to be found in the way the formation of religions originated. All these peoples had, and still have, an already quite complicated system of religious ideas. But to observe how religious ideas form and grow in a child could only bear fruit

-----File: 038-----

if the child were to be left to grow up as a savage, isolated from all contact with civilized humans. Parental brutality could sometimes succeed in making a child grow up in this way, if the culture did not inherently surround him on all sides. And since, according to Herodotus, the old king of the Egyptians locked a child away from his first day of life, sealing him off from every form of human contact in order to learn what actual human language really was, the experiment has not been performed again. Hence, we lack the means for deciding. I think the only thing we need to say is that it was not outer language that created the religions, but rather inner language, and this will have predated outer language. In my opinion, if Max Müller understands only outer language, his theory is not tenable. Desire and fear, I repeat, are the foundation piers for religious approaches. And this is probably fear in the beginning, only later followed by desire. Where religious feelings or even religious approaches to life and the world are concerned, most scholars place much too high a value on them. In the process of deduction from all original revelation a deep descent from this high position must be made, at least when one defines religion in such a wide sense, as the anthropologist is obliged to do. If humans have emerged from the ranks of living creatures through progressive development and gradually acquired their mental faculties, it will simply not be possible for us to go back far enough in the emergence of religious feelings. And, as is widely known, some naturalists claim animals might well also have something that corresponds to a religious view, in the widest sense of the word. Some animals are certainly afraid of unfamiliar things and movements; they see apparitions in certain circumstances, and so forth. It has even been suggested by some that dogs see a kind of divine being in humans (divine from the viewpoint of the lowliest savage of all), although this will not really be in tune with the fact that dogs bark at and attack anyone other than their master, even without reason.

-----File: 039-----

Max Müller does, however, distinguish three levels of religious approach: physical, anthropical (Max Müller shies away from this word form and uses the term ‘anthropological,’ but I cannot see why one should resort to another form that has already been allocated to another sense in order to avoid an unfamiliar and indeed also disputable word form) and psychological. These levels are certainly appropriately chosen for the general development, but they do not encompass everything. One may also generally agree with Lippert in his fundamental theorem that religion cannot be understood if it lacks a certain cult, even a very low-level, crude and perhaps vulgar one. Nevertheless, this theorem only helps us to differentiate possible religion in animals from that of advanced humans if the concept of cult is not present in certain classes of animals, such as the familiar ant genera. But the theory of evolution can do nothing other than assume that in the beginning the religious concepts of humans were no different from those of the animals from which they had emerged, and that these concepts gradually became more elevated, while there evolved at the same time all the atrocities that have defiled the name of religion in the past and still do today. We do not know whether the intellectual powers of humans increased because they gradually lost their various forms of animal apparatus, or whether the opposite occurred: their animal apparatus deteriorated as their intellectual abilities developed. The most convenient way out will be to accept that the two took place at the same time, with one always towing the other behind. Then, while insight had to develop on the one hand, it was the instinct for self-preservation on the other; and it seems that initially the developing insight of humans was totally devoted to the service of self-preservation. Therefore, at the outset humans developed to be so much more formidable than the most terrifying animal, and their religious approaches by no means followed the peaceful pathways that many are so happy to assume while they blame all the atrocities that have been committed on ‘superstition.’ We may laugh at superstition we encounter in a

civilized person, e.g. when someone nails a horseshoe to the threshold or doorpost of his home, or when civilized people have a dread of the thirteenth of the month falling on a Friday, or whatever countless other inanities there are. If the people concerned believe in them, they become another religion alongside the accustomed one. If people remain indifferent, they make all the mischief from apelike imitation: 'Even if it doesn't help, it won't do any harm.' If they do not believe in it, they become guilty of an offence against the intellectually weaker part of humanity. But 'superstition' is the real religion of primitive peoples, and anything mystical and more elevated one might chance to find among them has no importance at all for them, or is only of narrative significance.

Others have sought the source of all religious approaches in the feeling of weakness that humans experience in the face of nature surrounding them. They are thought to have a feeling of there being a power above them and gradually learn to assign a greater and greater worth to this power. The instinct for self-preservation would then lead them into words and deeds of veneration and worship of this power. Led astray, humans would accept the existence of not only one force to begin with, but many, and localize these forces in what has particular significance for them: the sun, moon, fire, storm, thunder, river, sea and so forth. There is a lot to be said for this widely held view of the origin of religion. The sense animals have of other creatures being superior to them does exist in the animal kingdom; a small, weak girl can force even the strongest dog into servile obedience, as we see often enough, to our delight; the dog has an intuitive feeling for the superiority of the little human. Also falling within this are aspects of the life of animals connected with their own social form of life, if, of course, the superior force is conferred on an individual, as with bees. Even the behavior of the greenfly towards certain types of ant might be based on the feeling of a superior power, as, without putting up resistance or even

-----File: 041-----

making an attempt to escape, when stimulated these insects allow the ants to drag or carry them to their nest, where, as with livestock by humans, they are tended and then eaten up. This almost makes one think of the attitude of a particular people to a savage chieftain or a mad despot. If the feeling of a superior power in humans were based solely on fear, it would not differ greatly from that of the more intelligent species of animal. But another facet in humans is that they also base a hope for good, and the expectation of good per se, on this superior force. And this would certainly be something that is only rarely encountered in the animal kingdom. The examples of dogs that perform all kinds of tricks in expectation of a reward, or of small birds that, at the call of someone offering them seed or crumbs, fly at will onto his hand or shoulder, should not, in my opinion, be quoted here. These are lessons that animals follow, particularly when they are domesticated.

On the way towards the spiritualistic view of the emergence of the religions we encounter the assertion that religious perception actually forms part of the singularity of human beings, and, in a manner of speaking, forms a priori a category that is a regulative function of their inner and external life. We encounter a vigorous advocate of this view in Benjamin Constant, who establishes it in the first chapter of his great work ‘De la réligion’ (*On Religion*). Inasmuch as religious views are founded in the category of causality, and the latter certainly represents an indispensable prerequisite of our inner and outer life, one could also accept the existence of this inner and outer life from the religious view. However, it may well be portrayed as something definite that the concept of causality per se is not sufficient to explain the human propensity for religious views. It is indeed correct that a religious view has a regulative effect on our lives. But in such a view there comes into play something else that belongs entirely to the domain of feeling and for which we find no adequate expression in the concept of causality. Animals, and

-----File: 042-----

even plants, must also possess the concept of causality consciously or unconsciously (on an instinctive level, as we say); otherwise they would not exist. But we do not ascribe any idea of religion to them. Besides, there are undoubtedly people who totally lack any form of religious feeling, and do not even embrace a superstition. Therefore, should religious perception indeed be an attribute of the human soul, it must – apart from in causality – have a root also in another thing, or only in this other thing. This opinion, that causality is not sufficient for a purely psychological emergence of a religious view, is doubtless also the supposition of Wilhelm Wundt. Earlier we emphasized fear and desire as the mainsprings of religious assumptions. However, we are now to disregard these human traits, viewing them as undignified. Then we would indeed have no other option but to regard a religious view as a category of its own, against which there is a great deal that will emerge in the presentation of the individual religious approaches, where we encounter the least elevated of all views, which strike every culture and all humanity in the face. But should that view relate to our idea of religion, the concept ‘religion’ will be understood in terms much too narrow, and we will not yet need to discuss it here.

Finally, the purely spiritualistic view itself regards religion as revealed by supreme power. Taken in absolute terms, this can really only be believed of the sole true religion, as it is indeed impossible for a revelation to occur in more than one guise. No one knows which one this sole true religion is; everyone declares it to be his own. And we have no criterion by which to judge this. Histories of the religions written in the past and in modern times cut off every possibility we might have of this. The popular pretext that the revelation had been corrupted by humans is of no avail here, but rather merely does harm. For whatever is a complete revelation must guide people with compelling authority and cannot

-----File: 043-----

lead them to such terrible acts as the religious persecutions have produced. Otherwise a complete revelation has no sense at all, as no one will want to form it into something inconsistent with the best in humans.

If one abandons the viewpoint of the absolute it becomes easier to talk about revelation. Then, the religions would be inspirations of individual people or of particular social strata and may therefore be imperfect. As a result the revelation loses the significance that is the reason for its existence actually being accepted: i.e., to make the absolute correctness of the relevant religious view unchallengeable. The revelation goes back to the viewpoint of every sudden idea or contrivance or feeling of humans. We do of course have examples of this, some of which have the most powerful effects and provide the noblest teachings. But we also have many that have proven to be absurd and extremely harmful.

As in so many other cases, I do not believe one can persist rigorously in one viewpoint or another in the study of the emergence of religious views. Just as electricity generated in a storm may have originated, and actually does, from all the possible processes, the religious views will also have emerged from the most diverse causes. Humans have within them plentiful capital in attributes and instincts to enable them to combine these, sometimes in one way and at other times in another, and to convert them into new qualities. Occasionally one is crucial to their view, sometimes another. Religions will have resulted from all the above, perhaps from yet other sources. The course of development taken by the religions of the world highlights the fact that they cannot really be traced back to a single point of origin, but that for each of them a different moment (or occasionally more than one) has been the effective one. Many researchers in religion have felt compelled to concede that less elevated approaches to the world and life also have more elevated moments, or alternatively to acknowledge less elevated moments in higher ones.

-----File: 044-----

A real ‘philosophy of religion’ would have to take into account all these moments and follow the way they have influenced the individual religions. But as soon as we step out of the historical civilized world we lack only too badly the knowledge for this. It is not the task of this book to go into this in more detail; sufficient reference will, however, be made to the particular and to other theories.

8. Enduring of objects in general with life.

If we now proceed to the individual forms of religion, the physical religion whose existence is accepted by Max Müller does in fact seem to be the most original, although it is of quite lowly significance. Raised above the level of lusterless self-evident truth, humans will have seen in everything that surrounded them something that we can certainly best describe indeterminately as an agent, at work, acting, exerting an effect. It is particularly with occurrences such as flame, storm, thunderstorm, rain, etc., that this will have taken place first of all, and subsequently with objects. An observation of this kind with animals was natural; it was then possible to extend it to trees, flowers and grasses. Later, flowing or surging bodies of water and finally mountains, rocks and stones may have entered the ranks. Establishing these series *ex post* is an awkward task, as much will have been dependent on the particular environments of particular peoples. We also need to bear in mind that objects of a particular kind also exert a particular effect on humans in particular conditions, as, incidentally, they also do on animals: for example, overhanging rocks or stones in a flat region, trees that have twisting shapes or are unusually large, steam rising out of the Earth, etc. No dog can withstand a bottle of seltzer water being cracked open in front of him, and overhanging or almost suspended slabs of stone are uninviting even to a brave man. Certain lifeless objects may therefore have been thought much more likely to have been provided with this ‘something’ than innocuous

-----File: 045-----

bushes. Much has been recounted from which one might conclude that the people of Tierra del Fuego are at this level of the world view, at which a ‘something at work’ is seen in everything, without this something being identified with whatever is the thing at work in humans.

If a person learns to define his belief in more definite terms among such concepts, he will see something alive in what is acting in objects, whether it be that objects themselves are alive, or that something alive is present in them. We encounter both, but the former evidently cannot have much scope, since even animals have no difficulty in distinguishing the inanimate from the living. Max Müller examined a very informative example to the most meticulous degree: the significance of Agni in ancient Indian religion. As we have seen, to Müller Agni seems ‘to have expressed the concept of animated movement. His closest relative would be Latin ag-ilis.’ In Latin we have ignis, in ancient Slavic ogni, and in Lithuanian ugnì. This would be at the first level. But now come names that evidently express an active object: Dahana, the one who burns, and An-ala, the one who blows (with the root an, also occurring in animus, anima, ἄνεμος, and meaning breathe or blow). Max Müller lists still more names that also refer to an active object. And he writes in general terms, ‘Once this step was taken, once the word Agni, fire, was coined, then the temptation was great, indeed almost impossible to resist, just as Agni had been interpreted as the agent, also to interpret him similarly as something that resembled the only other active subjects that were familiar to humans, i.e. as the animal and human agent.’ And one can only agree with him on this. Hence, he also cites how the Rig Veda speaks of the tongue or the tongues of Agni, his teeth, his jowls, his burning brow, his fiery hair, his golden beard. It would be possible to interpret these ways of speaking as metaphorical if the first concept of Agni were a more elevated one.

-----File: 046-----

But as such they may scarcely be taken in any other way than *ad verbum*, as a description of Agni as a living 'something' (but see page 25). I have made mention above of how in Polynesia the sun is also seen as a monster, the Eskimo people take the sun and moon to be a girl and a boy, as do some peoples of South America, and how people in Australia take them the other way round, as man and woman respectively. Algonquin Indians, who regard the moon as the wife of the sun, even explain darkness in terms of these celestial bodies sometimes holding their child (who must therefore be dark) in their arms in front of them. Their arms are not seen, as they are constantly holding a taut bow in front of themselves. There is a pleasant legend among the people of Mexico, conveyed by Tylor in his outstanding book 'The Origins of Culture.' The old sun had burnt out and the world was entombed in darkness. Then a hero leapt into a mighty fire and, having been turned into a god, rose as Tonatiuh, shining in the east as a new sun. A second hero leapt into the fire after him. But the fire had already become faint, and so he only rose as the moon, Metztli. Hence, sun and moon are both male here. But this legend is too elevated for the present discussion. It fits better here that the Aleuts believe the moon throws stones at those who insult him. One should bear in mind that earlier it was actually very often believed that meteorites were ejecta of the moon. Even the stars are considered to be living beings, humans or animals, possibly even parts of living beings. I have no wish to quote the Greek catasterisms, which are recounted in so many beautiful legends and even as recently as the time of the Ptolemaic dynasty led to the placing of the resplendent hair of Berenice in the sky. Meanwhile, in Africa the Milky Way is a flock of birds. Elsewhere the stars are humans who have climbed up to heaven and now cannot get back down. In Oceania the stars are also passed off as the eyes of renowned chieftains, with the result that these chieftains place great value on having the most sparkling eyes possible in life, and seek to enhance those bestowed on them by nature by tearing out the eyes of others,

-----File: 047-----

and devouring them. In Polynesia tales are told of the rainbow being a living monster which can eat humans or poison them. In Lithuania the god Perkun is also believed to have represented thunder itself. Storms are personified; hence, among the American Indians, about whom Hiawatha sings, Wabun, Shawondasee and Kabibonokka are living beings representing the east, south and north wind, whose father is generally called 'storm': Mudjekeewis. Among the Polynesians we encounter winds similarly personified, which are kinsfolk of gods. The chief god of the wind, Tāwhirimātea, who seeks revenge for the dishonor that befell his father and mother, heaven and Earth, through their violent separation (p. 12), lets loose his offspring, the storms, on sea and land, and he himself rages amidst them, causing the forests, the children of Tāne Mahuta, to be uprooted, the land to be flooded and the seas to be churned up. 'To the lower human tribes,' writes Tylor in the above work, 'sun and stars, trees and rivers, wind and clouds become creatures like people endued with life, which lead lives imagined as analogous to human or animal life and, like animals, use their limbs to perform their own particular tasks in the universe.' And he rightly draws attention to the way of thinking of children, who also endue everything with life at first. Like a child 'a savage in Brazil strikes the stone on which he has stumbled, or the arrow that has wounded him.' Tylor provides yet more examples. Among certain south Asian tribes any tree from which someone has fallen to their death is felled and hacked to splinters. Corresponding examples even occur among civilized peoples: may I remind the reader of the courts held in ancient Athens for inanimate objects which had caused a person's death, Xerxes ordering the Hellespont to be whipped and other known events from antiquity and even the Middle Ages. We might almost call to mind the 'Tücke des Objekts' (*spite of objects*), described so wittily by Friedrich Vischer in his novel 'Auch einer' (*approximately: Also one*). In Germany it was previously the custom when the head of the household

-----File: 048-----

died to break the news to everything in the house, even the farm tools and the contents of the stores. We should not be surprised that primitive peoples actually do regard objects that should appear dead to them as living things, and that they feel so surrounded everywhere by life, whose nature they do not know and which consequently frightens and burdens them. This idea of life in everything, which we encounter at the lowest cultural level, reappears, cleansed of all crudeness, in highly elevated philosophical speculations, as we shall see. Tylor categorizes it as 'animism' for the level of the savages, thus bestowing yet another meaning on this word.

9. The soul and soul-endowed objects; animism and fetishism.

As soon as a human has reached the point of distinguishing body from soul in himself he will naturally do the same for all other living beings and for all entities he regards as living. At what point man 'discovered his soul' is something that evades our knowledge. Even animals can apparently distinguish between a living animal and one that has been killed. But at some point man must have gained a deeper understanding of this distinction and thus reached a division into two parts of his ego. There seem to be no peoples left who do not recognize the concept of the soul. And one might even think that, as soon as humans consciously learned to apply causality sufficiently well, the sight of the dead alongside the living must have forced them round to the view that the former is lacking something possessed by the latter which, simply because there is no corporeal difference at all between the dead and the living in the first place, must require life as a necessary condition. For a dead creature has lost something: the life in it, or what we call the soul. Primitive peoples understand the soul as something physical, i.e. as breath. This is indeed something such peoples do for mankind in general; think of ψυχή, anima, for the ancient Greeks and Romans, which signify a 'blowing,' and *ruach* or

-----File: 049-----

nefesh in Hebrew, expressing the same. The German word ‘Seele’ (*soul*) is also thought to be associated with a conception of this kind, and to be linked to seîvan (*to move*) and seivs (*the sea*). The soul is also occasionally described as a ‘shadow,’ actually not metaphorically but in material terms, as primitive peoples regard shadows as something physically related to the body, similarly to air, and there are even legends that originate from the same viewpoint. Jacob Grimm relates the story of the devil holding seven schoolboys in a tomb in Salamanca with the condition that when he has finished his studies the seventh should pay for the pupils’ board. When he dismissed his school he went to keep the last boy back. But the boy pointed to his shadow: that was the last one. So the devil had to take the shadow, and the schoolboy was left without a shadow, like – Peter Schlemihl. Elsewhere the soul is something airlike, so it can also permeate the entire body and be everywhere in it, while still, like air, being unseen. Sometimes the soul is, however, directly regarded as a living being: either it may be seen as an image resembling the human (on account of which the Greeks also portrayed it in effigy as εἴδωλον, a small homunculus, in imitation of the deceased, sometimes even dressed in traditional costume), or it may be interpreted even more crudely as a butterfly, weasel, or bird, although it appears mostly as a snake. At other levels the soul is also seen as a plant; in his German mythology Jacob Grimm seems to connect the metamorphoses of human victims of pursuit, i.e., girls such as Daphne and Syrinx, with this. ‘But originally,’ he writes, ‘a direct, swift transfer of the soul into the form of a flower (for which he contributes several examples from legends in German and the Romance and Slavic languages) may have evolved from this idea: just as a flower springs forth from mere drops of blood, which contain only a small part of life, the soul has its seat in the blood, with the shedding of the blood it flees.’ The Czechs call the species of thyme that grows on sandy burial mounds ‘mother’s soul.’ But since the soul

has lent life to the body, humans ascribe to it higher attributes than humans as such possess.

When humans also applied this discovery by itself to other living creatures and to objects that appear to them to be endued with life, they became surrounded by souls that they generally had to respect in a similar way to their own souls. And thus animals, like them, became endowed with souls, and the sun, moon, celestial bodies, trees, mountains, rocks, sea, rivers and natural phenomena filled up with souls. In fact Max Müller writes, 'I cannot help calling it irrational for anyone to try to hoodwink us into believing that at some time in the history of the world a human being was so ingenuous as not to be capable of distinguishing between inanimate entities and those endued with life, an act of distinction in which even higher animals are scarcely ever mistaken, or indeed that humans liked to ascribe life or a soul to the sun and the moon, trees and rivers, although they were perfectly aware that they possessed neither life nor a soul.' But in view of the enormous number of facts available it is precisely the latter that cannot be acknowledged. Humans were even unaware that objects possessed neither life nor soul; they just assumed the exact opposite. And it may be said that the discovery of the soul as a particular thing helped them minimize the difficulties that arise from the apparent inanimateness of many objects. For in regarding themselves they saw that at times – when asleep – they also appeared as if inanimate, since the souls of objects could similarly be encountered in slumber or semi-wakefulness. They saw that humans are lifeless the moment the soul fades from them; this could also be applied to objects in which appearance all too greatly contradicted the presence of a life.

With the adoption of the soul as a special thing and a principle of life, which of course proceeded only very gradually, the religions took a new turn. This turn takes us in various directions. To begin with, we make a distinction between belief in

-----File: 051-----

fetishes, belief in souls, including shamanism, belief in ancestors, including totemism, belief in spirits and daemons, and belief in gods. One should not assume that areas of religion which emerged one after the other, or are (at least nowadays) separated, are at issue here. Everything descends into disarray, and we have such a tangle of accounts and views that it is barely possible to tell what is the fundamental thing for one people or another. Hence the definitions and findings of the individual scholars, often contradicting each other, and the disparities in the significance that they, according to their own viewpoints, attach to the individual forms of approach to life and the world. Only common fundamental features can be ascertained.

As we noted above, it fits within the nature of human beings for unfamiliar, new or curious objects to attract their particular attention. Should these objects then become endowed with a soul, fear or expectation can become attached to them. They are regarded as magical, for good and for bad, and people offer gifts to appease them or ease them into a favorable mood. Fetishism is founded on this, as the Portuguese first encountered it in Africa and gave it a name from their own language (feitiço, magic). It follows that everything can be, or can become, a fetish: pots, stones, wood, hair, braided fiber etc. One characteristic story originates from Africa. An anchor was found, something unfamiliar or even totally unknown. One man broke off a piece from it and died a short time later. The people immediately came to believe that the anchor was a fetish, and the man had had to die because he had caused offence to this fetish by wounding it. Chinese pots are believed to be venerated as fetishes in Oceania. There are thousands of examples originating from every part of the world as evidence of belief in fetishes, and thousands of fetishes are also brought into our museums and collections. People avoid places where evil fetishes are encountered and visit them only for cult ritual acts. Good fetishes are taken into people’s homes or put into special huts. Should such fetishes not fulfil expectations

or should they prove themselves ineffectual, they are sometimes chastened, and, if that does no good, discarded, being perceived as totally inanimate. Fetishes can exert an influence of their own accord, and can bring and preserve good fortune and health for their owners; we also encounter vast numbers of these in such things as lucky charms. Elsewhere they may react only to invocation by an expert. From this there arises all the nonsense of magical creatures and sorcerers, encountered all over the Earth and bearing the same characteristics everywhere. Impostors who deceive us, and impostors who have been deceived, play their calamitous role in this. In judging one should not forget that the savage possesses so few remedies for illness, famine, animals, etc., and therefore naturally resorts to reaching for everything he may possibly believe might avail him. We even encounter the same in our society, where humans are abandoned by better expedients and they know of examples of this or that, be they even so absurd, helping at some point in space and time. But we see that belief in fetishes is constructed purely on fear and egotism, and the cult of fetishes is organized accordingly. Dealings with a good fetish are like those with a sweetheart: the fetish receives gifts of food and drink, a dwelling place and refuge. Some people acquire hundreds or thousands of fetishes for themselves: stones they have stumbled on, leaves that have been blown towards their feet, pieces of wood that stand out to them, small figures and so forth. And they occasionally sit among the great mass of such objects and, with flattery and veneration, ask them to devote their power to their owner. Dreaded fetishes can develop into formidable idols that can only be placated with bloody sacrifices, including human sacrifices in particular. In many cases fetishism is interpreted, e.g. by Comte, Lippert and Schultze among others, in a much wider sense, which will be discussed later. I have chosen the more limited definition, so as not to proceed immediately to wandering on aimlessly in a general analysis. However, on the other hand there are scholars who want nothing at all to do with belief in fetishes.

-----File: 053-----

The way in which belief in souls can be ladled out is not limited to mere belief in a soul; it also enters into the soul's composition and singularity. A soul can make its dwelling anywhere; however, it best prefers to stay in its accustomed place. As it nevertheless exerts an eerie influence, either one seeks to ward it off or one surrenders its accustomed abode for it to live there. So a pot or a basket is often set down and the soul of the deceased is invited to take its place in it. The soul may favor models made of wood or clay or stone, according to what kind of body it previously inhabited. If it has proceeded into such a model, the latter can become a fetish, which is why so many fetishes are in the form of humans and animals. In other cases people seek to make the soul forget the usual entrance to the dwelling place and resort to such childlike expedients as running several times around the hut carrying the body of the dead person, or taking the deceased out not through the door but through a hole specifically made for this purpose, which is subsequently closed up again.

Lippert recounts a tragicomic story from our own time (1879) and from our own homeland of Germany, which could just as well have taken place in Africa. A military bandsman had committed suicide in a village near Zittau. The landlord would not allow the corpse to be conveyed out through the usual exit under any circumstances, as 'in this case the soul of the suicide would remain in the house and haunt it.' The pallbearers had to go away and, as it was late, did not return with the constables until the following day. How astonished they were to find the corpse in a wooden box in front of the house. With the help of some friends the landlord had put it into the box during the night and lowered it to the ground on a rope through the window. I hardly need point out that Germany is also teeming with ghost stories.

If a degree of indulgence is being exercised, or there are particular grounds for this, the deceased will be buried in his hut or beneath its entrance. In the case of the former, the hut will probably also be

-----File: 054-----

left by the relatives, so that the soul can stay undisturbed with its body. Alternatively, a special hut may be built for the soul and the body of the dead person will be buried in it. This does indeed touch upon civilized practices, but has another sense, merely to give the soul a lasting abode, without causing offence to it. Finally, the bodies of the dead may also be buried under trees or rocks, or in caves. Their territory then goes as far as the shadow of the tree, rock or cave extends. Muslims believe the soul of the deceased stays with him for one more night. Savages may make this time longer arbitrarily. To ensure that the soul does not leave the body all the bodily orifices are plugged, or else the parts in which the soul is believed to live, such as the brain, the heart and the kidneys, are removed and destroyed, or used as 'medicine,' magic cures for mishaps and potions for the strengthening of one's own powers. These people deal with adversaries in particular in this way, e.g. predatory animals and human enemies (unless they eat them in their entirety), in order to absorb their souls into themselves. Desire for such medicine is so great that, where there prevails the belief that the soul departs with the fluid leaving the corpse, people will even drink this repulsive liquid. Frobenius, who writes about this in connection with the customs surrounding the mythical creature the fanany, reports many examples from Africa and Polynesia. It is not uncommon for beliefs to lead to vile murders, although the killer merely wishes to devour e.g. the kidney of the slain person; he then has two souls, gains in strength and can expect to live a longer life. There also seems to exist the belief that the soul can be prevented from returning to the light of day with the deceased if the hands and feet of the corpse are bound. This practice appears to be ancient, as skeletons with shackles on their hands and feet have even been found in prehistoric graves in Europe. To what extent the corporeality of the soul is a fundamental idea for primitive peoples is also revealed by the view that the soul corresponds to the body in its form. Should a person lack a limb,

-----File: 055-----

his soul will not possess this limb either. This is why savages cut off the thumb of the right hand from the deceased, so that the soul cannot hurl its missiles after them. It has been told that when four Negroes committed suicide on a plantation to live as free souls in the hereafter, the plantation owner had the hands and feet cut off their corpses. This had an impact: the Negroes now feared having to spend their existence in the afterlife mutilated in this way. Hence the annihilation of the soul by total dismemberment or, even better, by cremation of the body (p. 71). The soul even suffers illness and grows old along with the body, which is why some savages have a fear of infirmity or senile debility, and no longer being capable of gaining sufficient enjoyment from the pleasures on offer in the hereafter. Some have sought to use this to explain the cruel custom practiced by some primitive peoples of killing the elderly and the infirm; the intention is to preserve them in a certain degree of strength for the afterlife. Proof of this custom has also been found among the Teutons, Celts and Slavs.

A soul cannot penetrate encircling walls either. Therefore, where the corpse is surrounded by a grave mound a hole must be left in this mound, so that the soul can be provided with food and drink; the soul would not be able to reach provisions left near the grave.

10. Shamanism; totemism; cults of souls and ancestors.

As the soul enjoys a certain degree of freedom from the body, it can occasionally withdraw from it, even while the body is still alive. Hence, a primitive person will believe either that figures he sees in dreams are such souls which have detached themselves from their bodies and have now come to his soul, or that his soul has left his body and visited those souls. Inanimate objects present no difficulty in this, since these are also thought to have a living soul. It cannot be the purpose of this book to discuss the sinister subject of dreams; my only task is to lay emphasis on what is of significance for each view of life and the world.

-----File: 056-----

How much it lies within human nature to be troubled by one's dreams is something only the least prejudiced among us can perceive in himself. And all the enlightening information offered by physiologists and biologists is of little use to someone who has been affected by a bad dream. It remains in all his limbs throughout the day; the dreamer is happy to see the day gone past, as, strangely enough, the worth of a dream is generally limited to the time between one night and the next. A fair number of ethnologists and anthropologists are indeed inclined to trace back concepts of the soul and of religion to dream phenomena. However, animals also have dreams. So there must be something else in humans in particular that provokes in us reflection or a sudden idea out of these concepts of the soul and religion. There is ascribed to some people the ability to send out their souls from their bodies at will, after certain preparations mostly intended to elicit ecstasy or a dull stupor, to certain places where they make inquiries about acts of theft, enemy plans, remedies for sickness or the destiny of people and animals. The person in question lies there as if dead; in the meantime, his soul goes to wherever he has dispatched it. After it has heard the desired message, the soul returns to him; he awakes and now possesses all the knowledge sought. There are countless accounts of such dispatches of souls and their miraculous outcomes, particularly among the peoples of northern Asia, northern Europe and North America, and even in Africa. And some of these accounts are so remarkable that they have prompted belief even among educated travelers. People with such power over their souls chiefly rank among priests and sorcerers, or, as we commonly call them, 'medicine men,' since they also cure diseases and possess and administer remedies for every possible instance. They go by different names among different peoples. The most well-known name is shaman (from the Indian word Çramana), and shamanism is regarded as an expression of religion in connection with certain cults of spirits.

-----File: 057-----

Such views are also familiar among the Aryan peoples. Odin is said to sleep from time to time, and when he does, his soul roams through the world as a bird, a fish or a snake, to enable it to impart to its lord whatever it finds out. The historian of the Lombards, Paul the Deacon, preserved for us a strange story, which I retell here in Jacob Grimm's version (in his 'German Mythology'). 'King Guntram (the renowned king of the Franks), who had grown weary, had fallen asleep in the forest in the lap of a loyal servant. Then the servant sees a small animal, like a snake, slip out of the mouth of the lord and go to a brook, which it cannot cross. The servant lays his sword across the water; the animal runs across, and into a mountain on the other side. After some time it returns by the same way into the sleeping king, who soon awakes and tells of how, in a dream, he crossed an iron bridge and entered a mountain filled with gold.' Snakes are among the images and embodiments of the soul found throughout the world. Hence, the snake was King Guntram's soul. Incidentally, Paul the Deacon also informs us that the place in question was dug up and a great amount of hidden gold was actually found. What the soul discovered was thus correct. The king had a goblet made from the gold, and dedicated it to Saint Marcellus in his royal seat at Châlon, where the king himself was buried.

One who possesses this knowledge is even capable of dispatching alien souls to anywhere he wishes to send them. Whenever they wished to seek the advice of a god the kings of Dahomey killed someone, whose soul was then believed to float up to God and to ascertain from him what was needed, so it could later go back and reveal it to the sorcerer. As is well known, Herodotus recounts a similar example from the Thracian Goths: 'Every five years they choose one person from among them by drawing lots; this person is sent as a messenger to Zalmoxis and puts forward their particular request to him.' They perform the dispatch by making three people hold spears and then throwing the messenger up into the air, so that he falls on the spears. If he dies immediately, this is regarded as a gracious sign from God;

otherwise, another messenger is dispatched in the same way. Herodotus adds, ‘But they give him the instructions if he survives.’ So there is a resemblance between ideas in countries so far from each other and times in history so far apart, as evidence of how uniformly humans think, draw conclusions and act!

The acknowledgement of supremacy of some individuals means their souls are of particularly high value. So belief in ancestors as a natural tendency and belief in superordinates as something often imposed on peoples are concepts attached to belief in souls. Belief in ancestors is commonly encountered almost everywhere in the world and in every period of time. Perhaps even peoples who abandon or kill their elderly fathers and mothers do not lack this belief. It is certainly natural that the provider of the family assumes his own particular status and his soul is held in particularly high esteem. It will obviously be particularly inclined to demonstrate to those left behind the same good deeds as the person performed in life, and more besides. As a savage is an absolute realist, he seeks to safeguard their affection for himself. And this has led to a peculiar cult of souls and ancestors, which occurs everywhere and, as well as leading to quaint practices, has, at the level of the savages, given rise to the most shameful acts of cruelty, represented in the most curious forms. All this mounts into the immeasurable where the soul of a mighty sorcerer or a chieftain is concerned, and in consequence his death can turn into veritable lamentation in the most unpleasant meaning of the word for an entire people. We have gruesome finds from prehistoric times, and horrifying accounts from past and present. However, it is not my task to discuss cults; only approaches to life and the world belong here. But, as one will see, these lead to a gradation of souls. A lowly slave has a lowly soul capable of nothing; the ancestor, priest and chieftain possess souls of significance. And the higher the rank and the greater the authority, the more powerful the soul is, for good and, in particular,

-----File: 059-----

for evil. This differentiation is of great importance: it has led to theories according to which the religions actually emerged from belief in souls and ancestors (if we interpret ‘ancestors’ as superordinates in general). I shall discuss this later.

A primitive person considers animals to be no different from himself; he bestows souls on them, just like his own soul. But some African tribes do speak of certain human beings being able to live as humans or wild animals, just as they wish. And when the Polynesians tell of people turning into predatory animals, birds, fish or snakes at will, they interpret this not in the way we interpret our legends and fables, but purely in real terms. In this way, there has formed alongside a belief in human souls a belief in animal souls, with an animal soul cult associated with it, i.e. totemism. And it touches us in a peculiar way when animal souls are also taken to be souls of ancestors, as is the case among the American Indians, where not only families, but entire tribes refer to some kind of animal (bear, raven, snake, tortoise, spider and so forth) as their ancestors. If I am interpreting Lippert correctly, he certainly does not intend to acknowledge animal souls as the souls of ancestors, but accepts the existence of a soul of a human ancestor which has entered into the animal and taken up residence in it. This would correspond to the belief that ancestral animals should not normally be killed or eaten; on the other hand, it would not be compatible with people having to eat the same animals at certain festivals. However, there is no real certainty about totemism at all. Some are not inclined to see anything more than heraldic figures in ancestral animals, and many of these animals do undoubtedly give this impression. Elsewhere, people interpret them exclusively in terms of animal names of human ancestors, which has, through misinterpretation, led to the adopting of animals as ancestors. One or the other will apply in many cases. But it is certain that animal souls sometimes have no lesser significance than that of human souls, and they, likewise, enjoy veneration. Family and tribe

cherish their totem (the word originates from Algonquin Indian ‘dodaim’) and name themselves after it: bear, wolf, deer and so forth.

11. Belief in spirits and daemons; idol worship.

Belief in spirits and daemons is a direct descendant of belief in souls. Spirits and daemons are the souls of deceased humans or animals. If these souls are successfully banished into objects, be these dead or living creatures, we have fetishes, which increase in importance with the significance of the soul in them. Chieftains and priests can declare that a particularly important soul has gone, or been banished, into such and such an object. The object is then taboo, untouchable and unapproachable, the familiar scourge of the Oceanian tribes. Objects – figures of humans in particular, but also animals and figures of them – are particularly preferred as abodes of a soul, and if the soul is of some significance, we have an idol as a fetish. Idols and images of gods occur through vast swathes of space and time and are still found today, even in nations that boast a great cultural history. These idols and images arise from the human trait of wishing to interpret everything in material terms. And in Catholic countries it may still so often be said that pictures and statues of the Virgin Mary and the saints adorned in clothing and crowns are there to remind men and women solely of the high Mother of God and of people who have lived the most devout lives; however, simple people interpret this differently, if not quite like the Negroes or the people of the Society Islands, who consider their idols to be absolutely subservient to them and endow them with a rough, unhewn soul, which under certain circumstances has to be compelled to render service, but these are nonetheless animate objects with souls. How else are we to interpret pictures of saints with miraculous powers, which, as such, work miracles or even produce signs of life, such as weeping, nodding and perspiring blood, not to mention the Eucharist wafers, whose manifestations of life have brought the most excruciating deaths to such horrific numbers of innocent people,

-----File: 061-----

even though they are no imitation of human form? We can assume very little else except that at least the power of the deity or saint makes itself known to the unenlightened in all these things, particularly since the things concerned are always particular things of this kind, but not all. Adherents of the doctrine that all religion has emerged from the cult of souls linked to a belief in fetishes would even say that people suppose power is concealed in the things in question. That certainly goes too far, even for the Middle Ages; it is merely about a manifestation, not idol worship in the sense of that found among primitive peoples. But we might rightly doubt whether worship of Moloch by the Phoenicians and Carthaginians, worship of Çiva and Kali among peoples in India, the original idolatry of the Greeks and Romans, animal worship by the ancient Egyptians, and worship of trees and icons among the ancient Teutons, Celts, Lithuanians, Prussians and Slavs is very far removed from that idol worship. Tylor emphasizes how, despite its widespread occurrence, idol worship was not practiced by some peoples, even though all those in the surrounding areas embraced it. The most well-known example is that of the Israelites, who were even forbidden to make idols or graven images. But it is among these very Israelites that we see the extent to which the worship of fetish idols is in our blood. How much did the mighty seers and prophets have to preach and agitate to keep the people away from idol worship, and how many regressions into this worship there are to note! In the book of Judges we have the most vivid description of idol worship in the house of Micah, who even appoints a Levite to be priest of his idols, and then in the worship of the golden calf, with such disaster resulting for the people. But after the exile we no longer find any trace of idol worship, and how the people loathed and detested this form of worship is something we see in the heroic time of the Maccabees in the indignation at even the elevated worship of images practiced by the Greeks. And directly alongside this Hebrew race live the

Phoenicians, their kin but yet most active in idol worship; in the south there dwell the Arabs, who actually worship fetishes, and in the east there are the Mesopotamians, who, in spite of the beliefs of our Babylonians, worship idols. A second similar example can be seen in the idol worshippers of the Society Islands and in the inhabitants of Tonga and the Fiji Islands, who are free of idol worship. Even religions not at all based on worship of gods, such as Buddhism, have ultimately given rise to idolatry and fetishism, when they have reached peoples who did not grasp their elevated teachings and only adopted what conformed to their almost savage instinct. Thus, the noble teachings of Gautama Buddha sank as far as becoming pitiful idol worship among the people of Tibet and Mongolia, with spirits and witches and magical mischief of every possible kind. An idol was driven out of a province of China after a trial against him, as he had promised a girl healing through his priest and the poor girl had still died. This brings to mind an amusing anecdote from the works of Herodotus. The affable father in the story recounts how the men of Kaunos, the home town of the great painter Protogenes, had begged their gods for many things, but had received none of them. So they dashed into the temple with spears and swords and, shouting and stabbing their weapons into the air chased the gods out of the temple, then ran after them, still shouting and stabbing into the air, until they had driven them off over the border. Then they invited new gods into the temple. But as things were no better under these gods, they drove them away as well and brought back their old gods. Just like the Negroes! And there are a great number of similar examples among the Greeks, the Romans and other peoples, if not so naive in every case. In his book ‘Primitive Semitic Religion To-Day,’ which is well worth reading, Curtiss recounts something very informative about the Muslim tribes in Syria and the neighboring regions. For many of them the teachings of Mohammed only barely serve as a cloak for a belief in saints and fetishes. The saints, Weli, can live in graves (the large number of these graves in all Muslim countries is indeed well known)

-----File: 063-----

but also in trees, rocks, stones, springs, bodies of water and so forth. ‘Theoretically,’ writes the above author – and he refers to the well-known Palestine scholar Conder – ‘they are worshipped in connection with the God of all the world; practically many people know no other god … They are the deities whom the people fear, love, serve, and adore.’ A devout Muslim recounted how his patron saint had gone into a stone situated in Asâl. And stones seem not to be at all unpopular as abodes for the Weli, particularly if they are at all noteworthy, such as pillars, memorial stones and so forth. Curtiss reminds us that even in the Old Testament stones occasionally play a special role, such as the stone of Jacob, on which his head rested as he dreamt his beautiful dream and which he anointed and named as a house of God. Trees are also sacred in the above sense. ‘In popular belief sacred trees are evidently sites of the revelation of the spirits.’ ‘Meat is hung up in such trees: food, as it were, for the resident spirits.’ The bodies of water in which saints live are especially curious. They are visited in particular by women who are barren and believe that if they surrender themselves to the water spirit they will become fertile. So they lower themselves into the watercourse and let the waters wash over their wombs. The following peculiar story recounted by Curtiss shows that something other than bathing is involved here. A rich Muslim in Damascus had repudiated his wife in anger and given her the thrice-uttered statement of divorce. He soon regretted this, but he was not permitted by the law to remarry her before she had married another man and divorced him, or before she had at least given herself to another man. The Muslim ulemas did not know how they could help him. But the patriarch (!) advised him that the woman should lower herself into the River Rásada, ‘let the water wash around her and thus consummate a marriage; he could then take her home with him again. The ulemas declared themselves to be in agreement with this.’

A medicine man in Africa would not have given counsel much different from that given here by high priests of two of the higher religions. Even bribery is not absent in this, there being quite a businesslike process by which more and more is offered to a picture of a saint if it is apparently not in the mood to grant someone's wish.

The more eminent the soul, the higher the fetish idol in which the soul lived is judged to be, as has already been observed. Hence, the souls of chieftains could supply idols for an entire people, and therefore many popular idols are named after chieftains, and vice versa: chieftains are named after idols. So the population of Mount Olympus would increase into unmeasured numbers for primitive people, if the demise of these gods were not taken care of through their being forgotten or deliberately removed. We know that, at the time of Alexander, Euhemerus of Messina maintained (as, incidentally, others before him had supposed) that the Greek gods were merely deified princes and heroes. As a consequence of this bleak view he met with great hostility and will be in the wrong with respect to the Greek gods familiar to us. But one can scarcely doubt that gods can start out as such fetish idols of chieftains, and the Greek legends themselves contribute much towards attributing the origins of the human race to their gods. But such deifications are totally natural among primitive peoples. The chieftain is the most powerful in the tribe; while he is alive, he can cause good and inflict evil, particularly the latter. Hence, his soul must be of the same nature, and the object in which it dwells, an image of man, an image of an animal, or even an actual living animal, must possess, through the soul, a particular power likewise to bring about good and, particularly, evil, and has to be kept in a good mood with offerings, often even human sacrifices. The soul can even enter humans, who then decline into a frenzy. Stuhlmann tells of this in the Waganda tribe. He also notes that, when a priest dies, someone will set himself up as his successor by declaring that the soul of the deceased priest has travelled into him.

-----File: 065-----

12. Magical beings.

Now, souls can live at liberty in the air or in mountains, caves, forests, bodies of water, clouds and so forth. These provide the host of spirits, ghosts and daemons with which a primitive person's surroundings are teeming. Nothing unpleasant can take place without some spirit or other being to blame. This is why primitive people find sorcerers so indispensable, as they understand how to drive out and ward off daemons and even how to send them out against enemies. Manaia, as Grey recounts in his Polynesian mythology, took the sister of Ngatoro-i-Rangi as his wife. One day she cooked a bad meal for him. Then he put her brother under a curse and sent out evil spirits against him and his people. His wife immediately sent out her daughter to warn the brother. The girl reached him and told of the incident; at this, after Ngatoro-i-Rangi and his relatives had purified themselves through submersion in water, they dug a pit, and, chanting spells, he shoveled the evil spirits sent out against him into this pit, covered them with earth, stamped down hard on it and then stretched across it robes he had conjured up and finally a piece of netting. This is how he annihilated the daemons. Later, with his people, he moves towards Manaia and puts a stratagem to use. They all punch each other's noses raw and lie on the ground as if dead, their weapons hidden. Manaia's priests come and find them; they can only think that their spirits have killed them and brought their bodies to that place. They send out a call and the people come streaming in. But while they are still arguing about how to divide up the bodies of those they assume to be dead, the latter jump up, mount an attack and slay them all. Then they devour their bodies. Even more curious is a second narrative from Grey, also from New Zealand. Two sorcerers living in a fort, Purata and Tautohito, have a carved wooden head: at the sound of their magical invocation this wooden head will send out spirits upon spirits, which kill everything that approaches the fort, so that no one any longer dares enter that area,

which is like a scene of carnage. Then a might sorcerer, Hakawau, decides to go there and break the spell. First, he summons his spirits and asks them to show him his destiny while he sleeps. He sees that it is favorable, as he dreams that his head touches the sky and his feet stand firmly on the Earth. Then he sets out. And as he approaches the fort he says an invocation of his own to send spirits against the malicious spirits. This turns into a real battle between the two armies of spirits. The sorcerers in the fort scream louder and louder at the wooden head, which dispatches more and more spirits. But Hakawau is more powerful, so his army of spirits is victorious and slays the hostile spirits. He finally makes his way into the fort by climbing over the fence, and completely eradicates the deadly magic.

Invocations, spells and cults of spirits and daemons alternate with each other incessantly, so primitive peoples are constant slaves to this belief and, at night, live in all kinds of fear of the creations of their own fantasy, or, to be more precise, fear of their conclusions, which are logical, but based on false assumptions. Belief in spirits also exists in nations of greater cultural history: it occurs to a narrower extent, but still abundantly enough. And occasionally it shows a marked increase in prevalence.

> Now with such glamour doth the air overflow
> That how he should avoid it none doth know.
> If one day lit with reason on us beams,
> Night trammels us within a web of dreams.
> From the young fields we turn us home elate,
> A raven croaks! What doth he croak? Ill-fate!
> Us Superstition soon and late entwines,
> With happenings, with warnings, and with signs.
> Thus are we overawed, we stand alone.[4]

This is said by Faust before sorrow makes him lose his sight, perhaps in consideration of the thriving Weinsberg ghosts and specters of the eminent poet Justinus Kerner. And what does spiritualism do nowadays other than construct a world of spirits? – and on the same stem as for the

-----File: 067-----

primitive peoples, only, for earnest adherents, in a form that is nobler and richer in ideas. But belief in vampires among the Slavic peoples is gruesome enough still to frighten us even in the opera of Marschner. And where do we not encounter similar ghostly and daemonic figures? The deceased give cause for fear and apparitions everywhere; nature at play does this no less in a remote place or in the middle of the night. It is to these figures that we owe such magnificent poetry as Bürger's 'Lenore' and numerous popular ballads. These are said to be 'survivals' from vague prehistory. And belief in spirits and ghosts is in fact gradually diminishing among people in Germany, whilst it is certainly showing a strong increase in society and in an entire school of psychologists in the same form or in another, despite the sometimes totally ridiculous trials against deceitful exorcists. Primitive peoples interpret the subject in purely material terms, as both these examples, which it would be pointless to increase by several hundredfold, teach us. For them the spirits are indeed earthly, even destructible. But the fact that these spirits cannot be perceived fills them with uneasy fear of incessant, ruinous attack and compels them to defend themselves constantly. Accidents, disease and death are not regarded as natural by primitive peoples; they see them as violations of nature which are always to be attributed to evil spirits which, whether acting on their own or sent by a foe of some kind, attack humans. And so they constantly have to protect themselves and resist; at one moment the sorcerer has to summon the benign spirits for help, and in the next moment drive away the evil ones through invocation and dance and rattling with everything available, and if possible steer them back to the enemy. Just as the Romans were partly hostage to their *dies fasti* and *nefasti*, to their dreams and their notions, and to all incidents and stories, primitive people are to a much greater degree. They see the hand of sinister powers everywhere. This may not be true of all primitive people, but it certainly applies to most by far. Even the Bedouin hold the view that humans can be struck dead by spirits in dreams. And the concept of 'those possessed by

evil spirits' was familiar in ancient times and throughout the Middle Ages, and has continued to be so for a fair part of modern times. It is unedifying to discuss this, and all the less edifying when primitive people administer every possible remedy in an attempt to heal the possessed person and free him from the evil spirit, while in this country absurd superstition led to the cure being ultimately seen in the drowning of the unfortunate person and cremation of his body.

13. More elevated approaches among primitive peoples; religions and myths in which nature is revered.

In filling everything with spirits, primitive peoples do not leave the sky, sun, moon, stars, Earth, sea, rivers, springs, clouds or forests free of them. However, it is only occasionally that these particular spirits have pernicious significance for these peoples; the spirits generally bestow on them a life of well-being. This is how they emerge from the ranks of the other spirits. And it is from these spirits that religion with reverence for nature gradually develops. As the home of the celestial bodies, the sky gains importance above all, followed increasingly by the sun, weather and Earth. And as these are of vital long-term importance for entire peoples and countries, they become populated with the noblest spirits. But this process takes place slowly. And pandaemonism must actually have already petered out to some extent for these higher forces to be able to emerge. In fact, even among primitive peoples they have far more limited significance than the spirits and daemons in close proximity, particularly as they remain constantly visible and so humans are used to the sight of them. But it is they that give rise to actual belief in gods, and to the mythology that then eventually mounts to the level of a belief in God. It has often been asked whether the savage tribes are already in possession of more elevated, and the most elevated, ideas of this kind. Earlier I pointed out that there is by no means only one approach to the world and to life prevailing among them, and that instead their processes of reflecting and of forming opinions and beliefs take turns in all possible directions. Hence, it is

-----File: 069-----

to be expected that some tribes, if not all, will also acknowledge the higher spirits, and perhaps even the highest one, alongside the spirits and daemons existing in close proximity to them. People also often make this claim and seek to demonstrate it through examples. But it is sometimes rather difficult to see that this is actually the case. It usually simply involves a name, with no indication of qualities, and at best with reference to creation. When one considers how almost self-evident miracles are to a savage one understands how little creation has by way of meaning for him intellectually. The work of creation is indeed often assigned to humans. Frobenius writes of how African gods originated in three ways:

> spirits as deified ancestors and rulers, the latter quite often while they were still alive;
> mystic deities, indifferent to humanity ('They sprang forth from the feeling that, alongside the exceptional phenomena so carefully observed by Africans, there still prevails an unidentified regularity in nature; they are, as it were, the personification of the rhythm in nature');
> gods occurring in high mythology, such as sun gods.

There is believed to be no sharp distinction between these three groups; they are seen to overlap with each other. We are familiar with the first group. What use one might make of the second group is not totally evident, particularly since it has not developed any further, if we do not intend to encroach into science. But should this second group also possibly lead us precisely to the most elevated conceptions, the third group would then need to be attached to the first. Meanwhile we see in this group nothing more than a dark feeling and foreboding, lacking name and legend – almost the gods of the mysteries. I admit I have found no real indication of belief in these gods among primitive peoples. But, as is widely known, there exist among them an abundance of secret societies, and we cannot exclude the possibility that these societies preserve rites in the form of mysteries, like the Greeks and other peoples. We encounter such secret societies in North America, West Africa, the islands of Oceania, Australia and so forth, not to mention the civilized peoples. What one reads about their doings

-----File: 070-----

is really hardly what it would take to instill higher concepts of their mysteries; most of it lies in the realm of egotistical imperiousness, rapaciousness and bloodthirstiness, and also evil cannibalism, and is far more scourge than boon, even though a type of legal oversight (similar to the Fehmic Court) does take place. These mysteries are by no means comparable with those of the Greeks, about which all authors of the past write with such great esteem. Hence, I have nothing to say about the second group; perhaps someone else knows more.

Frobenius discusses the third group by way of several examples. But here very broad interpretations are sometimes required to enable us to arrive at more elevated ideas. Let us take a few of these. Among the Yoruba in the Niger Delta Shango is the god of thunder, lightning and fire. He is a son of the sea (Yemaya); Oshunmare, the rainbow, is his servant and carries water from the Earth up to his cloud palace. Ara, the rumbling of thunder, is his messenger, and Biri, the darkness, his entourage. He has three wives, who carry his string, bow and sword. All this sounds very pleasant and quite like a myth of the type in which nature is revered. But it is not the only myth about Shango. According to other myths he is descended from mortal human beings. ‘He was a ruler in Oyo, the main city in the Yoruba region. He was so ruthless that the chiefs and the people sent him a gourd full of parrot eggs with the message that he was tired out by government business and should go to sleep.’ A war breaks out over this; he has to flee, and loses everything, even his wife. Then he hangs himself. Now everyone is alarmed; they search for his body and find a chain protruding from the ground. But beneath it they can hear Shango’s voice. Then they build a temple over it for Shango as a god. And when doubters say Shango is dead, he comes down in a thunderstorm and strikes the unbelievers. No residue of high ideas remains here; the story takes a path of a thoroughly fetish-related kind. Still more myths about Shango are not much more elevated, particularly when one considers what we read on page 16 ff about the

-----File: 071-----

perception of the world held by some of the simplest primitive peoples. At best, a kind of lordliness akin to that of Māui is still recognized. Another deity is Huveane among the Basuto people; here, any trace of a more elevated legend is totally absent. His father was Modimo, 'who created everything good, only not humans, who soon fell prey to ruin and death.' Huveane launches into acts of degrading behavior towards this very same father, and even beats him. Now he wants to kill him and attempts to do this with poisoned gruel, then by paying an assassin, and so forth. Huveane evades all pursuit, and in the end his father is forced to flee. Another myth has Huveane as the son of a woman who is the only one left after every human has been devoured by an ogre. Suddenly gaining in strength, he goes into battle against this ogre, but is himself devoured. Nevertheless, he manages to save himself by cutting a hole through the ogre's body and slips out, followed by all of humanity re-emerging into the light of day. This legend is illustrated more clearly in another one, in which Huveane is given the name Litaolane on an ornament attached to his neck at birth, particularly with respect to the pursuit he experiences from the people he earlier set free. So one day he flees and, at a river, turns himself into a stone. His pursuers seize the stone and fling it across to the other bank of the river. There the stone turns back into Litaolane, who makes fun of his foes. According to the interpretation Frobenius gives to the first legend, Huveane is swallowed up (= sunset), then he comes back into the daylight (= sunrise). All the people follow him, meaning they awake in the warm glow of the morning sun. This is revealed by analogies. And all the rest, the pursuit by the people? It has to be admitted that there is not much of any special value about such myths. And in this connection Frobenius writes, 'With Shango and Huveane we have exhausted the entire stock of the unadulterated sun gods of Negro Africa.' He then tells of the Hottentot gods Heitsi-Eibib, Tsui-Goab and Kauna. In all these accounts I can see only more or less

fairy tales and I cannot follow the interpretations of Frobenius. Only a few characteristics reveal a glimpse of something more meaningful, such as where Heitsi-Eibib escapes through a body of water which parts in front of him, but then crashes back down over his pursuers (p. 13), or where Tsui-Goab lives in a white heaven above the blue sky, which stretches itself across to protect the people whenever Tsui-Goab is angry.

An example of a real fetish monster is Odente from the Gold Coast, discussed in the following. The spirit living in a cave near Date, called Konkom in the beginning, was ‘a man with only one eye, one arm and a crab-eaten nose, who was covered in boils.’ The people had grown tired of always making offerings to this graceful phenomenon without ever seeing it, and at a sacrificial feast, when an arm stretched out of the cave to receive the piece of meat, courageous men seized this arm and despite all its whimpering dragged the figure behind them. But everyone ran away in horror amid cries of ‘It’s no ordinary man – it is really a god.’ This corresponds perfectly to the perception of the primitive peoples! So they negotiated with him. He proved conciliatory and imposed on them penance of burning all the fruit in the fields and in the house; they would then recover it all one hundredfold. The people did as they were told, at which Konkom was avenged, as he fled from them and a famine broke out. He made his way to Krakye, where he was renamed Odente and the townsfolk were happy to keep him there. He again retired to a cave, and Krakye went from strength to strength. However, he did not like living there and wanted to return to Date. Then a woman called Koko appeared in that place; she was obsessed with Odente and promised the people of Date everything possible if they would obey Odente’s commands. She said the god was himself moving back to them. The god demanded bulls and rum, and forbade anyone to wear dark blue clothing. In future no one was to cross the street with a light at night, as ‘he might see one of Odente’s children, who, having arrived in the thunder and the rushing of the wind, roam through the town at night

-----File: 073-----

to keep watch over it.' A human sacrifice, the hideous nature of which I do not wish to speak of, took place, and a cone-shaped altar is erected over this sacrifice. And all this took place not centuries ago, but in recent times.

I may pass over other similar deities without comment; they are, incidentally, all of a unilateral nature. How it is to be deduced that they represent sun deities is something one cannot always discern. Accounts among the African tribes vary greatly. The Namaqua people see the sun as a slice of bacon from which you can even cut a piece. In contrast, in Madagascar the sun is thought of as a radiant body. 'They consider it to be the source of earthly possession, pleasure and all fertility.' Among the Ewara people on the coast of Guinea, Lisa is the sun god, and his wife is Gleti, the moon. They have many children: their daughters are the stars, which follow Gleti constantly. Whenever Lisa strikes Gleti, she becomes dark, hence lunar eclipses. In his work *Im Goldlande des Altertums* (*The Eldorado of the Ancients*) Carl Peters writes that the Makalanga people perform sun worship just like that practiced for the Semitic god Baal. It is known that he regards the Makalanga region as the biblical site of Ophir. Max Müller has provided evidence that in many instances a form of fire worship runs parallel to worship of the sun. In Africa, however, this seems not to occur frequently and to be substantially restricted to the tribes of the south. The Herero is believed to maintain a holy fire, Ukuruo, which is tended by a daughter of the chieftain; she bears the title Ondangere. It is therefore a kind of Vestal Virgin service, quite similar to that practiced by the Romans. Prometheus is played by an old king. The fire also receives sacrifices, and in addition it serves to drive away evil spirits.

Among the American Indians there seems to be something of higher ideas that corresponds to Frobenius' second group of African deities. In his ethnology Ratzel writes, 'Where there actually is a sufficiently abstract conception (i.e., of God), it does only align with 'soul,' 'spirit',

'to switch' or simply 'wondrous.' Among the Algonquin Indians, manitous are numerous spirits of familiar origin, which inhabit everything in nature and – sometimes in a hostile way, sometimes benignly – encounter human beings.' Some tribes nevertheless recognize a supreme creator of the world, a god of light, who has created the world for the 'men of light.' The European discoverers were considered to be these. All American tribes have a sun cult: in Ratzel's opinion, this reaches as far as arable farming extends (and no doubt as far as crop plants thrive). Some also worship the moon and the celestial bodies. But according to the legends of peoples such as the Tlingit Indians, who live on the coast of northwestern America, conveyed to us by Krause in his book on these tribes, the sun, moon and stars were to be found in three boxes, in the possession of a chieftain, Yelch's uncle. As a boy Yelch succeeded in playing with all three boxes one after the other, and opened them, despite his uncle forbidding him to do so; hence, first the celestial bodies, then the moon, and finally the sun flew up to the sky. And although the American Indians say, 'Just as Yelch acted and lived, so must we too act and live,' Yelch was no high deity. The essential thing in the many tales Krause tells about him is that as a raven he played trick after trick. Whether he was a raven or whether he just wore raven's feathers, in any case he flies like a raven and behaves in a similar way to the bird. For other tribes, different animals represent Yelch, such as the bear, tortoise and spider. Thus it was really only higher forms of totemism and belief in ancestors that gained a new slant, aiming more for the ideal, under the influence of Christianity. In this respect the American Indians can be distinguished favorably from the Negroes. And as for the civilized peoples of the America of the past: I do not wish to repeat what I argued in my book 'Die Entstehung der Welt' (*The Emergence of the World*), and so merely make reference to it.

Among the Oceanians, in spite of their other notions based on belief in fetishes and souls, it is the Polynesians who have taken their conceptions to the level of some elevated ideas. I do not share the great enthusiasm others have for their legends and myths, as childishness

-----File: 075-----

and barbarity are evident even in the best of them. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that a good many things in them are at the level of Greek creations of the same kind. Even the husband and wife pair Rangi and Papa, no matter how much they might be interpreted in material terms, are certainly characterized as higher, particular beings, heaven and Earth. In the beginning they are closely nestled against each other, so that darkness generally reigns and their children know nothing of light. The times passing thus, counted by the decade, are interpreted as beings, pō. Those children are called Tangaroa, Rongo-mā-Tāne, Haumia-tiketike, Tāne Mahuta, Tāwhirimātea and Tūmatauenga. Earlier I made mention of the violent separation of Rangi and Papa. As soon as they have separated there is light. Nothing is said about the sun and the stars. But even the Bible acknowledges light without the sun: it is the first thing God creates. Now, one should expect the children of Rangi and Papa to be something quite special. But no, they are entirely earthly. Grey, whose lead I may take here, and who is probably the most eminent authority on Polynesian mythology, writes, 'Tangaroa signifies fish of every kind; Rongo-mā-Tāne, potatoes and everything vegetable cultivated as food; Haumia-tiketike, fern root and everything edible that grows wild; Tāne Mahuta, forests, the birds and insects that live in them and everything made of wood; Tāwhirimātea, the wind and storms; Tūmatauenga, mankind.' We cannot make much use of that. Realism goes even further. The child of wind and storm disagrees with the outrage committed against heaven and Earth, at the instigation of the first human, and takes revenge on behalf of his father and mother by attacking his brothers. He overcomes everything. Only Tūmatauenga alone puts up any resistance, without any help from his brothers. Then he pulls them to pieces and eats up every part of them that is at all edible, hence all the animal life from the forest, the fish from the sea and so on. He finally chants spells to make them always serve as food for humans. Hence, the first person becomes referred to as a

-----File: 076-----

god, who taught people these spells. Apart from Tūmatauenga, only Tāwhirimātea, the weather, allows us to identify a more divine attribute. Tangaroa is otherwise a principal god. The offspring of the first human are humans in general. They are the first to have human form; the first four created beings do not resemble humans. But Rangi and Papa are still separated today. And when Papa sighs, full of yearning, his sighs ascend as mist to heaven, and when Rangi weeps for her lover, her tears fall to Earth as dew – a beautiful image. Rangi and Papa are also the benefactors of humans, in that Rangi sends breaths of wind to cool humans and plants, and mist, dew, rain and clear weather to make the plants grow. But Papa makes the plants emerge from their laps. They do this so that their children have food to eat.

Among their offspring is the widely known Māui, whose full name is Māui-tiki-tiki-a-Taranga. He is born prematurely and thrown into the lake by his mother Taranga (p. 12). The Polynesians believe that Māui will become a pernicious spirit and torment people, as the bodies of premature babies must be buried with ritual invocations. He is not, but in his character, he does indeed show malicious attributes as well. Thus, he kills a young girl for no reason at all and makes whole crops wither. Out of envy at his brother-in-law's success in fishing he turns him into a dog, causing his sister to throw herself into the sea in her grief. He is himself a hero who is afraid of the gods, but he accomplishes acts seemingly worthy of the divine. I have mentioned above how he makes the sun go slowly around the Earth without radiating burning rays. His second great deed is to raise New Zealand's North Island out of the sea using a jawbone as a fish hook. But for this reason, he is not the creator of the Earth, as the Earth already exists before he does this; he lives in a land with his four brothers. But he pulls the island up as if by chance, in the form of a fish, while out fishing with these brothers. His third act,

-----File: 077-----

which has led to him being compared with Prometheus, revolves around fire being stolen. Fire has, meanwhile, been in existence for a long time; for Māui it is more important to destroy the fire of his ancestress Mahuika. But first he puts out everything containing fire on Earth. Why he does this is not apparent, as he does not bring along any other fire, unless it is that he indirectly prevails upon the goddess of fire to hide the rest of her fire in the trees, from which people can draw it out by rubbing them together. Despite his mother's warning, he turns his mockery to the goddess of fire. He demands fire from her; she makes it spray forth from one of her fingernails and gives it to him. Then he extinguishes it and asks for more, only to put it out again. And so he continues, until Mahuika has used up the power of all the nails of her fingers and toes, apart from the nail on one of her big toes. As she realizes she has been deceived, full of rage, she stamps this toe on the ground. Everything catches fire: earth, field and forest. Māui escapes as an eagle and in the end can only save himself by begging his forefather Tāwhirimātea for rain. But the goddess has just a few sparks left of all her fire; she collects these and with them she proceeds, as we have said, to set everything alight. Unless this myth is meaningless, the goddess of fire must represent some evil daemon; otherwise, something has been lost in the legend. Elsewhere the myth is told in a different way, such as in Tonga, where Māui wrestles with the earthquake god, overpowers him and takes the fire, by which he had warmed himself, to the people. In other accounts he takes the form of a bird to bring fire. His final adventure brings death to him and also death to humanity. One of his ancestresses lives at the sky's horizon: her name is Hine-nui-te-pō, 'great woman of night.' Māui goes to her, accompanied by many birds, who are his companions. He finds her sleeping and decides to creep inside her, pass through her entire body and not leave her until her reaches her mouth. He asks the birds not to laugh until he comes back out, lest the terrifying woman should awaken, and he betakes himself unto her. The birds desperately try to stifle their laughter at this scene,

but Tiwakawaka, a little bird, cannot control himself and suddenly bursts out laughing. At this Hine-nui-te-pō wakes up, leaps to her feet and kills Māui. There is no doubt that this portrays sunset, particularly since Grey ascertained that the Tiwakawaka bird is only heard at sunset. In addition, Māui's parents live in the underworld, and he tarries and occasionally rises with them, and he exerts force over Tama-nui-te-rā, the sun, to make it clear that he is to be regarded as a sun demigod.

Bastian, in his book 'Die heilige Sage der Polynesier' (*The Sacred Legend of the Polynesians*) tells of much higher ideas from the Māori legends. Before Rangi and Papa there already existed other things, some of which are fundamentally to be interpreted as concepts. He lists 17 of them. First Te-Kore, the nothingness, then Te Pō, the primordial night, and after this Te-Rapunga, yearning, then emotion, expansion, gasping for air, thought, etc., and finally Hauora, life breath, and Atea, the universe, divided into Rangi and Papa. This certainly goes very high and wide, and Bastian compares this range of concepts with similar ranges in Buddhist perceptions. The moon, stars, daybreak and day are believed to be descended from Rangi and his second love Te-*ata-tuhi* Atatuhi (crepuscular rays), while Ra, the sun, originates from Rangi and his third love Wero-wero (heat trembling). By different husbands Papa gives birth to the brilliance of lightning, the rolling of thunder, and the Hine-nui-te-pō, then islands. Here we have a cosmogony in the form of a theogony. Bastian lists yet more gods, whose offspring always correspond to their function. Hence, if Tāwhirimātea's lineage is earthquakes, rainbows, hail, rain, ice, storm, cold, etc., Tangaroa's is eels, mussels, sharks, whales, seabirds and the like. Tūmatauenga, reproduced as a 'human' in Tiki, takes as his wife Rangi's daughter Kau-ata-ata, who would therefore be Eve, and has two children by her. The lineage of humans then develops further, and there is among them a Matuika, the father of fire, a Beelzebub (lord of the flies), a god of the rocks, and a Trawaru, father of the dogs. The entire world

-----File: 079-----

is believed to consist of ten heavens, one placed above the other, and ten strata of the Earth, one below the other. The gods and spirits are believed to be enthroned in the former (with Rehua – for Rangi? – in the highest one); the ninth, eighth and seventh contain the deified souls in order of their ranking of importance. There then follow the lower gods or demigods, the atua, who also include Tāwhaki (p. 17). In the fourth heaven is a source of life for embryos, in the third (Nga-Roto) the water above the firmament, and in the second rain and sunshine. The first heaven is the solid one and the realm of Tāwhirimātea. How this can be consistent with what is discussed on page 19 f, I cannot tell. We shall return to the portrayal of the strata of the Earth later.

Almost more astounding is what Bastian tells us about Hawaiian mythology. In the library of the king (Kalākaua) in Hawaii he discovered a manuscript dating from the beginning of the previous century, the 'He Pule Heiau,' the text of which he gives, and which contains a picture of the creation. The world is created several times over. The most recent creation proceeded in eight periods. Until the end of the eighth period pō, darkness, rules, but with diminishing power, while a glimmer of light constantly grows. Only then does Ao, light, emerge fully. But within these periods there appear first intelligence, then a chasm (male and female). After this the living creatures emerge, developing from the lowest upwards. At the same time the chasm fills up with earth, until it has completely disappeared. Then in the eighth period there arrive the human, in the form of the primordial woman Lalai, 'growing forth like a leaf,' and the personal gods. First the woman unites with the primordial forces, and then with the sun god and with Kane and Kii and other gods, and from this the race of heroes and humans eventually emerges. This whole account is a history of development, in which the spiritual always comes into being first, followed by the material that corresponds to it, and this history continues as far as historical times. The second verse of the poem, as a sample, is quoted from Bastian below:

-----File: 080-----

Born in the Night.

Born was Kumulipo in the night, a male
Born was Po'ele in the night, a female
Born the mites in the swarming mass,
Born the swarming mass in ranks,
Born the worms, those that burrow, that cast up the earth,
Born their multitudes with offspring,
Born those writhing in the dirt,
Born their twitching ranks,
Born sea eggs without number,
Born their streaked offspring in ranks

The interesting opening verse of this peculiar poem reads:

Here time reverses to when the world burns out,
Time in reverse back upwards once more,
Still sunless the time-veiled lights,
And flickering only in the faint shimmer of the moon;
From out of the mighty veil of cloud of Makali'i
The fundamental form trembles through, like a shadow of a future world.
Onset of the darkness from the depths of the chasm,
The very beginning of night in night,
From the furthest distances hither, from the furthest distances,
Far from the distant parts of the sun, far from the distant parts of the night.
Still night all around..

All this is not terribly clear. But it is thought to mean that the new world begins after the previous one has perished, that this occurs in deep darkness with only weak shimmers of light through it, and that on an idealistic level the Pleiades (Makali'i) fill the future world with light. Unless they are meant to portray the origin of darkness and of night, the last four verses are beyond my comprehension. But even the translation is provided with the greatest reservations by Bastian. Apart from the addition of gods, other accounts tally with biblical ones. Certainly, Bastian and also Achelis explain it solely from the concurring ways in which humans think. But I do not think this is legitimate in such specific accounts as the forming of the woman from the rib of the man. It should at least be noted that there is a triad of gods, Kane, Ku and Lono, who create

-----File: 081-----

everything: sky, Earth, sun, moon, stars and living creatures. Elsewhere Tangaroa (or Ta'aroa) is the creator of the world, about whom the poem preserved by Moerenhout expresses thoughts on the highest level found among the people of the Marquesas Islands:

> He tarries here, Ta'aroa his name, in the boundless emptiness of space;
> No Earth yet, no sky yet, no sea was there, no humans.
> From above Ta'aroa calls down below, shifting into new forms,
> Ta'aroa, he as the ground root, as the bed of the rocks,
> Ta'aroa as the sand of the sea, Ta'aroa scattered to the utmost.
> Ta'aroa bursts out as light,
> Ta'aroa prevails in the innermost, Ta'aroa in the surroundings, Ta'aroa here below.
> Ta'aroa is wisdom,
> Born is the land of Hawaii.

And in addition, we have what are undoubtedly fetishes, idols and spirits (atua). It has to be accepted that alongside popular religion, which, as elsewhere, adheres to the purely tangible, there is also a higher concept, which very few people possess. Also widely known is that those of higher status often have a religion quite different from that of those of lower status, and may even have other fetishes and idols. The remaining legends about those gods are by no means at a very elevated level. Even the legend of Ta'aroa or Tangaroa does not enjoy a very elevated ending. As the light grew around him, he called the sand of the shore to him. But this sand could not fly to him. Then he called the rocks to him. These were not capable of doing so either, as they were rooted to the spot. Then he himself comes up to the Earth, and uses the seashell in which he has previously dwelt to make the islands, and on these he produces humans out of his back, turns himself into a boat and floats on the seas. There he spills his blood in the storm, at which the sea and the clouds turn red. Ultimately his skeleton, 'with the backbone upwards, lying on the ground, becomes a dwelling place for all the gods and the model for the temple at the same time.' 'Tangaroa became the sky,' writes Ratzel in his ethnology. This is something one can concede if one does not see the sky as we do, and if one disregards all the inconsistencies, since land, sea and clouds do exist even without Tangaroa, and it is difficult to grasp how

this god was able to turn into the sky. In New Zealand Tangaroa is quite cold and neutral as the god of the seas, or to be precise as the god of the animals in them, and elsewhere he also appears as an evil spirit, like the corresponding god Kanaloa. We do not need to accept the other particular doctrines after we have become acquainted with the high and the low, and seen how naively great thoughts can coexist alongside the most ludicrous follies among the same primitive people, something we must also extol in ourselves. In my book cited several times above I have also conveyed further evidence.

Can we now say that the primitive peoples have reached the point of the idea of a god in our sense, even if we disregard their other concepts? I think not! They may have attained a notion of something very high and all-powerful. Some among them may, particularly under foreign influence, also have grasped more definite concepts of it. But on the whole, they have not even arrived at a polytheism like that of the ancient Egyptians and Greeks. Omnianimism and pandaemonism form the foundation of their concepts, and what is most significant is a monolatry within the former and within a polylatry. Bastian himself, who seems the most inclined to ascribe to the Polynesians elevated concepts of god and the world at least, expresses the view that it is not a matter of creations for them; rather, it concerns the flourishing of what is already present. And the whole cult they have practiced and still practice today, with all kinds of acts of foolishness and cruelty, stands in stark contradiction to every higher concept. At first the perceptions of the ‘savages’ could not be ranked high enough, and then not low enough, and now they seem to be ranked considerably too high again. The first arose from ignorance and theological partiality, the second was born of disillusionment in the face of reality, and the last seems to be based on the transposing of the behavior of primitive people living under the influence of the culture of civilized humans, or under their scrutiny, on to the circumstances of isolated primitive people.

-----File: 083-----

14. The soul and the hereafter among primitive peoples.

We must now return to the original notions of the soul. The soul requires the life of the body; therefore, outside the body it cannot exist in any way other than living. Consequently, it lives as long as the human being or another creature permits it to do so. The human can annihilate the soul, by eating it up together with the dwelling in which the soul resides, i.e. the blood, heart, kidneys, eyes and so forth. The soul has then become totally merged into the human, fused with his own soul or even eaten up by it. Many have sought to explain cannibalism from this aspect: either to fortify one's own soul, to make oneself into a fetish of a kindred soul, or to create harmful, dreaded souls out of the world. A second practice is based on destruction of the body through burial in a deep grave or cremation, while the soul is still lingering in it, even if no longer actively. Finally, a third one allows souls to degenerate, by not serving their needs for things they cannot do without, such as a dwelling place, food and drink. Inversion of this signifies the preservation of the soul, in that its needs are constantly supplied. The harmless form is where a dwelling place, food and drink are offered to the spirit. And we know that this form is used, whether completely or partially, consciously or unconsciously, up to a level far within the bounds of high cultures, while among primitive peoples it is required for every soul needing to be sustained or to be made well-disposed to those offering to it. Yet it sounds innocuous to put implements and jewelry into the grave of the deceased, for his soul to use, and to make the soul's dwelling place match the home of the deceased on Earth, in the form of a hut, palace or temple, to which the soul was accustomed when the body was alive. Examples of this are widespread throughout the Earth, from lowly holes and huts to the magnificent buildings and splendid furnishings seen in the civilizations of the Etruscans, the Egyptians, the Chinese and other peoples. But then something living is also assigned to the deceased;

this is something his soul needed in life, and in this the persistence of the primitive person knows no limit except egotism, which prevents him giving away everything. Animals, slaves, women, captured foes, whether still alive or killed beforehand, are buried with the deceased or cremated on the funeral pyre with him. The higher the standing of the deceased, the more substantial these gifts are; the death of a chieftain sees people hunted to create as large a gift as possible. A Dahomey chieftain would not have been content with a poor Polyxena, as Achilles was; here the numbers of human sacrifices went into the hundreds and beyond. And what terrible accounts there are from Herodotus about offerings to the dead among the Scythians, and from what we also know about Teutons, Slavs, Celts and other peoples. The soul should be given as many other souls as possible, to provide it with pleasure and service and to act as a retinue.

It is difficult to associate this with a view that the soul always remains on Earth and holds court in the grave, or whizzes around in the air, or even enters a fetish. Hence we see in fact that primitive peoples who really believe that souls remain on Earth until the Earth itself is destroyed do generally also resort to dwelling places for souls that do not belong to the Earth itself. And the sun and moon, followed by the stars, have been pre-eminently suitable for this purpose. The observation that these celestial bodies are also regarded as fetishes and worshipped accordingly (p. 39 ff) is therefore quite correct. At this point we can speak of a ‘hereafter.’ But primitive peoples recognize a hereafter anyway, as either a city of the dead, or an underworld, or a world beyond the horizon or above the sky. People such as the Dayak in Borneo have cities of the dead. The extensions of these would be lands of the dead. And Frobenius writes, ‘Not only does the land of the dead very often lie in the place from which the tribe once came, but the events occurring on the journey of the soul correspond to the events of their past migration. Hence, the souls of these peoples (i.e., of the Oceanians), who once came over the ocean in a boat,

-----File: 085-----

drift across the water in the boat into the land of the deceased.' This is why, writes Frobenius, in Oceania the dead are often laid to rest in canoes, a practice incidentally also customary among American Indians. In a quote from Grimm's 'Deutschen Mythologie' (*German Mythology*), the Aesir 'brought the corpse of Balder onto a ship, where they built and lit the funeral pyre, and then they entrusted it to the surging lake.' And even as late as the tenth century North Germanic peoples were cremating the bodies of their sea heroes on their own ships. There is also an account from Russia of a case where the body of a high-ranking person was cremated in a boat, and with him, alongside horses and dogs, young girls were also burnt to death. A restive troublemaker that is an irksome spirit from the Nicobar Islands is caught in the spirit basket; it is laid on a ghost ship and rowed out to sea. Charon's death boat and the Egyptian ship of the dead are certainly familiar in mythology. Meanwhile, souls are also conveyed into the hereafter by birds, a belief familiar to the ancient Greeks, whose harpies and sirens are birds of the dead (or soul birds), just as even the cock can be a bird of the dead for them. The Greeks gradually humanized the bird of the dead to some degree in first giving it human limbs, and then, conversely, a human head, and sometimes elements of wondrous beauty. The primitive peoples have kept with the simple bird form, but often with the addition of something human. If Yelch, the raven, is a bird of the dead for the peoples of North America, as Frobenius writes, it can also be a human in bird's clothing (p. 62). By the same token, Māui takes the souls of those of high rank up into the sun. But he has also become associated with birds, for on his journeys he turns into a bird as often as into any other animal. I shall juxtapose two images: a Greek harpy or siren with a soul as εἴδωλον on her arm, and a northwest American Indian bird of death, carrying a man with the soul fleeing out of his mouth. In the second of these two representations the soul is depicted as a snake (p. 45), which slips out of the mouth of the man.

-----File: 086-----

Death boats are also a familiar custom in Africa. According to a legend among the Ewe people on the northern coast of Guinea, the dead are transported across the River Volta by ferry spirits. But conclusions on birds of the dead can only be drawn from sacrifices of cocks and hens at all the festivals held to commemorate the dead and at some fetish festivals. The crow is the bird of the dead for Australian aborigines; people of this race also recognize something of the death boat. Incidentally, Frobenius uncovers a connection between the death boat and the bird of the dead, in that he establishes that it is not uncommon for death boats to be furnished with birds' beaks and other bird attributes.



Nevertheless, where is the land of the dead in the hereafter? In the opinion of Frobenius the soul follows the sun, as with the Egyptians. Consequently, the hereafter would be in the land of the sunset. But, as mentioned earlier, the sun itself is also an abode of the spirit, according to the legends of the Tahitians and the Bushmen. Barotse people are said to have explained a corona around the sun to Livingstone as follows: 'The Bavimo (souls) are holding a Pitsho (assembly); don't you see the lord (sun) in the center?' 'When sunshine is accompanied by rain, according to the Dahomey people, the souls are going to market.' The Ewe people believe the land of the dead to be a sand flat on the River Volta. Some American Indian tribes believe the land of the dead lies far away in the west.

-----File: 087-----

At the border every soul is met by its waiting relatives and fellow tribesmen and finds an abundance of game to hunt and rivers to fish in this land. Yet others have the souls travelling along the Milky Way as birds, and they suppose their abode to be above the sky. The Melanesians call the land of the dead Mbulu and describe the destinies of the soul on their journey there. Ladies will be interested to hear that the souls of unmarried women endure quite particularly bad treatment; Nangga-Nangga, a spirit of the dead, lifts them up and hurls them against a rock, to shatter them to pieces. But they will find it even less pleasant to hear that for this reason widows in the Fiji Islands were strangled so that they could depart at the same time as their husbands. If a man's wife died he put a piece of his beard into her armpit, to take along with her as proof that she was his wife. The soul swims to the true hereafter, or sails there on an invisible boat. But it is almost exclusively the souls of those of high rank who succeed in this; those of the *misera plebs* perish on the long, hazardous journey or return to Earth, where they wander about aimlessly. The Teutonic tribes also believe the way into the hereafter involves crossing a body of water. Jacob Grimm quotes several examples of this in his 'Deutsche Mythologie' (*German Mythology*). A Swedish folk legend tells of a golden ship that lies sunken near the Schlüsselberg at Runemad; it is believed that on this ship Odin took the slain from Bråvalla to Valhalla. A stranger puts the body of Sinfiölti, Sigmund's son, into a boat and casts off. The people of Franconia believe the land of the dead lies in what is now Britain; the souls of the deceased are taken over there by those who live on the shores, who in return are exempted from all imposts. The ferrymen see no one, and notice only that their rowing boats are full when they push off in them at midnight. After arrival they feel the boats gradually relieved of their load and hear a voice asking each his individual name and homeland. Legends of this kind must also have been known to the Celts, as stories reminiscent of them are still

circulating in Brittany today. We hear from the Celtic Arthurian circle that the Demoiselle d'Escalot requests of Lancelot du Lac ‘que son corps fût mis en une nef, richement équippée, que l'on laisserait aller au gré du vent sans conduite’ (*‘that her body be put in a boat, richly furnished, which would be let go as the wind pleased without navigation’*). I have quoted this here just because I shall refer to it again later. I do not think the Greek legend of the crossing on Charon’s bark quite belongs in this grouping, as this journey is made when the soul is already in the underworld, although prior to the spirit reaching its abode.

Quite different from this, but again broadly in harmony with other widely held concepts of the abode of the soul, is what Bastian recounts about the hereafter in the beliefs of the Māori, which reads almost like a shortened Dantesque description of hell. As noted above, the Earth consists of ten strata. The uppermost stratum is the Earth itself. The next stratum belongs to the realm of the roots and tubers. The third stratum, Reinga, where Hine-nui-te-pō, the goddess of night, also lingers, is where the true realm of the dead commences. Up to that point the souls are still viable and sentient; they can return to Earth and still wreak much havoc there. But now their powers begin to diminish ever more. In the fifth stratum the soul may already have become a pale shadow; afterwards it falls into the hands of the vengeful goddess Rohe, originally Māui’s wife, and is killed. If it still manages to escape, the soul reaches the sixth and seventh strata with ever-diminishing powers. Few stagger into the eighth stratum, where some of them are destroyed by the god Meru, and even fewer reach the ninth, to tumble from there into the final stratum, meto (= stench of death), where everything comes to an end. ‘These were the prospects after death, that is to say, even more bleak than Odysseus found among his brothers in arms in Hades,’ writes Bastian. The entrance to this underworld was to be found on New Zealand’s North Island, on the North Cape; the path is believed to lead back westward again. Even the Australians regard the hereafter as more pleasant: the good go to the good spirits, the evil to the evil ones.

-----File: 089-----

Or else souls may sit in trees or linger in a cave. For the uncultured Malays the way into the hereafter leads over or under the sea, and they need to be armed with weapons, and accompanied by attendants supplied with money for bribes to enable them to conquer the dangers of spirits and hounds of hell before they find their way to paradise. Or those who die a natural death go north and then stay in a forest there, 'where the trees turn into cabins at nightfall.' There they live 'on the invisible parts of animals, and rice and the offerings of their relatives,' the latter of which occurs everywhere. Those who die an unnatural death, in battle or childbirth, go to the gods.

If we interpret the question of the fate of the soul after death in ethical terms, it must strike us how different the answers are. The beliefs of the Māori, totally bleak and lacking in hope, are in sharp contrast to the almost amusing beliefs of the American Indians. 'So much seems to be established,' writes Spieß in his extensive work 'Vorstellungen vom Zustande nach dem Tode' (*Conceptions of the post-death state*), 'that all the elements of terror or fear of the other world were alien to the original religion of the American Indians. We encounter only odd traces of a necessary or a supposed purification and retribution. But for the most part the difference between good humans and bad consists only in the former managing to cross the lake or river they have to traverse before entering the other world without any difficulty at all, while the latter either drown in the water or sink up to their chins in it, where they struggle in vain for all eternity to reach the enticing shore nearby, or else only make their way to the shore after great exertion.' Hence, the absence of any gain is the punishment. (The torments of Tantalus!) Incidentally, Schiller fittingly portrayed the Indian hereafter in 'Nadowessier's Death Song.' Between these two concepts there lie conciliatory views, such as that of the Eskimo people, in which the souls of the good go down into the warm earth, while those of the wicked go up into the icy sky. This is a very interesting inversion of

our own conceptions, interpreted in terms of the character of the land the Eskimo inhabit, entirely corroborated by the caution of Carus Sterne (Ernst Krause) against explaining myths without regard for living conditions. A corresponding inversion was observed among the earlier Negro slaves in America. While a free Negro in Africa seeks the joyful hereafter in the west, for a Negro slave in America this hereafter is in the east, in Africa, and many killed themselves in yokes that were so tight they suffocated in order to return to Africa and to live free there as souls (p. 43). It cannot be denied that some primitive peoples do adopt the idea of harsh punishment for the wicked in the hereafter or on the way there, and reward for the good. But they define good and evil in their own way. And, all being well, this boils down to the brave and the cowardly, as with the Teutons. In most cases this fits very badly with 'good' as defined in our concepts. Add to this the obvious preferential treatment, even in the hereafter, for those of high rank, a trace of which is preserved in the works of Homer, where, even if Achilles is indeed a shadow in Hades, he is still a superior among the shadows, to create a sharp distinction between paradise and hell for primitive peoples and those same concepts among more civilized ones. But in conceptual terms it does not depend on this; the idea is the determinant here, not how it agrees with our view.

Primitive peoples are much less concerned about where they spend their time before the beginning of life than they are about the fate of the soul after death. Everything connected with the transmigration of souls will be discussed later, as such a concept exists among primitive peoples only inasmuch as souls can proceed at will, by themselves, from one body into another. But even this is sufficient to convince us that they were previously on Earth and have now returned. For this reason many legends tell of humans who have lingered in the hereafter, and then, having made their way back to Earth, have been able to give a complete description of the afterlife. Some of these descriptions run a course like the legend of Orpheus and Eurydice, such as a very lovely story of an American Indian,

-----File: 091-----

who, when his beloved died, followed her into the hereafter, but was sent back to Earth by the great spirit. And I have read somewhere that a European who took a Negro girl as his wife was totally unsuccessful in persuading her that she had not previously lived on Earth with the same name and in the same circumstances. This is not the metempsychosis we know well, but rather a resurrection better befitting primitive peoples. Meanwhile, souls also reach Earth in another way: to be precise, this fits with what Frobenius calls the law of inversion. The same means that convey the soul into the hereafter also bring it on to the Earth. Hence, birds in particular are also seen as the bringers of souls. The people of Tonga and Samoa believe that Tuli, as a bird, brings souls into human bodies – indeed, even for worms. According to a tale told in New Zealand, once a huge bird swooped down over the sea and, in so doing, dropped an egg; out of the egg came ‘an old man and an old woman, a boy and a little girl with a dog and a pig in an old canoe, who landed on the coast of New Zealand.’ Malays in Sumatra tell of so much living force dwelling within birds that the entire Earth, along with everything that lives in it, was produced from one single bird. Another legend pertinent here is one told in Australia in which the sun was originally an emu’s egg. A small bird readied it and threw it into the air, where it grew bright. This is why birds and their blood serve as sacrifices and form part of symbolic acts symbolizing the giving of life and fertilization, so even images of fetishes can be endued with life when a chicken is lowered into their interior, or bird’s blood is brushed on them (remember that it is in the blood that the soul resides), or bird’s feathers are wound round them. In Africa bridal couples are brushed with bird’s blood to make them fertile, and bird’s eggs are sunk in the ground in fields, to ensure that these yield as many crops as possible. And we only need to be reminded of our friend the stork.

-----File: 092-----

SECOND CHAPTER.

Religious views of the world and of life among the highly civilized peoples

15. The highly civilized peoples seen as primitive populations.

It can scarcely be subject to doubt that peoples who have reached a high level of civilization, whether in the past or in recent times, were once in the position of the more primitive peoples. Yet we find that from the very beginning of their history, when most of the highly civilized peoples come into view they are apparently already in possession of a fully developed culture. It is one of the great mysteries of the development of humankind that the Egyptians, for example, stand there, at a stroke, as a people exactly as history has known them for several millennia. Brugsch has produced evidence of this with respect to their entire system of religion and myths. We know it also applies to their skillfulness, and for life at the national and social level. And to us, in the moment when the first hieroglyph is written, there it stands, completed, except for trivialities about design and construction. How people learned hieroglyphics, and how their buildings, carvings, paintings, institutions of the nation and of life in general and their suppositions about God and the world began and developed, are things we do not know. We have to accept that the Egyptians took thousands of years to attain the level of culture which the first and the last accounts describe in almost the same way. Why do we have no information at all about these thousands of years? We do not know. There the Egyptian people are, ready-made, as if they had been suddenly created as such. They could have arrived in the region just at the moment in time when the first king was reigning, and the first building was being constructed. But nothing is told about this; on the contrary, we have the impression of Egypt always having been inhabited by the Egyptians, and nowhere else do we find any trace of them perhaps having been in other countries earlier. And yet

-----File: 093-----

we know from prehistoric finds in Egypt that in remote antiquity, perhaps ten or twenty thousand years ago, people in the Nile Valley lived at a very low level of cultural civilization. Were these the earliest Egyptians? Excavations in recent decades have led to similar findings among the Babylonians, the Phoenicians, the Israelites, and even the ancient Greeks. It is as if about five to six thousand years ago humankind suddenly chanced upon the idea of writing and leaving behind monuments, so robustly constructed that they would survive until our times. Is this the invention of a man or of a number of enlightened men? Or how else are we to interpret this? As evidence that the writings of the Old Testament cannot have been composed in very early history Max Müller presents the fact that one of the oldest inscriptions in a Semitic language in our possession, the famous one from the time of the Edomite king Mesa, only dates back to approximately 900 BC. But if a king is already having such inscriptions produced, he must be assuming that people generally know how to read them, and that the art of writing must have almost become a shared public asset. And how many centuries must that have taken after the art of writing had been devised! Our own experience leads us to say at least ten centuries, if not more.

This compels us to accept that the cultures of such peoples existed far back beyond historical time, when we possess no information on them from this extrapolated time and also have no exact explanation for why such information is not in our possession. There is no question as to whether the development of humankind can be dismissed with a simple formula. Individuals will obviously disturb the course of this formula, and wherever this course might take people, but only after centuries or millennia, an individual person can shift them there by persuasion or by force. But even if we can speak only in terms of averages, it is still certain that conditions must have been cruder, or even downright crude, unless we are willing to abandon every thought of a development of humankind..

This is because it requires a certain level of culture for an individual to be able to exert a successful influence. And there has been sufficient time for this, considering that humanity as such has, even in comparison with modern-day savages living at the lowest cultural level, existed for at least twenty thousand years – probably very much longer – as scientists are already on the trail of Tertiary Man. We are also familiar with peoples who have developed to a highly civilized level, such as the Teutons, Poles and Lithuanians.

We are not in a position to establish a boundary between primitive people and civilized human beings; the period of the primitive state flows like an ever-narrowing river into that of established culture. And one might even say that when this river goes below a certain volume it does not drop any further at all, and, indeed, even becomes broader again, after decreasing greatly in depth and width. It is more by instinct than by definition that we sense which peoples are civilized and which are primitive. The general impression is the deciding factor; in the detail, even the most civilized people can retain pure manifestations of nature in their culture. Hence, the naturalist's thinking on culture will differ from that of the philosopher or the theologian, or the economist or the man of letters and so forth, while anyone who abhors war and the destruction of human life will think differently from someone who sees glory and anything befitting human dignity in his life of warfare. Any attempt to specify a characteristic trait for culture would entangle us in a mesh of contradictory beliefs from which we could not extricate ourselves. Even what is apparently the most self-evident – moral elevation and respect for the image of God and for God's creatures – would founder, since we see the greatest depravity and vileness entirely compatible with what we have to call culture, just as it was at the courts of the first Roman emperors and of the three rulers preceding Louis XVI of France. It also suffices for our purposes if we accept as civilized peoples those named as such elsewhere. Our reflections here do not center on whether we incorporate a particular people to a greater or lesser degree into the domain of culture.

-----File: 095-----

It is only in one regard, history, that we need to exercise caution in this work. Mistaken national pride – in particular, vanity – among genuinely civilized peoples has led particular nations to push the beginning of their culture back as far as possible into the darkest times, an aside to the peculiar endeavors of some dynasties to trace back their lineage at least as far as the Trojans. Lippert is of the opinion that, to salvage for their people a kind of ancient Aryan mythology with the associated elevated concepts, Slavic authors did not even shrink from amending documents. I have no opinion on this. But on reading what is probably the most comprehensive work on Slavic mythology, written by Hanusch, I also marveled at the energy and skill with which he found connections with the ancient Indian religion everywhere, even as far as the names, while today even the greatest scholars are still struggling to establish proof of one or two names of gods being common to the Aryans, or at least to the majority of them. The situation is similar with the Hungarians, when they were accredited with monotheism and every fine virtue while, like the wildest horde of savages, they made murder, burning and desecration rife across Germany, Italy and France. Even we Germans are not free of such chauvinism; many sins have been committed in our country with regard to the ancient Teutons, and still more are being committed today. But we do have Tacitus as chief witness. Anyone wishing to write about the views of different people to life and the world has so many nationalistic exaggerations to wrestle with that he will ultimately be stripped of almost any capacity for critical judgement. We are presented with a curious example of almost astonishing chauvinism in the otherwise brilliantly written book by Chamberlain ‘Foundations of the nineteenth century’.

16. Universal religious approaches among highly civilized peoples within the domain of mankind.

We previously took classical polytheism and monotheism as the norm for human

-----File: 096-----

religious approaches and regarded the perceptions of ‘savages’ more as a curiosity, or sheer lunacy. But the growing development of ethnology and anthropology has seen a change of events that has led a number of scholars to opt for the perceptions of savages as the points of departure for the higher approaches to the world and to life, and to derive the latter from the former. The most consistent system to follow this course was devised by Lippert. Over several of his books he attempts to establish how, in the period of time for which history tells us about them, almost all civilized peoples have for the most part embraced a conscious or unconscious belief in souls and deceased ancestors. It could be said that the facts presented by this very distinguished scholar to substantiate his view are from one aspect, however, overwhelming. It is quite impossible to escape their conclusiveness that belief in souls or ancestors occurs in all the religions of the civilized peoples and plays a role of greater or lesser importance in them. In previous sections I cited, by way of comparison, some examples from the works of Lippert, Jacob Grimm and many others. And this comparison, while not providing the full picture, does show how the same ideas occur in broad prevalence all over the world. But, as we see with the implementation of any new idea, I think Lippert and his followers often go too far in considering religious views that include belief in souls and ancestors to be depleted, and regarding every further thought people might have had as having emerged from these earlier views. This question intensifies into a two-part one: can polytheism develop from belief in souls and ancestors, and can monotheism also only arise from polytheism? I shall address this double question later. But Lippert endeavors to demonstrate the existence of a cult of souls and ancestors everywhere, either as existing alone, or as the sole foundation of views of life and the world developing later, or as continuing to exist alongside these views and often standing in for them. This is particularly dependent on what emerges from belief in souls and ancestors: it relies on the

-----File: 097-----

belief in the existence of soul figures (ghosts, water sprites, fairies, goblins, dwarfs, specters, evil spirits, ghosts, daemons, devils and so on), and the adoption of mineral, plant, animal and human fetishes, and of oracles; it is also dependent on the cult dedicated to all the aforementioned, including the customs associated with burial, cremation and graves, and also including the festivals held to commemorate the dead and souls, and also on human sacrifice and cannibalism, including the blood customs. This list will teach anyone who is familiar with the legends, fairy tales and customs of different peoples that no culture will prove itself free of every aspect redolent of primitive man. But what it relies on is evidence of the entirety, or of everything that is fundamental – the latter because custom or social advantage will reduce or eradicate some aspects, such as human sacrifice and cannibalism.

Now delving into the detail we see that Lippert writes off every other belief held by many civilized peoples in their historically heathen times as a belief in souls and ancestors. He says the Lithuanians lack a true belief in gods; accounts of them merely indicate a pure cult of souls and ancestors. And Lippert maintains that it is inconceivable that if a people who were converted to Christianity less than six hundred years earlier had possessed a doctrine of a god or gods this belief could have faded so completely from their memory in such a short time, and that not even chroniclers or missionaries had written about such a doctrine. Of the two deities that were definitely passed on to the Lithuanians, Perkūnas and Žemyna, the former is thought probably to be of northern Germanic origin and therefore imported, while the pedigree of the latter is uncertain.

Lippert holds the same view of approaches to the world and life among the heathen Slavs. One particularly interesting aspect here is provided by his remarks on the most well-known Slav cult, i.e., that of Svantovit on the island of Rügen. The meticulous description of this cult given by Saxo Grammaticus provides Lippert with the lever necessary to see in the cult of Svantovit nothing other than an ancestor being venerated in the way primitive peoples do, and hence not really a god of the sky or of light, as he has been understood to be by others from the first syllable of his name, which means light, or the world. He explains this name as meaning

‘he of the people of Swantow,’ which could equally denote a family or a family-based community. And for him a mainstay of this view is the oracle associated with the cult, in which a horse, Svantovit’s steed, plays the main role. The horse oracle is a concept also known in Teutonic mythology. Tacitus gives an explanation of this, indicating that none of their other oracles enjoys such great trust, as they consider them (the horses) to be the ‘confidants of the gods.’ Accordingly, the horse is interpreted as a kind of animal fetish. But we should compare this with what the Slavic mythographers teach. Thus, in the perceptions of the Slavs Hanusch finds consonance with the most elevated doctrines of the Indians and Iranians. For him, the Trimurti of Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva correspond to Perun-Proven, Radegast and Porenut (as the good principle, like the goddess Shiva, with the goddesses Morana and Ubijica as the pernicious principle) forming the unity of three gods that is Triglav. For the Prussians the three equivalent gods are Perkun, Potrimbo and Pikollo. Indeed, the concurrence reaches such a level of detail that Perun tallies with the physical Brahma and Proven with the spiritual Brahma, Perun-Proven represents the physical and spiritual deity of light, Radegast appears in the same incarnations (avatars) as Vishnu, and the characteristics of Shiva to preserve or destroy the world are shown in corresponding deities! The identical nature of this and Iranian conceptions is thought to be represented in Belobog and Zcerneboch: the former Ormazd, the latter Ahriman. The White God and the Black God are of course Slavic forces, corresponding to the Iranian dualism, but with nowhere near such elevated significance as Ormazd and Ahriman; they differ little from the good spirit and the evil spirit, but the congruence is nonetheless worthy of note. Svantovit and particular manifestations of him such as Swenteboh, Witislaw, Harowit, Rugiewit, Porewit, Jutreboh and so forth (some of whom are gods of peace, others gods of the day and times of the day, or gods of the morning and evening star) emanate from Belobog, the god of light; Wrag and Zlyboh emerge from Zcerneboch. Scholars are attempting to establish what is applicable in this parallelization, not only in terms of the characteristics of the deities but also with regard to corresponding festivals

-----File: 099-----

celebrated by the Iranians and the Slavs. It is still claimed that to a certain degree the Slavic approaches to the world and to life represent a fusion of those of the Indian and Iranian peoples. For the Prussians and Lithuanians Ausca is believed to denote the deity of light and Puschkayts the deity of darkness. And the well-known Indian goddesses are placed in parallel with Lithuanian ones: Maya = Laima, Lakshmi = Lada, Parvati-Bhawani = Liethua (Slavic Baba), Saraswati = Percunatele, and Kali = Niola. Hanusch also acknowledges that there are actually Slavic elements in the Slavic teachings about gods. And these are thought to relate to a transposition into nature of the more abstract concepts that originally denoted those deities, and thus to refer to the ancient Indian and Iranian conceptions becoming material in a certain manner. 'In the consciousness of the Slavs the external side of nature (ὕλη) was the true being and was endowed with a universal spirit, which appeared in the particular outward individuals as an individual spirit. But this spirit was nothing other than a personification of the life process for which people's mental understanding was, according to the analogy, of something not endowed with a soul.' This sounds almost as if it were written in the spirit of animism. Another thing that falls under this topic is recognition of earthly (and underground) deities alongside ones that live over the Earth and acknowledgement of the existence of an anthropomorphic process with respect to the deities (those of the sun, the moon, the stars, the weather and so on); this anthropomorphism plays a seemingly fitting role in countless legends and songs. All this boils down to a form of worship of nature, with forces of nature possessing varying degrees of power, and with an incalculable multitude of good and evil spirits; this host of spirits is associated with worship of protective spirits for all the particular circumstances and activities in life. But all this does lie far from the belief in souls and ancestors that is all Lippert would concede for the Slavs. According to Hanusch, the Slavs also believed in souls of the deceased being present in the form of ghosts and daemons. They sometimes even treated souls as truly primitive peoples did, giving them greetings to pass on to those who had died previously, recommending that they should conduct themselves in a convivial manner towards each other and so forth. Their deities are, however, neither

souls nor ancestors. I do not know how to untangle this discrepancy: how much unfounded and forced conjecture may occur even in adaptations of Slavic mythology written by Slavic authors, so everything can be outrageously contrived. What argues against this is that no objection can be raised to the dualism of Belobog-Zcerneboch, as it is too well attested by authors and still extant legends and ballads. Hanusch wrote too little about cults (and customs), while Lippert wrote too little about mythology. On consideration of both, i.e. cult and mythology, we will probably be more inclined to attribute the conceptions of primitive peoples to the heathen Slavs and Lithuanians, although these will be accompanied by ideas that are not less elevated. Whether the latter are a vestige of the earlier connection with Indians and Iranians, as Hanusch contends, or whether they developed later, is something we cannot know.

It is of course even more difficult with the Teutons. In Chapter 21 of Book VI of his 'Bellum Gallicum' (*Commentaries on the Gallic War*) Caesar makes a very dismissive comment about their religious approach: 'Deorum numero eos solos ducunt quos cernunt et quorum aperte opibus juvantur, Solem Vulcanum et Lunam, reliquos ne fama quidem acceperunt' (*They rank in the number of the gods those alone whom they behold, and by whose instrumentality they are obviously benefited, namely, the sun, fire, and the moon; they have not heard of the other deities even by report*). Hence, they revere only things they can see, and things from whose power they evidently draw benefits: the sun, fire, the moon. That would of course be purely the viewpoint of a primitive man who also understands everything purely in physical terms and offers gifts to it only if he is given a more substantial gift in return. But Tacitus has a considerably higher opinion of the Teutons. He is admittedly writing 150 years after the Teutons had adopted much in terms of culture, except that he also presents very old, indigenous material, using Teutonic designations several times at least. In the second chapter of his work 'Germania' (*original title De origine et situ Germanorum, or On the Origin and Situation of the Germanic Peoples*) he writes that the Teutons celebrated in old songs 'Deum Tuisconem, terra editum, et filium Mannum originem gentis conditoresque' (*an earth-born god, Tuisco, and his son Mannus, as the origin of their race, as their founders*), and tells of how Mannus had three sons, from whom the three renowned main German tribes of his time came about. Therefore

-----File: 101-----

the Teutons are, in all events, descendants of Tuisco and Mannus. Jacob Grimm's opinion of Mannus is 'No name can sound more German.' But what this name means in terms of the ideal is a source of controversy. The great mythologist ascribes to it a deeper sense, as denoting 'a thinking being, conscious of itself.' 'But Mannus is the first hero, the son of God and father of all humans,' and he places him in parallel with Manu in India, who, according to one version, at Brahma's behest, was believed to have created all the creatures, gods, Asuras and humans, along with all worlds, with everything that moves and everything that does not move. The Teutonic Mannus would therefore be a highly elevated being. But how does this fit with his father Tuisco, who himself emerged from the Earth, and so is a kind of earth spirit? There is uncertainty about his name, and there consequently exist many interpretations of this god. The most elevated of these interpretations relates to heaven and puts him on a level with Uranus in accordance with his meaning and status, and alongside Zeus with regard to his name (Tivisco or Tuisco). The Earth then plays the role of Gaea, who is also said to have given birth to Uranus and Pontus. Lippert naturally opts for the least elevated interpretation. Another possible variant is Tiusco (cf Tuisco). Grimm puts this interpretation together with Tivisco, which is precisely what results in the aforementioned highest level of significance. In etymological terms Lippert feels 'Geist' (*spirit*) is more appropriate as the German term for this. And where Mannus is interpreted simply as 'man,' Tyr becomes his protecting spirit, and therefore that of all Teutons, and Tiusco means a 'spirit being,' just as Mannisco is a 'man creature,' a 'human being.' This would bring us back to an ancestor and his soul.

Tacitus goes on to say 'Deorum maxime Mercurium colunt' (*Among the gods they worship Mercury the most*). A seemingly quite complete hypothesis by this scholar would be that this Mercury was a livestock-protecting spirit, as some Teutons still lived by nomadic livestock husbandry, and there is nothing in more ancient Greek and Roman mythology to conflict with this interpretation. But Caesar also says that the highest god of the Celts was Mercury, and the Celts were not nomadic livestock breeders. Herodotus informs us that the Thracian kings honored Hermes above all gods and claimed to be descended from him. And

we will not be able to take livestock breeding to be the motive here either. It is, however, perhaps Caesar himself who gives the explanation: ‘Hunc omnium inventorem artium ferunt, hunc viarum atque itinerum ducem, hunc ad quaestus pecuniae mercaturasque habere vim maximam arbitrantur’ (*from Skaldic: They regard him as the inventor of all arts, they consider him the guide of their journeys and marches, and believe him to have great influence over the acquisition of gain and mercantile transactions*). And as Tacitus uses exactly the same phrase for the adoption of Mercury by the Teutons as Caesar does for that by the Celts (except with deorum in place of deum), he will probably also have had Caesar’s explanation in mind. As we know, Odin has been taken as the equivalent of Mercury since the writings of Paul the Deacon, and Caesar’s interpretation, which relates to a god of inventions, routes and trade, fits this to a certain extent. Tacitus may also have known that another of Odin’s tasks is to escort the deceased (the slain heroes) into his realm, hence acting a psychopomp, and that he is also a storm god, just as Hermes was originally a wind god for the Greeks. And this would also tally with Odin being the greatest god; in particular, human sacrifices are believed to have been offered to Mercury, as Tacitus recounts. Nevertheless, Lippert’s view is not necessarily incorrect on account of it involving an ancestor god, for everything that is specified as falling into the domain of this Mercury does not exceed what even a primitive person ascribes to a fetish of the highest level. Indeed, when we see how Jacob Grimm has provided so many examples as evidence that even in the Middle Ages the Germans still had a tendency to personify the ‘wish,’ in the fullest sense of the word, and that Odin is also a god of wishes, we will be all the more inclined to join Lippert’s side. Therefore it depends whether the Teutons ascribed to Odin-Mercury yet other attributes of a more elevated kind that can no longer be interpreted in terms of simple belief in souls and ancestors.

At one point in his writings Tacitus observes that the Teutons neither ‘confine the gods within walls, nor depict them in human form, due to the greatness of the gods; they sanctify clearings and groves to them. And it is with the names of gods that they name that secret thing which they view solely

-----File: 103-----

with awe (or timidity).' If the above words in expanded type are spoken from the sense as understood by the Teutons, the argument must be considered settled. However, many have postulated that what Tacitus writes here about the gods was actually extracted from his own views. What else we know of Teutonic views of gods does not always speak in favor of such elevated notions. We do also know that, at least later in their history, the Teutons very probably possessed effigies of their deities made of wood, stone or metal; there are a great number of accounts of this. It is interesting to read what Tacitus himself tells of the goddess Nerthus, whom he describes as Mother Earth. The site of her cult (believed to be in the vicinity of Rügen) is a pristine grove on which no one except the priest may set foot. A chariot in its entirety, complete with a robe (veste!) is said to lie there, covered over. The priest believes that the goddess is inside. At her festival the chariot is led around by cows in procession, and joy and peace prevail everywhere the goddess goes. Finally the priest leads the goddess, 'satiated with dealings with mortals,' back to her temple. Forthwith 'the chariot, the garments (vestes!) and, if you will believe it, the deity herself are washed in a concealed lake. There are attendants in waiting, and the lake swallows them up there and then.' Accordingly, the chariot must contain a cult object containing the goddess herself, as she is associating (Tacitus even says 'conversing') with the mortals and this tires her. Lippert interprets this object as a fetish. For a female god to be possible here is something that would freely emerge from the matrilinearity also familiar earlier to the Teutons. In addition, the Teutons took effigies and symbols with them into battle. Jacob Grimm describes these as objects represented in the form of figures, while Lippert refers to them as soul fetishes and objects appurtenant to fetishes. Of the other deities also named by Tacitus, Mars and Hercules are found anywhere that war and the heroic spirit prevail, represented by Castor and Pollux, a truly remarkable pair of brothers. But of course this is of no use at all to us. And

worship of Isis by some of the Suebi has also been cited. The Roman historian believes worship of Isis by the Suebi is imported, because, as at Roman festivals in honor of Isis, a ship is paraded around. But Jacob Grimm established that processions with ships still took place in the Middle Ages in Germany, and he conjectures that Isis is a German goddess and the ship something similar to the chariot of Nerthus. Lippert also alludes to the ship of the dead (p. 75). Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the view of Jacob Grimm that, as Tacitus so often and meaningfully speaks of God and the gods of the Teutons, sometimes in general and at other times in national and domestic terms, this, alongside other traditions and 'survivals,' does not allow for something that is merely a belief typical of primitive people. 'How can we,' he writes, ' having acknowledged everything else that we know about the language, the freedom, and the customs and virtues of the Teutons, hold on to the idea that they, lost in torpid fetishism, had prostrated themselves before blocks of wood and puddles and rendered crude worship to them?' Neither does Lippert see it in such low terms; belief in souls and ancestors can very probably coexist with a refined view of the world and of life. Worship of gods among the Teutons and their burial customs were by no means particularly innocuous; these burial customs are, as shown in many examples presented by Jacob Grimm, entirely founded on primitive perceptions of the soul. Hence we will not be able to get away from at least an element of beliefs in souls and ancestors, and also fetishism (Lippert cites several examples of trees to which sacrifices were presented), in the religion of the Teutons. We do know that even after they had adopted Christianity the people of Franconia still sacrificed humans at the Po crossing by hurling them into the river, and there are accounts of other similar atrocities resulting from belief in souls and fetishes.

Here we find no mention of the great Nordic and Teutonic hall of the gods. There can no longer be any doubt that this hall was also familiar to the true Teutons to some extent,

-----File: 105-----

although the accounts in the Edda bear very clear traces of advanced culture and knowledge of the world, and of the influence of Christianity. The Nordic myths reinforce the impression that the Teutons as a whole did have a higher religion in which nature was revered, in the sense of that of the Greeks and Egyptians, but that they also retained much from their primitive past. Tales of human sacrifices among the Scandinavians are recounted by Adam of Bremen, writing in the eleventh century, and taking as his source the accounts of a certain Sweyn Ulfsson, who spent twelve years at the court of the King of Sweden. In the grove at the temple at Uppsala, which was dedicated to Odin, Thor and Freyr, there sometimes hung the bodies of seventy or more sacrificed humans alongside those of dogs and other animals. Adam of Bremen says of this grove, 'is enim locus tam est sacra *gentibus*, ut *singular* arbores *eius* ex morte vel cibo immolatorum divinae credantur' (*This place is so sacred to the people that its individual trees are believed to be holy due to the deaths of those sacrificed or their putrefying corpses*). The trees were therefore regarded as divine (sanctified) due to these sacrifices and the food offerings made there. The gods were appeased with blood, and the priests themselves were also given the names of gods: Goda, Dior, Asar, anses (*half-gods*) – like living fetishes. There were sacred groves everywhere, as in other parts of the world, singly and composed in the most diverse ways possible. We are familiar with the firm belief of the Scandinavians that after a courageous life they would continue in the most joyous existence with drink, food and weapon play in Valhalla. But people must also have believed that life could continue for the dead in graves. In the Lay of Harbard in the Elder (Poetic) Edda, where Thor suffers such ridicule from Harbard (Greybeard) the ferryman, that Thor asks his tormentor where he acquired such satirical skill, and Harbard replies: 'I learned it from men, those age-old men who live in the hills of the homeland.' At this Thor sneers, 'The way you give the graves charming names, calling them hills of the homeland.' Necromancy was practiced widely. In the Lay of Hyndla, Freyja summons the wise woman Hyndla out of the grave to prophesy for her. Richard Wagner no doubt used these ideas to create the tempestuous and tremendous first scene of the third act of Siegfried. Magic and witchcraft thrived in Scandinavia, even more so than in

Germany, and must occasionally have developed into a truly calamitous phenomenon, as a number of kings had hundreds of people who turned these practices into a profession burnt to death. Forests, mountains, water and caves teemed with ghosts and daemons. Most of these were believed to be of a malicious nature. But every Scandinavian also had a protective spirit (Vættr), a 'guide,' fylgja, the importance of which corresponded to that of the man to which it belonged. Nevertheless, these people were strikingly fatalistic-minded: 'No one can preserve himself against his fate' has countless variations in songs. This is not conceived in terms of the beliefs of primitive man. But on the other hand it must be described as redolent of primitive perceptions when the gods, as so often occurs, occupy positions barely higher than those of the more powerful humans. In the Rune Song forming part of Hávamál in the Edda Odin speaks of himself in the same tone as a magician of the runes would speak. He recounts how he hung in a tree (probably the world ash tree Yggdrasil) for nine nights, without food or drink. Up there he learned the art of the runes and then fell down. And then he lists everything he knows how to accomplish by means of these runes: relief against tribulations and epidemics, how to blunt and to take the edge off enemy weapons, freedom for those who are enchained, life for the slain and so forth. And what a profusion of human depravity among the Aesir and Ásynjur is contained in the Lokasenna, the defamatory song sung by Loki in the Edda. There the gods and goddesses appear to be even lower than in the Ring of the Nibelung; Wagner elevated them. It seems as if the southern Teutons did indeed have higher concepts of their deities than their Nordic brothers. But ballads such as the Lokasenna have often been regarded as a conscious foundation to the extremely tragic 'Götterdämmerung,' or Twilight of the Gods.

Not much has been handed down to us about the Celts. In Caesar's writings we read of the druids teaching the people that the soul does not perish, but travels into another body after the person has died. We find the same concept in the writings of Diodorus Siculus, but he adds, 'It is due to this idea that some people throw letters they have written to their deceased fathers, mothers or relatives into the fire at funerals,

-----File: 107-----

supposing the dead will read these letters.' Caesar also recounts how not only objects and animals, but also slaves and children under the guardianship of the deceased were cremated along with them in their funeral rites. The Gauls also lent money, to be paid back in the hereafter, where they thus lived just as they had in this life. In the Pharsalia Lucan also expresses this quite clearly:

... You preach against it, that the shadows of men never
Seek to travel to silent Erebus, nor will they see
Pluto's twilight land, which governs the limbs of the same
Spirit yet in another world: death abides – if your song be true –
There in the midst of your lives.

All this is certainly purely reminiscent of the perceptions of primitive people. The belief that the world was created or raised from the depths, or from the sea, by three druids, also falls under this topic. What the situation was with the deities Teutates, Hesus, Cernunnos, Taranis, Belis or Belenus, Ogmios, Andraste and many others is something we have no means of knowing. Caesar tells us that the Gauls worshipped Mercury, Apollo, Mars, Jupiter and Minerva. This does nothing to serve our purposes. We do, however, know that they regarded the deities as having emerged from matter, and that they also made offerings to rivers, springs, mountains and trees. And the worship offered to them was filled with such horrors that, after failing to make it less extreme by any means, the Emperor Claudius had to suppress it entirely. Nevertheless, the Gauls must have been at quite a high level of culture, as Caesar and others tell us so much about their towns, temples, schools and knowledge. What is recounted by the ancient Gaelic bards and what we read in the works of Ossian has, due to its at least questionable authenticity, had to be disregarded here. Incidentally, I have addressed some of this elsewhere in this work.

We are compelled to continue the circuit through the civilized peoples. The Greek religious approach has been made subject to thorough examination from every aspect. Characteristics of belief in souls and ancestors, and also of fetishism, have undoubtedly been present in it, particularly in earlier times and among more remote groups

of people. In the works of Homer the soul leads its life quite like it does for the primitive peoples: it flees out of the gaping wound in haste, it goes under the ground like steaming breath, it appears in dreams to beseech the dreamer for a burial for the body and to find repose for itself, it drinks blood and thereby gains earthly recollection and power, and it is given offerings and human sacrifices. Even until quite recently, clothing, jewelry and weapons were still put into the grave for the deceased person.

> To your wife the whole host of servants bear
> In their hands her jewelry, in which the dead delight

says the chorus to Admetus in Euripides' play 'Alcestis.' And a comprehensive description of all the death gifts presented is given by Atossa in 'The Persians' by Aeschylus. Lucian scoffs at how so much is given to the dead to take along with them, or cremated with them, as if they could make any use of it in the hereafter. And in 'The Trojan Women' by Euripides, Hecuba, who through overwhelming misfortune has become inclined to doubt, says to the attendants as she arranges the funeral of her brutally slaughtered grandson Astyanax:

> Go, bury now in his poor tomb the dead,
> Wreathed all duly as befits a corpse.
> And yet I deem it makes but little difference to the dead,
> Although they get a gorgeous funeral;
> For this is but a cause of idle pride to the living.[5]

And yet the same Hecuba believes that in the underworld his father, Hector, will heal the wounds of his son. So much inconsistency prevails in a topic that is indeed vague.

Tombs were also venerated in exceptional cases. Again from 'Alcestis,' the words of the chorus at the moving funeral are not merely poetic sentiment:

> Her tomb let none regard as the graves of those who dad and gone,
> But let her have honors equal with the gods,
> Revered by every traveler;
> And many a one will cross the road and read this verse aloud,
> "This is she that died in days gone by to save her lord;
> Now is she a spirit blest.
> Hail, lady revered; be kind to us!"[6]

-----File: 109-----

is not just poetic sensation. The same chorus calls after the deceased Alcestis: 'Κούφα σοῖ χθὼν ἐπάνωθεν πέσοι,' 'sit tibi terra levis,' or 'May the earth be light for you,' as we still say today. I have already made mention of the soul phantom, εἴδωλον, and soul birds (p. 73 f). We know from Pausanias that the ancient Greeks even saw and venerated souls in snakes. We can see from the many transformations of humans into trees, bushes and rocks that fetishes were also commonplace. Furthermore, writers have borne sufficient witness to stones and posts being allegories of gods in early and more recent times, and sacrifices even being brought to them. But as far as the cult of ancestor worship is concerned, it was to this that Euhemerus attributed the entire Greek belief in gods. And, as is generally known, many other writers before and after him have, to a greater or lesser degree of completeness, done the same. The Greeks themselves have contributed to such overstatements, in that every dynasty of princes and every minor nation wanted to be descended from a deity if possible, or at least from a demigod, as the gods have been talked of in a manner that is really too human, and ultimately because divine honors were not infrequently conferred on the powerful on Earth. Add to this human sacrifice, which still took place until very recently, and which so strongly go against every truly elevated concept of a deity. And when a Themistocles or even a Caesar performs such sacrifices, one can in fact understand it in terms of their having given in to the urging of a people (or of an army). But it does tend to stick in the minds of a people. In the eerie first scene of Hecuba by Euripides the spirit of Polydorus says:

> For the son of Peleus, even Achilles, appeared above his tomb
> And stayed the whole host of Hellas,
> As they were making straight for home across the sea,
> Demanding to have my sister Polyxena offered at his tomb,
> And to receive his guerdon.[7]

And he was indeed favored with this sacrifice: the soul of Achilles gained his bride. Nevertheless, what relieves us of any further analysis is the fact that, no matter how humanly the gods might often behave in their ways of living,

their conduct, their feelings and their passions, they do still constitute real gods, not by any means just humans given greater powers, as has often been claimed. But in particular they are not ancestors, as the universal worship they enjoy would contradict this. Even though fables have told of Zeus being the king of Crete, and dying and lying buried there, there is nothing in Zeus as we know him that recalls this. Apollo and Artemis are gods despite being born of a mortal woman. This is linked to the emergence of myths and legends, which is not always prompted by religious perceptions. Some of these will originate from events occurring between people, particularly in princely dynasties, which were then transposed on to deities – at first consciously, and then later, when the people involved had been forgotten, unconsciously. We owe others to the power of poetic invention of the people en bloc and to that of individuals. There are yet others which have emerged from the personification of natural phenomena. After this the interpretation of the names of the deities, popular etymology, plays a significant role, in functions and influences being inferred from translation and transcription of the name (which may be done correctly or incorrectly) and stories then naturally becoming associated with these. Some legends will turn out to be sophisticated – or otherwise – figures of speech and feigned allegory. Finally, a great number of legends might be invented by way of explanation for customs and practices in life and in the cult, the origin and significance of which have been lost to memory, while others might be concocted to justify claims to people and property. The Greek legends and myths give us examples for everything, as do the legends and myths of other peoples. In the light of such a great variety of reasons for the emergence of myths and legends we cannot expect to obtain a homogeneous image. Hence, the Greek legends include the beautiful and the graceful alongside the ugly and the repulsive, the elevated next to the lowly and the deep-rooted beside the foolish and the ludicrous. But in many ways, we honor a people better if we derive their views from primitive conceptions than from allegories or interpretations of nature, and if we refrain from claiming

-----File: 111-----

wisdom that is no longer intelligible to us, as was previously the trend and sometimes becomes popular again even now.

For the Romans, belief in souls is even more open to public scrutiny than for the Greeks. Dii inferi, some given the particular designation of manes or lemures, are souls of deceased humans, conceived entirely in primitive terms, which dwell under the Earth. As larvae they inflict harm on humans, while as lares familiares they provide for the needs of the family in question. As is well known, the Romans attributed to every single thing, and hence also to every human individual, a spirit called a genius, which in the course of time gained more and more functions and finally signified everything that prompted a man into his actions in life. There was something divine about these genii, and accordingly they were revered within the family circle or, in the case of the genii of the gods, the ruling powers, the nation, the town, the local place, etc., were worshipped publicly, and oaths were sworn by them. I do not know whether the souls of humans are to be identified with the genii; some scholars do this. In any case we are dealing with an extensive belief and cult, which, whether it related to the genii, inferi, manes, larvae, lares, or whatever other names might have been used in practice, is closely associated with the general belief in souls and the cult of souls. The souls had to be placated in death, and this was done through entirely specific ceremonies and offerings; they were entitled to continual veneration from their family members. (Cicero writes of manium iura, the rights of the manes.) If this was not forthcoming, they wandered about restlessly on Earth, plotting bad things and doing evil. On three days of the year (24th August, 5th October and 8th November) the gate to the underworld, the mundus, was deliberately opened to the souls. This gate was a round hole situated in the center of the village or town, with a dome arching over it; the dome had an opening covered by a stone. The general offerings for the souls were put into this mundus, and into it were also hurled humans ‘who were to be protective spirits of the town.’ Because the people had once forgotten to give their offerings to the dead,

the dead left their graves and were heard whizzing through the streets of the town and its environs, until the offerings were brought to their graves, as recounted by Ovid. Hence, sorcerers were also able to raise souls into the upper world, a practice on which the Greeks had so much knowledge.

Another custom reminiscent of primitive beliefs is veneration of the fire in the family hearth, which was treated as if it were alive and given offerings. The Romans did by all means have a household cult (devoted to their penates, i.e., the souls and the home fire), which far surpassed the public cult in significance and constituted a cult typical of primitive people. And the same is no doubt true of the Greeks. How poignant is the supplication made by the slave girl to Alcestis, who is about to die, beside the fire in the hearth, which is treated as a goddess, for protection for the orphans who will be left behind:

> Do not let – as I now, their mother, must end –
> Them pass away before their time, but in great happiness
> In the land of our fathers let their lives fly in joy.

The religion of the Romans is composed of an extraordinary range of elements: heavenly gods, gods of the fields, mountains, forests, trees and springs, gods of the underworld, and gods for almost every occurrence and act in the life of individuals and of the population as a whole. In addition there are the countless soul gods and ancestor gods, as the manes are dii and can even reach heaven, like the souls of Romulus and the emperors. Scarcely any other nation (the Indians and the Japanese perhaps being the exceptions) has such a replete hall of gods filled with so great a variety of deities. And through it all we experience a kind of childlike innocence and artlessness, as we would observe in an elevated primitive belief. If Roman religion did not contain so much of the childish and the coarse, it would perhaps appear to us more like magnificent Greek myth.

Just how cautious one has to be in making assertions about the Egyptians, due to their bad habit of giving their words all kinds of mystical meanings, is something Brugsch demonstrates in his work ‘Religion und Mythologie der alten Ägypter’ (*Religion and mythology of the ancient Egyptians*). One can read the most elevated concepts into areas where there are really none at all,

-----File: 113-----

simply because a word with a high-level meaning is used where it is actually its most mundane meaning that is intended. And the opposite will also be the case. A second factor that makes it all the more difficult to assess Egyptian views of life and the world is their striking predilection for animal characteristics. Gods are depicted with the heads of frogs, snakes, rams, jackals, cats, sparrowhawks, falcons and so forth, or portrayed in the form of a complete animal, as a beetle, monkey, crocodile, etc., or occasionally even in a combination of several animals, e.g. Rā as a man, frog and ape all in one. And this occurs not only in images, but also in texts: the soul of Osiris is the ram of Mendes, and the souls of the gods are crocodiles, according to an inscription from the time of King Seti I. Geb, the god of the Earth, says of himself: 'I whistle like the falcon and I cackle like the goose.' Much of this, perhaps most of it, is to be interpreted in symbolic terms from the characteristics of animals or from their behavior towards natural phenomena. But some interpretation has to be based on theriomorphic conceptions, and on totemism, as the Egyptians did actually revere certain animals (not only Apis, worship of which is well known), and buried them with great ceremony when they died. Herodotus, who tells of this in great detail, knows why it took place, but does not explain for fear of the divine. On one occasion when he does indulge himself, he tells an absurd fairy tale about the ram's head of Amun (i.e., Zeus): Zeus had moved it forward so as not to reveal himself in his true form to Heracles, who by all means wanted to see him. We can scarcely take this as anything other than a concept at the level of primitive people. But according to Brugsch the Egyptians must have had a very high concept of god. The texts he cites are of critical importance. We shall return to these later. Alongside this the Egyptians also had a cosmogonic male-female double pair of gods known to Herodotus, which I discuss in my book, mentioned at several places above. Then there was a principal deity and an ennead of gods, the true objects of their worship: Rā (also called Atum, Ptah or Amun), Khons, Tefnut, Geb, Nut (and also Hathor), Osiris, Isis (and also Mut),

Seth, Nephthys and Horus. Each of these deities was often split according to their own distinctive tasks or manifestations, as with the sun deity's manifestations as the morning sun, midday sun, evening sun, summer sun and winter sun. It also worked the other way round: almost every god also adopted the tasks and manifestations of all the other gods and even unified them in himself, which then made him 'God.' But a curious thing is that the ennead was also interpreted to be a succession of prehistoric kings of Egypt, and hence of ancestors of the royal houses. Just as kings were allocated divinity, divinity was ascribed to kings, not merely as a matter of form, but with corresponding results. However, Herodotus was told by the Egyptian priests that these god-kings had never lived among the people.

But to turn to the cult of the dead, it is well known how minutely developed it became in Egypt and how necessary it was deemed to be for perpetuity of the soul after death. Souls could perish if they lacked the necessary cults. Lippert cites evidence that even more than three thousand years after their death the most ancient Egyptian kings had soul carers. And many created such soul carers for themselves and maintained them through donations. In this way, Ramses II established an entire royal household for his deceased father Seti, 'with arable land, pastures, fowl, flocks, ships, taxes of every kind, and with craftspeople, farm laborers and servant girls.' He even founded a library for himself in his own funerary temple. And it was the duty of every son to put a portion of his property into the cult of his parents. In the hereafter the deceased needed everything that had been necessary in this life. Here I cannot resist acquainting the reader with a text from the work by Brugsch cited above. The deceased turns to Osiris and other gods with the entreaty 'to grant me: the lights shining in the sky, wealth on Earth and the revealing of the voice in the underworld, the coming to and going from my house, to be able to cool myself in its shade, to be able to quench my thirst with water from my pool at any time, the well-being of all my limbs, the gift of the Nile and abundance of fresh vegetables of the season for me, my walks around my pool at any time,

-----File: 115-----

the ever-present resting place for my bird soul on the branch of the tree I planted, to be able to cool myself in the shade of my sycamore fig trees, to sustain myself on their fruits, the language in which I speak, just like the attendants of Horus, my journey towards the sky, my return to Earth – without obstacles in my path, without any snares being set for my body, without my soul being sealed off – my presence in the host of the blessed among the most worthy, for my field to be touched with dew in the Elysian Fields of Aaru, for me to live in the field of peace and appear with offering jugs and gifts of bread before the god Onnophris.' Such a life and pleasures just like those of a lord of the manor, instead of the soul of a dead man! This soul becomes apparent in the phrase 'bird soul' and in the deceased man's fear of getting lost on his return to Earth due to obstacles and snares. The bird soul serves as a warning of fetishes. Something very typical of this is a beautiful dialogue between a man and his soul, probably held four thousand years ago. The soul exhorts the man to show endurance in life. Perfectly following the principle of Heracles in the play Alcestis ('It befits the mortal only to have a mortal disposition'), after a number of remarks on the nature of death the soul says to him, 'Follow the happy day, forget your cares.' (This Epicurean concept is illustrated in yet more detail on page 188 of the Harper's Song, which dates from approximately the time of Ramses II). But in myriad verses the man enumerates all the tribulations of life and all the depravities of human beings, and concludes with the words (Gressmann, Altorientalische Texte (*Ancient Oriental Texts*)):

Death stands before me today ...
Just as a man desires to see his house,
After he has spent many years in captivity.
Whoever is there will indeed be a living god,
Who punishes sin in him who commits it.

-----File: 116-----

He who is there will indeed stand in the ship of the sun
And have the choicest from it given to the temples.
He who is there will indeed be an initiate, who has not been prevented in anything
And who prays to Rā whenever he speaks.

The soul is now convinced and says,

> Thy body will reach the Earth.
> I desire to settle, after thou reposest –
> Let us have an abode together.

So the soul stays and settles in the place where the deceased person is, or – as one probably has to conclude from the words of the man – remains always with the deceased wherever he goes.

According to Lippert, fetishes were a very familiar concept to the Egyptians. A stone block later used as a millstone, bearing an inscription from circa 712 BC, but presenting itself as a restoration of an old piece of writing, which 'His Majesty (King Shabaka) found, a work of our forefathers, completely eaten by worms,' and now only partially legible, the content of which must thus in any event be very old, bears the words 'Ptah was satisfied after he had created all things. He had formed the gods, made the cities, and established the nomes.[8] He had placed the gods in their sanctuaries, made their food offerings flourish, established their holy places, and made their bodies alike to their satisfaction. The gods entered their bodies from all forms of wood and precious stones, from all kinds of metal and all growing things from which they had come into being. He assembled all the gods and their souls in the Temple of Ptah, the domain of all living things, in which the life of the two Egypts was made.' This has a strong ring of fetishism to it; the words highlighted in expanded type, in particular, scarcely permit any other interpretation. Nevertheless, I think we would be going too far if we immediately described the celestial bodies, and the rulers in particular, as fetishes. Although the rulers may have been sons of the sun or the abodes of the spirits of gods, they were not fetishes in the sense understood by a primitive person. They are characterized as gods after they have departed this life. But in the sense as understood by the Egyptians,

-----File: 117-----

any deceased person could be a god; all return into God, as we shall see later. The court language needs to be distinguished from the religious view. Our rulers are also at the mercy of God, and no one considers them to be anything other than absent, essentially powerless humans, although some people genuinely are convinced of the divine right of kings. Animals certainly became fetishes, such as the well-known Apis, as well as snakes, crocodiles, cats, birds, the scarab and others. For this reason, even statues were regarded as objects in which souls resided. Just as pictures of saints and the Virgin Mary are taken from place to place and from house to house in Germany, to enable them to provide their power to work miracles, even in the most distant antiquity images and figures of deities were dispatched far and wide throughout the land for the same purpose. We have accounts of this, one of which dates from the time of Ramses II, and tells of the 'Khonsu of the master' being sent out to Bechten (Bactria?), in order to free a princess from the evil spirit, as Greeks robbed palladia and Romans abducted emblems and statues of the gods. However, as living souls were free to choose their abode in later times, even more objects may indeed have been regarded as fetishes than we can prove. The enduing of dead things with life was by all means common for the Egyptians. A text cited by Brugsch from Chapter 125 of the Book of the Dead, inserted in the chest cavity of the deceased in the tomb, has 24 verses in which doorposts, threshold, lock, keyhole, wainscot, door leaf, pieces of frieze and so forth in the Courtroom for the Dead ask the deceased what their names are. He must give these names before he can continue on his way. And some of the names have meanings that are entirely of personal significance for life, the left-hand doorposts being called 'those that explain what is true,' the pieces of frieze 'brood of snakes of the goddess Ra-Nut,' and the keyhole 'life-eye of the god Sobek.' One will hardly discern allegories or profound mysticism here. And at this point who is not thinking of the first miracle Moses performs before Pharaoh, whose magicians immediately imitate it, of transforming a staff into a snake? The Egyptians never saw belief in souls and ancestors (if ancestor worship was indeed practiced) develop into the horrors

we have so often encountered elsewhere. Herodotus writes, ‘For they are allowed to sacrifice no animal apart from pigs, bulls and calves, i.e., those which are pure, and geese – so how can they sacrifice humans?’

We shall now turn our attention to the Israelites. Many scholars have pointed out how little disposed this nation was to adopt concepts from the Egyptians, despite living under them for such a long time. The god whom Moses taught his people about was entirely different from even the most high god of Egypt, as the supreme Egyptian god belonged so completely to the material world that people have – not entirely incorrectly – ascribed a kind of Pantheism to the Egyptians. But the god of Moses is completely removed from matter. Nevertheless, we see evidence in the Bible itself that prior to the exile this god only rarely satisfied the Israelites, and they made idols for themselves, offered sacrifices on hilltops and kept and worshipped particular household gods (teraphim). This is so well known that I do not need to enter into it here. But whether the Israelites also embraced a belief in souls and ancestors and in fetishes is a separate question. Lippert’s theory leads him to subscribe fully to this. But I do think that the argument against it, which he disregards too lightly, is critical. So little is said about life after death in the Bible that it has often been concluded that the Israelites would not have believed in such an afterlife at all. Even if this is a rash conclusion, the fact remains: life after death is not spoken of in the Bible, or if it is, then it is only in quite vague terms (p. 193). We cannot concede that, in order to eradicate the Egyptian cult of souls, those who wrote and edited the Bible deliberately withheld all indications of it, as Lippert maintains, since they would have had more reason and occasion to ignore the worship of idols and teraphim, and they did not do that. As in the ancient world, the Bible speaks of its people objectively at all times; even with its beloved ones themselves it does not conceal the worst aspects of their beginnings. Accordingly, a belief in souls

-----File: 119-----

cannot be claimed of the Israelites.

The lack of a belief in ancestors is probably best demonstrated by the fact that neither any of the patriarchs, nor the leader (and Abraham and Moses were certainly figures worthy of veneration), was offered any kind of cult, not even one of the very simplest kind, let alone a divine one. We are thus left with the fetishes. In the absence of belief in souls these fetishes lose their distinctive significance. They will have become small graven images, which can be conveniently kept in the house and taken along on journeys, like the pictures of saints with which Louis XI of France had studded his hat and to which he prayed, setting the hat down in front of himself, whenever he was planning or carrying out one of his famous military operations. Large graven images are also sometimes involved, as in the house of David and with Micah. Should one want to regard all these as fetishes, so be it. But I think the golden calf and the bronze snakes are the only animal fetishes that can be interpreted as fetishes for certain. Lippert deems the tabernacle with its furnishings to be accommodation for a fetish with the accompanying offerings. We are all familiar with how they are interpreted in the Bible. However, at every point where we encounter offerings made to gods we will come across anthropomorphic interpretations. Hence, the prophets wanted nothing to do with this worship in its entirety. Necromancy, magic and prophecy were practices familiar to, and practiced by, the Israelites on an abundant scale. Think of the invocation for the tragic King Saul. But we may no doubt again make reference to the prophets and seers to demonstrate that here, on the whole, there did prevail a spirit different from that encountered among the most crudely primitive peoples, and even from that found among the civilized peoples in the areas surrounding them. Anything else inferred from the prophecies, and from circumcision and so forth, can be justified through a belief in souls. But then – just as the Bible simply relates to life after death – this belief relates solely to the living and has nothing to do with an actual primitive belief in souls in the way that such a primitive belief is portrayed relating precisely to death;

it is as far removed from it as the blood brotherhood is from the sacrifice to the dead, although both relate to notions of the soul.

The Phoenicians must have sustained a fairly extensive belief in fetishes, alongside their astrolatry and their religion revering nature, into very recent times. Mountains are given the name Baal and worshipped (e.g. Baal-Hermon and Baal-Libanon) and even trees, such as Baal-Thamar, the palm, hold this honor. Stones were regarded as Beth-el, home (abode) of the deity (βαίτυλος), and received offerings wherever the Phoenicians lived or went. Before he became emperor, Elagabalus was priest of a black stone at Emesa, probably a meteorite, as this stone was said to have fallen from the sky. At Byblos, Astarte was worshipped in the form of a cone-shaped stone; a coin from the time of Emperor Macrinus, illustrated below, shows a temple dedicated to her with an altar and with this stone in its colonnaded courtyard. However, she was usually portrayed in human form. We have insufficient knowledge of the views of life and the world held by the Phoenicians, although we do know about their bloody and murderous cult of Moloch. Inscriptions in tombs and on sarcophagi lead us to conclude that the Phoenicians were greatly concerned for the preservation of their mortal remains. But we also encounter protests against the dead possessing treasures; in this way King Eshmunazar sought to protect himself against grave robbers.

In my book, cited earlier, I describe a pronounced belief in fetishes and souls among the Arabs. Whether this was also true of the Babylonians and Assyrians is something we can only surmise. They are thought to have adopted their religion, essentially an astrolatry, from the enigmatic Sumerian people; in many respects this is a fairly elevated religion. But we know for certain

-----File: 121-----

that fortune telling, the interpretation of dreams, magical creatures and beings that could be summoned with incantations, sorcery of every kind and astrology were in full bloom among these peoples. They had ghosts and daemons in abundance, such as the seven chief daemons, about which a legend says (Gressmann, Altorientalische Texte (*Ancient Oriental Texts*)):

Assailing weathers, evil gods are they,
Merciless daemons they are, born on heaven's dyke, (and so forth).

Heaven's dyke is thought to be the zodiac. But it may also be the horizon, which, in all directions, leads to the underworld. These daemons are spirits of storms, darkness and weather; they even devour Sin, the moon. Other daemons in particularly large numbers bring plague, poverty and all kinds of disease. They are portrayed as savage and often grotesquely terrifying; dragons and griffins play a major part, but they also include dogs, scorpions, snakes, panthers, wolves and other animals. However, as far as I can see, there is no indication of a relationship to souls of deceased persons, although witches and bewitchings are very well-known phenomena and are feared; even as early as its second law, the Code of Hammurabi deals with sorcerers and those accused of witchcraft. A trial by ordeal, being thrown into the river, is what decides. There is by all means a belief in a life after death: in fact, as among primitive people, it is one in which the necessities of this life are provided. Gilgamesh (Izdubar), the hero of the epic poem of the same name, has lost his friend Enkidu to death.[9] Now, filled with fear, he thinks of his own death too, and after he fails to make himself immortal, or at least to see the hereafter, Nergal, the god of death, has to open up a hole in the Earth at Ea's command, to allow Enkidu's spirit to rise through it. Then Gilgamesh interrogates him. We only have the end in our possession, but he decides. Enkidu says:

He who died the death of iron – did you see such a man? – I saw him –
He is lying on the day bed drinking clear water.
He who is killed in battle – did you see (such a man)? – I saw (him) –
His father and mother are holding his head and his wife (bends) over him.

He whose corpse is thrown on to the field — did you see (such a man)? – I saw (him) –
His spirit finds no rest on Earth.
He whose spirit has no one to tend it – did you see (such a man)? – I saw (him) –
Food left over in the pot, scraps thrown on to the street, are what he eats.

This is in total consonance with views already familiar to us. The terrible curse sent down by Hammurabi on those he claimed had violated his laws also contains the words, 'Down in the underworld may he (Shamash, 'the Great Judge of Heaven and Earth') let his ghostly shade languish after water!.' (This water may be the water of life, which was in the custody of the judges of the underworld, the Anunnaki (p. 197). The last four verses of the text cited show that ghosts also had a cult. I would not wish to contend that the gods were fetishes, despite the presence of wording such as that in the second law of the Code of Hammurabi: 'He (the accused sorcerer) is to go to the god of the river and dive into him.' Lippert, however, naturally takes this opinion and interprets worship of the stars as fetish worship. Meanwhile the absence of soul spirits speaks against this. The customs, which in parts may still be so very 'African,' have nothing to do with this. But what the situation is, in terms of primitive beliefs, in connection with the sacred tree so frequently occurring on Assyrian and Babylonian monuments is something I cannot establish. Trees are relatively familiar in myths and, as mundane objects, are commonly found all over the world. I would not wish to regard the Assyrian and Babylonian tree as such, in view of the acts of worship and sacrifices offered to it even by gods and genies. But reference should be made to the fine book by Pastor Alfred Jeremias 'Das Alte Testament im Lichte des alten Orients' (*The Old Testament in the Light of the Ancient Orient*).

Leaving aside the true Zoroastrianism of the Iranians, which belongs to a study different from the present one, we do not know enough about the other perceptions of these peoples to enable us to state more than merely that belief in souls and fetishes was probably something familiar to them that they preserved.

-----File: 123-----

We encounter vestiges of this in the Zoroastrian textbooks. As the Bundahishn says, when the sacred bull died: 'Gōšurun, the soul of the only-created bull, emerged from its body and stood before the bull. As loudly as a thousand men raising a shout all at once, Gōšurun lamented to Ahura.' This lament relates to evil brought into the world by Ganamino (Ahriman). Exiled to the future by Ahura, the soul of the bull continues to lament to the circles of stars, moon and sun. Then Ahura shows him the farohar of Zarathustra. But this farohar is, in general, the soul that exists as a preformed entity (created by Ahura, Chapter II) and lives independently. At another place (Chapter VI) the 'farohars of the warriors and of the pure' enter the battle between Ahura and Ahriman with clubs and lances in their hands – hence, like humans themselves (p. 43). And thus all farohars (souls) are apparently already in existence beforehand in the realm of Ahura, a concept similar to the ideas of Plato. And even the world has a farohar of this kind; long before it becomes the world, it already exists in the sky. And the highest gods themselves possess farohars. In Chapter XV Ahura says explicitly, 'The soul is created first and the body was later created for it, and was laid in the body' (and similarly Chapter XVII). The soul is also called the 'one that acts of itself'.

We also know of wondrous birds: one is Karshipta, which conveyed the Mazdaean doctrine of Ahura to Yima, the primordial human and sovereign of paradise; another is Varaghna, who took away the three graces from Yima, as he had told untruths; yet another is Sīmorgh, also a familiar figure in fairy tales, and there are many others. Some of them, such as the cock, quite naturally, do battle against the evil creature of the night. Daemons, spirits, ghosts and so forth are also familiar figures in immense numbers, the good (yazatas) and the evil (Devs), in human and animal form, such as the terrifying Dahāka, which takes Yima as victim, and the satanic destroyer Aeshma daeva, who has been compared to Asmodeus. This means that the prerequisites for a cult of souls and fetishes are

indeed present. Nevertheless, I have not been able to gather any evidence that such a cult was active in historical times. I have found two direct references in Windischmann's 'Zoroastrische Studien' (*Zoroastrian Studies*) to a cult of mountains and trees, both relating to haoma, which can bestow immortality: 'I want to invoke the mountain Hukairya, the totally pure, golden one, from which Ardviçura Anahita flows down; at the height of a thousand men, she has majesty like all the waters that flow forth on the Earth.' Ardviçura Anahita is the water of life, in which the (white) haoma tree Gaskerena grows (p. 175 f). And we read: 'We appeal to Gaskerena, the strong one, created by Mazdā.' I would even hesitate to regard this as fetishism; the characteristic element is lacking, as the objects are after all merely visualized, not worshipped in their physical form. Moreover, they are givers of life. Worship does not relate to earthly haoma, the yellow haoma serving in offerings. Lippert ascribes a much greater significance to fetishism among the Iranians and also includes fire worship in this. Zoroastrianism accords no divine significance to fire in itself; the interpretations I have looked up in the Bundahishn (relating to the five fires and the three fires) are purely physical. Nevertheless, as is widely acknowledged, true fire worship occurred on such an extensive scale that it was often regarded as the essence of the 'religion of the sorcerers.' It is also possible that a spirit is intended by this. Strabo tells how the gods take only the soul from sacrifices; everything physical is consumed by the priests and those offering the sacrifice. But fat and oil are offered directly to the fire; these substances actually fan the flames, as if the fire held a spirit that was feeding on the offering. Sacrifices are even made to water, but according to Strabo's account in such a way that everything takes place alongside the water, while the water itself retains nothing, so that it does not become contaminated. There is nothing specific we can state for historical times; this period is too late, in view of the long past the people had already lived through before

-----File: 125-----

they entered history. But much that was redolent of primitive man must have been conceived and performed during this past.

The best way for us to observe this is among Indian peoples, many of whose perceptions correspond to those of the Iranians, as they probably coexisted for the longest period of time. The explanations from several aspects provided by Carus Sterne (Ernst Krause) lead us to incline towards the view that the cradle of the Aryans was in (northern) Europe, and the Indians are the race who finally found themselves furthest to the east, which means that ancient Aryan perceptions are to be sought not among them, but rather at their opposite pole in the west. For the time being there is not a great deal that can be said about this. But it would be very strange if total barbarism had prevailed in their homeland for over a thousand more years, as there was already radiating a high form of culture that was their own, not adopted from foreigners, among the tribes who had migrated furthest to the east. No people has developed such a remarkable range of religious conceptions as the Indians. Everything is represented in these conceptions: the notions of the savage, as well as those of the polytheist, the monotheist and the most high-thinking, entirely abstract philosopher. And the trouble is that the majority of this goes side by side: the height of absurdity exists in close harmony with what is most noble. Nevertheless, we have to assume that what was common to primitive people in itself preceded everything and subsequently continued to exist alongside more elevated conceptions, sometimes with such force that it surged completely over the higher views. When the Indians gained what is today their land from Iran and gradually took possession of it, which probably occurred over four thousand years ago, they found a population that was non-Aryan – we shall call them Dravidians – which still today essentially preserves the viewpoint of primitive people. In his interesting collection ‘Aus dem Lande der Nibelungen’ (*From the Land of the Nibelungen*) L Feuth writes that the Dravidians were widely dispersed, as far as Persia, and had a distinguished culture. But I am unable to follow him in his arguments. Beliefs in fetishes and souls were prevalent, and evil and good spirits filled the universe and dwelt

in every object, particularly in animals (such as the snake), but also in trees, posts and stones. If the soul of a deceased person moved into an object, this object was placed on the grave and coated in oil. The priesthood was a form of shamanhood.

The Indians adopted some elements of these conceptions and cults, where they had not already brought them along themselves. For them the snake (nāga) plays a substantial part, even causing thunderstorms and tempests. Krishna sees the soul of his brother Rama 'emerge as a snake from his mouth and slither into the sea, where it was received with great honor by the snake gods.' This ties in completely with what we read on page 45. And hence a substantial cult was also devoted to snakes. Another fetish is the 'white elephant,' which may be compared with Apis among the Egyptians and which serves as rainmaker. Gubernatis has written an extensive book about the animals in Indo-Germanic mythology, and we should make reference to this. Lippert rejects the indications of natural phenomena, such as clouds, sunrises, lightning and thunder. I think for primaeval times this was entirely justifiable; later, the relevant animals did indeed serve to allegorize deified natural phenomena in the languages of India, which are rich in imagery. The Egyptians, despite having Apis, still named numerous gods 'wild bull.' And it is not uncommon for the allegorical meaning to be totally forgotten, and for the animal to take the place of the phenomenon, such as the cow for sunrises, or cows for clouds, the horse in representation of Indra as the god of sun and weather (Poseidon also turns himself into a horse), just as the snake becomes a cloud monster holding back the water, which Indra must slay with a thunderbolt before the waters can be released and stream on to the Earth. The white elephant is even given the honor of making his way into the womb of Princess Maya and being born of her as Buddha. Souls are in need of sustenance in the underworld. They receive it from the sacrifices and the gifts they gave to the priests of the underworld

-----File: 127-----

deity Yama while they were still alive. Lippert tells us that princes had assigned hundreds of villages and entire lands to members of the Brahman caste, to ensure they were provided for in a manner befitting their status in the hereafter. The concept of 'Give, so that I will give' is thought to be a fundamental characteristic of the old Indian religion of Indra, which would correspond to what is to be expected from primitive people (p. 39 f). In the meantime, the poor could indeed secure their keep in the life to come by inflicting particular privations on themselves and performing acts of penance on Earth. In the dialogue referred to as the Bhagavad Gita (*The Song of God*) from the epic poem the Mahabharata, which has been compared with the Iliad, but which towers intellectually above it, as the Iliad is on the whole surpassed in artistic terms by the Mahabharata, the Pandava hero Arjuna is loath to do battle against his kinsmen the Kurus. In justification he says (*translation by R. Boxberger*):[10]

How should we, the initiated, not shrink from this outrage,
When at the demise of a race a host of misfortunes without number draws near?
Where perishes a race, ceases forthwith the duty of offerings to the manes,
And the whole tribe becomes restless when it lacks its ancestor cult ...
Then murderers of whole tribes go, with their entire tribe, to the underworld,
For the forefather plunges from heaven the moment there lacks an offering to the manes.

Thus, an ancestor may only remain in heaven for as long as he is offered sacrifices; as soon as this ceases, he has to go down to the underworld. The deity Krishna (Vishnu), who represents such remarkably elevated ideas, also teaches thus in a dialogue with Arjuna:

> To gods there enters he who worships them; to ancestors, he who venerates them;
> To grubs, he who venerates the grubs; to me, he who worships me alone.

And he also states that after death a human is united with what he was thinking about as he died. It strikes us as utterly savage when the deceased is told in the Atharva Veda, 'Do not go back on the paths of the gods – stay there, keep watch with the forefathers,' and particularly when the fetters are placed on the deceased: 'The fetter of death, placed on the deceased, she who restricts the feet' (p. 42). Even Max Müller, the great authority on Sanskrit, concedes the existence of elements

-----File: 128-----

redolent of primitive peoples in the perceptions of the Indians, but only at the primordial stage. However, in defining the course followed by these conceptions in terms of a god, Agni, the god of fire, he writes, 'You will see that we can observe this god of fire in the Veda long before he is a god at all, and conversely we shall be in a position to trace his further development to the point where he is not merely a god of fire, but a god of the highest order, a god above all other gods, creator and governor of the world.' Then he recounts how Agni is often interpreted in both human and animal terms in the Vedas. At first he is called Deva, the 'resplendent one,' in purely physical terms, until this name gains ever-higher significance and eventually actually comes to refer to the deity. Yet consciousness of the real nature of Agni remains: 'Thou, o Agni, art born, desiring to shine, thou art born of the heavens, thou of the waters, thou of the stone, thou of the wood, thou of the herbs, thou, o king of mankind, the pure one,' runs a song in the Rig Veda. But this brings Max Müller to the view that, even in the earliest interpretation, Agni is not a fetish in the sense shared by primitive peoples. From Rig Veda verses addressed to Agni such as 'You are always father and mother to man' and 'It is Agni I consider as my father, I consider him as my kin, my brother and my faithful friend' Agni could be called upon as a forefather, but countless other verses conflict directly with this. Everything said about Agni (he licks with his tongues, he eats with a powerful jawbone, he chews up and lays the forests flat, he does harm to the trees, he makes the plants serve as his nourishment, he shears the hair of the Earth, he leaps forth from wood and so forth) has a theriomorphic and anthropomorphic ring to it, but can hardly be regarded as anything other than very succinct poetic style (but see page 33 f). When we then read at another place in the Rig Veda 'Agni, our priest, as a steed, is led around at the offering,' we could certainly, as with Svantovit, think of an animal fetish as

-----File: 129-----

something representing Agni. But Max Müller rejects this view, regarding the wording as figurative style – and after everything else the Rig Veda says about Agni, probably justifiably. However, Agni is not an original god: the primordial god of the Indians seems to have been Indra, who subsequently fell from his high position, but nonetheless was always of significance, while among the Iranians he occurs only as a spirit. The same scholar cites as a further example the tempests (Maruts), which are also spoken of in entirely personal terms in the Rig Veda. They shake heaven and Earth like the seam of a garment, they appear glistening in their chariot with spears, daggers, rings, axes and whips, which they crack in the air, they shoot arrows and hurl stones, they have golden headbands round their heads, and they are also depicted as musicians and singers, pipers and dancers, sometimes also as birds and as wild boar with tusks. One cannot speak in more earthly or dramatic terms, or in less fetishistic ones. The exact status of soma as a deity, as an offering and as an intoxicating drink is not quite clear, as with the corresponding haoma for the Iranians. Initially portrayed, lauded and recommended as being of great significance and even bestowing immortality, it later became frowned upon and was prohibited, probably as a consequence of excessive use as an intoxicating drink. We will hardly be able to see a fetish in the plant in question, which was believed to have been inhabited by the deity Soma.

After all this I might think that the Indians of the time of the Rig Veda and subsequent periods interpreted the soul and their lives in terms associated with their primitive past. Something that supports this is the accepted belief in transmigration of souls, which will be discussed later. I might feel that through primitive conceptions they imagined gods as encumbered with human needs and weaknesses. But I might also conclude that belief in fetishes asserted itself only in single natural phenomena, insignificant for beliefs as an entirety, even in the case of animals such as bulls, snakes, elephants and the well-known monkey Hanuman.

In a population of unsophisticated people and in individuals there will of course have existed a great deal of fetishism, just as there is in nations with the highest level of culture. But the religious views of the Indians take such a remarkable course, on the one hand into the purely abstract, and on the other hand into the purely ethical and anthropopathic, that such humble notions as those of fetishism cannot have existed as something fundamental in these views, despite the presence of all the sacred animals and the natural phenomena they worshipped. Everywhere else fetishism presents itself as self-evident to a certain degree (it is indeed obvious to a primitive person), but the objective mode of expression of the Indians is largely so somber and extravagant that we have to take refuge in allegories and symbols if we refuse to accept the existence of pure nonsense and absurd claptrap in a nation that is still so inclined towards the profound, so high-thinking and so sentient to poetry. A horrifying belief in daemons, together with persistence taken to the extreme, among themselves and against their fellow men, witnessed in certain doctrines about cults and gods, are at most things whose existence we have to acknowledge in individual sects, together with credulity in the face of claims by recognized and unrecognized priests and sorcerers, and finally an astounding, hair-splitting, petty formalism against the higher powers that cuts through all of life like an iron web, from which even the Buddha, with all his liberty, was not able to disentangle the people. Phrases such as ones found in the Rig Veda: ‘Indra assists those who give plentiful alms and offerings; a sacred deed has no effect if the appropriate dakshina is not presented,’ and ‘Indra turns his back on poverty and hunger,’ are certainly unpleasant, as are curses against those not performing works and those not offering sacrifices. The same view is even encountered in the Bhagavad Gita. Krishna says in this text:

When once the master created the world, he also established the offering of sacrifices,
Through this, multiply yourselves, it shall be peace from the curse of the fathers to you.
Through it, nourish all the gods, that they might preserve this world;
Only thus do you gain benefit, if one preserves the other.

-----File: 131-----

They grant the desired good to those who offer sacrifices to them;
A thief is one who, repaying nothing to the gods, devours their gift.
Anyone who feeds on the remains of the offering becomes free from the torment of sin,
But the one who has prepared the banquet only for himself will fall prey to it...

Yet the Bhagavad Gita shows a conscious contrast with the 'sacred scriptures,' and hence no doubt a contrast with the Vedas and their commentaries on offerings. The ritual burning of widows and the insidious offering of human sacrifices to Kali, the goddess of destruction, are even worse. Most of the vivid descriptions of the deities also prove to be extremely fantastical and grotesque, and not uncommonly totally idolatrous. But when studying the Indian peoples we see in their perceptions, their literature and their art an odd blend of the noblest and the crudest, the most beautiful and the most repulsive, of a kind found in scarcely any other people. This is such an extraordinary hindrance to correct assessment. Anyone hearing or reading that idols should be bathed, and that images of deities are endowed with life and deprived of life, will doubtless be inclined to see fetishes in these idols. But anyone who thinks of the incredible intellectual achievements of this nation will put them on the same level as their equivalents in regard to Athena, and with our images of the Virgin Mary and the saints and in our churches, where consecration and desecration also take place, and interpret it in terms of the needs of so many people: to have whatever they turn to as an object in front of them, and then to treat it with reverence, and to divest it of reverence as soon as it is, or has to be, turned over to a profane purpose.

The more ancient religion of the Indian peoples, associated with the names Indra, Rudra, Yama, Agni, Varuna, Mitra and others, has been termed the religion of the Vedas, while the more recent one, revolving around the Trimurti of Brahma, Vishnu and Shiva, with the accompanying female figures, has been designated as the Hindu religion. Brahma belongs to both. As far as our subject matter is concerned, nothing that is valid for the newer course differs from what we find in the older one. The deities are merely more concentrated and more powerful, and hence (apart from Brahma, who will be discussed as an abstract

later on) all the more terrifying; Shiva is one of the gruesome creations of the human imagination. As for the third and fourth religious views in parallel with Hinduism: Buddhism and the higher form of Brahma worship go beyond the level of true religious conceptions and lead into philosophical theosophy and ethical humanity. Nevertheless, we shall deal with their main doctrines, at least in part, together with the others discussed in this book.

The Chinese make our work easy: their Confucian perceptions, which are part of the state religion, are as completely founded on belief in souls and ancestors as we find in scarcely any other people, even the more primitive ones. Just as the entire world came into being through the collaborative effect of Yang (warmth, light and masculinity) and Yin (cold, darkness and femininity), the soul also consists of two parts: a good part, shen, and an evil one, guei. After death the former provides the good spirits and the latter the evil ones. The deceased requires service to maintain him, and a constant supply of offerings. The latter are now mainly given in the form of paper imitations, particularly of money, humans and animals. Soul boards are set up on a table in the house; these show the name and status of the ancestors, and offerings of foodstuffs and drink are placed before them. Soul boards are also found in the temples and on the altars erected to the gods, emperors, saints and great men, and also those dedicated to objects found in nature (rivers, mountains, stars, sun, moon, sky and so forth), which are venerated. It is supposed that the souls make their way into these soul boards (or images) for a time and take pleasure in the offerings. Even the most highly revered things, sky and Earth, are worshipped as souls. The emperor, ‘the son of the sky,’ is the soul of the sky on Earth. Thus, belief in, and a cult of, souls permeates the whole popular and state religion, and just as the people make offerings to every possible soul, so do the state, the emperor and the mandarins on certain days, both individually and collectively. Souls that prove their worth by fulfilling wishes receive the most extravagant worship: to honor them,

-----File: 133-----

chapels and temples are built, and people stream in in their masses with gifts of every kind. If fulfilment of wishes does not ensue, the souls fall into disrepute and are abandoned. Priests and priestesses are able to absorb souls into themselves and transport them from place to place to be worshipped; they are living, walking fetishes. However, it seems as if what occurs is the opposite of that observed among savages: this takes the soul away from the person or animal and transfers it into an object. In contrast, the Chinese believe that the souls of living creatures are derived from the souls of objects, i.e., from the soul of heaven (as shen) and that of the Earth (as guei). Hence, with consistent logic diseases are also derived from shen totally or partially leaving the body, and the art of the physician does not consist in warding off an evil spirit from the body, but in leading the good spirit back into it. It is thus incorrect to equate the conceptions of the Chinese with those of primitive peoples; they really belong much more to Pandeism than to Pananimism – to a dualistic form of it, to be precise. The element reminiscent of primitive peoples becomes apparent in the process by which souls are believed to gain their independence and in the physical characteristics attributed to them. For this reason even the highest souls, those of heaven (tian) and Earth (qi) and those of the emperors, differ only in degree from the souls of primitive people, and therefore they and all objects thought to be endowed with a living soul can indeed be described as fetishes. Nature in its entirety is made up of such fetishes. The course of nature, Dao, which is governed by the planet Jupiter (Tai Sui), determines the course followed by men; a man has to follow this course precisely, and where he cannot readily perceive it, must ascertain it through oracles. Combinations of continuous and broken lines which have been in existence since 2300 BC are believed to be attributable to Emperor Fu Xi; they serve as abodes for the souls of the deities they represent, such as the sky, Earth, bodies of water, mountains, wind, thunder and so forth, and to decipher such things

is the task of priests. The doctrines to be ranked within this category, governing the entire lives and all the acts of Chinese people, from the lowest to the highest, were compiled in the Yih-King by Confucius. Humans were offered the possibility to ascend completely into nature, become a zhuăn-xiān (*literally: transforming fairy*) and thus live at one with the world. Meanwhile, there also existed a means of reaching the ultimate destination by amassing as much shen as possible in oneself, which could be achieved in entirely primitive terms through the ingestion of as many objects thought to be endowed with a living soul as possible. A quite different interpretation of Daoism will be discussed later (p. 143 and 220).

Buddhism, which has achieved such broad dissemination in China in the form of Foism, had to conform to such popular views and has become attached to the cult of souls, although in a manner of its own that is rather more spiritual, in that the cult involves reading aloud from the sacred books and calling upon the name of Buddha. However, when disaster needs to be averted the possibility is still open for magic spells to be recited and offerings to be made, which truly maintains the sense of the placating of spirits. The same practices serve at the Roman Catholic requiem mass, to release the soul and to transfer it into a state corresponding to the Buddhist state of bliss. But the Indian habit of splitting hairs is a factor here, as is evident in the significance of thought. It often suffices if a holy man totally absorbs himself in supplications for the deceased person to obtain the state of bliss for him. In the same way, a human can transfer himself into the condition of sainthood to every degree, up to the highest, that of the Buddha, if he strives to follow the rules of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, which, as is widely acknowledged, also unite in themselves so much that is noble and of an ideal nature. In Tibet and part of Mongolia, Buddhism, in the form of Lamaism, gained a dominant position of power. But this left the people empty-handed. Previously they embraced a full belief in souls and fetishes, and were totally devoted to shamanism, and now humans are their gods: i.e., the lamas, who are regarded as incarnate Buddhist minds. The two

-----File: 135-----

highest ranks, the Dalai Lama and the Tashi Lamas, are believed to be incarnate Bodhisattvas (in historical and spiritual terms), while the immense number of others are seen as incarnate Buddhist holy men of times past. The incarnations are an Indian invention; Vishnu has a considerable number of these, termed avatars. Degenerate Buddhism has seized control of these to create human fetishes out of one of the greatest and noblest men of every country and of all time. Alongside the elevated teachings of the master, which indeed cannot fade away, there proliferates the most abominable superstition and the most fatuous cult of venerating holy men.

At other places above I have already commented on conceptions among the Japanese. But their primitive religion, which has undergone a few modifications to become the modern-day state religion, is Shintō (Chinese 'path of the gods,' Japanese 'kami no michi' or 'way of the kami'). As in China, the endowing of everything possible with a living soul plays a major role. In addition to this there is the deification and cult of rulers and other men (for the arts of warfare and writing, ethics and so forth) and the veneration of animals, such as the fox, deer, turtle and snake, essentially because of their harmful characteristics, as well as that of certain trees (sakaki and hinoki). The sanctuaries of Shintō temples contain a mitama-shiro (or shintai) as a 'deputy for the illustrious spirit'; this can be some kind of object such as a metallic mirror (as the sun deity Amaterasu admired her countenance in a mirror), a sword or another article that is sealed in a pouch or a chest and can be addressed as a fetish. Similar emblems representing the gods in shrines were also kept in their homes by individual families on a 'ledge for the gods,' alongside jugs or bottles of maize wine and vases of twigs from sacred trees, or flowers. There is also worship of family ancestors on an extensive scale, sometimes even in the house itself, where small soul boards stand on the 'ledge for the illustrious souls.' The deceased are given everyday objects to take with them. Another thing reminiscent of the conceptions of primitive man is the Shintoist's fear of ritually defiling himself. Blood, death and birth give rise to the most contamination and the most enduring forms of it, and, just as the Negroes shut away

women who are about to give birth, so do the Shintoists. Even breath defiles. No one who has been defiled may visit a temple. And the priests have to make offerings with masks held in front of their faces, just as Saxo Grammaticus writes of the Svantovit priests, who were not allowed to breathe within the temple of the god, and had to go out every time they needed to take a breath. Lippert gives the view that, as the soul is in the breath, any affront to the deity through obtrusive adulteration of its soul by the human soul needs to be prevented. Despite all this, the mythology relating to nature deities – in many ways very beautiful – is worthy of note. Shintō subsequently amalgamated with Buddhism; the deities, kami, were equated with the Buddhas, hotoke; they were believed to preserve the laws of the Buddha. Writing in 'Die Religionen der Japaner' (*The Religions of the Japanese People*), which was included in the collected work 'Die Orientalischen Religionen' (*The Oriental Religions*) published by B G Teubner, Karl Florenz, whose lead I took to some extent in the above, states, 'People appeal to the Shintō deities in association with all that is favorable, joyful and auspicious, but they invoke Buddha, on the other hand, with regard to the troubles of life and in death.' The latter does fully tally with the character of the teachings of the Buddha, just as the character of Shintō (i.e., actually that of the people) will be seen as befitting the former. Pure Buddhism is thought to occupy a higher level, and to be more closely associated with the teachings of the master, in Japan than in China or Tibet. Yet the Japanese Buddhist pantheon is described as the most immense in the world, just as Japan is designated the country with the greatest number of temples. However, any further portrayal of the above no longer belongs under this topic

Still travelling straight across the Pacific Ocean, we reach the civilized peoples of the Americas. A cult of the sun seems particularly widespread in America in general, but it is precisely among the highly civilized peoples of this part of the world that it has undergone its greatest development. Among the Mexicans, for whom the sun god was also the god of war (Huitzilopochtli), this cult took on the most gruesome form in mass human sacrifices associated with cannibalism. The people were obliged to bring blood as an offering to the deities at every opportunity;

-----File: 137-----

if it was not that of a sacrifice, it was their own blood, which they shed by slitting their chest, ears, tongue or lips. The blood is where the soul lives, as we know. The Mayan peoples had similar customs, though not remotely as ruthlessly horrifying as those of the Mexicans. And among the Peruvian peoples the sun cult attained a distinguished nobility, only on rare occasions interspersed with human sacrifices. The Incas were sons of the sun and deputized for the sun deity on Earth. The rulers of Mexico were also representatives of the deity; they swore an oath of the will to cause 'the sun to travel its course, the clouds to rain, the rivers to flow and fruits to ripen.' We are also acquainted with similar obligations for rulers among other peoples: for instance, a king of the Norwegians had to offer himself as a sacrifice when, under his reign, he could find no other way of disposing the gods favorably towards the people to avert a famine. In Mexico, as in Peru, rulers were offered divine worship and sacrifices during their lifetime, to be continued after their death. Human protective spirits were encountered everywhere. Some of these were those chosen for sacrifice themselves, who even while still alive before the sacrifice were given honors befitting gods and showered with all kinds of gifts, to make them favorably disposed to those offering them. Other spirits were acquired through the walling up or burying alive of humans, particularly children. Pillars dedicated to the sun and huacas – a word that is also believed to mean spirits – are monuments to such protective spirits, as are even stones found in those places. Another practice very widespread in Mexico was that of eating the gods themselves. 'At the third annual festival of Huitzilopochtli the priests made a model of the god, baked out of all kinds of seeds together with the blood of the children who had been sacrificed. One of the priests shot an arrow towards this model, thus shooting through the god. Then a priest performed the same acts on it as for a human sacrifice. He would open up the chest, bring out a heart and offer it to the king, who would eat it. But then he distributed the body of the model to the houses of the town in such a way as to ensure that each resident

-----File: 138-----

received a small piece of it. This piece was called teocualo: the god who is eaten,' as recounted by Lippert. This act allows for various interpretations; the simplest and most obvious one seems to me to be that the image represented the god and everyone, in an act of sacrifice to him, wanted to take a part of him into himself. According to Lippert, the temples in Peru – and incidentally elsewhere also – were merely burial places for an ancestor who was worshipped. All this activity typical of primitive people is augmented by animal fetishes and totems. The hummingbird, heron, eagle, snake, bear and other animals are seen as having this status in Mexico. And they preserved their icons as symbols, as can be gleaned from the depiction of a deity reproduced here (left). A live rattlesnake was even kept and worshipped in the main temple. A bird regarded as a fetish in Peru is the condor. Through the works of John L Stephens ('Incidents of travel in Central America' and 'Incidents of travel in Yucatan') we possess a great number of descriptions of Central American deities and cult acts. On the peculiar cross in the temple at Palenque there is a cock or a heron between the two worshipping figures; the arms of the cross end in stylized snakes. Animals, including alligators, birds and monkeys, often occur in Central American sculptures, nor is it uncommon for humans with curious animal heads to appear in these.

With this I conclude this doubtless rather wearying itemization. Elements redolent of primitive man are of extraordinary importance for an analysis of views of the world and of life, since they portray

-----File: 139-----

what is common to all mankind. These elements do not betray themselves at any time or in any population, not even with us in Germany, a country we have had no particular need to discuss. And wherever they are not openly revealed, because more experiences and better insights have led to other views of the world and of life, they still contribute a totally concealed influence and steer the views of a proud culture far more than they might acknowledge. Such elements have become physically refined and elevated in ethical terms, but in their essence they remain largely unchanged. And absolute Materialism and absolute Energeticism (which however, as will be seen later, lead to an absolute compulsory system), together with Spinozism, are really the only approaches that have outwardly stripped away completely all that is characteristic of primitive man. Later in this book we shall therefore often have cause to recall the explanations given so far.

17. Polytheistic, henotheistic and antagonistic views of life and the world.

As a whole, the deities encountered in polytheism can be divided into the following: earthly spirit and object deities, deified beings, natural phenomena, reigning and creating deities, deities connected with fate and ethics, and deities related to principles. The first two of these types of deities are directly associated with primitive peoples; they belong to animism and to belief in souls and ancestors. They provide the incalculable host of genies, spirits, fairies, nymphs of every kind, daemons, witches and so forth, which we have already discussed. Natural phenomena interpreted as personal deities also include a great deal that is characteristic of primitive man. Should fire, the weather, the tempest, the sun, the moon, a star, the sky and the Earth be deities, then we have to assume that endowment with a soul is associated with the appropriate phenomenon, as in living creatures. Naturally, it does not follow from this that the placing of a soul has to originate from living beings; it can be placed independently and accorded distinctive peculiarities, just as a plant is endowed with a living soul in a different way from an animal, and an animal,

in turn, in a different way from a human being. While it should therefore not be disputed that in certain cases the nature deities actually developed from fetishes of departed souls, which chose the phenomena in question as their abodes, I really do not think that this occurred in every instance. Neither Zeus, as the sky, nor Helios, as the sun, nor Odin, as the weather, nor Rā, Indra, Mitra, Ahura Mazdā nor so many others show any indication of anything purely resembling a soul. When souls set up their dwelling place in the sun, the weather, fire and so forth, in the instances highlighted above this has always occurred after the deity departed from the phenomenon, e.g. after Zeus became the god of the sky, Helios the god of the sun and so forth. We should also note how in these instances souls are spoken of in such entirely different terms from the gods. Homer is the chief witness for the Greeks, as he thinks in a way entirely associated with primitive perceptions in regard to souls, but his gods have absolutely nothing shadowy about them, while the souls in his works do. Deification of natural phenomena is a consequence of animism in the first place, not just a result of the soul becoming independent and of it being assigned to a particular location in the world. At this level of polytheism the views of the world and of life belong to a monistic animism that is capable of development only by the ensoulments, or rather the things endowed with a living soul, being increasingly divided and arranged apart from each other according to their significance, until the weather, sky, sun, stars and so on are given higher worth than humans themselves. But, just as with living humans, the world is uniformly composed of things that exist, and it was always so and remains so. The only aspect of this in which a polytheism can be seen is that the things considered to be higher, i.e. the more powerful ones, are worshipped for reasons of egotism, just like powerful humans whom others fear and so want to make well disposed towards them.

It is difficult to say how man learned to take deities out of things and to set them as rulers over these same things. Perception of the soul and the granting of independence to it are probably not factors to be considered, because the

-----File: 141-----

extinguishing of life in these things themselves was by necessity connected with the removal of this perception and independence; however, with the sky and the objects in it, the Earth, the sea and so forth, there could be no question of this. In fact one may speak of a dying and coming back to life for varying phenomena, such as forms of weather, sunsets and sunrises, and similar things, and people have indeed done this everywhere. But this is still entirely different from domination by free deities that govern the varying behavior of things just as they please. Seeing things from the purely animistic viewpoint, many people really do believe that every day has a new sun which is born in the morning and dies in the evening. Indeed, some actually infer the dying of living beings from this. I have already recounted the Polynesian legend of Māui, the sun hero, and his death in the goddess of darkness (p. 65); his death is interpreted by the people of New Zealand as having brought dying into the world, as everything had previously lived without limit. And Osiris, originally a sun god, became a god of the dead after he died. In the seventeenth chapter of the Book of the Dead we read, ‘Mine is yesterday, I also know tomorrow. This is Osiris. What is this? Yesterday is Osiris, tomorrow is the god of light Rā.’ Here it is quite evident that we are not dealing with deities separated from a natural phenomenon; yesterday’s sun is Osiris, today’s is Rā. But a nation like the Egyptians did not stop there, and where they ascribe to Rā or Osiris attributes of the highest kind, including perpetuity, they have already detached him from the natural phenomenon. The Romans possessed something that could have paved the way for the separation of deities from natural phenomena, the genii, which do remain on the outside of things and exercise their guidance on them. However, they even pinned genii on to the deities: Jupiter had his genius, as did Mars, Minerva, and all the other gods, and so did humans and animals and so forth. Thus, the genii were even superordinate to the gods, who in turn were superordinate to the natural phenomena, even if the genii were inseparable from the gods, so that one could perhaps also describe them as of the same order.

This will no doubt make it impossible for us to avoid acknowledging that deities gradually imposed themselves after becoming separated from natural phenomena through a feeling of being higher than the same phenomena. At first this feeling will have been very vague, but in the course of the centuries it will have worked itself to increasing degrees of clarity among a people. How much these peoples have struggled, and continue to do so today, to be constantly aware of this feeling, is something we certainly see in how the deity is again and again confused with the phenomenon, and, despite a more elevated interpretation having been attained, there is a relapse into the purely animistic interpretation. In the same chapter of the Book of the Dead from which the quotation above was taken, we read, 'I am the primal concept of what is and what will be. What is it? It is Osiris.' Hence, this most elevated idea relates to the same god who was to be merely the day that had previously passed. Something similar is true of Helios, Marduk, Jupiter, Zeus and other deities. If the names of the deities are indeed appellatives (which is of course acknowledged only for some of them at present), and it is only that we are not yet in a position to translate so many of them, such as Ishtar, Aphrodite and others, a dual-faceted interpretation of this kind is quite understandable, with the names corresponding to the deities identified with the natural phenomena, for example Dyaus (Zeus, Jovis), 'that which shines,' 'the radiant one.' The names stayed with the deities even when they had become separated from the phenomena; they were mere names, like those of people, but at the same time they were terms for phenomena, so that in some places the deity denoted an individual, and in others a phenomenon. Lippert takes as his starting point the view that initially, corresponding to a belief in souls and ancestors, the names of the deities meant master, mistress, man, woman and spirit. This can doubtless be proved for some names. As Ὕπατος, Zeus is the supreme master, while for the Chinese, Shangdi is the same for heaven; Freyja is the woman, Mannus the man and so on. But others are, just as certainly, not attributable to such meanings. We have previously mentioned Dyaus, Dev and Div, meaning radiance, according to Max Müller. However, Lippert makes a very apposite comment on this. To the

-----File: 143-----

Iranians the Dev are exactly the opposite of what they are to the people of India, despite their geographical closeness, i.e., evil spirits instead of good ones. It would be inconceivable for the evil spirits to have also been described as radiant. On that account Dev must initially have possessed a neutral meaning common to both peoples. And in accordance with words occurring in Slavic languages Lippert finds this meaning actually to be close to the appellations in his theory. The etymologies are often quite unreliable; in this case he might probably be right. But Amun is referred to as the concealed one or the one who is summoned, Brahma the speaking one, Agni the flickering one, Apollo the one who averts, Helios the burning one, Artemis the one who slaughters (as the goddess of death), Odin the one who rages (or storms) and so forth. Such names as Dyaus Pitar (Jupiter) and Demeter would also be superfluous pleonasms, with the first part adding nothing to the meaning given by the second. Finally we should note that this also works in reverse: even personal names have turned into designations of rank, such as Caesar becoming Kaiser in German. So Lippert's view will probably not be universally supported to any great degree. But where it applies for the most elevated interpretations, it is often merely a case of acknowledging the highest sovereignty, as with 'the LORD' for us, but not beliefs in ancestors.

If the deities are separated from the natural phenomena and now reign over these, they also cause them, just as Poseidon or Odin is the cause of the tempest, Zeus or Indra the thunder and lightning, and Osiris the floodings of the Nile. Hence they appear not only as leaders and rulers, but also as those who produce things, and by extension of this attribute they can also become creators. However, an aspect doubtless linked with the original perception of the deities as the natural phenomena themselves is that many of them are not actually regarded as the creators of these phenomena. On the contrary, we find cosmogony connected with the theogony in many ways; the natural phenomenon and its accompanying deity come into being at the same time, or else they exist at the same time. At most, humans and living creatures are actually created by a deity. And even in this there is often uncertainty and ambiguity, in that, alongside

belief in these acts of creation, people also acknowledge the existence of spontaneous formation, or more simply, descent from deities by natural routes. It seems almost trivial to make reference to Hesiod's theogony. Chaos, Gaea, Tartarus and Eros come into being, and then the entire succession of gods develops, in which the natural phenomena are considered naturally to belong to them and to emerge together with them. Uranus comes into being with the sky, Helios with the sun, Pontus with the sea and so forth. The situation for the Egyptians follows similar lines. The pair Nun = Thot (primaeval water = primordial spirit) already exist, and there then develop the cosmogonic four pairs of gods, through which we gain the foundation for all natural phenomena. The male and female pair of gods Heh and Hauhet lift an egg out of the primaeval water; from it emerges Rā and, with him, instantly light, the sun. But Rā differentiates himself into new deities representing natural phenomena. Of the various Indian cosmogonies, the most important one, with the basic elements Tad (Das) and Tapas (fervent meditation), out of which emerge Kama (will), Ṛta (natural order of the world and causality), Satyam (truth and consequence) and the alternation of day and night, the sun, moon, stars and so forth, also corresponds to this principle. The cosmogony that begins with Brahmaṇaspati (Lord of Prayer or Offerings) as the original principle perhaps belongs even more strongly to this grouping. Aditi and Daksha are his succession: the one from whom things come into being, and the one who can enable things to come into being. From them emerge the Adityas, one of whom is Varuna. He is the real creator of the world: he creates all beings, maintains heaven and Earth, and places the sun in the sky. However, like Rā, the sun (Surya) is also lifted up out of the primaeval sea in a world egg. According to a hymn in the Rig Veda, Varuna establishes a tree 'in what is bottomless,' which is no doubt intended as a world tree, like the ash tree Yggdrasil in the legends of the Teutons. In a book by W Schwartz titled 'Indogermanischer Volksglaube' (*Indogermanic Popular Belief*) the author interprets the world tree as a tree of light, or a tree of the sun, and draws upon it as a cosmogonic principle. 'The ascending light appeared ... as a column of light, or, through the reflex of a

-----File: 145-----

tree, as a trunk, the rays of sunlight branching in the clouds as branches and twigs, the clouds as leaves.' According to him and other authors, sun, moon and stars were fruits of this tree of heaven. I cannot follow this or the other statements made about almost all natural phenomena being associated with the world tree, however interesting these comments specifically might be. The world tree is, I think, conceived merely as a means of supporting the worlds, or as something to hold them up, since a mind with no scientific training needs a concept of some form of support; this is why almost every part of the world has a belief in a world support in the form of a tree, a mountain, a pillar, an animal, a human being or the like. Varuna's tree will be no different from the tree of Zeus, on to which he hung the world like a robe. The Japanese believe that at least three deities (those of the sun, the moon and the tempest, Amaterasu, Tsukuyomi and Susanoo) come into being at the same time as the sun, moon and thunderstorm, being born from the right eye, the left eye and the breath of the gods Izanami and Izanagi.

In other instances the deities are already in existence and certain ones among them construct the world, instead of just one of them forming everything. Then the natural phenomena are distributed among the deities. The ancient Egyptians recognized a universal creator of the world, sometimes called Amun, and sometimes Osiris, Rā, Ptah, Atum or Tum. Thus we read in the seventeenth chapter of the Book of the Dead: 'I, the god Atum, I am the one who is. I was alone in the primordial waters (Nun). I, the god Atum, the creator of the sky and the one who formed the one who is, I arose from the primordial waters.' 'I am the god of light, Rā, in his first ascents. What does this mean? Rā, the god of light, as king at the beginning of his dominion over all he has created.' But in the same chapter Rā is however referred to as a deity (Atum) in the sun disc: 'I am the one unsurpassed by any of the other gods. What does this mean? It is Atum (also represented by Rā) in his disc.' And in addition, such a creator is at first portrayed as merely the creator of the deities, who then in turn continue the creation process. We read this in what is called the

Book of Apophis from 310 BC, which was put into the tomb of a priest called Esmin to protect him in the underworld from the enemy of Rā, the dragon Apophis. In this book Rā, as the master of the universe, speaks:

When first I came into being there emerged what had emerged,
Everything that had emerged, emerged after I came into being.
Numerous were the forms that came out of my mouth.

Here, as in Babylonian and other creation poems, we are told what did not exist. Then we read, 'I created all forms, being alone.' 'There emerged many forms of the forms, In the forms of the begetters And in the forms of their children. I spilt seed into my hand, I coupled with my shadow.' 'I spat out Shu, I spewed out Tafêne (Tefnut).' 'They (these gods) brought my eye to me behind their backs, And after I had put it in, I wept over them. Thus humans came into being.' Apart from the final very beautiful image, in which humans are formed from the tears (rîme = to weep, rôme = human being) of the god, everything is odd, muddled and, in places, quite hideous. The writer goes on to tell how all the other gods emerge from Shu and Tefnut. They beget Geb and Nut, who beget Osiris, Seth, Isis and Nephthys. In another text Rā says to Thoth, 'But I will allow you to encircle the two skies with your beauty and your radiance.' And by way of explanation, 'This is the origin of the moon, Thoth' is added. The value of observations of this kind is diminished greatly by their so often being founded on a play on words. And no one has such a wealth of wordplay as the Egyptians; Brugsch provides a host of examples of this.

For the Babylonians, the deities (or at least three of them: Anu, Enlil and Ea, and probably also Ishtar) already exist before the world is created. Others are described as their sons, for example Marduk, who is referred to as the son of Ea. The world is, at least in part, formed by Marduk. In Tablet VI of the epic creation poem Enuma Elish the very section of text describing this process of formation has unfortunately been almost completely destroyed. But we can glean quite a lot from Tablet VII, in which

-----File: 147-----

Marduk is glorified by different names. What we can read about him there includes the following:

> ‘Tutu-Ti-Ukkinu, life of the whole host of gods,
> Who set down the brilliant sky for the gods,
> Who took charge of their paths, determined their courses.’ –
> ‘He holds the paths of the heavenly stars in his hands.’ –
> ‘For he created the place, formed the firmament,
> Calls his name ‘Lord of the lands,’ father Enlil.’

Another text names Anu as the creator of the sky, and Nudimmud, i.e. Ea, as the creator of the ocean. Ea then uses clay to create the brick god, the smith god – in short, the gods of crafts – as well as distant mountains, sea, channel, forest, kings, people and so forth. Another text says it is the divine triad of Anu, Enlil and Ea that brings forth sun and moon with the deities Shamash and Sin. The following lines from a text described as an ‘invocation against toothache,’ have quite an odd ring to them. The writer starts with the primordial beginning, before coming to the tooth worm that is tormenting him:

> After Anu had created heaven,
> Heaven had created the earth,
> The earth had created the rivers,
> The rivers had created the canals,
> The canals had created the marsh,
> The marsh created the worm.[11]

Finally, I cannot tell what the river, in one last text (all taken from Gressmann, ‘Altorientalische Texte’ (*Ancient Oriental Texts*)), ‘which created everything’ and which the great gods dug out and endowed with cyclone, fire, wrath, terror and fearfulness, is intended to mean. It is not unusual for Babylonian texts to include things that seem like absolute madness to us. Among these texts we do find simple schoolboy exercises and phrases from some obscure exorcists, accounts that will not have been better received at that time than such things are today

Similar ideas about the independent creation of the phenomena and the deities are encountered among Indian peoples. But since everything is represented in the conceptions of these people, we can scarcely achieve a distinction between some ideas and others.

Thus, what was said above (p. 132) also belongs here to some extent, particularly when the deities are as pale as they are in comparison with Varuna (or whatever the creating god may be called). Perhaps the Teutonic cosmogony also falls under this topic, as the Edda poem 'Vafþrúðnismál' specifies forefathers for the sun, moon, day, night and seasons (Mundilföri for the sun and moon, Dallingr for the day, Norvi for the night, Windswalr for the winter, Savasudr for the summer – all apparently appellative names). The Earth emerged from Ymir. But the poem Völuspá, which was very probably written with knowledge of the latter, says nothing about fathers of the other things named above; the sun and the moon are presented as already being in existence, just without names and without a defined abode, until both were awarded such by the gods.

Instinct tells us the deities of fate should be connected with the ethical deities. But in fact they are not; they are positioned alongside them. They also existed earlier than the latter, since ethics, and even a mere sense of right and wrong, did not originally belong to primitive perceptions, but emerged in consequence of a higher level of civilization: a practical regulative factor between egotism and altruism, made possible by people truly living together with each other – this is apart from a child's love, which is not merely a human characteristic at all. The deities of fate originate in the dull feeling of helplessness experienced by humans in the face of death and disaster. Everyone must die, and there is a great catalogue of disaster that cannot be averted by any amount of effort, beseeching or offerings to the chosen deities. As man comprehends each objectively, he ultimately imagines personal forces immovably at work, against the will of which even his deities are powerless. Hence his fate hinges on these deities and on destiny. It is these forces that bring about everything, provided the deities conduct themselves with indifference, whether for good or evil – hence the practice of worshipping them and placating them with offerings and invocations. But the gods of destiny are not to be bowed, and for that reason they are greatly feared, and bypassed if possible.

-----File: 149-----

The Moirai were Clotho, Lachesis and Atropos: respectively, the spinner (of the thread of life), the allotter (of fate) and the one who cannot be turned. The Greeks had a certain cult for them, but not a particularly widespread one; the Romans had no cult at all for their Parcae (Nona, Decima and Morta), although Parca was originally a goddess of birth. Whether the Teutonic Norns named in the Edda as Urðr, Verðandi and Skuld (and others also) were worshipped has not been established. The higher the ruling and creating deities ascend, the further the deities of fate have to step back. On this account they actually behave in a more passive way; they do not rule, do not create and do not lead. They merely decree once and for all. Whatever they determine, it will happen, although sometimes (as in the works of Homer) this involves cooperation between them. Despite their inescapable power they are not always cosmic deities. The Greek Moirai were daughters of Zeus and Themis. Hence they are appointed by the immortals for the mortals, as Penelope says. Indeed, a Moira can be appointed for every mortal. So a Moira is simply fate; Zeus is referred to as the Moiragetes, just as Apollo is called the Musagetes. But in the poem 'Shield of Heracles' Hesiod calls Atropos the 'most aged and sublime goddess.' Some of the Norns are of even more lowly origin, emerging not only from gods but also from goblins and dwarfs. The Greek Aisa and the Roman Fates, representing Moirai and Parcae respectively, correspond more to the Indian perception of the all-importance and omnipotence of the word. It is the judgement of Zeus and Jupiter, as the highest deities, which these deities themselves can no longer evade, so the consequences are still quite unavoidable. In this interpretation the deities of fate, as such, fade away completely and it is the word that gains determining power – or the phrase, or the thought, or the offering. This belongs in a study of the last class of deities. I have been totally unable to find particular deities of fate corresponding to the Moirai for peoples other than those listed above; among such peoples, the real deities will thus also determine destiny at the same time. Nor do they have such legends as the Greeks, about the downfall of entire

dynasties of gods, or those of the Teutons, about the destruction of the gods in 'Götterdämmerung' (*Twilight of the Gods*), even though they do have a conception of the destruction of the world.

Taken to the extreme, the doctrine of destiny leads to fatalism, or kismet, which is a brother of the purely mechanistic view of the world. Even Hellenism, which is a comparatively joyful approach, is familiar with this cheerless soothing of the soul, which the Stoic school in particular later seized. But how movingly Hecuba laments in 'The Trojan Women' by Euripides:

> Into the vicissitudes of fate submit yourself placidly;
> The ship to wherever God and the wave drives you,
> And turn the bow not against the current;
> For you sail with the helm of fate.

There is no need to make mention here of deities such as Nike, Fortuna, Victoria, Sors and so forth.

In his work 'Ideen der asiatischen Kulturvölker und der Ägypter' (*Ideas of the Asiatic Cultures and the Egyptians'*) Twesten writes, 'In almost all polytheistic religions that have retained traces of their more ancient organizational form in their tradition or in their later system, for the Indian and Iranian Aryans, as for the Egyptians and the Greeks, the association of the gods with bodies or forces of nature fades ever more into the background, with intellectual and moral attributes sometimes forcing back the nature-related side to the same gods, and a new race of gods at other times superseding the older one if it no longer meets spiritual demands.' The latter should in fact be rejected as too high a conception, but in light of what precedes this we can only declare our agreement.

The ethical deities, inasmuch as they are associated with the life to come, will be discussed later. With regard to this life, the introduction and elevated worship of particular ethical deities was something reserved solely for the Greeks. Apollo, Nemesis and Themis have no equal anywhere else. The Furies of the Romans are the equivalents of the Greek Erinyes, but are far removed from them, as they are merely the souls of criminals appearing as ghosts, used by the gods against the ones who were living,

-----File: 151-----

to frighten and punish such criminals. In Apollo, what we refer to as Hellenism, kalokagathia, arrived at its most vivid idea. Elsewhere, the diverse areas of the ethos are governed jointly by different deities, and ruled by the highest deity in particular as a whole. The Greek kalokagathia comprises righteousness, noble conduct, harmony of life within oneself, calm gentleness, love of art and knowledge. What goes beyond these attributes – as far as I can see, forbearing, heartfelt and constantly practiced love for mankind – does not belong within Apollonian teachings. One need only think of how it was emphasized as something so remarkable that the Athenians had an Altar of Pity, which they naturally ought to have had. On the other hand, something else that strikes us as Christian and Mosaic in Apollonian doctrine is atonement for sin: Apollo is also the atoning god. He is actually the deity of higher inner life, and therefore also of the amphictyony. The concepts of the Iranians are closest to those of the Greeks: Ahura Mazdā is the principle of good, but at the same time he is a world god, the principle of light. The good that he represents is righteousness and truthfulness. He lacks the fine beauty so characteristic of Apollo: the noble simplicity and quiet greatness, as Winckelmann says of the art of the Greeks. No doubt the aforementioned love also. Ahura Mazdā, or Ormazd, is more similar to Zeus, who indeed also administers justice, and bears only a partial resemblance to Apollo. In the Vishnu doctrine the Indians have found a peculiar expedient, in making a god appear with various meanings for the world and at the same time making him human and personal: the incarnations, avatars, or appearances of Vishnu. Of these, it is the first and the ninth we shall consider here. As Krishna, Vishnu is the ideal of all that is noble, good and beautiful; half-god, half-human, he moves from country to country in constant battle with all that is bad and ignoble. As mentioned earlier, the Bhagavad Gita (p. 115) includes his teachings. They are presented in endless variations:

-----File: 152-----

> Fearlessness and integrity, perseverance in the thirst for knowledge,
> Generosity, abstinence and offerings, penance, probity
> And innocence, goodness, kindness, truthfulness, affability
> And love of mankind, gentleness and sincerity, modesty and constancy,
> Strength, forbearance, dignity, moderation, perseverance, humility
> Are signs of divine birth;
> Pride, hypocrisy, anger, boasting, indecency, ignorance,
> Anyone who indulges in these is doomed to daemonic birth.

Elsewhere in the text the three gates of the underworld (hell) are called lust, anger and avarice. This corresponds in every way to the Apollonian doctrine. And the teachings of Krishna are certainly for the most part far removed from the latter, as their fundamental characteristic is total self-denial: being free of desires, but also free of feelings. A man should be disturbed by no harm, but neither should any joy give him pleasure. The world of sensory perception should count as nothing for him:

> In each thing in the world of sensory perception there is a continuous marriage of love and hate,
> Both are the adversary of the wise man; on that account he does not pander to the world of the senses.

And at another place:

> Zeal is preceded by judgement, judgement by contemplativeness,
> Renunciation precedes contemplativeness, and before it goes lack of irritability.

This is nothing Apollonian; Apollo is the god of the abstemious life, and also the god of the beautiful world of sensory perception. The teachings of Krishna reached their height in later forms of Buddhism (p. 214 f). And the Buddha is actually regarded as the ninth incarnation of Vishnu. The Vaishnavas believe there are innumerable Buddhas who appear each time the world is mired in indulgence, sin and suffering. The historical Buddha is one of these. And what is the purpose of this lesson? Not to lead humanity in Apollonian terms to ever higher ideals, or to subordinate them increasingly to the beautiful and the good, but rather to take away their will to live, so that humans do not repeatedly come back in the cycle of the transmigration of souls, and they enter and rise into universal nirvana; Krishna, the universal being, says they go into him. We shall discuss this later.

-----File: 153-----

Other peoples also have deities who preserve their customs, such as Freyr, Freyja and Frigg for the Teutons, but these do not quite have the significance or the majesty of those discussed above. Among some peoples we encounter ‘sons’ of the deities, e.g. the sons of Rā in Egypt, the sons of the sun in the land of the Incas, the sons of heaven of the Middle Kingdom, and the offspring of the Amaterasu in Japan. As princes and rulers these sons then have the significance of ethical deities, alongside their other divine characteristics. Ethos is of course mostly defined by these rulers. And if self-interest, cruelty, weakness and lack of discernment come into play, the people are used to this, even from their deities. But order creates this conception. And this sometimes occurs in such a wondrous way as in Peru, as a human has more direct power over another human than the deity does, and he can thus make everyone a slave with no will of his own. Later the law behaves as this deity, as do social customs; as an entirety this constitutes executive authority, or else it is organs that are appointed. But there is no higher level than when the Socratic daemon dwells within us and we create the ethos out of ourselves.

We now come to the last class of deities, the conceptual deities. It stands to reason that the higher a particular people’s ideas of deities ascend (without these deities being incorporated into the universe itself, which is something Pandeism achieves, and will be considered later), the more these are divested of their earthly and human characteristics and peculiarities. Thus, they are constantly approaching the purely conceptual, and the personal enforces itself only in the type of the conceptual, and in the fact that effect is also ascribed to the conceptual. It is only the Indians who have raised this to the ultimate logical conclusion. Their conceptual primordial deity is Tad, nothing more than ‘that’ without any characteristic at all; not even being or non-being is bestowed on this pure concept. However, because such a single concept is of absolutely no use at all, the Indians have indeed introduced other additional conceptual deities, such as the word or the phrase or the thought, order, and sacrifice. If the world is already in existence,

these things can be regarded as world-governing principles: the principles are deified. However, if the world had to be created first, there needs to be an active force ascribed to concepts. The Indians did not shrink from this; they were more consistent than Plato, in whose works there is an unbridgeable chasm between his ideas and actual things. Concepts function like Logos, λόγος, which is yet to be discussed, and they are also understood in such personal terms as Logos. Indications of a conceptual view of this kind have been present among Indian peoples since the earliest times. Hence, in the Vedanta Upanishads we read, 'In the beginning was Sat.' Max Müller translates Sat as that which is, τὸ ὄν; at another place we read 'In the beginning was Asat, hence that which is not, τό μὴ ὄν.' As if in a polemic against these apparently contradictory statements, the Bhagavad Gita states, 'Brahma, who has no beginning, is called neither being nor non-being.' Hence, there also exist other established phrases, such as 'In the beginning was the self,' probably referring to Tad. Or 'Tat tvam asi': 'Thou art that.' It is quite natural for such fathomlessly abstract conceptions to go against the mode of expression which still always clings to the physical, and thus for even such broad transliterations always to be reminiscent of physical things. But another aspect to be considered is that, while something material is believed to follow from the immaterial, the latter, even at the highest level, unconsciously gains materiality and thus becomes the ultimate being, which encompasses everything. Here, on the one hand the conceptual view merges with Deism and Pantheism, and also with theosophy and Emanationism, which will be discussed shortly. On the other hand this view shifts into materialism in this respect, when, once it is materialistic, it leads into the concept of a universal matter, or to something that is perceived in the material world. Hence, we also read in the same Upanishads, which speak of the self as the primordial object, 'In the beginning was darkness,' and even, 'In the beginning was water,' and also, 'In the beginning was Prajapati, the Lord of All Creatures.'

-----File: 155-----

The ‘Daoism’ furthered by Laozi in around 600 BC among the Chinese (p. 122) appears to be very closely related to the religions of concepts. The essence is Dao, absolute being and absolute knowledge, and hence approximately like the Indian Tad unified with Tapas. Dao is accompanied by Yin, the female principle that bears offspring, and Yang, the active, formative male principle. These are joined by qi, which approximates to Eros. This provides us with three more cosmogonic principles in addition to Dao. The entire world, down to the smallest detail, has always existed in Dao. Through those three principles, no doubt also conceived in Dao, the world reaches the point of reality. Thus, Dao is also the highest god, which, however, as it is an abstract being, finds use in neither sacrifice, nor prayer, nor gift, but only in an irreproachable life (p. 122). Such an intellectual tenet meant as little to the Chinese as the corresponding elevated teachings meant to other peoples. It soon fell into decline and could not hold its ground in the face of the state religion. It was only late on that the Greeks arrived at abstracts as cosmogonic principles, such as δύναμις, νοῦς, ἀνάγκη and πιστίς: creative power, reason, necessity, belief and the like. The Roman conceptual deities cannot be counted as falling under this category. Di Indigetes were forces, gradually invented over time, which represented activities and occurrences, and were therefore in charge of them; a Roman would find them before him at every turn, and they had nothing to do with the more elevated questions of humanity, but were merely concerned with their duties and the events in their lives. These are cerebral conceptions, each belonging to a narrow domain, and as a whole, despite their vast number that could be increased arbitrarily, they are no more significant for the world view than the spirits themselves. We see this in spiritualised characters such as Adeona (who ensured children were returned home), Afferenda (who presided over the offering of dowries), Fabulinus (who ensured that children learned to speak), Mutunus Tutunus (who was the god of coupling and fertilisation) and so on. Quite a number among the multitude of Di Indigetes are actually phenomena, such as, among others, the well-known Aius Locutius, the mighty voice, which announced in the night to a plebeian, Marcus Caedicius, that the

Gauls were marching on Rome. In this respect there is even less to say about other peoples, inasmuch as we are dealing with conceptions in the domain of the religious. It is only in a monotheistic approach that we encounter a term for God that totally corresponds to the most conceptual term used by the Indians. When Moses asks God for his name in the scene at the thorn bush, so that he can refer to it when speaking to the people, he is given the answer 'eheye asher eheye,' 'I will be who I will be': this is what he should say to the people. This sounds like the Indian 'Tat tvam asi.' And the name we read as Jehovah is indeed also connected with being. And we also encounter a great deal of similarity between the Indians, who had come the furthest of all Aryans in their religious views, and the Israelites, who were the most distinguished in the same way among the Semitic peoples, in that alongside deities in the most abstract form such concrete concepts are also understood and expressed, except that in one population the concrete only goes as far as an anthropomorphic mode of expression, while in the other it descends much deeper. But the Israelites in particular lack the majority of the concept deities which were revealed among Indian peoples in Tad, Tapas, Om, Ṛta, Satyam, Brahman, Purusha, Sat, Asat and so forth and which do belong in polytheism rather than monotheism.

The religious approaches to the world and those associated with them in polytheism have developed on another course, that of henotheism. But here I have to withdraw a comment I made about this singling out of a certain phenomenon in the religious views in my book 'Die Entstehung der Welt' (*The Emergence of the World*). I now regard the distinction between henotheism and monotheism emphasized by Max Müller as entirely justified, in fact of fundamental importance. As is generally known, the earlier tendency was to designate monotheism as the original view of mankind and polytheism as what came later. The long dispute fiercely waged over this is essentially without substance. If someone connects with the concept of a deity not what we connect with it,

-----File: 157-----

but no more than what primitive people understand by it, or at most acceptance of the existence of a particular superior power, whether he assigns a number of gods or just one god is quite unimportant. We must, however, also note that primitive people are almost certainly never content with just one god. The idea they have of God is so completely tailored to them and their needs that they will always need a large number of deities. Just as, when they wish to intensify meaning, they simply repeat the words, for example much-much for more, far-far (cf Greek Tar-Taros) for very extensive, they take on two or more deities to be all the more sure of achieving their objective. And as the deities are also as restricted as they themselves feel, they also require a distinctive deity for each particular instance. I have previously mentioned how countless deities are often found in huts, and how, for savages and less informed people, the entire world is actually filled with spirits of every kind. It may be that even in very early cultural conditions some peoples possess a purer religious view. Curtius writes in this vein about the Pelasgians and their worship of the oracle Dodona, which is believed to have essentially related only to a pair of gods, Zeus and Dione. Yet as a rule religions develop, alongside rising levels of culture, to increasingly elevated views of life and the world and ever-purer forms of worship. This begins at least from the moment where these forms of worship are practiced with full consciousness; earlier on, as the worship that is originally so crude is absent, there seemingly exists a more noble-minded religion, although it is not yet present at all in people's consciousness, but is experienced merely as a numb feeling or presentiment. Such religious views, which emerge in this way as common property throughout humanity, go through the same circumstances as culture itself does.

The case is different with doctrines anomalously proclaimed by individuals to the people and forced upon them. The sovereignty of these does of course come to an end with the religious foundations, or does not survive long afterwards. And the conceptions of life and the world sometimes decline alarmingly, until prophets and reformers

arrive and bestow the original sense on them again for a while, or endeavor to do so. It is not pleasant even to think about such a decline in spirit, let alone to write about it, particularly in the current day, where individuals and entire peoples vie with one another in inventions to destroy each other, quite in contrast to the most nobly intended teachings of religion. But we have not yet arrived at views of life and the world that are presented to the people, as we are still with those that emerge spontaneously. Even with these conceptions it is possible for the number of deities to rise, rather than showing a constant decrease. When races unite peacefully, their deities also unite into a form of society. Brugsch demonstrated this clearly with regard to the Egyptians, whose nome deities all became provincial deities after the unification of the nomes. Even when tribes or peoples are subjugated through the supremacy of another tribe or people, their deities are generally not lost, as long as compulsion was not exercised from religious views outwards. The vanquished deities continue to be tolerated, and in most cases are even accepted and joined to those of the conqueror collectively, although perhaps with a lower status. What forms of syncretism were not practiced by the Romans! And the same is observed among Indian peoples, Mexicans and others. In the Land of Canaan the Israelites soon lapsed steeply from the teachings of Moses in adopting the deities of the oppressed first occupiers of the land. Even simple importation enables the gods to multiply, as probably occurred for the Greeks from dealings particularly with the Semitic peoples (Phoenicians, Lydians and Assyrians) and for the Egyptians, and certainly for the Romans; think of the Greek deities and the worship of Isis that were simply accepted, indeed summoned by the Romans.

But all this is accompanied by the unconscious endeavor to centralize the deities. Firstly this gives rise to the singling out of certain deities as focal points, around which the other deities form into groups. Where these other deities belong to the tribe itself, this finds expression in their being listed as sons, daughters, grandchildren,

-----File: 159-----

brothers, sisters and so forth of those deities. Hence the theogonies. Where they are removed from hostile tribes, or ones that have been suppressed, they assume the roles of evil spirits or overthrown gods. Examples among the Greeks will be familiar to every reader. Should the cult still be associated with the views of life and the world, it will necessitate a certain economy and accentuation. Hence, a people, a tribe, a nome, a town, or a family, while fully acknowledging all the other existing deities, can ultimately restrict their actual worship to one single deity, which gives us henotheism. All the attributes awarded to any of the deities are then also naturally ascribed to the single god that is the subject of their worship. He assumes the position of supreme sovereign among the deities; this position can become absolute if the other gods are merely the forces performing his will, like the angel hosts of God. Such an extreme henotheism has never existed anywhere; the deities have always retained their personal significance constantly. Neither Zeus, nor Marduk, Rā, Indra, Huitzilopochtli, Odin nor any other god has ever been able to achieve such a status in any religious view, despite their superior power. Henotheism is therefore not a complete view but one that peoples have approached in varying degrees – philosophical views aside, of course. Yet, as always, the ideas were ahead of the cult. The Greeks thus wanted to acknowledge Zeus per se in their ideas as the one who rules over and governs the world. But the Athenians also worshipped the glorious goddess of their city Pallas Athene, as well as Demeter, Dionysus and many others, while the Spartans revered their Apollo and Heracles, and so forth. All the same, henotheism comes quite close to monotheism. It is perhaps closest to it with the ancient Egyptians, under King Amenhotep IV (circa 1370 BC), a very odd king who wanted to recognize only the sun, Rā, as a deity. We have a remarkably beautiful hymn to the sun from his time attributed to Amenhotep-Akhenaten (regarded as a totem), which I regret

not being able to reproduce here due to its length (in Gressmann, Altorientalische Texte (*Ancient Oriental Texts*), page 189 ff). In this hymn Rā is hailed as the resplendent god who has created everything – the world, humans, mountains, rivers, towns, villages, paths, the entire animal world, down to the lowliest worm, and who rules in his might over everything. Why henotheism cannot shift into monotheism, and has not done so, we shall see in the next section.

Finally, we need to highlight a very significant approach that is referred to as a dualistic one, but here, as it is based on the supposition that two opposing deities exist, should be described as antagonistic. We have already explained and emphasized how good and evil spirits are believed in and venerated. But the Iranians have created a pair of gods consciously joined in battle against each other. This pair comprises Ormazd as the principle of good, of light, and Ahriman as the principle of evil, of darkness. As soon as Ahriman discovers the world of light they are in battle, and they remain in battle. Ormazd creates everything that is good; Ahriman destroys it, or seeks to destroy it, and creates everything that is evil. Good and evil are equally present in the world and wrestle against each other; the view related to Zarathustra is a transposition into the divine. The world originates from Ormazd, and all good deities and good spirits are under his authority. The underworld is the work of Ahriman, and all the daemons of all diseases and evil obey him. But the battle is believed to lead increasingly towards the victory of good, and it is for this purpose that humans are created. This follows from the spiritual heights of the Iranians and probably more also from those of Zarathustra. In the course of events that follows, at first evil is so predominant that good is scarcely a consideration, as, through fear, many people offer sacrifices and flattery only to the evil principle. Then the good principle gains more and more ground and increases in influence. But the two principles still stand side by side, indifferent to each other; good spirits and evil spirits act separately. In the continued course of events the battle begins and good predominates. But I must

-----File: 161-----

not neglect to point out that in other approaches Ormazd and Ahriman are not to be understood as separate deities; rather, the highest deity (let us call him Ormazd) unites two principles in himself, as Vohu Manah or 'good mind,' which has brought forth everything real and excellent, and as Aka Manah or 'evil mind,' from which everything unreal and evil has originated. And these principles are also united in humans, as they are in Ahura Mazdā. In him they appear as his Spenta Mainyu, his 'beneficent spirit,' and as Angra Mainyu, his 'destructive spirit.' This is believed to have been the true doctrine of Zarathustra. Then its dualism would of course not be antagonism, but god would be taken to be as dualistic in his works as humans are. This definitely seems far more obvious to a primitive man. Max Müller, who also interprets the teachings of Zarathustra in this way, points out that attributes of the deities are often separated from them and made into distinctive deities; this is what is thought to have occurred later with Angra Mainyu, and with all the distinctive attributes of Ormazd. The former became Ahriman, while the latter produced the host of the other gods and the angels. Like Ormazd, Ahriman, who had become detached from him, is also believed to have split and thus been furnished with a host of spirits of the underworld and daemons. These are ideas that have often been expressed and applied to other religious views; we also encounter them in the theory of creation by emanation. Ahriman has often been interpreted as the fallen angel from which Satan emerged, the adversary. It can hardly be subject to doubt that Persian doctrines in part infiltrated into Alexandrian Judaism and Christianity. In fact even Satan bears all the characteristics of Ahriman. But this Satan is not the one who appears in the Book of Job, which is indeed regarded as one of the oldest books in the Bible, perhaps the oldest, as this Satan appears not as a principle of evil but solely as a kind of Mephistopheles, an accuser. God asks him whether he has ever seen such a righteous

man as Job. To this he replies that Job is indeed blessed with riches of every kind. If God took these away from him he would turn his back on him. This Satan even appears among the 'divine' before God. Here I make reference to the 'Prologue in Heaven' in Faust. The legend of the fallen 'angel' is an extremely abstruse one and less than satisfactory. We can see that it is really meant to offer a kind of explanation for an alien element which has been adopted, and neither Milton nor Klopstock was actually able to strip what is alien from this magnificent figure of Lucifer. I myself have devoted a great deal of effort to this legend and have tried to make it such that I can understand it; however, I cannot report here on what I have concocted, as I intend to publish it in a drama titled 'Adam und Lilith' (*Adam and Lilith*).

However, the battle between good and evil is common property throughout humanity to such an extent that even monotheistic approaches can scarcely avoid introducing a principle of evil: think of the snake in the Bible. Indeed, polytheistic approaches are better placed to dispense with a principle of evil than monotheistic ones. This is because, since their deities are limited in their power, they are not themselves capable of preventing all the evil and the bad flowing from the nature of things and of humans. It is in an almost naive manner that Zeus says, at the very beginning of the Odyssey:

> It is a wonder how much the mortals do lament against the gods!
> From us there only comes evil, is what they imagine; but they themselves
> Create for themselves through ignorance, even against fate, misery

and then refers to how even he, with the warnings he sent down via Hermes, could not prevent Aegisthus marrying Clytemnestra and killing Agamemnon. When people also accept the existence of passively acting fate and deities who take decisions as the mood takes them, a particular deity for everything bad becomes superfluous. This is most evident for the Greeks and Romans, followed by the Babylonians, the Teutons (as Loki is not really the principle of evil – this was just how Wagner made him in the ingenious character of Loge) and others. The Egyptians have such a principle in their god Seth, but he is nowhere near

-----File: 163-----

as magnificent or as significant as Ahriman. He is also not the principle of what is morally evil, but rather that of what is ruinous to nature, as his conduct towards Osiris shows. The Indians also regard Shiva and their Kali, like Seth, as principles of destruction rather than of evil, and Shiva's nature is by no means something conclusive, as it also reveals itself in creating, just as Vishnu-Krishna is a creator and also a destroyer. In any case we need to separate that which destroys from that which is actually evil. Ahriman destroys and is evil; the corresponding deities of other peoples, where they exist, are exclusively, or almost exclusively, destructive. They are not even always, or not exclusively, underworld deities like Ahriman – they are only associated with the underworld. The Iranians accepted the evil principle as a deity with the others, because they were unable to attain a monotheism of the good principle. And they were at least consistent in giving it almost the same greatness and power as they gave to the good principle. The polytheism they otherwise followed remains unaffected by this; it relates partly to the natural phenomena (sun, weather, sky and so forth), and partly rather to conceptual things and aspects of the world view, as in the amesha spentas: dominion, wisdom, immortality and so forth; and also space, time, power, material etc. But the significance of the battle between good and evil is something that will occupy us greatly later on. For at another level, at which evil is transferred into the 'flesh,' life joins battle against matter, and this approach to life and the world gains a particular philosophical and scientific character, despite its importance for the ethical, and it is applied to the universe: its purpose, its development and its end.

18. Monotheistic approaches.

Monotheism shapes a religious view which (if we believe extraordinary workings and acts to be possible) is the most elevated with respect to thought. However, experience has taught that it is also the view people oppose most often and most

passionately. The lone god is too far superior to humans, too inaccessible. And if one god governs everything in the universe, he has not only countless things to take care of, but countless things taking countless courses. How should an individual gain consideration for his particular requests in this situation? The god of the entire universe cannot be a household god, and can hardly be the god of a nation. At least, this is how it is generally expressed in humans. For we see from history that no monotheistic view has emerged via a path of development, and that all those known to us were established by certain figures (p. 81), i.e. by people, who have interrupted the course of development of a mighty spirit and who have guided mankind on tracks quite alien to them, which they have followed with great reluctance, left at every opportunity, and still today shrink away from in fear if possible. This allows us to conclude that monotheism has not just been sublimated out of any form of polytheism. But an even stronger argument consists in what follows. We know of not a single polytheistic view in which the female principle is not represented alongside the male, in fact not just in a subordinate position beside it, but in most cases in perfect juxtaposition or as the principal element. Ishtar is an absolute obstacle for any interpretation of Babylonian views as monotheistic, as is Hathor or Isis for Egyptian ones, Dione, Hera and Athena for Greek ones, and so forth through all the truly polytheistic views without exception. In the most ancient monotheism, the foundation for all other corresponding approaches to life and the world, there is also not the slightest trace of a female principle alongside the male one. I have already commented that polytheistic views have not even led to a real henotheism. Now we see that it is not even possible for them to lead there at all. They have the capacity to rise only as far as a ‘duism,’ a pair of deities (as distinguished from the dualism of the opposing deities for the Iranians), not to a single god. If there were polytheistic approaches without a female principle, such an ascent

-----File: 165-----

would be, even if not actually a probability due to human vagaries, at least possible. But no polytheism has developed such conceptions. The enormous stumbling block of the female principle for real monotheism was also acknowledged by F Delitzsch, who was as great as an orientalist as he was remarkable as an admirer of the Babylonians. When he and others, such as the very commendable Pastor Jeremias in particular, speak at least of 'monotheistic undercurrents' among certain peoples, especially the Babylonians, it would be more correct to call them 'henotheistic undercurrents.' I have to quote what Friedrich Delitzsch said from his lecture 'Babel und Bibel' or *Babel and the Bible* (first presentation 1905, page 81 f, footnote 42). But I shall give his quotations on the Babylonians in the form of a German translation provided by Gressmann ('Altbabylonische Texte' (*Ancient Babylonian Texts*)), and in their entirety, so that the reader can judge for himself. [12]The text (marked as a tablet of Kudurru, son of Mastukku, and specified to be a collated copy of an older text) is Neo-Babylonian; what time it dates from it is not certain. Gressmann's translation is not complete, in that the designation 'God' (ʾIl) before the name is missing. The phrase always runs: 'God (name) is Marduk in respect of ....' The names of only thirteen gods are legible: Tu, Lugal-Aquila, Ninib, Nergal, Zamama, Enlil, Nabium, Sin, Shamash, Hadad, Tishu, Râbu and Sukamuna. These therefore depict Marduk with regard to (respectively): planting, spring depth, conflict, battle, dominion and judgement, lighting up of the night, justice, rain, armed forces, (*unknown*), and irrigation pipes. The text continues on the reverse and we can read another five lines at least in part, following the formula of attributive ('the one who examines' and 'more luxuriant' remain to be deciphered), then image, then name of god. Beneath this we read: 'Eight images of the great gods all together'; Zamama, Nabium, Nergal, Sulmânu and Pabilsag remain to be decoded as such gods. This reverse side, bearing three names which also appear on the obverse side and attributable to the same writer, leaves no room for doubt that it is all about gods, and at least in some cases even great gods, should the descriptive il, meaning god, still not suffice to establish this. Therefore Marduk

simply is these gods, and has their duties to perform. Friedrich Delitzsch writes, ‘Marduk is just as much Ninib as Nergal, just as much moon god as sun god, and so forth.’ The word ‘is,’ which he gives printed in expanded type, does not appear in the text; in Gressmann’s book it is put in brackets as an explanation added by him. This may be true. But how might such an assessment enable us to conclude that biblical monotheism is Babylonian? It is not a case of being directly about ‘Bible and Babel,’ but rather revolves around whether that assessment denotes a monotheism. For I find it difficult to grasp how anyone can misjudge the nature of monotheism in this way. In monotheism God is neither sun god nor moon god, nor a god of natural phenomena at all. Here we have Jehovah as an example. Where in the Bible is there a single word about Jehovah being sun god, moon god, plant god, god of property and so forth, even the god of irrigation pipes? In monotheism God is placed above all the world, he is nothing of what is in the world; he creates the entire world (simply by command, in the Bible) and reigns over the entire world. Marduk, even as interpreted by Delitzsch, is nothing more than such and such a number of gods of certain objects and phenomena, whom the author of the text cited here even feels obliged to list all together, totting up a certain eight ‘great gods’ (in the form of images). This is far below the conception the Greeks had of Zeus, whom they also called Zeus-Helios or Zeus-Hades and who became their sovereign god. And what else do the Egyptians declare about almost every single one of their gods, and how remarkably much more elevated and more wide-ranging these statements are! In the course of his discussion Delitzsch also moderates his view, as this observation shows: ‘As far as this text is under consideration, we can at most speak of a monotheistic undercurrent.’ I myself think we can barely speak of a henotheistic undercurrent. I may content myself with these explanations, which no doubt elucidate adequately what is to be understood by monotheism and what it is in relation to polytheism and henotheism.

-----File: 167-----

We need say nothing about monotheistic approaches; we were all brought up in them. And where this topic brings us into a struggle with ourselves is an area that falls under the forum of philosophy and natural sciences. Another aspect belonging there (if not in the realm of incapacity for thought or lethargy in thinking) is what there would be to say about atheism, as atheism as a religious view is of course a contradiction in itself and has never even existed.

19. Approaches relating to the world, humanity and global catastrophes.

Conceptions of the beginnings of the world and humans based on myths and fables are described in my book particularly devoted to this subject. There is some repetition, supplementation and continuation here, but only inasmuch as the purpose of the book demands it. What is of more general human significance in this is the acceptance of the existence of a primordial being, or a number of them. Where only one primordial being is possible, it is God, Rā, Jehovah or Brahma. Whether Nun (or also Ptah, Rā, Amun and so forth) signifies god or prime matter (primaeval water) to the Egyptians is something we cannot determine. As ‘father of the gods,’ as he is described in a temple from the time of Seti I, depicted with feathers on his head (a symbol of the presence of a living soul) and with a scourge in his hand (a symbol of control), one might regard him as God, particularly since he is also called Nut. It is just the same when he is called the ‘Lord of attentiveness’ (p. 132) and directly referred to as ‘creator.’ But the Nile is also called Nun when it is at its highest, as is the sea; Brugsch produces evidence of this. Thus it will probably be a case of a prime matter in conjunction with a primordial spirit, which is in consonance with the tendency towards Pandeism of the Egyptian conceptions (p. 228). For two or more primordial beings the question can only be of deities, or deities in conjunction with matter. Here is another area in which there is not always assurance with respect to views of life and the world. What are Oceanus and Tethys: deities, or primaeval water and primordial force? Homer

writes about them as if he were writing about people, although he certainly also refers to Oceanus as a river encircling the world. And Chaos and Gaea, Tartarus and Eros? One might consider Chaos to be prime matter; however, Chaos begets the darkness (ἔρεβος) and the night (νύξ). Tartarus seems to have been more of a concept, as perhaps infinity is; it subsequently becomes a place. Ge, or Gaea, bears the traits of a goddess, but in addition she is of course also clumping earth. Only Eros is solely a deity in the works of Hesiod, but he has no cosmogonic significance here at all. Alongside the deities, the Iranians also acknowledged four other cosmogonic primordial beings: Tvasha, Zurvan Akarana, Anagra Raoca and Anagra temah, interpreted as space, time, light and darkness respectively; the last two are also believed to represent power and matter. If the amesha spentas – Vohu Manah, Asha Vahishta, Khshathra, Haurvatāt, Ameretāt and Armaiti – were to be interpreted as primordial beings, other attributes would also be bestowed on them: preservation, truth, order (dominion), perfection, immortality and wisdom. The Iranians would then of course have accepted in advance a belief in everything that belongs to the creation, organizing, operating and governing of a world. The Teutons regarded a deity and matter as primordial beings, as the gods were called the sons of Bur, and the world was constructed out of Ymir, the giant, just as Indian peoples believe it was made from Purusha (person). We cannot be certain whether the Israelites also regarded matter, alongside Jehovah, to be a primordial being. There is no need to hike through the entire globe; everywhere we encounter primordial beings like those highlighted above, sometimes composed in one way and sometimes in another. Some peoples have, each according to their doctrines, believed in the existence of various kinds of primordial beings, in particular the Indians: besides the absolute being one and the absolute meditating one, Tad and Tapas, they also have deities as well as master workmen of the world (e.g. Varuna) and world matter (as Purusha is), all in the forms of persons. Those whose views were modern ten years ago tried to emulate the ancient Indians and to create the world out of itself in poetic terms. As we have already devoted so much time to difficult and weighty things, and since yet more difficult, weightier

-----File: 169-----

things await us, perhaps I may do something for the enjoyment of the reader, by reprinting a poem that the Kreuzzeitung (*Neue Preußische Zeitung, or New Prussian Newspaper*) printed for the same reason a few years ago. The name of the poet is – I would rather not say.

> In the roll of thunder, as I created the sea,
> His creation was already old, a thousand years ago,
> And I myself age-old,
> And I lost my hold and my form,
> Fell, melancholy, into a dream,
> Sprayed over with white wave-spume.
> Screeching eagles, whirring around me,
> Tangling through the holes in my coat.
> All my souls were sleeping.
> Then, radiant, the sun rose from the depths,
> And I tremble.
> Noting how I, like a tiger, lie in wait for myself:
> My hand, extended steep to the high vault,
> And the roof of the sky now uncovered,
> To let out the sun
> Into its golden alleyways.
> And the hand creates without the spirit,
> I lie encircled by screeching eagles,
> All this takes place outside my will

Here we see the sheer simplicity of the act of creation over which people agonize so much.

A second, more universal cosmogonic concept relates to man. He is a primordial being for some primitive peoples , as well as being a principle of creation. He generally comes into being after the world is formed, as a descendant of the gods, or a particular creation made by them. In the Elohist creation story in the Bible man is created by God: ‘So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them.’ Man is created like light, the sun, the moon and so forth; what he is created from, we are not told. But the Yahwist-Elohist account specifies the material used and adds in the breath of God. ‘And the eternal God formed man, dust from earth, and blew into this nose the breath of life; at this,

man became a being endued with life.' All animals are also formed of earth; they only lack the breath of God. According to Berosus and the creation poem the Enuma Elish, the Babylonians believe the blood of the gods plays a part in the creation of man. Bel's head is cut off, and the blood streaming forth is mixed with earth. It is from this that humans and animals are formed. This version is quite different from the biblical one. The Egyptians also considered humans to be formed of earth. We have descriptions in which their god is sitting at a potter's wheel forming man. Hesiod posits various substances (gold, silver, bronze or ash wood, and iron) for each of the five successive races; the material used for the fourth race is not specified. This comes close to indicating symbolically the higher quality of man, but still seems to be not quite admissible. It is the gods in general who form the first two races, while Zeus forms the next two. No forming entity is named for the fifth race: it is born. According to other Greek legends, humans are formed out of earth, mud, loam or clay by gods and, as is particularly well known, by Prometheus, for whom Athena provides spiritual succor, although the latter is only found in later literature. Elsewhere humans even grow forth from trees or bushes, as they do for the Teutons, the Iranians, the Greeks (Attis from the almond tree, Adonis from the laurel), the Italic peoples and others, or they might emerge from stones, rocks or blocks of ice. The legend telling of new humans emerging from the stones cast behind themselves by Deucalion and Pyrrha after the flood has no place here: Zeus gave life to the stones. In the same way Odin, Hoenir, and Lodur turned the ash and elm into living human beings by issuing them with soul, breath, blood and colors.

The perception of the world developing is also very widespread. We have various things to consider at this point. The first concerns humans. Here the tendency to compare the past to the present in a favorable light plays a major role. I need only make mention

-----File: 171-----

of the Bible's magnificent paradise story and the calamitous fall from grace. The doctrine of a fall from grace was also familiar to the Iranians. The first human couple, Mashya and Mashyana (meaning 'human man' and 'human woman'), are warned by Ahura Mazdā to think good thoughts, to speak good words, to do good works and not to offer sacrifices to the Devs (the evil spirits). And it says respectfully and good-heartedly, 'Ahura has created water, the Earth, trees and animals, stars, moon and sun and all the comforts, each and every one of which is evidently derived from purity.' Hereupon the enemy rushes into their thinking and casts a gloom over their thoughts, and this causes them to lie: 'Ahriman has created water, the Earth, trees and animals and everything else.' Through this impious talk both become ungodly people (darvand, or wicked) and their souls are in hell until they gain future bodies. This is how it is portrayed in the Bundahishn, which goes on to describe how their food loses its taste and their life becomes arduous as they continue in sin, through which the Devs become ever more powerful. Paradise plays a particular role in another Iranian legend. To clarify: Vivanhao, who is equated with the Indian god Vivasvân, but without the mystery attached to this character, is the first human to pay his respects to the sacred haoma (p. 112). His son is Yima, corresponding to Yama, son of the Indian god Vivasvân. It is to him (before Zarathustra) that the Mazdaean doctrine is revealed by Ahura. He lives his life based on this doctrine with all his human descendants on the paradisiacal Earth, immortal and innocent in a paradisiacal climate. And as the Earth becomes too small to hold them all he repeatedly digs the western boundary with a golden shovel, saying, 'Be kindly, Spenta Armaiti, expand and stretch yourself out to bear livestock, draft animals and people.' And each time the Earth expands by a third of its previous size. Thus, Yima dwells with the whole Earth for a thousand years. This is followed by an event that corresponds to the Great Flood, which will be discussed later. But Yima loses immortality and mercy for himself and all his descendants

because of a lie. He falls victim to the dragon Dahāka. Yima is Firdusis Jamshīd (Jam, the 'resplendent one'), who perishes because he made the people worship him, Dahāka the Arabian tyrant Dhohhak (Zahhak) with snakes growing out of his shoulders.

The Babylonian texts do actually recognize the idea of sin against God's command and penitential psalms, but they do not tell of a fall from grace. A picture on a seal, which we can reproduce here (left), has been interpreted in terms of this fall from grace. Two people are sitting on either side of a tree; a snake coils upwards behind the person on the left. The people are fully clothed (even wearing headwear), while Adam and Eve are naked, before and at the time of the fall from grace. Snakes, together with deities, also occur elsewhere for the Babylonians. Even if we do not accept as valid the two portrayals (Figures 27 and 70) shown on pages 81 and 203 of 'Das Alte Testament' (*The Old Testament*) by Jeremias, because the first one is perhaps not Babylonian but Persian, while the second may be not original but copied or created by free modern invention, there still remains the depiction shown in Figure 35 on page 100, in which Sin (the moon god) and Ishtar stand facing each other, and between them, besides other symbols, there is also the unmistakable image of a snake coiling upwards. In the seal reproduced here there are two deities (one certainly a deity, as it is wearing a horned head covering, which, as Jeremias writes, 'is exclusively a sign of divinity for the Babylonians') with the familiar mystical tree between them: a depiction found remarkably often, and with many variations, on Babylonian and Assyrian monuments (and also Persian ones). One of the deities has a snake as a symbol, or else the snake could be a hostile being, as battles between the deities and dragons are indeed such commonplace events for the Babylonians. And even



-----File: 173-----

the Babylonians acknowledge the existence of a human who lives forever, which should really not be possible after the fall from grace. We shall encounter him in the flood legend.

Other peoples seem originally to have had no concept whatsoever of a fall from grace in the sense of that found in the biblical account. Even what Hesiod tells of the five ages of man, which we have touched upon more than once, does not fit in here. Thus, the Israelites and the Iranians may be the only ones to whom a fall from grace was a common conception in all its particulars, although admittedly in quite different versions. Even the closest relatives of the Iranians, the Indians, do not recognize a true fall from grace; man has lost consciousness of his divinity through avidyā, or ignorance. There is a tendency to ignore the significance for the whole of humanity of the fall from grace of a single human couple. The hardships of life are recognized by the Bible as consequences, as is death; the fall from grace is an explanation for how peoples have often sought an interpretation for both hardships and death and found it in the most diverse ways. As far as I can see, the Bible contains no indiscriminate burdening of mankind with sin for all time, as such; it is rather among the Iranians that it could be demonstrated. There is a distinction between this and the fall from grace of Lucifer in the choir of angels, mentioned earlier (p. 150).

But there is of course an increase in man's wickedness and acts of violence on Earth, and finally God sends the flood, to destroy every living thing, with the exception of Noah and what he has been commanded to take with him. As is generally known, legends of floods are to be encountered everywhere. As it is the closest to the account in the Bible, we need to take a look at the flood legend of the Babylonians. We have four accounts of it. (As is widely known, the Bible has two). The Epic of Gilgamesh contains one, two seem just to be other revised versions of this account, and the fourth is the account passed on by Berosus. These accounts correspond in most aspects. In the first account the Babylonian Noah is called Utnapishtim, whom we encountered earlier, with the epithet Atrahasis (the 'surpassingly wise,' according to Gressmann), who might perhaps have given rise

to Xisuthros in the works of Berosus, just as his father Opartes originated from the Babylonian Ubara-Tutu. The real cause of the flood is Enlil, deity of the Earth and also of the zodiac, who was previously taken to be Bel. Three other gods (Anu, Ninib and Ennugi) allow themselves to be persuaded in the resolution of the gods to cause the flood. The reason for the flood is something we can only draw from the reproaches Ea subsequently showers upon Enlil. According to these, it is apparently centered on sins committed by individuals against Enlil, for Ea says he should have deposited on to the sinner his sin, and on to the transgressor his transgression; he could have sent lions, wolves, famine or plague to reduce the people in number, instead of the Great Flood, which destroyed them all. Ishtar is on Ea's side. But at another place in the text Ishtar says she had advised the gods about the Great Flood. Incidentally, the role of the gods in the story is a sorrowful one. As the Great Flood swells they become frightened. 'They escaped and climbed up to the heaven of Anu. Like dogs the gods squeezed in, encamped by the wall.' Ea, always benevolent to humans, saves Utnapishtim by advising him to build a boat. However, it seems hideous for Ea to prevail upon Utnapishtim to tell the others a wicked lie and in so doing draw them to their destruction. Incidentally, much tallies with the biblical account, in particular the boat (in the Bible a chest, the ark), how it is equipped and its contents, the running aground at, or on, a mountain (Nisir or Nimush instead of Ararat), the sending out of a dove and a raven (or a swallow for the Babylonians), and the offering made by Utnapishtim, Noah, after the flood. The subsequent fate of the Babylonian Noah is, however, a quite different one from that of the biblical Noah, as he becomes entranced by mankind and lives on in immortality, as we have seen, in the far west.

In Iranian beliefs Ahura Mazdā announces the flood to Yima. For reasons totally absent here, a hard frost will take hold of the Earth and snow will enshroud everything. In order to protect himself and everything else from the floods to arise from the melting masses of ice and snow, Yima should make for himself a 'varem,' a dwelling. The Indians have

-----File: 175-----

several versions of the flood legend; their Noah is Manu (Manu = human being). The prediction of the flood, the warning and the counsel to build a ship is delivered to him by a fish (which is interpreted as god in the form of a fish, like e.g. Ea for the Babylonians), which he caught when it was small, and at its entreaty not to let it be devoured by the other fish, keeps in a pot, and then leaves to mature in a hole, until he lets it go in the sea. The ship is tied to the 'horn' of the fish and the fish leads it to the northern mountains. In a later legend Manu, like Noah, also takes plants and pairs of animals on to the ship, and, as in the Bible, the flood is proclaimed seven days in advance. In the Mahābhārata the reason given for the flood is the need for the Earth to expiate its sins. But in another legend, incomprehensibly to me, the flood is to retrieve the Vedas and the seven rishis (seers and singers) who preserve them. The retrieval of sacred writings for the same or similar reasons also comes into play for the Iranians, Teutons and Babylonians. The flood imposed by Zeus due to the wickedness of the 'bronze' age of man, and the ark (λάρναξ) which Deucalion (Noah) builds on the advice of his father Prometheus and in which he saves himself and his wife Pyrrha by sailing to Mount Othrys, all belong to the well-known Greek flood legend. This legend of a flood involving Deucalion was greatly embellished and subsequently also enhanced by Plutarch and Lucian with oriental features which brought it nearer to the biblical and the Babylonian legends. In his description of Attica, Pausanias also tells how the Athenians had a crevasse in the ground around the perimeter of their city, through which the flood was supposed to drain off. The flood of Deucalion was preceded by the Ogygian deluge, which struck Boeotia and Attica and in which the curious cities of Athens and Eleusis by Lake Copais are believed to have perished. But this was not a Great Flood. In Ogyges the veteran Buttmann sees Oceanus, i.e. the actual god of water, and also, with his predilection for odd etymologies (e.g. Tubal-Cain is Vulcan), interprets Noah as a water god (from the Hebrew nahar, meaning river). Whether a flood legend existed for the Teutons is

difficult to establish. The Younger (Prose) Edda tells of how, when the gods (Odin, Vili and Ve) killed the giant Ymir, whom we encountered earlier, so much blood flowed from him that the entire race of giants was drowned. Only one giant saved himself, with his wife, in a boat (Lûdr), and engendered the human race. This Noah is called Bergelmir. Jacob Grimm describes this legend of the flood as 'crude and rudimentary' in comparison with the biblical one. However, this Teutonic legend is reminiscent of a similar one among the Babylonians, in which Enlil kills Labbu the lion, and Labbu's blood keeps on flowing for 'three months, one day and ten hours.' Legends of floods are prevalent all over the world. For the Lithuanians the ark is a nutshell, which the highest god Pramzinas, who had sent down the flood to exterminate evil, threw out through the celestial window and on to the Earth while eating nuts.

Other peoples, such as American Indian tribes, Negroes, Oceanians, Peruvians and so forth, give other flood accounts. Richard Andree has taken great pains to compile all the flood legends, and lists 88 of them. But there could only be a true connection between the biblical and the Babylonian ones, an opinion Andree shares. Of these, the latter will probably prove to be the more ancient, as it is much cruder in nature. The poetic account of the rainbow is unique to the Bible. Otherwise legends of floods must have originated at local level at the most diverse times, as floodings and inundations of the land do occur everywhere, and from the most diverse causes. The essential element is the ethical motif and the deliverance of a human couple. China does not seem to have cultivated a flood legend. The inundations by the Nile are a blessing on the land, but those of the Huang He are the 'curse of China.' However, they have always been regarded as natural, and there have been attempts to dam up the river since ancient times. I do not know whether Japan has a legend of a flood; with the powerful tremors (Japan has the most earthquakes of any country on Earth) and the tsunamis often associated with these we should expect there to be flood legends.

An Egyptian legend in the 'Book of the Heavenly Cow' passed down to us from circa

-----File: 177-----

1300 BC has a very peculiar ring to it; if the topic were not so serious, it would almost sound like a spoof story. It is an inscription in a grave chamber belonging to Seti I at Biban-el-Moluk. The people must have spoken ill of the god Rā and plotted against him. He takes this very badly. As befits a ruler, he assembles the other gods to confer with them, and just like court flunkeys they approach him. The oldest god, Rā's father Nun, is asked first and replies, 'My son Rā, you, a god who is greater than his creator and mightier than his begetter, do remain seated on your throne! There is great fear of you when your eye (referring to the goddess Hathor) is directed towards those who say bad things about you.' Rā then says, 'See, they are running away into the wilderness, through fear because of what they have said.' 'Let your eye go forth, so it can strike for you all those who have uttered such malicious blasphemy against you,' urges Nun. Hathor hastens into the wilderness after the people and kills them all. But some of them have fled towards the south; Rā wants to save them. He orders the cow elephant Didi (?) to bring red ochre, as well as grain, from the high priest named the 'side-lock wearer' in Heliopolis, and has it ground and made into beer by his handmaids, then has the beer brought to the place where there are still people. Then 'the majesty of Rā rises early in the morning under cover of night, to pour out this sleeping potion.' 'At this the fields were filled four spans high with the liquid, through the power of the majesty of this god.' But Hathor, who then comes to kill the rest of the people, finds everything flooded with the beer. 'At this she drank and the taste pleased her, and she returned home drunken, without having recognized the people.' A strange legend of human destruction and a flood! With the flood of beer, and all for the deliverance of the remains of humanity! Incidentally, Rā will no longer dwell on Earth. The goddess Nut, in the form of a cow, lifts him high and forms the sky, where Rā remains.

It is, of course, of far greater significance if not only living creatures perish, but the entire world is destroyed.

I know of only one reference among the Semitic peoples of the Babylonian Berosus to this, preserved by Seneca. The world is to be destroyed by fire when the planets converge in Cancer, 'so that a straight line can pass through the circles of all men.' This is an astrological notion, not a myth, although astrology and myth are naturally interwoven for the Babylonians. The end of the world and a great fire engulfing the world are otherwise specifically Aryan perceptions. To those Indians who regard the world as merely an illusion (Maya) or a dream dreamt by Brahma, the world is destroyed as soon as the god perceives the illusion or wakes from the dream. At one point in the Bhagavad Gita we read:

> They who know the Day of the Creator as completed in a thousand ages, and the Night of the Creator as ending in a thousand ages, they are knowers of day and night. All manifest things spring forth from the Unmanifest, at the coming of the Day; and at the coming of the Night, they melt away into the Unmanifest again. The whole host of beings, coming into being again and again, melts away at the coming of the Night, and comes forth inevitably at the coming of the Day.

As difficult as it is to penetrate the sense of this, there is no doubt that it is describing higher epochs in world history: epochs of light alternating with epochs of darkness. The usual ages in world time amount to a kalpa, equivalent to 432 million years.[13] It is in the course of such a kalpa that the world is destroyed and then formed anew. This is the doctrine of the Ramanuja school of Vedanta, about which we shall learn more. Day and night in God's time were each believed to amount to a thousand such kalpas, where the kalpas are understood as ages in world time as given above. But perhaps the thousand ages in world time themselves are meant be a kalpa; then, according to the interpretation above, the world would alternately go through a kalpa and, after that, not go through a kalpa. The great dissolution (mahapralaya) relates to not only the entire world, but also all the gods, with the exception of the One and Only. The Iranians also believed in an end to the world: it would be destroyed by fire when the comet Muspar plunged to Earth and liquefied everything. This is of course associated with purification of the world from

-----File: 179-----

evil. However, the Bundahishn does also say in express terms, ‘Ahura will remain on his magnificent throne without creation, as he will not perform works while they (the amesha spentas?) are preparing the deceased.’ The conflagration the Greeks believed had engulfed the world (prompted by Phaethon, a legend which may not really fall under this topic) is something we shall encounter later.

But now we shall turn our attention directly to the Teutons, about whom we have the most detailed accounts on this. The Edda describes the end of the world (Ragnarök, where those who prevailed disappear like smoke) as a battle: the battle of the gods against Surt (the swarthy one, guardian of Muspelheim, the land of fire), in which they perish and the world is destroyed by fire. In Völuspá the völva recounts:

> From the east the ship sails; There will come Muspell’s
> Sons across the sea, But Loki takes the helm.
> Fifl's (Loki's) sons sail All together with the wolf,
> At the same time the brother of Býleistr (and of Loki) is on the ship. –
> Surt rides from the south With flaming sword,
> From the sword flashes The sun of the gods of the slain;
> The rock mountains are toppled, Ogresses stalk along,
> The men set foot on Hel’s road; Yet the sky gapes.

Then follows the battle of the gods: Odin faces the wolf Fenrir, which devours him, Thor against the Midgard serpent, which poisons him, and Freyr against Surt, who kills her. Finally the Earth sinks into the sea, and the stars fall from the sky:

> There rages fire and consuming flame,
> High licks the blaze against the very sky.

Other Nordic legends correspond to the account above, except that they elaborate further on the detail. In Germany itself we have the ‘Götterdämmerung,’ or the Twilight of the Gods, in ‘Muspilli,’ written in Old High German and chronicled in the ninth century. Elijah takes the place of the Aesir, with the Antichrist and Satan instead of Loki and Surt. Elijah is wounded and what follows is described in Johannes Scherr’s translation into modern German: ‘Die Berge entbrennen, kein Baum bleibt stehen auf der Erde, die Wasser trocknen aus, das Meer verdampft, in Lohen vergeht der Himmel, der Mond fällt hernieder, Midgard flammt auf, kein Fels steht fest. Der Tag der Vergeltung fährt über die Lande,

-----File: 180-----

fährt über die Völker mit Feuer. Da kann kein Verwandter dem anderen helfen vor dem Muspille.' (*The mountains are set on fire, no tree remains standing on Earth, the waters dry up, the sea evaporates, the sky vanishes in tongues of flame, the moon falls hither, Midgard bursts into flames, no rock remains firm. The day of retribution travels over the lands, it travels over the people with fire. Then no man will be able to help a kinsman before the muspilli.*) One thing tallies strikingly with the account of the völva: the destroyed old world (in which only the sea remains) must be succeeded by a new one. Teutonic legend also sees this new world is better than the previous one. The völva beholds:

Another time I behold rising
From the sea an Earth, Once more a green Earth;
The floods descend, Over them flies an eagle,
Which, on the rock, Hunts for fish.
The Aesir assemble On the Plain of Ida
And it is of Moldthinur (the Midgard serpent?), the mighty one, that they speak
And there recall Earlier deeds
And Fimbultyr's (Odin's) Age-old runes
Then will be found in the grass
The wondrous golden tablets (rune tablets?),
Which they had back in primaeval times.
Unsown, there The crop fields will grow,
All evil will yield; Balder will come;
Höd and Balder will be united Under the roofs of Hroptr (of Odin),
The two gods of battle ...
I saw a hall standing there, More beautiful than the sun,
Covered in gold, On the shore of Gimlé (heaven),
There shall dwell the joyous hosts (good people?),
And find delight in bliss Until the end of days.

According to Vafþrúðnismál in the Elder Edda the new Aesir are called Vidar and Vali, Móði and Magni, offspring of Odin and Thor, who did not perish with the world. But Balder truly is the more poetic and more elevated figure, with his blind brother Höd. The new human couple are Líf and Lífþrasir; during the destruction of the world (?) they had taken shelter in the foliage of Hoddmimir (the world ash tree); their food was the morning dew. According to the Younger Edda, it is a daughter of the previous sun who now shines as the new one. Compare this with the end of the world and the emergence of the new world according to the Revelation of John, in particular Chapters 6, 7, 20 and 21. You will find very substantial similarities between

-----File: 181-----

the two accounts. The sibylline oracles, Book V, page 345 ff, should also be included here.

Humankind has always liked to believe in better times to come. When the world had foundered in sin and acts of violence, and poverty and depravity, the deity should intervene, not only to punish as previously, but also as a helping and creating force. To this end the Indians devised the incarnations, avatars (p. 139), of a deity (Vishnu); Semitic peoples thought up the Messiah, and others invented the return to Earth of long-gone benefactors or gods. It was by this belief that the Peruvians and Mexicans perished, since they saw in such bloodthirsty figures as Pizarro and Cortés with their Spanish rabbles these long-anticipated benefactors and gods (Viracocha for the Peruvians, Quetzalcoatl for the Mexicans). But the Jews very much took heart from their belief in the Messiah and owe to it their preservation through thousands of years. And Christianity became a world religion through this belief in the Messiah. Scarcely any other conception of humanity has proven to be of such enormous spiritual and practical significance as that of the Messiah, which the Second (Deutero) Isaiah so tenderly illustrates, the peoples of India having such a gift for fantasy. When we climb down from the elevated idea of the Messiah it becomes heroes and rulers whose return is anticipated by the people, and who are imagined to be concealed or sleeping somewhere in the meantime. Our Frederick I, Barbarossa (although it was actually not him but Frederick II), is the figure featuring most prominently here. But other peoples on Earth also have similar figures. In ‘Through the Dark Continent’ Stanley tells of how, in the legends of Uganda, the first king, Kintu, a gentle ruler advanced in years who shied away from bloodshed, fled with his wife as he saw his descendants indulge in all kinds of atrocities. The people were convinced that he was in hiding, and all the subsequent kings searched for him. Mawanda, one of the last kings, the twenty-seventh (Muteesa was the thirty-fifth), was awarded the privilege of being able to see Kintu with his entourage in a deep forest.

He was supposed to come with only his mother and the leaders among the peasant farmers. But his loyal Katikkiro followed him, to protect him from any possible treachery. Kintu perceived his presence and began rebuking Mawanda. When Katikkiro then stepped forward from behind a tree, Mawanda killed him with a throw of his spear. At this Kintu vanished, together with all those around him.

20. Construction of the world.

When we look at the forming and organization of the world we find no direct connection by nature between this and myth; it is rather more linked to outward appearance. We may, however, speak of mythological cosmologies as views of the world which do not rest on scientific study or opinion, but which, like the myths of the deities, are merely stated, and are taken as the basis for the myths and legends. This is because the Earth's central position is common to all peoples. Earth is the center of the world. Most consider Earth to be surrounded by water. It takes the form of a plate (round or square), a cylinder, or a cube, or a vast mountain range, or a convex dish. It floats on water or is supported by pillars, humans or animals, or is suspended from the roots of the world tree. The sky is conceived in simple, single terms, or in multiples corresponding to the number of stars moving separately (seven planets – Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, the moon and the sun – and the fixed stars as a whole) and the resulting number of the supposed abodes of the gods. All the skies are solid and surround the Earth like bells. The stars are lights, also abodes of the gods, or even parts of the gods' forms (eyes, countenance and body); they move from east to west in the skies and return on invisible paths from west to east. It is not in the nature of a myth to be consistent and to pay regard to the details in natural phenomena. Should a myth hit discrepancies in conditions that are thought to be simple, the gods are quite free and can arrange things

-----File: 183-----

as they please. Hence, the natural phenomena are conveyed only in their broad, generally perceptible characteristics, and any description contains manifold confusion and careless inconsistency.

The first information in literature on the Greek mythological view is found in the works of Homer. The Earth is a disc, with the River Oceanus washing around it and the sky covering it. The stars rise out of the Oceanus and then submerge themselves in it, assuming that they do actually rise and set and do not, like the Great Bear, have to refrain from 'touching Ocean's deep.' Far to the west, beyond the Oceanus, is the entrance to the realm of Hades, which, however, has to extend beneath the Earth. For, just as Poseidon makes the Earth tremble in the battle of the gods before Troy, 'Aïdoneus, prince of the realm of the night' leaps up, filled with fear, and cries out:

> Let not from above
> The earth shaker Poseidon tear open the Earth,
> Let his dwelling place not appear to men and to immortals.

This dwelling place is 'terrifying, oppressive, filled with a tangled mass, even dreaded by the gods.' Another place, probably beneath this one, is Erebus. And further still, as far below the realm of Hades as the Earth is from heaven, there is Tartarus, the most terrifying place, where the Titans Iapetus and Cronus, banished by Zeus, sit in chains in deepest darkness. In the west, on the edges of the Earth, but on this side of Oceanus, if not existing as islands in Oceanus, lie the Elysian Fields, 'where the brownish-haired hero Rhadamanthys has his abode, and the people live entirely effortlessly in bliss.' All these details have led people to want to conclude that Homer actually sees the world as a sphere, one half of which lies illuminated above the Earth, while its other half lies, eternally dark, beneath it. As for Oceanus, it is a river in the works of Homer. However, more recent studies express the belief that the pre-Homeric meaning points to the horizon of the sky, and Oceanus may earlier have actually been the god of the heavenly realms. The etymological link with the German word 'Woge' (*large wave*) would then of course cease to apply. Oceanus is thought to correspond to the Sanskrit word açayana, meaning

-----File: 184-----

‘encircling,’ ‘adjacent.’ I cannot quite see why this should not also be the Homeric Oceanus, which also encompasses the Earth and fits tightly around it. The seat of the gods is on Mount Olympus, above the clouds, and its gates are opened and closed by the Horae, and Helios shines on the gods, just as he does on the humans below. For the most part, Hesiod’s conceptions of the world correspond to those of Homer; it is just that he is somewhat more detailed in what he imparts. Thus, regarding Tartarus he says that it took an anvil nine days and nights to reach it from Earth, that even a tempest could not rush through it in an entire year, and that the Earth is rooted in it, as is the bed of the seas. These are quite considerable dimensions, as in Hesiod’s terms the breadth of Tartarus would be more than thirty Earths, and its depth twenty times the diameter of the sun. According to Hesiod the sky is held up by Atlas; Homer says Atlas bears the pillars that support the sky and hold it away from the Earth, in a place as yet unclarified. These pillars probably run all round (ἀμφίς) the Earth. But then of course we lose the Atlas we know as a person who had Calypso as a daughter. Atlas has also been interpreted as the sea (approximating to Oceanus?). Ways of supporting the sky and the mountains, running all round the Earth, are also encountered elsewhere. Something myth cannot explain is how the stars rise after they have set. It is said that every night the sun travels in a barque on Oceanus, or sun-bowl, around the Earth from the west, through the north, and back to the east. But it might also be imagined that the stars return via a route under the Earth. — The conception of the world in the legend of the Argonauts follows what is described above: as Homer and Hesiod probably also assumed, an inlet or current of the Black Sea was drawn right to the Atlantic or Arctic Ocean, making Europe an island to itself.

We have no real mythical cosmography from the Romans; the writers follow along Greek tracks.

-----File: 185-----

The world as seen by the Teutons comprises three parts: upper world, middle world and lower world, each part in turn consisting of three parts, and at various places the Edda speaks of these nine parts. According to Simrock these were: Muspelheim (the world of fire), Asenheim or Asgard (the world of the gods) and Ljosalfheim (world of the light elves) forming the upper world; Jötunheim (the world of the giants), Midgard or Manna-Heim (the world of mankind) and Vanaheim (the world of the Vanir, and of the secondary gods, demigods and subordinate gods) making up the middle world; and Svartalfheim (the world of the dark elves), Niflheim (the world of fog and ice, the counterworld to Muspelheim) and Niflheim (the world of Hel, or world of the dead) as the parts of the lower world. Each of the three chief worlds is supported by a branch (or root) of Yggdrasil, the world tree; the Irminsul, the afterimage of which among the ancient Saxons Charlemagne destroyed, is also thought to represent this tree. The world of the Teutons is thus richer in structure than that of the Greeks, and more poetically fashioned. Incidentally, there also exist connections between the different parts of the world, such as Bifröst (‘trembling repose’), a bridge from Asgard to the Earth, across which Richard Wagner has the gods walking at the end of ‘Das Rheingold,’ accompanied by such wondrous music, from the Earth to Valhalla (actually a hall in the Fortress of the Gods in Glaðsheimr). The world serpent, Midgardsormr, winds itself around the Earth; as Jacob Grimm puts it, this is ‘evidently the world sea.’ So was this Oceanus? Mention should also be made of the three renowned wells that bubble out under the branches of the world tree in the three worlds Asgard, Jötunheim and Niflheim: Urdarbrunnr, Mímisbrunnr and Hvergelmir (the roaring kettle). At the first well ‘the Aesir and Norns hold their court.’ The second is guarded by wise Mimir (not Mime in Wagner, but a demigod-like being who drinks wisdom daily with the water from the well, and for whom Odin has to submerge an eye as surety in the well before he may also drink from it wisdom and the power to see into the future). Níðhöggr is at the third well with other snakes. The Greeks think of the sky as covering or encircling the Earth. Each of the stars has its site (or its ‘chair,’ or its ‘table’),

and those tracing their own course have horses and chariots beneath them. The sun is the ‘wheel of fire’ (fagrahvel in the Edda), or the ‘glowing shield,’ or ‘Odin’s eye,’ or ‘God’s countenance.’ The moon is also referred to as the ‘glow.’ The course of the sun and moon around the world is perceived as them fleeing from two wolves (Sköll and Hati), which pursue them and occasionally devour them (as in eclipses!). The changes in the moon are attributed to dwarfs; ‘We do not know more fully how,’ as Jacob Grimm writes. Another thing we do not know is how the Teutons imagined the stars returning from west to east.

Where we may see old tradition in the Zoroastrian literature passed down to us, the myths of the Iranians demonstrate a view of the Earth and the universe that was quite correct. In the Minokheard we read, ‘Sky and Earth and water and everything else under the sky were formed just like the eggs of birds: the sky forms above the Earth and beneath the Earth, similar to an egg, by the handiwork of the creator Ahura Mazdā, with the Earth within the sky like the yolk in the egg.’ Hence, the universe is spherical. One part of the Bundahishn, which is an older text, is even more significant. In its thirty-first chapter, sky, Earth and celestial bodies are referred to directly as being unsupported. The sky is ‘without pillars,’ the Earth ‘has no bearer,’ the heavenly bodies ‘float in space.’ The Bundahishn goes on to tell us that the Earth comprises seven regions, keshvars, one in the center and the other six around it. The illustration on the right, taken from Windischmann’s ‘Zoroastrische Studien’ (*Zoroastrian Studies*) (but with two regions interchanged) demonstrates the positions of the regions with respect to each other and gives their names. Now, in a description of the course of the sun throughout the day and the year, given in the sixth chapter, we are told (and I have adhered to the original order), ‘As the sun rises, it lights up the keshvars of Savahi, Fradadhafshu and Vidadhafshu and half of Qaniras. When it goes down on that side of the darkness, it lights up the keshvars of Arezahi, Vourubaresti and Vourugaresti and the other half of Qaniras. When it is day here, it is thus night there.’

-----File: 187-----

We can see from this depiction that the Earth cannot be lit up in this way if it is not cylindrical or spherical; the latter would tally with what is stated in the Minokheard. The following is also said of the Earth. It has a number of sacred mythical mountains of great significance. The Harburc Mountain range is fastened around the Earth and to the sky; it even reaches above the region of the stars, as far as the 'lights without a beginning.' Stars, sun and moon rise and set on it. This last statement is difficult to understand, particularly since the fifth chapter says, 'Mount Taera is in the center of the world, and the sun revolves around it like the water all round the world … The Taera Harburc is the mountain by which I make sun, moon and stars circle back from the back ... It is at the Harburc that the sun rises every morning and sets in the evening; the moon, the fixed stars and the planets have their tie and their course by it.'



The conclusion from this would be that the Harburc is a range of mountains that encircles the Earth in the same direction as the equator. But it could also go around the Earth like the supporting pillars in Greek myth. Something that supports the latter is that the sea, Frhankart or Vourukasha, which is compared to Oceanus, is at the foot of the Harburc Mountains and surrounds a third of the Earth, apparently in the south. Two rivers emerge from the most northerly point (?) of the Harburc Mountains: one, the Arg, eastwards, and the other, Vas, westwards; both flow out into the sea, Frhankart or Vourukasha. Thus, the ring of water around the Earth (the inhabited Earth?) is complete. The river sent forth by the miraculous spring Ardviçura Anahita is also of significance. (Anahita is also goddess of the planet Venus.) She comes down from heaven on to a ruby mountain, which is sometimes called Hugar Bulvend, and sometimes Hukairya, or Haraiti, or

-----File: 188-----

Harā Bərəzaitī. This mountain holds the tree of paradise and the paradise in which Mithra (and previously Yima) lived, and a path leads from the mountain over the Chinvat Bridge into heaven. The Ardviçura flows through golden channels to the Earth and into the ocean, then under the Earth, thus forming invigorating, purifying water. The sky is made of precious stone, and the stars are set beneath it, 'between heaven and Earth.' The sun is also called Aurvataçpa, the 'charioteer.' The zodiac and many stars are known by their names. The world, incidentally, consists of the realm of light, which is the 'embodied' real world, and the realm of darkness, which is below it. Hence, this world itself is in the middle, in the 'vai'.



I have nothing more of any substance to say about the Indians; they think up a host of upper worlds arranged one above another, one for almost every god, or for every class of celestial body, and in addition worlds for penitent sinners, the devout, the truth and so forth. Beneath the sky is the air world, the world of mists. These upper worlds as a whole are borne by elephants in the north (?). The latter stand on the Earth, which in turn rests on more elephants. Acting as support for these animals, the turtle rests upon the mighty world serpent, which encompasses the entire universe, with the rear part

-----File: 189-----

of its body resting in the vast ocean. Between the Earth and the turtle are the worlds of the cursed, arranged one beneath the other. The image above shows the entire fantastic invention, with Meru, the golden mountain, as the upper worlds. Anyone who wishes to gain a conception of the impossibility of untangling Indian cosmogony and cosmography should read the second section in the work of Adolf Bastian 'Der Buddhismus in seiner Psychologie' (*Buddhism in its Psychology*). It is scarcely possible to discern what was really intended. The Indians were in possession of fine systems of mathematics and astronomy. But how they interpreted the movements of the stars in mythical terms is something I have not been able to establish. What is peculiar is that (p. 212) the gods eat from the moon, hence its waning, which is transformed into waxing as souls migrate into it.

We shall now take a look at the conceptions of the Israelites, Babylonians and Egyptians. The Bible often speaks of the world, mostly in the way in which it is described through the creation story. We read of the Earth rising above the lower water, with the air and the sky above it; in the sky are the stars, and above the sky the upper waters. The latter corresponds to the Babylonian conception, to which great importance has been attached, but is also similar to views encountered in Oceania (p. 17) and doubtless also in Egypt (p. 181); these do suggest themselves as similar conceptions. The Earth is solid. In the 104th, cosmographical, Psalm we read, 'Who laid the foundations of the earth, that it should not be removed forever.' And in Job Chapter 38 the Eternal One says, 'Whereupon are the foundations thereof (of the Earth) fastened? or who laid the corner stone thereof?' But it is precisely in Chapter 26 of this book that we have a noteworthy declaration from Job that the Earth floats freely: 'He stretcheth out the north over the empty place, and hangeth the earth upon nothing.' This chapter also speaks of pillars of the heavens: whether these are figurative or material is, as is so often the case with poetic texts, difficult to determine. But the sky is at the edge of the world ocean. The 104th Psalm says of the waters, 'Thou coveredst it with the deep as with a garment: the waters stood above the mountains. At thy rebuke they fled; at the voice of thy thunder they hasted away.

They go up by the mountains; they go down by the valleys unto the place which thou hast founded for them. Thou hast set a bound that they may not pass over; that they turn not again to cover the earth.' The upper waters 'form the upper chamber' in the heavens. Beneath the waters there is also an underworld, Tachat or Sheol, according to Job Chapter 26: 'Dead things (Rephaim) are formed from under the waters, and the inhabitants thereof. Hell is naked before him, and destruction hath no covering.' And also in Chapter 38, Verses 16 and 17: 'Hast thou entered into the springs of the sea? or hast thou walked in the search of the depth? Have the gates of death been opened unto thee? or hast thou seen the doors of the shadow of death? .' The stars return to the east under the Earth. Ecclesiastes (Chapter 1, Verse 5) says of the sun, 'The sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth down, and hasteth to his place where he arose': literally 'keuchend' (*meaning 'panting,' but this sense does not appear in English Bibles*), because it has to ascend to the heights.



Neither does the Babylonian myth actually contain more knowledge of the world. As we have already discussed, its universal conception of the world is that of the Bible; it may even be older. In his book 'Das Alte Testament im Lichte des alten Orients' (*The Old Testament in the Light of the Ancient Orient*) Jeremias presents a 'Babylonian map of the world,' which I reproduce here. He writes, 'In all events the seven triangles depict the seven corresponding parts of the sea washing around heaven's dyke and the Earth, and they are connected with the seven circles (see below) of the supuk (supuk samê is the zodiac), which plunges into the celestial ocean. Perhaps here we should also consider the seven seas that appear in Indian cosmology, and the seven islands in the sea in Enoch Chapter 77'; we can also add the seven keshvars of Iranian thought. I have also taken

the following details from the same author. The universe is a double form corresponding to itself. The celestial universe has three parts: celestial ocean, zodiac (celestial Earth), and northern sky. The earthly universe consists of the ocean (in the Earth and around the Earth), the Earth, and the sky of the air (where meteors appear and the spirits float). The planets, moving within the zodiac (at number seven with sun and moon), are the mouthpieces of divine will. 'The role of the sky of fixed stars is like that of an annotation in the margin of the Book of Revelation.' For the stars are also called sitir samê, 'writing in heaven.' It was from perceptions such as these that the renowned Chaldean astrology developed, with all its scientific achievements and also the follies that still resound in modern times. After the seven planets, the zodiac is regarded as consisting of seven concentric rings placed one above the other (the seven circles, mentioned above), 'like a round staircase, a gigantic tower of steps' (an Indian concept?). 'The seventh level leads into the highest heaven, the heaven of the god Anu.' This heaven is also considered to be the sky of fixed stars and counted as the first heaven. This step heaven is imitated, with all or just some of its steps, in the pyramid-shaped step temples of Babylonia. Three of the seven steps are given emphasis: those of Sin (the moon god), Shamash (the sun god) and Ishtar (the goddess Venus). These denote the regents of the zodiac. Cylinder seals often show Shamash appearing between two mountain peaks as the 'gate of heaven.' But I have not been able to form a conception of either this gate or the world mountain and the 'mountain of the countries.' In 'Die Vorstellung vom Weltgebäude' (*The Conception of the Cosmos*) Arrhenius presents an illustration of the Babylonian world based on a sketch by Faucher-Gudin. 'In the center lies the continent that rises on all sides to the world mountain Ararat. The land is completely surrounded by the ocean, on the far side of which lie the abodes of the gods. Above the world mountain hangs the sky, like a bell (according to the illustration, resting on a second mountain range running around the ocean).

The northern part is furnished with a tube (with two openings). The sun appears out of the eastern opening in the morning and rises into the firmament, only to go down again in the afternoon and finally, as night falls, to enter the western opening of the tube. During the night it pushes itself through the tube and next morning comes out again through its eastern opening.' Where the erudite writer borrowed the sun tube from I cannot establish. It is unquestionably convenient, but in none of the texts and images at my disposal can I find even a suggestion of it. The earthly world is, incidentally, a likeness of the celestial world in its every part, a conception shared by the Egyptians, and examples of this (but in reverse) have indeed been found among primitive peoples. As can be seen, most of this particular detail is, despite outward resemblance, in stark contrast to the biblical conception; in the latter, the sky has nothing in the slightest to do with the earthly world, and the entire universe is nothing in the face of God. God has given his 'statutes' to the stars.

Even the world of the Egyptians consisted of the familiar three parts: sky, Earth and depths (Pet, Ta and Duat). The sky is the extended one, the veiling one, the high one, the arched one (Kapu) etc. It rests on four pillars or is supported by the region of dry air (Shu), and holds the stars and their deities. The temple is regarded as an image of heaven and so is constructed and decorated accordingly. Brugsch presents many examples. Thus, 'for those living on Earth, heaven is a magnificent temple hall, a cupola beneath whose magnificent roof they delight in their existence.' Burial chambers are also covered with the sky on their ceilings; this sky is black though, being the lower sky, to which the sun withdraws at night. Sometimes the Egyptians seem to have imagined several skies above one another; the figure bent double in the next illustration, which depicts the sky, the air and the Earth in human form, appears twice or three times in a row,

-----File: 193-----

as the sun sky, the moon sky and so on. The sun also travels in its sky in the sun barque (na-n-Rā), carried by the primordial god Nun (shown in a picture towering above the primordial waters). In the book of Job the sky is described as a mirror, and among the Egyptians as iron. Iron (ba) sometimes simply stands for the sky (‘Rā travels or swims or walks on the iron’), just as the same happens in reverse: the ‘iron of the sky (ba-n-pet)’ is actually used to mean iron. The name given for the Earth (Ta) in myths is Geb. This is believed to mean bending or curving. Whether the ancient Egyptians knew of the roundness of the Earth, or whether Geb is simply a name characterizing the areas of unevenness, is, however, unclear.



The idea of ‘weakness’ is also thought to be contained in this name, and the Earth is portrayed as a weak old man (as in the depiction mentioned above), or as an ailing woman. The lower world is the world’s night realm of the sun, beneath the Earth and under the waters. We shall return to this lower world later. It is fashioned in figurative terms as a doubled-up figure, Osiris. ‘The lower hemisphere, bent double, contains his form (i.e., that of Osiris),’ reads one inscription. The entire world appears to be enclosed by Nun, the primaeval water, as we can gather from the illustration on page 216 of Brugsch’s work ‘Religion und Mythologie der alten Ägypter’ (*Religion and Mythology of the Ancient Egyptians*).

This would correspond approximately to the biblical and the Babylonian interpretations. But if the illustration also shows a border of water round the outside of the world, that would be more reminiscent of the Oceanus of the Greeks, beyond which the world does continue, in Tartarus. However, it can be a question of a caprice of the painter. The universe is portrayed beneath the image of the scarab.

21. Living and deity.

Any conception of life is determined by the degree of freedom in the face of God or the gods and the degree of reliance on them. The Aryan races seem to have been the least dependent on their gods, and probably also those with the least trust in them. Buddhism developed out of their midst; although it does not deny the existence of the gods, they are certainly regarded as having very little value for mankind. Here the most extreme principle rules unilaterally: the life of a man is determined by himself, and he himself is the master of his destiny (p. 211 ff).

There are five aspects according to which life with its inner and outer processes is evaluated above all: chance, freedom, providence, predetermination and constraint. Precise examination of these aspects falls under the domains of metaphysics and ethics. Where we speak of views of the world and life that have emerged from religion, the first and fifth aspects are dropped; only the three aspects in between remain, and they determine man’s relationship to the deity. If freedom of will is to prevail in a religious approach, there must be accountability to the deity. So egotism also leads to demands on the deity. Both freedom of will and accountability can be discarded with the end of life, or else continue beyond life. In the case of the former, a human has all the harm that befalls him in his life to consider as punishment for wrongdoing of his own free choice, and everything good to regard as reward for good conduct. He usually accepts the latter without thanks; he will always find some fine deed for which he believes he may expect a reward.

-----File: 195-----

This is because the purely ethical practice of doing good through the soul's desire, and the joy found in it, is very rare and actually eliminates the deity. But a man does not always regard a punishment as something he deserves. This requires true, heartfelt piety and contrition, as we encounter, often expressed in such a moving way, in hymns, psalms and anthems. Here we find this view mixed with belief in the provident care of the deity for man. Life is trustfully left in the care of the deity. Anything offered by the deity is accepted in humility, and anything bad the deity might impose is borne in humility: as reward or as penance, but always as a decree of the most high, who does know why. There is no need for me to cite any examples from monotheism. But such conceptions are also found within polytheism:

> Zeus, whoever you may be, exalted, unfathomable,
> Whether spirit of men, or whether a natural necessity,
> I beseech you; for you steer us on a tranquil path
> Walking thither, all in the fate of man, to his fitting destination

exclaims the hapless Hecuba in the words of Euripides. In a similar vein, we read in the beautiful Babylonian song of lament to Ishtar:

> You behold the unfortunate and broken man,
> and guide him daily with vigor.

A conception linked to this is one so absolutely crucial for all religion: that the deity is prevailed upon, grants mercies that are unearned, and waives punishments that are deserved. Polytheism even allows one deity to be invoked against the other. In the Song to Ishtar the supplicant says,

> Loose my breast and create for me abundance!
> Steer my steps, that I,
> Joyful and free, may walk the road with the living!
> Give orders, that at your order the enraged god should become good once more,
> That the goddess who, raging, turned away, should become good once more.

Ishtar is thus also called the 'star of laments,' and all this despite the portrayal of her arbitrary and total superior power, which engenders enmity between friends and has

dominion on the battlefield. There is a strange – or rather, peculiar – almost standard phrase of reconciliation in relation to the deities: that 'their hearts may find rest' or 'they themselves may find rest,' just as the Babylonian texts actually say so much about the restlessness of the deities, and indeed, about their tumults, through which so much rivalry and conflict emerges between them; hence the cosmogonic battle wrought by Apsu and Tiamat against the deities. Perhaps our translations do not hit the correct sense. Collective songs for any arbitrary deity have also been written and made well known. When a man wants to demonstrate his good conduct to God, it is not uncommon for this to take the form of him saying he did not commit such and such a sin. The 125th chapter of the Egyptian Book of the Dead is very typical of this. The formula runs: 'What NN (as the deceased) says, when he reaches the Hall of Two Truths (p. 189), after NN has freed himself from all the wrong that NN has done, in order to see the countenance of every god.' And there now follow the confessions. 'I have not acted wrongly towards people,' and so forth. There are sixty-three negatives of this kind and scarcely ten positives, the latter including the beautiful words:

> I have given bread to the hungry,
> And water to the thirsty,
> And clothing to the naked.

Other peoples have acted in a similar way. But for all of them, doubts are frequently expressed as to the succor offered by the deity, either because he is too far from man and is not concerned about him, or because the man thinks himself too lowly in the face of God. How often the latter sentiment is given expression in Psalms, but it also occurs in other biblical scriptures: 'What is man that you are mindful of him' and so forth. Among Aryan races we more often encounter doubt about the will of the deity; Euripides provides many examples. Hecuba's cry of 'You gods! True that you are useless as help to us; but it is comforting to beseech the gods when misfortune strikes people of our kind' is among the mildest.

-----File: 197-----

Even the concept that the deities harbor ‘envy and ill will’ towards man is very widespread. How they cultivate reciprocal envy and ill will and are thus driven into battle against each other, resulting in one race of gods dethroning the other, is portrayed in horrifying language by Aeschylus in ‘Prometheus Bound.’ How the deities then reign by caprice, just like tyrants on Earth:

> Alas, new masters are now at the helm
> in Olympus; in keeping with new law
> Zeus now rules without law.
> What was earlier mighty he now destroys.

And then:

> For poor human creatures showed
> He no consideration; to exterminate their race entirely,
> Then to create another new one was his plan.

Prometheus, who says this of Zeus, saves the people. This is not far removed from the way in which Enlil acts with the Babylonians, so that Ea must, at least for a few, be the deliverer. Good fortune in particular provokes the envy harbored by the gods. And anyone who may be presumptuous in such instances must pay a heavy price. Niobe’s tragedy still speaks to us today through the wonderful, poignant descriptions which give us cause to marvel. Even the Bible contains suggestions that God does not intend to grant everything to mankind, as in the paradise legend and the building of the Tower of Babel. But such accounts also bear the hallmark of the interpretation of natural phenomena in the life of humanity: why humans live such arduous lives, why they die, why they linger on Earth scattered so far and speaking so many different languages. Other peoples have thought up other legends for the same reason.

So the freedom of human beings is not unconditional and the providence of the deity is not total. Therefore man is familiar with the concept that there is nothing at all about himself he has to determine: that, as with his birth, his entire life is predetermined through the deity, and so it is with his death. Whatever good might be in store for him, and whatever might affect him in a harmful way, has already been set in place by the deity. This

good or harm might be either total or relative. (On fate, see page 136 ff.) We see how far absolute predetermination goes in the morose book of Ecclesiastes: ‘And also that every man should eat and drink, and enjoy the good of all his labor, it is the gift of God. I know that, whatsoever God doeth, it shall be forever: nothing can be put to it, nor anything taken from it: and God doeth it, that men should fear before him.’ ‘(I know) that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts; even one thing befalleth them: as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath; so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast: for all is vanity.’ This gives rise to the well-known quotation ‘Vanity of vanities; all is vanity.’ It is of course rare for us to encounter pessimism expressed as harshly as in Ecclesiastes, except perhaps among the philosophers. But people lament their feelings of constraint and powerlessness everywhere.

Hence, despair leads first to the wisdom of lack of concern, and of enjoyment. The book of Ecclesiastes recommends this continually: ‘Behold that which I have seen: it is good and comely for one to eat and to drink, and to enjoy the good of all his labor that he taketh under the sun all the days of his life, which God giveth him: for it is his portion.’ ‘In the day of prosperity be joyful, but in the day of adversity consider.’ ‘Then I commended mirth, because a man hath no better thing under the sun, than to eat, and to drink, and to be merry.’ ‘But if a man live many years, and rejoice in them all; yet let him remember the days of darkness; for they shall be many. All that cometh is vanity.’ These words of counsel are moderated by the ethical perception that joy is compensation for the drudgery men must bear, and that in all things man should do no evil, but must do good works. One tradition attributed Ecclesiastes, incorrectly of course, to King Solomon. The Aztecs had a king similar to Solomon in Nezahualcóyotl (1470): ‘All earthly things have their end already prepared for them. Amid the mirthful orbit of their splendor and

-----File: 199-----

vanity their power is exhausted and they turn to dust. The entire globe is nothing other than a grave, and everything that lives on it will one day be buried in it. The things of yesterday are today no more, and the things of today will perhaps tomorrow already be no more. Those who once sat on thrones, governed assemblies, commanded armies, conquered lands, demanded divine reverence, and who pursued glory and the power of dominion, where are they now? Vanished with all their grandeur, just like the smoke that rises from the crater of Popocatépetl and disappears without a trace.' So reads the cheerless wisdom of the Aztec king according to Ixtlilxóchitl, as if he had surmised the terrible fate of his people and his descendants. And to this he adds, as in Ecclesiastes, the exhortation: 'But you, my friend, delight so in the gracefulness of these flowers, delight with me. Cast away fear and care, which mar our pleasure to the end of our lives. Do gather together all those whom love binds to you, who are dear to you in friendship. For nothing on Earth is so certain as the harsh cutting edge of death. And it is in change that the future lies.' Ethnologists endowed with imagination have already claimed that the Aztecs and Maya were the lost ten tribes of Israel. Hence, what tradition! The ancient Peruvian drama 'Ollanta' is thought to contain similar conceptions. The literatures of most peoples certainly contain such, and similar, eruptions of human despair at life. What thoughts the Indians had on this is something we shall debate at a different place in this work. It is sufficient to emphasize two observations from Greek and Roman teachings. In Alcestis, Heracles says to the attendant mourning for his mistress:

> On all men is imposed the fate of death
> And to no one was it yet disclosed,
> Whether only of the days when first it will strike them in life.
> For it is dark where the paths of fate lead,
> And it cannot be learned, and no guile exposes it ...
> Be cheered and drink, count this day
> As thine, the other as belonging to fate.

And as the principal maxim he says the following, already quoted above (Epicharmus also having written a similar aphorism):

> It befits the mortal only to have a mortal disposition.

And the exhortation of Horace will also doubtless occur to my reader: 'Quid sit futurum cras fuge quaerere, quam fors dierum cunque dabit, lucro appone' (*What can be so absurd as to ask what the future will bring? Count as gain every day that fortune grants you*). In a recension of the Babylonian Epic of Gilgamesh (which may date back further than 2000 BC), Sabitu (a goddess who dwells at the edge of the world) says to the hero:

> When the gods created humans,
> Death they designated for humans,
> But life they took in their hand.
> You, Gilgamesh, may your body be replete,
> Day and night amuse yourself!
> Daily hold a joyous celebration!
> Day and night dance and rejoice, etc.

We encounter similar doctrines in the Egyptian poem 'The Harper's Song,' whose content dates back to about 1700 BC. The poet describes how humans, towns and countries perish, and then counsels:

> Follow your heart, as long as you live,
> Put myrrh on your head and garb yourself in fine linen,
> Anointed with the true wonders of all that is of the gods.
> Be of cheer yet more, let your heart not languish,
> Follow your heart and your delight,
> Perform your duties on Earth and trouble not your heart,
> Until that day of the cries of woe comes, comes to you –
> For Osiris will not hear your crying out –
> And lamenting will deliver no one from the grave.

All this has sounded so universally human since the most ancient times, and still does today.

It is only quite natural for people to be very keen to discern their fate. It was principally the Chaldeans who developed the system of astrology for this, found almost everywhere on Earth, whether it be that the stars, as deities, in their position at a person's birth and subsequently, make known their will, or whether higher powers arrange destiny like writing in the sky (p. 179). A meaning for the individual human being

-----File: 201-----

and for the world is attached to each star, both by itself (who is not thinking of the star at the birth of Christ?) and also in association with the other stars. And the essential thing is to guess the truth from the combination of stars, or to read them in the sky as in a book. This is not understood by everyone, only by particular individuals. Elsewhere mankind has also cultivated the oracles of the deities, the most noteworthy examples probably being those of the Greeks. In other places prophecies are received through the spirits of the dead, or made by wise men and women. (The invocation of the witch of Endor, whom the mighty and dejected Saul approaches, falls within this category.) There are also signs made to animals, particularly among the Romans, who in this respect were rather foolish, and resorted to being mocked by their own interpreters, and also signs made through storms, wind and every possible encounter, all of which played a significant role. It is not my task to discuss all these. The 'esoteric doctrine' (Kabbalah) is a science found widely around the world, with a horoscope, invocations, the casting of matches, fortune telling with cards and all the curious nonsense, magic and hauntings of this kind. As is shown by the many legal proceedings, which do invariably only relate to flagrant instances, it is still of extraordinary significance in many circles, not uncommonly those interspersed with superstition where there is very little intellectual cultivation. From the domains to which my work takes me I could tell of the most incredible things, such as how a man's urge to discern his future and the consequences of his doings, which is quite understandable in itself, degenerates into the most foolish acts. We know how much harm the Greek oracles brought about, mostly due to ambiguity, but often also through their readiness to help a person or a tribe, as with the Oracle of Delphi and the Spartans. But the most enlightened intellects among the Greeks did indeed believe in them. Hence, it is not surprising that peoples in Egypt, China, North America, India and other regions also believed in such things, and that prophecies became state institutions. The Delphic god's pronouncements enabled him to rule over almost the entire ancient cultural world, deep into Asia and as far as the pillars of Heracles. We know of a great number of these pronouncements. And how we like to think of the prophecies of the mighty prophets

with their immense ethical and religious significance! And, although greatly removed, but in part borne by the poetic spirit, there are the sibylline prophecies, from a time much later. Babylonian and Egyptian texts and those from other civilizations also contain prophecies, and in particular many invocations uttered by gods or daemons. These were so much an integral part of life that they became compacted into set phrases, in which, as in the rogation songs (p. 184), only the respective name of the god or daemon of the person performing the incantation, or of the person for whom a spirit was to be summoned, and the request (e.g. for a cure from some ailment or other) needed to be inserted. A Babylonian text begins thus:

I appeal to you, you great gods,
... god and goddess, lord of deliverance,
On behalf of NN, son of NN, whose god is NN, and whose goddess is NN,
Who is sick and broken, filled with grief and sorrow.

And as an invocation of this kind was said, flowers, fruit, wool and other things were – harmlessly enough – burnt. One of the great Babylonian incantations given under the names of Ea and Atrahasis (p. 161) refers to disaster and sin that have taken hold of the entire land, and afflictions sent by Enlil, but is essentially directed towards succour for expectant mothers. Ea and Atrahasis appear to be the ones providing aid. Even the deities use incantations in their activities; in the same text Ea and the mother of the gods Mami, or Aruru, form beings out of clay (meant symbolically?), and in this act Mami recites an invocation and spits on the clay. Seven ‘mothers’ (one cannot help thinking of the mothers in ‘Faust’) take part in this invocation. Even Ormazd avails himself of an incantation, the ohnover, against Ahriman and, in so doing, hurls him to the ground. Several times I have emphasized the immense significance of aphorisms for Indian peoples. And the Romans simply could not live without sayings to ward off evil, just as the peasants today (and not only they) mumble superstitious sayings or cross themselves against tempting fate, the evil eye, cats crossing their path and the like..

-----File: 203-----

A subject connected with perceptions of this kind are the dies nefasti, days teeming with disaster on which nothing could be done, and their opposite, the dies fasti, the good days. In every part of the Earth calendars served the purpose of marking these days. And priests and fortune tellers were used for undertakings great and small, to ascertain whether the day in question was appropriate by divination involving observing the flight of birds, offering sacrifices and other omens. The history of human populations is rich in examples of this. Even the Sabbath laws, cited in the Bible as having such a philanthropical and noble purpose, rest from effort and work for oneself and for all others, even for working livestock, often relate elsewhere to inauspicious days. But a Babylonian text, described as a Sabbath law and actually forbidding the cooking of meat, the donning of a shirt, the offering of sacrifices, travelling, prophesying, the treating of the sick, and any kind of undertaking on the 7th, 14th, 19th, 21st and 28th days of the month of Elul, as on the Hebrew Sabbath, begins with the heading ‘An evil day.’ It is therefore not a Sabbath, not a Sunday, which should indeed be, and was, and is, a solemn and auspicious day. The order of the days in the month also shows this; between the 14th and the 19th there are only five days, and between the 19th and the 21st only two. And our ‘Friday’ combined with ‘the thirteenth’! Even the prohibitions on certain types of food prevalent throughout the world also fall under this topic to a certain degree, in that they do not owe their origins to indigenous conceptions. But I am unable to go into this here.

On the whole, humans gain more freedom as the number of deities decreases, and the monotheistic ‘servant of God’ is certainly more free than the polytheistic ‘sculptor’ of his deities. This is also because it is not the case that, as among men, an increase in the power of an individual is accompanied by a growth in oppression and so often also exploitation; rather, belief in providence turns the thundering and feared god into one who, although he punishes his people, is still a benevolent father in heaven, despite the many

experiences that here so poignantly run contrary to this.

22. The afterlife and the hereafter (eschatology) among the highly civilized peoples.

We now arrive at an investigation that is rather difficult and wide-ranging, but also of the greatest significance. How primitive peoples conceive the afterlife and the hereafter is something I have often explained, and in detail. (See also Section 14.) We are now in the realm of the highly civilized peoples. I have also already explained and revealed how even these peoples still retain vestiges of primitive conceptions in abundance in this respect. In fact, every kind of afterlife with earthly feelings, thoughts and needs is per se redolent of primitive perceptions, and only further ethical motives and ethical activities can create something of a cultural nature. Hence, generally speaking we see the purely primitive paired and mingled with the cultural. We must above all distinguish between three main types of approach. In one of these types the deceased is dead forever, or at best, is raised from the dead at the end of time. In the second, for certain reasons he can still visit the Earth as a daemon, ghost, spirit or such like. Thus, these involve solely primitive perceptions, with which we are already acquainted. In the third type of approach humans die only to enable them to come back in another form. General human life is not a one-time occurrence, but an arriving and departing of the soul existing since eternity, up to the point of entering the final repose (i.e., the transmigration of souls, or metempsychosis). Discussion of this will be reserved for the next section.

We shall consider the first type of approach, and in doing so must immediately discuss one race of people separately, because it is for them that the greatest uncertainties remain unresolved: the ancient Israelites. The well-known Pentateuch expression for dying is ‘to assemble with the forefathers.’ We have already elaborated on how this can be interpreted in animistic terms (p. 106). Elsewhere we encounter statements about the soul or the spirit, nefesh

-----File: 205-----

or ruach, as something breathed by God into what is formed from dust, leaving the person when he dies; the body becomes earth. In his pessimism, the writer of Ecclesiastes asserts, 'For to him that is joined to all the living there is hope: for a living dog is better than a dead lion.' And he denies the dead will have any part 'in any thing that is done under the sun.' They do not even receive the reward, 'they know not any thing.' This would thus be total death. But just how uncertain the writer of Ecclesiastes feels is revealed by the observation 'All go unto one place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again. Who knoweth the spirit (ruach) of man that goeth upward (maala), and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth (arez).' And we encounter this lack of certainty almost everywhere among the ancient Israelites. The dead dwell in Sheol, or Tachat, but it is not certain whether we should see this as a kind of Hades or Orcus, or just the grave of the person in question. The former seems to be the more universal, although the epithets can be applied to both the grave and the realm of the dead: the 'wilderness,' 'concealment,' 'solitary crypt' and so forth. In Chapter 10 the book of Job speaks of the 'land of darkness and the shadow of death,' and a 'land of darkness, as darkness itself; where the light is as darkness.' Isaiah writes of the 'gates of the grave' (Shaare Sheol). And the dead are called 'dwellers in the emptiness.' Phrases such as this again rather indicate a particular kind of underworld. The departed are in most cases referred to as Rephaim, the feeble, the weary, or as Zalmaweth, the shadows, the images; the latter also correspond exactly to the Greek εἴδωλα. And these conceptions do bear a remarkable resemblance to Graeco-Roman ones, without the later embellishments. There are no real traces of reward or punishment to be found in the ancient scriptures. For unconscious and unfeeling souls they would not even have any significance. Views of life and the world should actually be judged as all the more elevated when these aim to teach mankind justice, morality and love, rather than threatening them with eternal punishment

without promising eternal reward. Resurrection of the dead is suggested by pronouncements such as that in Isaiah 26:19: ‘Thy dead men shall live, together with my dead body shall they arise. Awake and sing, ye that dwell in dust: for thy dew is as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast out the dead.’ Only after the return from exile do the ideas of hell and paradise seem to have developed to the point of becoming conceptions. We see this in places such as Psalm 17:15: ‘As for me, I will behold thy face in righteousness: I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with thy likeness.’ Psalm 16:10-11: ‘For thou wilt not leave my soul (nafshi) in hell (Sheol); neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption (tachat). Thou wilt show me the path of life: in thy presence is fulness of joy; at thy right hand there are pleasures forevermore.’ Among other examples, Psalm 26 Verse 9, which reads ‘Do not take away my soul along with sinners, my life with bloodthirsty men,’ points to this. We know only when very few of the psalms were written; there are those who take the extreme view that none of them came into being until after the exile of the Israelites. The Apocrypha and the pseudepigrapha contain more precise information. In the second book of the Maccabees (probably written not long before the birth of Christ, perhaps around 100 BC), Chapter 7 is about the martyrdom of seven brothers later accepted among the saints of the Catholic Church (whose relics are displayed in Cologne Cathedral), and therefore deals with resurrection and life in heaven. Chapter 12 tells of how Judah's men found ‘hidden under their clothes, small images of the gods worshipped in Jamnia’ on the Jews killed at Adullam. To atone for this, Judah gathered together money and sent it to Jerusalem as an offering, ‘with consideration for their resurrection. For if he had not expected those who had died in the battle to rise again, it would have been folly to pray for the dead men. Then he considered how the most magnificent reward of grace should be kept for those who had remained pious until death.’ The ‘Book of the Wisdom of Solomon’ is thought to have been written between 150 BC and 40 AD. It says of

-----File: 207-----

the ungodly, ‘As for the mysteries of God, they knew them not: neither hoped they for the wages of righteousness, nor discerned a reward for blameless souls. For God created man to be immortal, and made him to be an image of his own eternity. Nevertheless through envy of the devil came death into the world: and they that do hold of his side do find it. But the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God, and there shall no torment touch them. In the sight of the unwise they seemed to die.’ Next comes something that sounds like belief in purgatory: ‘For though they be punished in the sight of men, yet is their hope full of immortality. And having been a little chastised, they shall be greatly rewarded: for God proved them, and found them worthy for himself.’ The writer goes on to elaborate further on this, and how the righteous ultimately even judge the heathens and rule over the peoples. Then it says, ‘But the ungodly shall be punished according to their own imaginations.’ Here, and in yet more places in this book, we thus have immortality, resurrection, reward after death, purification and the punishment of sinners. These are all elements from which Christianity later created tremendous poetry about paradise, hell, purgatory, resurrection and the Last Judgement. Immortality is, however, still attached to man fulfilling God’s commandments. And in the book of Daniel (written before 100 BC) we read in Chapter 12, ‘And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt. And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars forever and ever.’ Before long, hell is known as Gehinom; the concepts of the Last Judgement and the bridge of the dead are also adopted (p. 192). The Talmud in particular developed these doctrines further. An interesting illustration of this is seen in a legend. A Roman emperor asked the eminent rabbi Judah ha-Nasi how it could be: the body could do nothing without a soul, and the soul in itself lacks all passion;

who, then, should atone for the misdeeds? The Talmudist replied with a story. A king had a garden growing magnificent fruit and, to be absolutely safe, set a blind man and a cripple as watchmen. But the cripple climbed on to the blind man's shoulders, and with him guiding his steps they reached the fruit and stole it all. Who was the culprit? The blind man, who could not see the fruit, or the cripple, who could not reach it? The king saw through this ruse and punished both of them. 'This is exactly how God will act on the day of the Last Judgement. He will put the soul back into the body, so that they might together share in the punishment for the outrageous acts they have committed together.' We know from Enoch and Elijah that the Bible speaks of people being taken away. I have only been able to cite a little of the great amount of material in the Bible. What a vast array there is in the peculiar and, in places, very beautiful Book of Enoch (167-64 BC), of which the Apocalypse of John is so very reminiscent! And how much we find in the more ancient books, as far back as Isaiah! And later ideas about life after death could not have emerged without any idea of the teachings found in the Bible or in works lost to us, even when one considers how remarkably distant the Jews have invariably been to all things alien, particularly heathen, despite all their outward sufferings. I do not need to explain Christian ideas of life after death at great length; we are familiar with all of them and see them in the stupendous 'Divine Comedy' and in countless artistic portrayals.

Enkidu, Gilgamesh's friend, has a bad dream; a daemon leads him into the 'dwelling place of darkness, the abode of Irkalla (the god of death)'.

To the dwelling place that man enters but without departing again,
To the path whose course does not turn back,
To the abode whose occupants live without light,
Where earth is their sustenance, dry mud their food;
They are clothed like birds in the clothes of birds
And the light they see not; they dwell in darkness.

-----File: 209-----

This is the first Babylonian portrayal of the underworld and of its dead. And all kinds of people are found in the underworld: those who wore tiaras, high priests and priests' serving boys, exorcists and mendicant priests, heroes and cowards. An almost literally identical description is given in the renowned work 'The Descent of Ishtar to the Underworld.' The underworld is called Kurnugia (land of no return). And the goddess of death, Ereshkigal, herself says that the fate of the dead is lamentable. Why Ishtar visits the underworld is not clear; she forces the gatekeeper to let her in by threatening to burst open the gates and let the dead out. At Ereshkigal's command the gatekeeper opens the gates and is ordered to deal with Ishtar 'in keeping with old commandments.' She has to make her way through seven gates and at each one the gatekeeper takes a piece of jewelry or clothing from her. When she stands before the goddess of death she is completely exposed. She flies into a rage of threats towards this goddess, who however commands the vizier Namtar, who is also a daemon of disease, to lock her up and afflict her with sixty ailments. At this, all physical love on Earth ceases, as does all fertilisation and reproduction. Shamash weeps over this before Sin (god of the moon and father of Ishtar) and Ea, who then creates a Babylonian Orpheus, Asushunamir, a minstrel. He is to play before Ereshkigal until she is filled with delight, and then ask for the skin bag containing the water of life. So it happens thus. Then, due to the ruse he has employed, Ea's creation is cursed to become the lowliest of the low. But he keeps the skin bag, and Ishtar is led before the Anunnaki (judges of the underworld), sprinkled with the water of life and released from hell. At each gate she receives the items taken away from her there. In Gressmann's view the poem is very muddled, for which the transcriber is at fault. At the end there is something that enables us to conclude that the dead also ascend to Earth, in the days of lamentation for Tammuz (Dumuzi), the Babylonian Adonis, for whom his sister Belili (a goddess of the underworld, in place of Aphrodite) weeps. The god of the underworld is Nergal; the way he attained this status is quite a curious story. The gods hold a

banquet; since Ereshkigal may not leave the underworld, she has to have the food brought down for her. She sends her vizier Namtar up. All the gods rise before him, and only Nergal (deity of everything bad, of the blazing heat of the sun, of war and of plague) remains seated. At this the goddess of death flies into a rage and demands that Nergal be surrendered to her so she can kill him. After great lamenting Nergal is sent off to face his fate. But he takes fourteen spirits with him and sets each of them to keep watch over a gate of hell. (Hence there are fourteen gates here, not seven.) Then he rushes at Ereshkigal, and this time it is he who intends to kill her. But at her pleading he lets her live. She puts the 'tablets of wisdom' (?) into his hand and becomes his wife, and he thus becomes a god of the underworld. Nergal's chief cult site is Kutha (as Babylon is for Marduk), and so the underworld is also called Kutha. There are yet more Babylonian accounts of the underworld, but these do not teach us anything new. The underworld may correspond to Hades and its god Orcus. It has judges of the dead (the Anunnaki); a god and goddess of death rule over it, and a female scribe figure and daemons of all evil stand at its sides. Alfred Jeremias writes, 'The signs are accumulating that the Babylonians associated the concepts of a court of judgement and absolution from punishment after death with their belief in immortality.' And that is really the only statement we can make for the time being.

We know more about the Egyptians. 'Pyramid texts' (magical texts which were buried in the grave chambers of the pyramids between 2600 and 2500 BC, to equip the deceased kings for the afterlife) and the Book of the Dead (probably just as ancient, perhaps even older, and serving the same purpose) provide us with information. There are also countless pictorial descriptions. The subterranean realm of the dead is Amenti, the 'land of the west,' or Akernuti, the 'sacred underworld,' or Aalu, 'field of serpents.' There is also a kind of Elysium, in the form of the Mountain of the Sun, Am-Sesennu. But the realm of the dead can also be the depth that is the lower world Duat. It is filled with daemons and monsters. The deceased, who has to wander through it from west to east, has to wend his way

-----File: 211-----

through all the perils, and emerges from it only if a fitting cult for him is being maintained on Earth (p. 102). His guide is Anubis (hence Hermes-Anubis or Hermanubis for the Greeks), who also takes him across a body of water, corresponding to the River Acheron, on the barque of the dead. The deceased has to give the names of all the objects he encounters, even the inanimate ones, at their request (p. 105). Should he reach the 'halls of truth,' Thot and Anubis will judge him. And, together with 42 judges, Osiris, the true ruler of the depth, announces the judgement. An unfavorable one totally annihilates the deceased. Otherwise it may drive him to torments, or to the Earth and into an animal, or into the region of dry air. There his soul is lashed by tempests and progressively cleansed. (It is therefore a kind of purgatory.) A favorable judgement brings the pleasures of the hereafter. The deceased goes to the Mountain of the Sun (p. 181) in the east, which is paradise in a manner of speaking, but he is actually allowed to choose his future at will (p. 102 f). In the Book of the Dead we read (with the deceased speaking): 'I have arrived in this world of the shining spirits, that is to say, of the gods, near the abode of the sun.' 'Open to me stand the doors of heaven, open to me the doors of the Earth, open to me the bolts of the Earth god Geb, open the first house (the first zone of the course of the sun).' We know that the deceased identifies himself with each of the deities. 'You gods of the forefront, reach out your hands to me, for I have become what you are.' In endless reiterations the deceased speaks: 'I am Rā,' 'I am Atum,' 'I am Osiris' and so forth, implying he has all the peculiarities of the god in question, as if he himself were this god. 'I, the god Atum, I am the one who is. I was alone.' 'I am the god of light Rā in his first ascents.' 'I am God, the great, the coming into being, he himself.' 'I am the morrow's day, I know the morrow also, this is Osiris.' Lepsius says, 'The underlying concept throughout was that a pure and righteous person was both an individual being and also the highest god himself, or that he had only of his own free will adopted the existence and form of the individual human, and with the death of the human would return to his divine existence ... Therefore, after death a righteous man would go to

God, merging into God himself.' This might be too hasty an ascent in concept; it would correspond to the range of ideas of the far more profoundly and more ethically thinking Indians.

Let us turn our attention to the Aryan races: the Indians referred to above furnished their paradise with every kind of delight, and equipped their hell with every kind of anguish to the most excessive degree. Where the realm of the departed lies, and where the places of the terrors are, has been mentioned previously (p. 176). The highest paradise, the purely spiritual one, is nirvana, which we shall discuss later. Paradise, which is both divine and human, is filled with gandharva maidens, apsaras of beautiful form, magnificent flowers and trees, and houses for eating and drinking; there is dancing, singing, shade and fragrance everywhere. In litters, in chariots and on elephants the deceased approach the dwelling place of Yama, the ruler, his countenance more beautiful than the lotus flower. And many paradises are arranged above one another, with heightening degrees of bliss; humans float to one of these according to their inner worth. The horrors of hell are more extreme than the beauty offered by the paradises. Hell has more sections beneath one another than paradise has above one another; a hell is allocated for every kind of misdeed. It strikes me as strange that women have to follow men into hell; whether this goes for paradise as well I do not know. Wollheim da Fonseca recounts a lovely legend in the teachings about Krishna: 'Once, to save its own life, a gazelle that had been startled by tigers fled out of the forest to the king's palace. The prince's lust for hunting was stirred when he saw it coming, and jumping up, he swiftly killed the gazelle with his sword. This meant that the king had had someone seeking his protection killed. For this reason he and his wife are to be punished by you (i.e., Yama, the judge of the dead). At this the prince, with his spouse, was taken into hell.' n the same scriptures, the writer also gives a portrayal of the torments of hell from a king redeemed from them: hunger, thirst, lying on iron beds red-hot or surrounded by flames, clasped by pillars of fire, sprinkled with lunar caustic, walking on thorns, with streams of blood flowing over them, and perpetually torn to pieces by animals

-----File: 213-----

are the mildest of them. Even Dante envisaged nothing more horrifying than that Indian king saw. Yama is the judge of the dead, Chitragupta is the public prosecutor for the dead, and the witnesses are (a remarkably beautiful conception) sun, moon, fire, ether, earth, water, and even law and times of the day. Chandas serves as an attendant along with others. How long infernal punishment lasts depends on the crime: a minor one might run to 26 years, the gravest to 800 million kalpas (which converts to 432 million years):[14] hence, far longer than the world itself has existed. An early release can be obtained 'through prayer, sacrifice and devout offerings by descendants' (or by others), which to a certain degree corresponds to Catholic teachings. After the punishment has been served there arises the possibility of a purification, in which the soul undertakes a transmigration through different bodies; it goes into the lowliest animal initially and then progresses to humans, first entering the most despised caste, in order, if it proves itself to live in virtue, to reach the higher castes and eventually arrive in paradise (p. 181). But a sacred place can also give purification, as with a pair of sinners, who, released from hell, turn into locusts and are blown by a tempest into the Ganges, to drown in this sacred water, and go straight to paradise. We will return to this. The concept of hell (later called Naraka) is a much more recent one than that of paradise. In the Rig Veda it is only mentioned in general terms, as a deep place, the place of the lower darkness, the pit (kartá). Thus we read in Mandala IX, Hymn 73: 'The wise guardian of the law may not be deceived; he has krinigar (the conscience) set within his heart. He looks with wisdom upon all things and hurls all that is evil and wicked into the pit.' The narrative also talks of being devoured by a wolf, or four-eyed grey dogs being present after death. The Upanishads speak in equally general terms: 'There are in fact those wretched worlds which are wrapped in intense darkness; those who, in their ignorance, are not enlightened (and who are thus blasphemers) go to these worlds after they die.' It is of interest

that the path of the dead also finds itself mentioned here; later it is referred to as a bridge, hence the bridge of the dead. ‘The same path leads either to the gods or to the forefathers. Two flames burn forever on both sides; they scorch those who deserve to be scorched, and allow past those who deserve to pass.’

The doctrine of the hereafter, or eschatology, of the Indians is by no means concluded with the above; we shall soon encounter it again. The eschatology of the Iranians appears relatively simple. The soul stays for three nights with the body, remaining by its head. This is a time of pleasure and delights if the departed has lived a righteous life, but the unjust spend it in sickness among all that is loathsome, while the Dev Vajis, the guardian of hell, incessantly subjects them to terror. The journey then follows on paths filled with dangers, to the even more perilous Chinvat Bridge, the bridge of the dead (p. 176). There, Roshnu, the righteous one, weighs the soul for the evil and good it has done. For any soul found to be good the bridge widens to the breadth of many spears, and the soul enters, one after the other, the four paradises of good thoughts, good words, good deeds, and endless lights, remaining in the final one , in the presence of Ahura Mazdā, in eternal bliss. The souls of the good (ferver, farvardin and fravashi) are Ahura Mazdā’s assistants in the battle against evil. In the Farvardin Yasht, the god says to Zarathustra, ‘If the strong guardian angels of the virtuous would not lend me assistance, livestock and humans, the last two of the hundred classes of beings, would no longer exist for me, and then would begin the power of the devil, and the origin of the devil, and all living creation would belong to the devil.’ Such an elevated active significance is borne by the righteous. For the evil, the bridge narrows to the width of a thread and they plunge into hell. The daemon Vizaresha drags them along. The bridge of the dead was adopted by later Jewish teachings and probably also by the Arabs. A Hebrew work from the tenth century described by Max Müller as containing ‘fragments from

-----File: 215-----

a much earlier date' states, 'In this hour (i.e., of the Last Judgement) God will call the idols of the people back into life, and he will say, "Let every people go with their god across the bridge of Gehinom, and when they cross, it will appear like a thread to them and they will plunge into Gehinom."' This Jewish view is not believed to have been adopted from the Muslims, and so probably originated with the Persians. The people of Iran also recognized a Last Judgement and a resurrection, apocatastasis, which is associated with the end of the world (p. 166 f). The resurrection will begin with primordial beings and primordial humans, and will last 57 years. It is a physical resurrection: 'By the Earth the bones are reclaimed, by the water the blood, by the trees the hair, by the fire the breath of life, just as they were seized in creation.' The souls recognize the reconstructed bodies. Then the devout are separated from the ungodly. The former go to heaven; the latter suffer physical punishment in hell for three days and three nights. Then all sinners will be purified in the metals liquefied by the world conflagration (p. 166). This melting will feel like warm milk to the devout, but to the ungodly it will be like glowing heat. And everything is alive before the countenance of Ahura Mazdā. The world serpent Dahaka perishes in the melted metal, and Ahriman plunges into the depths. A universal sacrifice ushers in the new time of blessing. In all events, what we see here is a belief in immortality. When Xenophon puts into the mouth of the dying Cyrus the words 'May I now be with the deity or be no more,' it is intended not in the Persian sense, but in terms of Greek philosophy.

Perceptions of the underworld and paradise among the Greeks and Romans are so well known that only the most significant points need to be mentioned here. Earlier (p. 183) I emphasized how to some extent these perceptions resemble those of the Israelites. In any case, they generally give little cause for satisfaction and are scarcely borne by the ethical spirit. Transgressions against the gods, and good works done for them, play a role far more significant than that of evil against humans and good done for them. However, the

Danaïds do have to atone for their acts of mariticide, and the Odyssey says of gentle Menelaus:

> But it is not ordained for you, as godlike, oh Menelaus,
> To endure death and fate in Argos with its horse pastures,
> No, the gods will lead you one day to the ends of the Earth,
> To the Elysian Plain, where the brownish-haired hero Rhadamanthys
> Dwells and the people live entirely with ease;
> Never is there snow there, nor winter storm, nor rainstorm;
> Eternally there drift the whisperings of the west wind that softly breathes on men,
> Which Oceanus sends, whispering, to bring cool to men.

Abstemious as the Greeks always are, even their infernal punishments are not too extreme and the joys of their paradise are essentially repose and comfort free from care. However, people do also go to the gods on Mount Olympus, or ascend to the heights of the demigods (we only need think of Heracles), or are placed in the sky as stars. At the other extreme, the Greeks have a particular hell even for gods, Tartarus (p. 172). There is a kind of limbo in the form of the Asphodel Meadows, in which those who are not evil but not good either roam like shadows (p. 172). The play Alcestis provides evidence that in Greek beliefs humans can even be led back to life out of the underworld. For Eurydice this comes to naught only through Orpheus' lack of caution. Only later in time was the afterlife interpreted from the ethical viewpoint. Pindar makes many allusions to this. We are strangely moved by the assertion that after eight years' purification in Hades humans who have suffered misfortune in their lives, yet have maintained their honesty, are released back into the world by Persephone, so that they might become strong, wise, fortunate regents there. All this belongs to the domain of the immortality of the soul, also given expression by Pindar, a concept of which so many Greeks were convinced. But we shall return to this. The Orphic mysteries seem essentially to have offered the initiated hope of a joyful afterlife. This is indicated by comments in the writings of Plato, Socrates, Cicero and others. Polygnotus in Delphi is believed to have depicted the underworld in his paintings. For all that, the stance of the Greeks on the question of immortality varies, even if we

-----File: 217-----

disregard certain philosophers who reject everything in any case. Immortality often dwindles into a figurative lingering of glory and the like. But we have great advocates of immortality in Pythagoras, Pindar, Socrates, Plato and others, and even among the natural philosophers (p. 231 f).

The Romans adopted some aspects of views of life and the world from the Etruscans. But the latter must have envisaged an underworld full of shuddering, as we can deduce by the images of their burial chambers, in which terrible daemons pursue the dead with weapons such as swords, hammers and firebrands, and we can see in their innumerable host of underworld deities. Here I may make reference to such a fine work by Dennis, 'Cities and Cemeteries of Etruria' and to one by K O Müller, 'The Etruscans.' But we really know too little about the actual religion of the Etruscans and are too uncertain about even the little we do know, as this civilization so noticeably adopted a great deal from the Greeks, even names of deities (such as Aplu for Apollo). Mantus and Mania are thought to correspond to Pluto and Persephone, while Charun is Charon. Much is purely typical of primitive peoples; the cult of the dead, with all the horrors found in parts, was also a primitive one. I cannot recall where I once read that Dante owed the terrifying imagination shown in his description of hell to his Tuscan lineage. The Elysium of the Etruscans seems to have consisted in untroubled enjoyment of the joys of life. (Pleasures of the table in particular are described.)

Among syncretic Romans, Orcus was sometimes the underworld, and at other times the god of death, assumed to have the form of a horrifying figure. If we think of the Greek god of death, Thanatos, the gentle brother of sleep, we can hardly avoid regarding the shuddering that accompanied Orcus as having arrived from Etruria. Rome was indeed an Etruscan dependency for a while, almost a federal state of Etruria. Dīs Pater and Proserpina are the Roman equivalents of Pluto and Persephone, respectively, in Greek mythology. Human sacrifices, which in the Latium region were brought to Dīs (and also to Saturn, father of Dīs), and to yet other daemons of the underworld, and which Hercules was believed to have redeemed through

offerings of pictures, dolls, poppy heads and the like, could perhaps also be charged to the account of the Etruscans if the Romans and Greeks had not actually practiced human sacrifice themselves (p. 97). However, Dīs Pater or Vatis is believed to have been an Etruscan underworld deity, just as the Etruscan goddess Mania served the Romans as a goddess of the underworld. I have already made mention of the spirits of the deceased (p. 97 f). Everything else is almost entirely modelled on Greek conceptions, if it was not actually common property of the Greek and Italic cultures. Despite their emulation of the journey of Odysseus through the underworld, the travels of Aeneas in the works of Virgil diverge from it in some respects; the later writer will have devised much to entwine his account with new embellishments. And Virgil is Dante's guide as far as he, as a heathen, can go, until he is relieved by the angel form of the beloved Beatrice. Virgil's paradise is therefore also not our paradise, but the Greek one, although his hell provided some features for Dante's hell. The poet Lucan, who wrote Pharsalia, is thought to have believed in a real devil of the underworld, a Beelzebub.

The underworld, Niflhel to the Teutons, Hel's realm of fog with the streams of poison, is something we have already encountered (p. 173). Nástrǫnd and Corpse Shore are other names given to this underworld.

> A Hall I beheld standing there, far from the sun,
> On the shore of Náströnd; to the north are the doors,
> Drops of poison drip in through the window;
> This hall is adorned with snakeskins. –
> There I saw, wading through miry streams,
> Perjured men and murderers' accomplices
> And those who seduced the beloved of another,
> There Níðhöggr sucks at the corpses of the dead,
> Men are torn to shreds by the wolf.

Other descriptions are similar. Hel, also known as Hellia, the ruler of the dead, is the daughter of Loki and sister of Fenrir the wolf and a 'gigantic serpent.' And she gives back nothing that is due to her. Even the gods can tear no one away from her; Balder became hers. Incidentally, the above

-----File: 219-----

description in Völuspá will already be interspersed with Christian elements. Later legends embellish Hel and Hel's realm with yet more terrifying things. Hel is half black and half white; everything she possesses is an expression of insatiable greed. A nine-day journey leads to her realm, passing through dark, deep valleys inhabited by the dark elves, crossing the River Giöll on a gold-covered bridge, guarded by a maiden called Móðguðr, or battle of the soul. Jacob Grimm draws a parallel between the River Giöll and the Lethe. The dead travel there in wagons or on horseback. Here we see a real descent into hell by Brunhild, and also a 'Helreið' (Hel ride) by this Valkyrie; the constellation of the Great Bear is also believed to be called Hel's wain. Incidentally, the name Hel refers to the goddess as well as the place, as is also the case with Hades and Orcus. The original conception of this realm would no doubt simply have been a land of mist, similar to the Homeric realm of Hades, an abode for the dead in general, as even deities such as Balder and Brunhild go there. Hell is also referred to as a hostel, an inn and Valhalla. However, the segregation of the heroes who have fallen on the battlefield to dwell in Odin's hall of the gods, Valhalla, seems also to be an ancient belief. A later addition are the princes, spoken of by the völva in the Edda. A true god of death was something the Teutons did not have. But Odin sends his Valkyries into battle to escort the fallen heroes to him. The idea of spirits of water and the sea, such as the sea goddess Rán, drawing people in to their deaths is something that suggests itself. Death perceived as a person who slays is a later concept of Christianity; the Greek god θάνατος (Thanatos), also known as a god of the dead, takes only the dead to himself. And thus the very poignant dances of death familiar to us are without example in antiquity. In the same way, the prince of darkness is a subsequent conception, perhaps adopted from Parseeism by the agency of Judaism (p. 149 f). But what we need to gather from all this is that the Teutons had a conception of immortality – if not universally, at least for some. And it is worthy of note that the heroes dwelling in Valhalla have almost the

same task as the Iranian fravashis (p. 192): to assist the deity in the final battle.

I have no knowledge to impart on Slavic eschatology, apart from the elements redolent of primitive conceptions mentioned above (p. 85 f).

Conceptions ascribed to the Celts correspond to those of the Indians on the transmigration of souls. A source of authority on this is of course Caesar. We have already discussed this (p. 94), and shall revert to it (p. 216).

Now we return to Asia to discuss a number of points. The conceptions of the heathen Arabians were purely those typical of primitive peoples. Mohammed however, by the influence of Judaism and Christianity, taught of a hell and a paradise; between the two there is an embankment holding those who are not evil but not good either, just as Christianity has a hell for the good heathens. In Surah VII, Verse 39 ff the Qurʾān says of sin, 'Jahannam shall be the quagmire in which they rest, and also the covering (of fire) over them; thus we teach sinners.' 'But those who believe and do what is right – we do not burden their soul above its capacity. They shall be the people of paradise and dwell there forever.' 'And in between there is a boundary; on the earth banks are men everyone can recognize by their appearance (those going to hell are black, those going to heaven white); and they call to those bound for heaven, 'Peace be upon you,' but they cannot enter, although they desire to. And thus their gaze is turned towards the conveyances travelling into the fire, and they say, 'Our Lord, take us not among the unjust.' The Qurʾān also accepts the existence of a resurrection. The body of traditional practice, Sunnah, has given many interpretations of Mohammed's teachings and explained them in greater detail. Thus, the deceased is interrogated under torture by Munkar and Nakīr while still in the grave. One found to be righteous remains in tranquility and breathes the air of paradise, while the sinner is beaten with clubs and crushed with the grave (Iranian legend, page 192). On the day of the Last Judgement the trumpet of terror and that of judgement will be blown by the angel Israfil, as all the creatures still alive will first perish.

-----File: 221-----

Now all the souls assemble and each regains its body; Mohammed appears at the head of this assembly. Gabriel holds a scale with weighing pans: paradise and hell. No one can help another, each must stand for himself alone. Grace does not preside, and the judgement is made only on trusting faith and good deeds. The unbelievers are actually forfeited to hell and torment for all eternity. For the faithful, their punishment is determined by the measure of their sins. Then the souls have to walk on Serat, the bridge of the dead; it is as sharp as a knife and hotter than fire. It stretches across the abyss from Earth to heaven. Every unbeliever and sinner plunges into the abyss. With Mohammed, the believers and the upright cross it, for it spreads out and cools itself for them, while on both sides angels conceal the chasm with their wings. But in heaven, places are awarded according to worthiness. The concept of the bridge of the dead is highly poetic and the poet Rückert adapted it to this purpose. But, as the details in particular show, it was undoubtedly borrowed from the Persians (p. 192). Hell has seven levels: one each for the Jews and for mild punishment of Muslims, two for Christians and a certain sect within them, and one each for fire worshippers (Parsees), idol worshippers, and unbelievers and hypocrites of all religions. Only at the uppermost level is there a limit to punishment; at each other level it lasts for all eternity. In Surah LXXXIII of the Qurʾān Mohammed says of paradise, ‘See, truly the righteous will be in bliss. On wedding thrones will they command a sight. Thou wilt recognize in their faces the beaming brightness of bliss. Their thirst will be slaked with pure wine sealed. The seal thereof will be musk. And for this let those aspire who have aspirations. With it will be given a mixture of Tasnīm, a spring, whereof drink those nearest to God.’ This has become embellished with all the ardent sensuality that leaves such a great imprint on primitive minds and has made such a remarkable contribution to the astounding success of Islam.

The primitive view of the afterlife and the life to come held by the Chinese has already been described (p. 120 f). It is not certain whether Confucius embraced it. He prevaricated towards those asking questions. He feared that, if he agreed with such a view, people might neglect their own souls in tending the souls of the dead; if he contradicted it, he would have to ensure that the beautiful piety extended to the dead should dwindle away. Hence it has also often been claimed that the teachings of Confucius in themselves relate only to this life, and neither threaten punishment nor promise reward in the hereafter. The teachings of the nobler and more spiritual Laozi show a greater inclination towards the philosophical and lead towards an ultimate unification with Dao, the universal spirit (p. 220). But his teachings do not seem to recognize conceptions of paradise and hell either. For a good person, bliss rests in the calm with which he faces death; for an evil person, punishment is founded in his fear prior to death. Hence, paradise and hell are things everyone has in himself, a view which is indeed held by large numbers of highly intellectual Europeans. Despite their fine hall of the gods, the eschatology of the Japanese will scarcely be any different. And apart from the primitive elements I have already discussed (p. 124 f) I have not become acquainted with any other knowledge of the eschatology of the civilized peoples of the Americas.

A tour through world views shows that, despite all the similarity between the fundamental ideas on Earth, when we examine the detail we find there do exist considerable differences between the civilized peoples. Even such close peoples as the Indians and the Iranians, and also the Israelites and the Babylonians, do indeed differ very substantially in their conceptions of the afterlife. And on the other hand there exist instances of concurrence between such distant peoples as the Israelites and the Graeco-Roman civilization. Only the feeling of the soul being immortal, together with the sense of reward and punishment, is encountered almost universally: in some places more distinctly, in others less so, and in some places conceived as real, in others as spiritual, but always with judgement after life has ended and often interpreted not much differently in the highest religions from how it is understood in those we regard as the lowest. Nowhere is conceit about one’s culture less appropriate than here.

-----File: 223-----

23. Transmigration of souls and reincarnation; saṃsāra and nirvana.

The topics given in the title of this section constitute a very noteworthy chapter in the study of the views of life and the world among mankind. Belief in transmigration of souls and reincarnation may have its origin in the animism of primitive peoples. However, its real significance has been derived from cultural ethics and eschatological metaphysics. Our best course is to launch straight into a description of this belief as held by the people who have developed it to the greatest degree and dedicated the most profound thought to it: the people of India. The conceptions of other peoples can then easily be explained in terms of this belief. The essence is that the soul always existed (a view also held by Plato) and merely changes from body to body constantly until, purified and cleansed (what exactly this means is determined by each individual doctrine), it enters an eternal life of the soul or eternal absolute rest. This means that after death two different things may await the soul: either a new life within a body or a soul life, if we leave aside the possibility of absolute eternal rest. The soul has two possible paths: Devayana, the path of the gods, and Pitriyana, the path of fathers and forefathers. We read about Devayana in one of the Upanishads. (Like the Vedas, the Upanishads are among the sacred books of the Indians, both texts being of almost the same age, although the Upanishads surpass the Vedas considerably in intellectual content, while parts of them provide a commentary on the Vedas, the name meaning ‘sitting down at the feet of the teacher’.) Max Müller’s translation (*used in the German original, but here rendered in English from Müller’s version*) says, ‘They (who have reached the highest level of perfection) go to the light, from the light to the day, from the day to the fortnight of the waxing moon, from the fortnight of the waxing moon to the six months where the sun goes northwards, from these six months to the world of the Devas (lower gods), from the world of the Devas to the sun, from the sun to the place of lightning. When they have reached the place of lightning, a person, not a human, approaches them and leads them

into the worlds of Brahman. In these worlds of Brahman they dwell always and forever, and there is no return for them.' Anything the reader might not understand in this account – what is said about the day, the half-month, or the six months – others have also failed to understand; here there seem to be concealed ancient *termini technici*, the sense of which has been lost, and which the Vedanta philosophers were obliged to make efforts to restore in their commentaries (sutras). But the rest is clear. This is described in even more evident and precise terms in other places and other works: e.g., that the person in question reaches there by travelling through the sun, and in the same way through the moon, then traverses the worlds of the individual gods, crosses a river called Vigarâ (unageing), arrives in front of the hall of Brahman (Vibhu), the custodians of which are Indra and Prajapati, and steps before the throne of Brahman, the individual parts of which are designated as discernment, splendor, prudence, reason, intellect and so forth. But the essence is always the same: the soul entering the room to face the highest god.

But it says of those who have not reached perfection, 'They go (in the cremation presupposed here) into the smoke, from the smoke into the night, from the night into the half of the month with the waning moon, from this half of the month to the six months when the sun goes to the south. From these six months they go into the world of the forefathers, from the world of the forefathers into the ether, from the ether to the moon. (This is Soma, the king, this is the food of the gods, the gods are nourished by it.) After they have sojourned there for as long as there still remains a vestige (of good works), they return, on the path by which they came, back to the ether, and from there to the air. When it (the spirit) has turned to air, it turns to smoke; after turning to smoke, it turns to mist; after turning to mist, it turns to cloud; after turning into a cloud, it falls as rain. Then they (the souls) are born as rice and grain, herbs and trees, sesame and beans. It is very difficult to escape from there. For anyone who wants to be among

-----File: 225-----

those who eat this food and scatter seed becomes just like them. Those whose way of living has been good will probably attain some kind of good birth, perhaps as a Brahman, or a Kshatriya, or a Vaishya. But those who have lived in a bad way will probably arrive at a bad birth, as a dog or a pig or a member of the Kandâla caste, for instance.' Here too there exist many variations, without the essence being changed. In particular, for each crime, and for each bad deed and act of thoughtlessness the writings of Manu specify the creature into which the soul has to go. This passing of the soul into different bodies endures up to the life in which the man has reached the highest level of perfection. The entire doctrine is relatively simple. We also know what the concepts of sin, transgressions, thoughtlessness and so forth mean. The difficulty lies in the requirements for perfection. The Indians have written countless expositions and books about this, but the definitions are naturally negative without exception. What is deemed the basic principle is that a soul has existed since the beginning of time and will remain for all eternity. Souls that eternally merely go from body to body can exist, as we read at the end of the last quotation, 'On neither of these two paths (Devayana and Pitriyana) do those small, often returning creatures move away. The state prevailing for them is the third state, expressed as 'live and die'.' But they have no beginning or end either.

his doctrine has undergone a number of expansions, all of which relate to the final state and to perfection. Later we shall see that the Indian peoples also taught Pandeism. In this doctrine, the final state consists in entering into the relevant deity, Brahma or Vishnu. Thus, in the Bhagavad Gita, after many lessons about a perfect existence, Krishna-Vishnu says:

> And whoever at the hour of death thinks of me and thus departs the body,
> He will enter into my being, which will beyond doubt hold fast'.

And elsewhere [in the Bhagavad Gita] we read:

Through this you are united with me, liberated from the compulsion of births,
Whether creation may be renewed, or whether the end of the worlds may loom.

And in many versions this is strongly inculcated. The soul ultimately goes back to where it always originated, to the universal deity. But where perfection is concerned, it includes not only moral and ethical requirements, but also ones relating to the affecting emotions; freedom from these emotions is demanded. The same Bhagavad Gita says:

Whoever never gloats and never hates anyone, whoever laments nothing and desires nothing,
Whoever is stirred by neither good fortune nor adversity, he is also worthy of my mercy.
(And) Whoever remains by friend and foe alike, unconcerned by joy or sorrow,
Contempt, honor, cold and warmth, freed from the urges of passion,
Whoever considers praise and reproach to be the same, whoever is not stirred by obsession for more,
Whoever fosters no anxiety as to shelter, whose steady mind nothing can now provoke ...

Humans have to cleanse themselves of the residues of life:

Nature engenders being, passion, darkness,
And these unfailingly thwart action in the body of the eternal soul.

We are familiar with the way Buddhism has contributed a distinctive version to conceptions of this kind. It has brought the doctrines of metempsychosis and metensomatosis to the ultimate level of development, just as it has the doctrine on the final state. In Buddhism the deities do not play a distinctive role; it is not their existence that is denied, only their significance for the world and for humans (p. 182). They themselves represent merely a transit state in the life of the universe, live and perish like everything in the universe and are only concerned with themselves, just like every living creature. Here we see a philosophical concept being mixed with ethical and moral considerations. Life, quite generally, is an affliction, whether it brings with it good or bad fortune. And reincarnation above all is an affliction. Recognition of this is the first stage of knowledge. But the second consists in recognizing how everything has to be directed towards not

-----File: 227-----

being born again. And this is accomplished through a life lived ethically and morally and through the extinction of all will to live and be reincarnated, so that such a will can never even enter into the person's consciousness. His deeds should be fitting to ensure he rises to higher and higher levels with each reincarnation, as he is atoning for his sins and shortcomings and enjoying the consequences of virtue in his previous life with each new birth: this is the Law of Karma. But his thoughts should sink completely into themselves, until everything that composes life with its passions, feelings, desires, conceptions, expectations – in short, all will in life and for life – has died and faded away. Anyone who has thus attained supreme perfection and absence of any will for life enters absolute rest, nirvana (a word used in the Upanishads for the final state), 'blowing away.' Not that the soul is lost, for even in Buddhism, everything that exists is there for eternity; it enters a state corresponding to death, in human estimation, which after all knows only life. This is a state in which there exists nothing that previously constituted life; hence, only infinite abstraction leads to the discernment of this state, which is why it is often interpreted as 'no, no,' just as Brahma is taken to be the ultimate concept. This is what dharma teaches.

As is widely known, Buddha was born the son of a prince with the name Gautama Sarvarthasiddhi in Kapilavastu (circa 623 BC). Up to the 29th year of his life he lived like all sons of princes, at least according to the popular idea, in complete luxury. So how did he come to his conception of suffering and rejection of life, or, to be more precise, develop it into something more consistent than had existed before him? On an outing to a pleasure ground he saw an old man 'with bald head, stooped body and trembling limbs.' On a second trip he caught sight of an incurably sick man, covered in the scales of leprosy and sores, trembling with fever, with no one to lead or assist him; on a third, he saw by the wayside a putrid, worm-eaten corpse. He wondered what the use of pleasure, virtue and joy could be

if these things were subjugated by age, disease and death.' At this he leaves everything, travels through the lands as a beggar and hears the teachings of the priests and scholars of every school. As he finds no satisfaction in anything he secludes himself in a forest and lives in harsh acts of penance and mortification of the flesh, for which he is given the name Muni and, with the addition of his family name, Shakyamuni. When he also recognizes the futility of penance and mortification of the flesh, he sinks into the most profound contemplation on the reason for suffering and the purpose of life. Only now does the right thought flash through his mind; it shoots as a gleaming shaft of light from his brow as far as the ends of the world. And now he is Buddha (p. 139), the 'Enlightened One.' This is a legend, but how greatly inclined Indian peoples actually are towards contemplativeness and the declaring of the world as futile is something Rudyard Kipling portrayed in one of his most engaging stories, about the top-ranking minister Purun Dass.

Among the people of Iran we encounter nothing of this doctrine of transmigration of souls and reincarnation, which strikes us as very strange. It must therefore have originated among Indian peoples after the two countries had separated. But at the most remote extremity of Europe an Aryan people – the Celts – are believed to have held this doctrine at least to some extent. Caesar was aware of this. In 'De bello Gallico' (Commentaries on the Gallic War), Book VI, Chapter 14, he writes, 'In primis hoc volunt (nämlich die Druiden) persuadere; non interire animas, sed ab aliis post mortem transire ad alios' (*Above all they* (*i.e., the Druids*) *wish to inculcate this: that souls do not become extinct, but after death pass from one body to another*). But this is probably the only thing that is certain; everything else that is told in this regard about the Celts and the Druids is fable or inferred by conjecture from dubious lore and later bardic ballads. The soul is believed to float into the breezes and to the clouds first after the death of the human who owned it; these clouds are hence believed to be the abode of souls. If the poems of Ossian were ancient property, we would have evidence for this assertion: 'My forefathers bend down from among their clouds, to receive their son with his curls of grey,' laments Fingal after the death of his dear son Oscar. As cloud spirits they float above armies in combat and take part in the judgement, like the Valkyries, who are also cloud spirits. There are

-----File: 229-----

even souls on the moon, a belief which is very widespread. There they live beneath snow and ice and forget everything about their past life. When there is a solar eclipse they return to Earth, are awakened by the sun and begin a new earthly existence.

As regards the Greeks, it was the Pythagoreans and Plato in particular who taught reincarnation. They limited transmigration of souls to animals and humans; no soul befitted a plant. Between two lives there is a pure soul state, as there is for Indian peoples and the Celts, and likewise in the teachings of Plato. Whether this state is connected with reward and punishment, as was taught by the Pythagoreans and others, is difficult to establish, since, as is widely acknowledged, a tangled mass of all possible mystical notions has poured in through the teachings of Pythagoras. Something else that is curious is the view that the soul cannot enter any individual body, but only one that is in keeping with its harmony (of which, more later). In general, like the Indians, they regard association between the soul and the body as unwelcome. However, they have also said that the organs offered to the soul by the body provide it with the opportunity for perception, and that the soul therefore loves the body, an idea totally inconsistent with the conceptions of the Indians. Pythagoras himself is believed to have referred to weapons in the Heraeum at Argos as those he wielded near Troy in a previous existence, and to have recognized the soul of a deceased friend in a dog – if the former is not a fairy tale and the latter not written in mischievous jest.

Plato’s ideas on transmigration of souls in particular are explained at length in his work Phaedrus. Max Müller draws our attention to the consonance with Indian ideas, which at times is certainly striking; in particular, the doctrine that embodiment of the soul has nine levels corresponds to what we read in Manu's book of laws, in which nine levels are also designated. The intermediate state of the soul between two lives and the end state also gives a strong impression of being of Indian origin. Plato couches everything in an image of myth and poetry. He treats humans

and gods as one, which once more corresponds to Indian practice. The image compares the soul ‘to the merged power of a team of feathered horses and that of its charioteer. The horses and charioteers of the gods are themselves good and of good descent, but the others are of mixed quality.’ ‘The power of the plumage consists in lifting the weight to lead it upwards to where the race of the gods dwells.’ This power is augmented by the divine and diminished by evil. With his team of horses, ‘the great ruler in heaven, Zeus,’ at the front, pulls the sky up there; he is followed by all the gods and then the souls, ‘whoever each time wants to and can.’ Zeus and the gods steer gently and surely and behold all the splendors in their fullness. But the teams of horses of the other souls have difficulty climbing and are in disarray, so that the souls have no enjoyment of the splendors, or can only partially enjoy them. Arriving on the ridge of heaven and torn away by the circular movement, the gods take a look into ‘what is outside of heaven’ and see ‘sallow, amorphous beings, lacking in solidity, but truly being’ and they ‘allow themselves to feel at ease, until the circular movement has brought them back to the previous place again.’ The entire journey is accomplished by just a few of the human souls which have most closely ‘followed and emulated’ the deity, despite having fears and afflictions and ‘scarcely glimpsing the one who is.’ Others rise from time to time but then disappear in the resistance of the horses. But the remainder are just forced around in the space below, jostling and shoving each other. ‘And this is the law of Adrasteia,’ says the poet philosopher, that a soul which, as a companion of God, has glimpsed something of the truth, suffers no harm and, as far as aspects due to it, remains unimpaired. But the soul that does not see anything falls to Earth and begins the cycle of rebirths, which, as mentioned above, has nine stages. The best souls can be born as wise men, or as favorites of the Muses and of love. Those to follow might be born as kings who rule by constitution or by war, then the next down as statesmen and so on, and finally the souls that become those for whom the Greeks had the most contempt: the tyrants. A

-----File: 231-----

soul can undergo a number of rebirths. After three thousand years the highest will return to where it came from. Other souls may not attain this in less than ten thousand years. Within the cycle of rebirths, the soul comes for judgement after each death. The bad soul falls prey to the place of discipline under the ground, where it suffers punishment lasting a thousand years; a better soul is taken off to a place in heaven where it dwells, also for a thousand years, as in the ultimate life. Then both souls are free to choose their own continued path of rebirth. Hence, even rebirth in animals is not impossible. Rebirths will give a philosopher reason to infer the fact of remembering, i.e. that a good many things we see or learn for the first time seem familiar to us. The similarity between the Platonic approach and Indian conceptions, just as much in the intermediate states as in the end state and in the transformations, is not to be underestimated. Plato repeatedly departed from this view in other writings. Nevertheless, it must still have had fundamental significance for him. We see this in the total earnestness with which Socrates, Plato's spokesman, presents it.

It has often been claimed, even by Greeks, that Pythagoras and Plato adopted their views on reincarnation from the Egyptians. Herodotus says of the latter, 'The Egyptians are also the first to have established the tenet that the human soul is immortal, and when the body passes away the soul travels into another animal that came into being at exactly that time, and when it has been through all the animals on land and in the sea and through every bird, it goes back into the body of a human who has just been born, and comes around in three thousand years.' When Herodotus then continues, 'Some Hellenes have also put forward this view, some at an earlier stage, others later. I do know their names, but do not intend to name them,' he can only mean the Pythagoreans and the Orphics. But it is nonetheless curious that even Plato's view includes the three thousand years, albeit only for the elect souls. Eduard Zeller rejects the idea that the ancient Egyptians had a doctrine of reincarnation. It

is difficult for us to draw a conclusion on this, as the Egyptians retained a great deal from animism in their conceptions. The extraordinary effort the Egyptians made to procure abodes for their souls on Earth argues against their having had any belief in reincarnation. Pausanias, who was admittedly a later arrival, writing at the time of Hadrian and the Antonine emperors, expresses the opinion that the Greeks adopted their views of life and the world from the Chaldeans and the Indians. He may not have been totally wrong. Does it not have quite an Indian ring when Empedocles says, 'I have once already been a boy, a girl, a plant, a bird and a mute fish plunging into the flood' and when he bemoans the horrifying process of being born?

Mention should also be made of how even among the Chinese there existed a school of Laozi (p. 210), which taught transmigration of souls and reincarnation. The eminent man says in the Daodejing, 'Anyone who does not appreciate that there is a perpetuity, and that he will also continue in perpetuity, is storing up disaster for himself by his very imprudence. But anyone who is convinced of, and inspired by, the great significance of perpetuity must also be high minded, noble and exemplary.' Death necessitates dissolution of the body into its basic materials. But according to this there always follows a coming back to life for a new purpose, to a new designation, to new life. Laozi, whose teachings flourished somewhat later than those of Buddha, spent time in India; he would have learned some things from the schools of philosophy there. But his Daoism is certainly no Brahmanism, let alone a form of Buddhism. As we have already observed, it is not possible to see how he imagined the end to be either: whether as rising in the Dao, or as there being no end at all, so that the transformations would endure into the infinite.

24. The soul and immortality; the succession of lives.

We can easily perceive that life unravels on two courses: the animal and the intellectual. So an animal soul is distinguished from an intellectual one at an early stage. The activity of the animal soul is spent on development of corporeal life, the maintaining of this life, satisfaction of sensual cravings and desires, and living together with the external world. The

-----File: 233-----

second soul is more concerned with refraining from corporeal and external life, and occupies itself with thought, judgement and perception. Plato separated off a part from this second soul: he calls this part θυμός in Greek, i.e. courage.[15] We shall refer to it as 'intellect.' It acts against the evil and bad impulses of the first soul while guiding the wishes and actions towards the good. Then what remains of the second soul is the purely intellectual, νοῦς, nous, 'reason.' There is no question that this division into three parts according to the teachings of Plato (ἐπιθυμητικός, θυμός and νοῦς) exhausts the activities of the soul. But when the Stoics divided the soul into seven parts and assigned five to the activities of the senses (for each of the five sense organs), then allocated one part to procreation (as did the Pythagoreans) and the last to language, i.e. thought, this proved even less satisfactory. The reader will know that in most cases psychology makes divisions into three parts: in thought, feeling, and desire. This practice barely suffices for the purposes of the pure, rational part of this science, and, incidentally, there is not a great deal of value placed on it. In fact what we see here are divisions of the soul exclusively in view of the above teachings on immortality. For there naturally arises the question: what in the soul is to be immortal? For this reason we intend to create a more meticulous classification of the activities of the soul. A more detailed analysis of all the activities of the soul shows that, for our purposes, and probably also in more general terms, the soul can be divided into the following classes.

Animal soul, for developing, maintaining and moving the body.
Impulse soul, for satisfying sensual desire and impulses.
Sense soul, for perceiving the external world and all the stimuli to, and in, our bodies.

Feeling soul, for feeling the affecting emotions, such as love, hate, anger, compassion and so on.
Regulating or categorical soul (consciousness, categories, freedom, will; forms of perception).
Intellect soul (discernment, retention, remembering, knowledge, imagination etc.).
Reason soul (reflection, thought, judgement and so forth).
Divine soul, spirit, belief, intuition.

There is nothing particular to note about the first four classes listed above. The fifth class, the activities of which as a whole we might also refer to as categories, or stem activities, actually – and in a compulsory manner – provides the norms for all activity of the soul. From the aspect of consciousness, we are only really familiar with the activities of the soul. Only animal life offers some activities – and very important ones – that elude our consciousness. The true categories, i.e. quantity, quality, causality, etc., govern each, and every, perception and experience, and are unavoidable even for animal life. However, many deny that freedom could be a category. A discussion on this is not yet appropriate. Here it suffices that all our soul activities appear to us to be free, even where we are under compulsion. Ultimately, will is the prelude to all conscious activities at least. The reader will know from Schopenhauer's philosophy what categorical significance is ascribed to the will. The forms of conception under which we ourselves, and the world, appear to us are ultimately space and time. The influence of the regulating soul therefore extends across all the activities of the remaining souls. The sixth and seventh classes again give no cause for comment. The eighth class in particular had to be appended following the sense of the Indian doctrines, for the theosophical ones in any case; in the next volume I shall elucidate in various ways to make the significance of this class clearer than is evident from its designation. And according to the major prevailing views this class, as it contains intuitions, is to be distinguished from the power of the regulating soul.

-----File: 235-----

Modern theosophists seem to divide this soul into tiers corresponding to three souls: Buddhi-Manas, the human as the highest principle; Buddhi, the world as the highest principle; and Atma, the highest principle altogether. Our seven other classes are then placed in four tiers: Kama-Manas, the intellectual soul, comprising the reason, intellect and regulating souls; Kama, the impulse soul; Prana, the animal soul; and Linga-Sharira (the ether body), possibly the sense soul. The names are Indian, as are the ideas. We can agree with the highest soul being split up into the three souls. But the uniting of the reason, intellect and regulating souls seems inexpedient to me and appears to have been done purely on account of the sacred number seven. Incidentally, in my book 'Philosophische Grundlagen der Wissenschaften' (*Philosophical Foundations of the Sciences*) I have examined the activities of the soul individually and placed them in a canonical table, insofar as it was necessary for the purpose that was critical for that work. The class division above is more specifically detailed for general application.

So to what does immortality relate? It certainly relates to the eighth soul, and for this soul, immortality is absolute. This is the interpretation of all the approaches discussed so far. Buddhism seems to confine absolute immortality to this soul, as Vaishnavism presumably also does, insofar as it is a Pandeism (p. 229 f). In these two approaches, for the remaining souls it would thusly only be a case of relative immortality and the continuation of life after death, until, after the requisite number of incarnations (living in embodied form) has passed, these souls are annihilated, or, perhaps better, annihilate themselves, by either actually disappearing or proceeding into something else that no longer has a connection with life and individuality. If we did not ascribe an eighth soul to animals and plants they would be excluded from absolute immortality. I believe this is also the view of our modern theosophists. According to Plato, absolute immortality also relates to the seventh soul, as he combines the seventh and eight souls together into the

reason soul. However, these and the other approaches no doubt cannot claim the existence of absolute or relative immortality without the fifth soul: this soul would always have to be included. Accordingly, the view Plato describes as the one that concedes the least also ascribes absolute immortality to this fifth soul, as well as to the sixth, but only relative immortality to the other four souls. But approaches such as those of Islam and Christianity, in that they accept that there are eternal physical punishments and eternal corporeal joys as rewards in the hereafter, also have to claim absolute immortality for these four souls, and thus for the soul as a whole. If they believe that a soul can feel anguish and desire for itself, the first soul may diminish with death or, where there is the assertion of a new incarnation, continue to exist in a restricted way. At the same time it is supposed that whatever continues to exist in an absolute or restricted form always remains together; otherwise, the individual character would indeed be lost. In a reincarnation the only thing that changes is the person. But the individual character must always become more free of the residues of the physical, personal life, in relation to the more that annihilates itself (or is annihilated) from what continues to exist in a restricted form, until absolute freedom from it ensues, the person fades away forever and absolute immortality denotes only the highest being.

If we now bring together into a succession of lives, with diverging individual lives, all the past lives, lives and afterlives, within the most general portrayal of the world views discussed above, we find the eight souls would walk in the different lives in different ways and intensities, and in their different activity. Each of them can be active in the extreme in one life, and totally repressed in another, so it appears as if it were not present. And this can even be the case in individual life; we know that the activities of the soul really do change constantly in our corporeal life. Hence the distinction between human, animal and plant – and actually

-----File: 237-----

between human and every other thing – can also be suspended, just as the different states fade in humans. And it is no contradiction if a doctrine, such as the Indian one of metempsychosis, has the human soul also migrating into animals, plants and other things and beginning a new corporeal life. The entirety of souls remains, but they are partially or completely diminished in their activity, so that even one soul or two, like the two animal souls in an animal, can function exclusively. But, even if it does exhibit steps backwards, the entire succession is essentially to lead upwards in the way given, until eventually the animal souls have disappeared completely, even though the soul individual as a whole still appears in an embodiment. In the teachings of Buddha this means until the will for corporeal life has been totally extinguished. Afterwards, the succession of lives no longer contains any corporeal life and the afterlife is a singular one free of a body. I have undertaken this closer elaboration involving specialization of the individual souls to achieve an understanding in summary of the not easily penetrable doctrines on world views given above. Should the reader not be familiar with the concept of the individual soul, he might actually understand it in terms of classes of activity of the soul. This changes nothing in our deliberations. But he should nevertheless take into consideration how the fifth class of activities, as regulating and categorical, is so completely different from all other classes of activity. I shall have a great deal to say about this in reflecting on the so-termed materialistic views of the world and life

It has always been asked why, if life also has past lives, we know nothing of these, or at least not everyone knows something of them, despite the fact that individuals such as Pythagoras and Buddha claimed to have had full knowledge of them. As anyone will see, the fact mentioned earlier (p. 217), that in the process of becoming acquainted with new things we probably think we already know them, by no means suffices as evidence that we know something of our past life, quite apart from the fact that former lives can indeed be, and are actually

-----File: 238-----

also believed to be, different from each other. The only response that is to some extent satisfactory has again been given by Indian sages (who, as the most energetic advocates of the succession of lives, are the most concerned with the question), and, in association with them, our theosophists. We will not be able to deal with questions and answers until a later section.

But I think the reader will have gained the impression that here, even where we are dealing with highly dubious and perhaps erroneous world views, there are indeed also truly sublime conceptions, particularly in the views of life and the world which flourished in India and later spread to the west, of the succession of lives and of its culmination in the pure, absolute intellectual or divine life. In the next volume we shall become acquainted with their rather more fanciful formation, and in the final volume their metaphysical development. Alongside such approaches to life and the world, in philosophical terms the concept of paradise and hell admittedly appears rather sketchy and crudely reminiscent of primitive conceptions. Whether this is also true in ethical and pedagogical terms is, however, another question, as the concept of the succession of lives (saṃsāra to Indian peoples) is highly disparaged against that of eternity at rest (nirvana).

-----File: 239-----

SECOND BOOK.

Philosophical deistic and theosophical approaches,

In discussing philosophical religious approaches, we include teachings in which a god or a deity, or a soul acting in the same way as a deity, constitutes the focal point of suppositions, and where at the same time the way in which the world and life are ordered is considered from philosophical aspects, precluding purely religious arbitrariness. The religious rests on belief, while the philosophical is grounded partly on an understanding of nature and partly on metaphysical concepts, and endeavors to fit everything better to sober rationality. Many of the approaches with which we shall become acquainted in this book reside almost entirely in the realm of literature. Typical of them all, however, is that they elevate the concepts of god and the soul and endeavor to establish a connection between these concepts and the world of humankind, which does not approach those concepts too closely but which does place the world and humankind in a status not too unworthy, and indeed if anything, where possible, connects the world and humanity to those concepts. The theosophical approaches are based not only in belief but also in intuition.

THIRD CHAPTER.

Pandeistic and panpsychist approaches.

25. Pandeistic approaches.

Even if only by one English letter (d as opposed to th), there is a fundamental distinction between Pandeism and Pantheism.

The latter is considered to belong with the metaphysical approaches, while the former is thought to maintain a share in religion. Pandeism is a kind of animism which is augmented, unified and transposed into the divine. The entire world is filled with spiritual deities, and these deities merge into a single spiritual deity for the world (or sometimes into two such deities); this permeates and suffuses everything, but has no significance beyond the world. There is a wealth of approaches to this, but we shall discuss only the more clearly prominent ones. The concept of individual deities as constituents of the world would naturally follow from primitive beliefs. Zeus was said to have been the sky itself in the beginning, Hera the air, Gaia the earth and so forth; they were both deities and physical entities (p. 127 f). Hades and Orcus were always god as well as the underworld, while likewise Hel was a goddess and also the world of death. The Egyptian goddess of the sky Nut was said to be the abode of the light in the solar disc, the vestibule of the moon; the stars emerged from her loins and poured into her mouth, and she stretched herself and arched over the earth: everything was fully tangible. Here I refer to the picture, in which the goddess appears as a star-emblazoned woman arched with two angles in her body, supported by the earth with her feet in the east and her hands in the west, her body stretched up in the air. The same is true of Shu, the god of the air, and Qeb, the god of the earth: like Nut, in the same picture they have merged to form human figures. But Egypt was to see an even fuller expression of Pandeism. Heinrich Brugsch presents evidence for this. He writes, “God and the Universe appear connected, just as the soul is connected with the body. God is a spirit who lives in his cosmic house, which he himself has built.” The Coptic name for god is reported to have been Nutr, Nuta or Nuti, names which, like *physisnatura*, mean “the ever-continuing activity of creation and bringing forth,” including what is embodied in that which is created, i.e. the creation and that which creates it. Besides many writings describing god (be it Amun, Ra, Osiris, Khnum or another deity) as the “one,” the “original spirit,”

-----File: 241-----

the “primordial one” (as well as the “one with no beginning”?), the “eternal one,” the “creator,” the “truth,” the “life,” the “primordial father,” the “primordial mother,” the “merciful” and so forth, we now also find in inscriptions, “He is the creator of his own form and the maker of his body,” “the enduring one, ever increasing and never destroyed,” “the one who multiplies a millionfold,” “The sky holds his spirit, the earth contains his form and the depths seal his mystery,” “Constant is he, the constant one in all things,” “the constant of all things” (Menchet) and so forth. These and similar writings show that the Egyptian approach also approached a pandeistic one. But since countless other writings declare god and the deities without doubt not to be the world themselves, instead suggesting that they and their constituent parts establish the world and reign over it, we are dealing with views which are not precisely set out, rather than generally accepted beliefs.

The emergence of Pandeism in India is more emphatic. In the creation story, which begins with Bṛhaspati and Aditi, Varuna is the entire world. The earth, the sky and the oceans are Varuna: the sun and moon shine as his eyes, the sky is his body, and his three tongues are the realms of the sky, the air and the earth; he enters his own body and so forth. He demonstrates his divinity as creator of his own body. In the Bhagavad Gita, Krishna-Vishnu tells Arjuna he himself is the origin and end of all things, the power in all things, and other manifestations: the bouquet of wine, the brightness of sun, moon and celestial bodies, the sounds of words, every single letter of the alphabet, every song, the Himalayas, the fig tree, the horse, the human being, the snake (every animal, in fact), and all the seasons of the year. As he subsequently reveals himself to Arjuna as the deity, Arjuna sees, along with infinite beaming radiance, “the Universe united in him”:

> All beings, all gods, I see attached to your body,
> Brahma in the lotus position, together with the prophets and the snakes,
> Many faces, arms, bodies, many eyes, O mighty one;
> But neither end nor beginning do I see in you, you of many forms…

There follows a description of how everything meets its end in Krishna-Vishnu; his mouth takes up hosts of people, and they stream into him like the rivers into the sea. Nevertheless we must not forget that even here the fusion between god and the world is not an absolute one. There is far more emphasis on the spiritual and life than on the tangible, and god is often spoken of as being outside and above the world. Elsewhere, in one of the Upanishads, we read of Purusha as the world principle: everything has emerged from him and everything returns to him, "breath (spirit) is born of him, the mind and all the sense organs, the aether, air, light, water, and the earth, the bearer of all." But here we see another discrepancy, for after Purusha (the human being) is sacrificed the world of objects and phenomena is formed from him by the gods of the world, just as it is formed from Ymir the giant in the beliefs of the Germanic people. Teachings on Brahman belong more in the realm of the metaphysical, i.e. they fit better within Pantheism. It is quite impersonal: an "it," the self of the whole world, which includes particular things and individual humans.

> That which is one is given many names by the poets;
> They call it Agni, Yama, Matarisvan.

So runs a song from the *Rig Veda* (164 in the first book) about this Bráhman. With Brahmán it takes a personal character and then come, as elsewhere, the doubts, which tell us the world can also be seen as separated from him. The *Atharva Veda* asks the questions "Who created the order of this earth?", "Who created higher heavens?" and so forth. The answer is Brahmán. If all this had not occurred through him, Brahmán would be outside of the world. Lines such as the following, in one of the Upanishads, support the former interpretation: "Brahmán rises through heat, and from this sustenance (matter) comes into being, and from this sustenance breath, spirit and many other things." In a quite metaphysical way Prana (spirit, breath, soul, ψυχή) is characterized as the world.

Ancient Greece saw the emergence of similar writings, initially among the philosophers (and the Orphics). These quotations are also dual-faceted in that, as with Brahmán

-----File: 243-----

and Bráhman, they have both theological and metaphysical significance. Examples of Pandeism are seen where the Eleatic philosopher Xenophanes (who lived in Colophon circa 580–492 BCE) is reputed to have said of god: "He is utterly spirit and thought and is eternal," "He has absolute vision, absolute thought, absolute power of hearing (οὖλος δ'ορᾶ, οὖλος δέ νοεῖ οὖλος δέ τ'ακονει)," "The One and the Whole (ἐν καί πᾶν) concur in him" and "God is born together with all things." Empedocles of Agrigento (482 to 422 BCE), also regarded as one of the Eleatic philosophers, interpreted the world in its original state as an orb harmoniously united in itself, and himself named it "the Sphere."

> So it remains firm, in the mighty bosom of harmony,
> The Sphere, round and delighting in quite pleasurable repose.

This is why the Sphere has been identified by many as the Empedocleic god. And that was associated with Pandeism; if Aristotle was wrong in that the deity came into being later than the powers which made the Sphere transform itself into the real world (Discord and Strife). We know that the Ionian natural philosophers also took a more or less animate primordial being as their starting point. But since this primordial being really must be regarded as the soul, we shall discuss this in the next section.

Greek natural philosophy was held back and periodically interrupted by metaphysical conjecture, the sophist school and practical philosophy. The gods receded into the distance or were argued into non-existence. Nevertheless, as popular religion survived unabated and began to adopt new elements from the Orient and Egypt as it lost others, philosophy was obliged to return to the palpably religious, to elevate and exalt it as far as possible, and to accommodate this route of thought. In later times, when, by way of the Romans, an inescapable fate descends over the Mediterranean world and bears down on people's minds, this return to religion becomes perceptible, and we find fully formed pandeistic teachings, which, together with emanistic

teachings and theosophy, eventually cross over into the mystical and make their influence felt right up to modern times. Still taking pagan deities as their starting point, through Judaism they gradually grow into Christianity, without totally losing their Hellenistic and cosmopolitan nature in the process. However, as knowledge moves in decreasing circles, accompanied by tangible associations between the facts, doctrines tend to drift into boundless realms of fantasy and become objects rather of sentiment and superstition than of reflection and belief.

Nevertheless, these teachings are of great interest, partly due to their poetic force, and for very many they were a welcome replacement for the detached philosophizing available to so few and so excluding the majority, which ultimately had not yet even offered anything conclusive, through either experience or thought, and which actually refers everyone to himself in the end, in that it does hand him the means to learn and draw his own conclusions in a structured manner.

Let us consider the Stoic school first. Zeus is the spirit (νοῦς) of the world and in the world; he is the one who germinates the world (λόγος σπερματικος). He is even represented as tangible, as a fine fiery ether and as forming fire (πίρ τεχνικον), but also as the breath or spirit (πνευμα). Whatever he might be, this is something he himself conveys into every other matter: air, water, earth and so forth. His own particular dwelling place is the area encircling the earth, or sometimes the sun, but from there he extends throughout the entire world in its various manifestations. Just as Zeus forms the world from his own substance, he also takes the world back into himself, and turns it back into fiery ether by way of a fire engulfing the world, subsequently to condense it anew from himself. Souls are constituents of the divine fiery ether, with more or less significant concentrations of this ether to some degree in living beings. Like the god of the Universe, in its respective body every soul has a seat, in its heart, where it is nourished on its blood; from there it extends, like god throughout the Universe, throughout the body, particularly into

-----File: 245-----

the sensory, speech and genital organs. This Pandeism, which is said to be attributable to Chrysippus of Soli (280–208 BCE), represents a link with emanationist teachings: god is the world, in that the world came into being and emerges from the substance of god through condensation and cooling, and inasmuch as god still radiates his substance throughout the world.

The concept of god as fiery (but also as breath or ether) is drawn from humans whose warmth constitutes their vital principle; this concept was already current among the first Greek philosophers, and particularly with Heraclitus. Stoic Pandeism is a professed emanistic approach, in that even the gods appear as mere expressions and emanations of the world god Zeus, like souls. In this, Stoic Pandeism closely approaches popular religion that takes a theogony as its point of origin. As god radiates throughout the entire world and is himself tangible, it was perfectly logical of the Stoics to convey the seemingly lifeless body of the divine Odem [a personification of breath]; they considered the properties of the body tangible and spirit-like. They went further in defining all impressions affecting us as being tangible. Thus, even virtue, thoughts, dispositions, and periods of time such as the year, day, season and so forth could appear to them in the same manner, divine but tangible. This goes beyond everything natural human animism itself has dreamt up. If the Stoics went on to embrace the consequential sensualism in which knowledge of everything, in its broadest sense, is derived solely from sensual impressions, the soul being a clean slate as it enters the body, this also has its foundation in the acceptance of the same divine but tangible characteristics for the properties of the corporeal world and for the soul; the tangible has an effect on the tangible. In this the Stoics cross paths with the earlier atomists and mechanists, who also understood the soul as tangible. Only thin air was regarded by the Stoics as intangible, and furthermore space (thus also place) and time were regarded as such, besides the formal possible conclusion.

Of God, they had, in spite

of having adopted this concept of materiality, maintained a very high concept. “He is eternal reason, which reigns over the entire world and permeates all matter; he is the benevolent providence which attends to the whole just as much as to the individual part; he is wise and is the foundation of the natural law, which commands good and forbids evil; he punishes evil and rewards good; he is perfect and has a beatific spirit. By virtue of his nature he is the moving force of matter, universal nature, without which not even the slightest thing comes to pass; he is fate (ειμαρμένη), which compels all things to follow essential laws of connection, and is the vital necessity of everything.” The goddess Heimarmene also appears in the writings of Heraclitus and is generally a highly popular concept. These attributes of god gave rise to the fatalism so characteristic of the Stoics. “He (God) is the life-giving soul of the world, a soul with a natural desire to make everything spring forth from him, as from a seed.” The Stoic view is thus presented as monistic and deistic materialism and mechanism. We know what considerable significance Stoicism took on for the later Greek world and particularly for the world of the Romans; its ethics and dialectics have been the masters of the best of humankind and the greatest statesmen, despite the indifferentism which through fatalism Stoicism has taught.

The later schools of the Platonic Pythagoreans and the Pythagorean Platonists associated themselves partly with this Pandeism. However, their approaches belong in another interpretation (p. 255 ff). Here more generally I wish to emphasize that the Greeks—at least in Hellenistic times—also built altars to a *pantheos* (god of the Universe). We cannot say whether this *pantheos* was identified with the world; but he was understood as one personal entity, not as a collective deity, as can be seen from inscriptions found at Epidaurus and Pergamon.

Of course, traces of Pandeism also occur

-----File: 247-----

among many other peoples. Here we could include Taoism in China, in the form given to it by Lao Tzu, if Taoism were not also to fall within naturalism, as this approach puts nature, rather than a deity, to the fore. This mention must suffice at this point, particularly since quotations such as "Everything has originated in Tao, and everything returns to Tao" do not contribute a great deal to the question at hand. One of the most significant Japanese philosophers, Yamazaki Ansai, writing circa the mid-seventeenth century, is said to have been the originator of the concept "God is the nature of all things and permeates heaven and earth." This has a pandeistic ring to it, but it can also be interpreted metaphysically, as with similar sayings relating to god.

Other observations on pandeistic approaches are associated with the teachings to be discussed in the sections to follow.

26. Panpsychist approaches; hylopsychism and hylozoism.

Of these approaches, those designated omnanimistic have already been described. Those belonging to theosophy will be dealt with later. The ground remaining follows from Pandeism itself, and essentially only differs in the soul and god. A soul of the Universe and the world is adopted in place of a god of the Universe and the world. The soul is closer to us than god is; we feel we know the soul better, as we ascribe it to ourselves. Thus we find it apparently less difficult to think of the soul as connected with the tangible world than god is. All individual souls are therefore merely constituents of the *anima mundi*. And just as in Pandeism all things receive from god only according to their status in the world, so it is from the soul. Since good and evil are connected in our souls, as are the noble and the base, in the acceptance of a soul of the Universe we lose the inconvenience of a reason for the evil in the world, which we are loath to seek in god, and unwilling to pass off as a second god.

Hence we gain what is termed hylopsychism (ὑλη, matter) or hylozoism, which is in keeping with Pandeism only in that this is pure hylodeism and god is not sought in anything besides matter.

Thales of Miletus (of Phoenician descent, who probably lived from 624 to 546 BCE) seems to have adopted this type of hylozoism. In a view he is said to have gained from Aristotle, all things are filled with deities (πάντα πλήρη θεών εῖναι), and so it is certainly difficult to determine whether his approach is to be interpreted in a higher sense than one governed by the assumption of an *anima mundi*, or solely in the sense of the child of nature. We might almost believe the latter, an example cited being the lodestone, which attracts iron. Zeller shared this view.

For Thales moisture was a soul, and so water was primordial matter, from which everything else was formed through solidification and evaporation. This means that the moisture in everything should still be present, to a greater or lesser degree. We know that the soul was sought in the blood and in moist breath. It makes no great difference if Anaximenes (probably 585–528 BCE) adopted gaseous matter as the soul and the air as primordial matter in place of moisture. “Just as air (breath) is our soul and binds us together, the breeze-blown spirit (πνεῦμα) and the air also surround the entire world.” Thales recognized in the soul, as in the example of the magnet, something that moves; in the soul Anaximenes saw something that moves itself. Other than that, consensus prevails. The thinnest air (expanded by heat to the greatest degree) is fire, and therefore the most spiritual; the densest (condensed by cold) is the earth, which makes it the least spiritual. The heavenly bodies are fire compressed by the air, and so although highly spiritual they are earthlike.

Diogenes of Apollonia (430 BCE onwards) embraced the same view; he expressed it even more clearly in asserting the existence in gaseous matter of simply an “endless, infinite, rational being, which rules over and brings order to everything.” “For it seems to me that this very substance (air) is god, is

-----File: 249-----

ubiquitous, in control of and present in everything. And there is not even the slightest thing that does not partake of his nature." This substance is "eternal and immortal"; it is "soul and mental power." "All things are mere changes in the air." Here matter really fades away and the world is just the soul in different embodiments and manifestations. It is difficult to understand the roles of warmth and cold (which also appear as principles among the scholastics) which Diogenes and his predecessors call upon for the formation of the world from the primordial matter of the soul. We do not know exactly what they are meant to do alongside the soul. It may be that the soul develops warmth and cold from itself and so is the particular reason for their transformations with primordial matter. But there is also mention of external warmth: the warmth of the sun, which is said to have enticed plants, animals and humans out of the primeval mud.

It is not entirely certain but probable that Anaximander, a compatriot of Thales and Anaximenes who lived between their lifetimes, adopted an *anima mundi*. He speaks of the first principle (ἀρχή) as something infinite (ἄπειρον) and indefinable, from which everything originates and to which everything returns as ordained by time. This first principle is to be thought of as eternal and constant in inner motion, and therefore probably endowed with a living soul. By means of motion (and hence life) the contents of the first principle, which constitute our world, separate and combine; warm and cold objects separate and form moisture when they combine, and earth, air and fire are then separated from this through further movements, fire rising into the air and gathering in a blazing circle around the atmosphere, bursting out into thunderstorms. These processes of separation and attachment are accompanied by loosening of bonds and intermingling. Thus movement in the first principle creates a world constantly in development and worlds in periodically repeating cycles. The latter view is much admired and has been taken up and further developed by many.

Motion as a principal was also adhered to by

Heraclitus of Ephesus (around 504 BCE), who defined it more precisely, in the well-known dictum πάντα ῥεῖ, "Everything flows." Nowhere is there stasis, not even for a few seconds. "One cannot twice step into the same river without twice touching a substance." The spiritual world was the only thing he did not see in this motion itself. He saw it in a blazing fire: "This world (κόσμος), the one for all beings, was made neither by gods nor by humans, but it was always, and is, and always will be an ever-living fire, kindling and extinguishing itself by its own measure." Fire is also characterized as breath or spirit of the soul (Ψυχή), for the reason outlined above. The world is, however, formed of continuous transformations of fire. And these never-idle, ever-persisting transformations of the truly spiritual occur like a "war which is law, father and king of all things." "War is father of all things, king of all things. And it turns some into gods, others into humans, some into slaves, others into freemen."

Thus in the teachings of Heraclitus the psychological and intrinsic constitutes the tireless activity of the soul even in the smallest things in the world, through which everything, as it emerges, promptly passes away, so that everything is, and at the same time is not. The concept of life is that of absolute transformation. Accordingly, the soul fire conceals a constant, insatiable yearning. And as these transformations proceed in the one direction, they also proceed to the contrary: "The transformations of fire are firstly sea; those of the sea, half earth, half fire." "For souls it is death to become water; for water it is death to become earth. Earth gives rise to water, and from water comes the soul." "The following are associations: the complete and the incomplete, concord and discord, harmony and dissonance, and one from all and all from one." "God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, abundance and hunger." "Good and bad are one." The approach of Heraclitus seems not to have been a purely psychological one.

The acceptance of another "concealed harmony" which

-----File: 251-----

always balances out opposites can signify a peculiar characteristic of the *anima mundi*, just as the human soul also balances itself out, so that despite the multitude of constantly changing activities the unity of the whole is preserved. This very thing is pronounced by divine laws, by wisdom, by reason, indeed by fate (the goddess Heimarmene), by Zeus as the ruler over all, and on the whole by the principles, "that the primordial being is transformed into all things and takes back according to firm rules." "For the sun will not exceed its dimensions, otherwise the Erinyes and the henchmen of Dikē (as a world order) will discover it." We will discuss this later, and also the elevated approaches of Anaxagoras and others, which rise above the purely psychological.

FOURTH CHAPTER.

Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle.

27. Intuitions of law, harmony, world reason, ideas and forms.

The reader will find it easier to follow me in the discussions to follow if I ostensibly (but only ostensibly) break off from the system of classification used so far to speak about the views associated with the names in the title of this chapter.

Pythagoras (who originated from Samos and lived circa 571 to 497 BC) is among the more enigmatic figures of Hellenism; mysterious as he himself seems, so too are his teachings and those of his students, the Pythagoreans. The ancients labored with these doctrines, and we continually encounter them adopted in different settings. In this domain, as in so many others, we owe the most fundamental of these teachings to what the writings of Aristotle have conveyed to us. Original material seems to have been passed down by Philolaus (p. 242). All things in nature consist

of that which limits and that which is not limited, "just as the entire world order (κόσμος) and everything in it consists of both of these." What limits is interpreted as a point or as points; provided that each point forms a unity, it is called One and, extended further, the number. This is believed to be the essence of all things. 'And in fact everything that can be perceived does have a number. For without these numbers we can neither comprehend nor perceive anything.' What is not limited is what exists between the limiting unities, such as the interval for sound, and the emptiness between the individual points for bodies. Therefore, everything consists of the opposites of the limiting and the unlimited, which the Pythagoreans also symbolized as even and odd respectively in arithmetic terms. The world did not come into being in its own intrinsic nature, but only according to the human way of thinking. The Primordial One, the mathematically odd, and the emptiness are believed to have always existed. As this Primordial One drew the emptiness to himself and into himself, it dissolved into a multiplicity of Ones, which became separated by the emptiness. And this is how the things of the world were produced. So the Primordial One was actually a multiplicity concentrated without intervals into a unity. As the points were seen in mathematical terms, this primordial multiplicity could also be designated the primaeval point, since contiguous points, even in an infinite number, always produce just one point. Things come into being only through the intervention of what is not limited, the emptiness, the interval. The Primordial One is therefore 'extolled as the foundation of all things, as God, who governs and guides everything, one united and eternal, enduring and immovable, his own equal, yet distinct from all other things.' For all other things do contain something else, the emptiness. And the origin and development of the world rest on a breathing on and breathing in of the emptiness by the Primordial One, a life process. "The One (τὸ ἕν, or ἥ μονάς) is the beginning of all things." The world has thus developed as a dualism and is conceived in dualistic terms: the absolutely perfect Primordial One is one of its parts, the emptiness which negates everything its other part. Hence the imperfectness of

-----File: 253-----

the world. The diversity of things arises from diversity in the quantity of the emptiness they contain, just as the diversity of sounds ensues from diversity in the intervals between musical tones.

To explain the order we also see in the world, the Pythagoreans begin with the principle that, as it is, the One holds the connection between opposites, since when it is added to an even number it gives an odd number, and when added to odd, gives an even; it reconciles in itself the essence of the even and of the opposite odd. It is in this reconciling that fundamental harmony is believed to lie. Numbers are thus not merely the essence of things, but also the essence of how they agree, i.e. harmony. But the emptiness induces dissenting sounds, or disharmony. Two tones individually were always harmonic; according to the measure of the emptiness between them, i.e. their interval, they can remain harmonic as in the octave, the fifth, etc., or, in disharmony, produce sound, as in the second, the seventh and so forth. But the world would on the whole be ordered according to particular numerical relationships. "For nothing about things would be clear to anyone, in their relationship either to themselves or to others, if it were not for the number and its being." As correct as this idea is per se, the advocates of this doctrine were just as excessive in their pursuit of it, and ultimately believed they could express everything in the world in terms of numbers, even concepts and concrete objects. These scholars are well known for using numerical relationships to represent the five regular figures: cube, pyramid, octahedron, icosahedron and dodecahedron, and thence the five classical elements: earth, fire, air, water and ether, the last being the 'cargo boat' of the globe. We thus see that they held numbers in intense awe, and even regarded the number four (tetractys), to which they attached a quite particular significance, as "the source of never-dwindling nature."

The most refined, original and true element of life is fire. It is believed to be situated in the center of the world, radiate from there throughout the world and thus provide for the whole world and hold it together. Around this central

-----File: 254-----

fire (Hestia, the fortress of Zeus) revolve the ten spheres: i.e., from the outermost inwards, the sky of the fixed stars, the five planets (Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter and Saturn), the sun, the moon, the Earth and the Counter-Earth. The Counter-Earth (ἀντίχθων) is introduced in order to maintain the sacred number of ten, which 'brings everything to completion, influences everything and begins and guides divine, celestial and human life.' The shining stars reflect either the light of the sun or that of the central fire. This is thought to be particularly true of the sun, which is regarded as comparable to a light-reflecting crystal. Musical harmony is believed to prevail between the distances between the spheres and their movement, and as each sphere generates a tone by vibrating, the world resounds in the celebrated harmony of the spheres, which we do not perceive, either because the tones are too high for us to discern them, or because we hear them constantly in the same way. It is again fire that is above the entire world and surrounds it. Due to the imperfection of the Earth we perceive nothing from the central fire directly, but only by the agency of the other heavenly bodies, which receive light radiated from it. So these other heavenly bodies are regarded as more perfect than the Earth, and therefore also inhabited by more perfect beings. The world is, however, homogeneous, and began its formation from the center outwards.

Hardly any other school is so consistently muddled as the Pythagorean one, or has, originating from dry observations of numbers (as in the famous experiments on relations between musical notes), developed such fanciful ideas. Its concept of the universe is bold and designed at a fine level, and the formation of this out of a point and emptiness is devised on a large scale. Pythagoras is thought to have been the first to use the term cosmos – denoting adornment, order and beauty – for the world. How the Pythagoreans, whose most distinguished scholars were Philolaus and Archytas (both somewhat older than Plato), pursued their ideas in harmony down to the faintest stirrings of the soul, is something we cannot go into here. They seem to have taken the soul itself as the harmony of the body. But

-----File: 255-----

they distinguished the animal soul, with its base in the heart, from reason, the root of which lies in the brain. ‘The brain is the principle of the intellect or nous (νοῦς), while the heart is that of life (ψυχή) and of sensory perception (αἴσθησις).’ They made growth and reproduction hinge upon a third soul, in the navel, while procreation was dependent on a fourth, in the genital organ. For the Pythagorean concept of transmigration of souls I refer the reader above (p. 217).

Just as for the Pythagoreans it is the harmony of the world which permeates, in the works of Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (from circa 500 to 428 BC), a friend of Pericles and Aspasia, it is world reason (nous, νοῦς). However, we cannot be certain that he conceived this reason as dispersed throughout all of matter. Yet reason does have a direct impact on matter. As in the works of Anaximander, matter is seen as a disorderly mixture of all possible things. World reason produces a swirling motion in the mixture, and this motion spreads further and further, while still being maintained at the same time. The motion brings related things together, while it separates dissimilar ones. This is how things come into being. The processes of linking together and separation are never complete, but only more or less so, such that each thing inherently contains something of all things; there will be more of certain ones and fewer of others, which is how the type of a thing is determined. White snow, for example, is also believed to possess a dark element within it, as it dissolves into darkness in dark water. But as a whole it can be neither decreased nor increased; everything remains the same without fluctuation. A thoroughly modern principle! “The spirit is infinite and governs the world according to its own choosing; it is mixed with no other thing (although it is contained in some things), but is, alone in itself, something quite apart,” as Anaxagoras writes. The spirit is not only that which causes the world to begin to form, but also that which causes its development and its order, and is the ‘custodian’ of the world: ‘It moves and orders not only things of the past, but also what is in the present and what is to come.” It is not a creating being; matter has always existed alongside it, and it is not even capable of

changing the constituent parts of matter. It is even only partially in control of movement and unmixing, as these processes also hinge upon the nature of matter. It can only accomplish an approximation of what it strives to do. Therefore it is only in general terms that the world is ordered by the spirit. Hence, doubtless, the existence of the imperfect. "As the spirit ("starting from a certain small point") began to move, it separated from the turbulent universe; whatever was set in motion by the spirit, all this was separated out. The things set in motion but separated out were placed in another orbit to separate out much more." So after the initial impetus the world continues to form by itself – yet again, thoroughly modern thinking! But the Greeks saw in Anaxagoras' dualism and in the half-force of world reason a considerable deficiency in his system. Anaxagoras was a physicist, a mechanist, and in addition a theosophist. We shall encounter him in this capacity again. The Athenians were offended by his indifference towards the gods, which he derived from his belief that even reason is only semi-effective, and because he also declared the celestial bodies to be just stones (which had been torn away from the Earth by vortices or formed in the ether through unmixing), he fell prey to a malicious charge of impiety, like the one which later cost even a such a great figure as Socrates his life. Despite the protection of the powerful Pericles he was forced to flee. Euripides is thought to have been a student of his.

It is well known that no one has yet succeeded in ascertaining for certain what Plato (427 to 347 BC) meant by his 'ideas' (εἶδος or ἰδέα), and there are indeed many interpretations. Ideas evidently owe their conception to the knowledge that, despite diversity, certain characteristics are attached to whole classes of things and phenomena equally. Therefore, in purely dialectic terms an idea would be what is common to all in a multiplicity. However, an idea would thus denote merely something in abstract, simply an act of thinking without any kind of reality. But Plato does not share this view. Above all he refers to ideas as being in existence before the creation of the world. In a description of the formation of the world by God (Zeus) in Timaeus he writes, 'Thus it (i.e., the world) was formed according to

-----File: 257-----

the original model of what can be grasped by reason and perception and constantly remains the same. If we now proceed on these fundamental elements to consideration of this our world, we see that it is, quite by necessity, a likeness of something eternal.' This 'something eternal' and the 'eternal gods' are simply the ideas which must hence have been in existence before the world came into being, if the world was believed to have been an after-image of them. He goes on to say of them, as the 'model' (παράδειγμα, paradigma), 'Among everything that belongs to the type of the parts, we shall not compare them with anything, since anything that resembles the imperfect (even only partially) cannot be beautiful. But we shall undoubtedly rank these things as closest in similarity to what the other living organisms (which, according to Plato's panpsychist view, is all beings anyway) are mere parts of, as individuals and in accordance with their types.' As we continue to follow the course of the discussion, we find an analysis of 'whether there is a fire, implicitly and explicitly, and for that matter everything else of which we usually designate each one as existing implicitly and explicitly. But otherwise, it is whether only what we see, or what we perceive in other ways with the senses of the body, actually constitutes the truth we are seeking, and is the sole thing alone having truth in it, and besides, to all intents and purposes, there is nothing other than this. It would therefore be sheer delusion on our part if each time we took from any single thing an idea comprehensible only to thought as the being, and this idea were nothing more than a name.' The task could not be set more rigorously. Plato concludes that we have to concede that 'the One is the type which always behaves in the same way, unbegotten and non-transitory, neither adopting something else into itself from elsewhere, nor itself originating in any other thing, invisible and perceptible by no other senses, and so the task of considering it is conferred on rational thought. But the second, sharing the name of the former and similar to it, is believed to be perceptible by the senses, generated, and in constant motion, emerging in one place and then disappearing thence again.' Other observations of

-----File: 258-----

Plato elsewhere in discourses among his works essentially correspond to the view that the ideas of the implicitly and the explicitly being (οὐσία, αὐτοζῶον), and at the same time, as original models (paradigms) of things, the implicit of these things, are actually of everything. And in that each idea embodies a class of things in itself, the idea is a unity, a henás or monás. Plato seems to have recognized an order of rank among these ideas, by virtue of which they are subordinate or superior to each other, or of the same order. Indeed, in deviating from the proposition that each idea is explicit, he brings the ideas themselves into conjunction with one another, so that a number of ideas can even be reflected in one idea and each idea is notionally capable of being a great number, which also explains sensory diversity.

The after-images of the ideas are imprinted in something that can perhaps best be compared with the Heraclitean apeiron, that which is unlimited. It is not what we call matter. Plato calls it the 'type of space,' 'not subject to destruction, which grants a place to everything that has a coming-into-being, but is itself inaccessible to the senses, and even the spirit can comprehend it only, as it were, through a surreptitious inference and can scarcely ascertain it for certain. Even when we dream, we still keep it in view. What exists must indeed by necessity be at one place and occupy one space; meanwhile, what is situated neither on the Earth nor elsewhere in the universe is not actually in existence at all.' According to Plato this thing we dream of thus is also the 'non-being,' in that he regards only the ideas as constituting the truly being. It is striking that Plato thinks space to be a particular thing, as time is certainly interpreted as a reflection of the idea 'eternity.' Why is space not a reflection of the idea of boundlessness? If space is the place of the expressions (images) of the ideas, the soul provides the connection between these images and the ideas. This means the soul will be the representation of these ideas and will at the same time be what endues their likenesses with life and sets them in motion. The soul presents itself

-----File: 259-----

as an individual but also as a collective soul, the world soul. It is described as the foundation of all corporeal figures and as that which governs them. It is based is in the center of the world, which is believed to be spherical, but it drifts through all things, and the individual souls are things that belong with it. 'Hence one may pronounce that, in all likelihood, this world came into being as a truly soul-endowed and rational being through the providence of God.' For gods (including the celestial bodies as blessed beings, which are 'visible gods,' as are the gods of popular religion) and for humans, world souls and individual souls are created by God himself, while world souls and individual souls for animals, plants and other things are created by 'the gods.' However, souls are also described as having existed forever. We have already discussed souls and their transmigrations (p. 217 f). It is the gods who enclose a soul within a body, if it is not done, as it seems to be, by the souls themselves, or at least by the world soul. And, as the eternal ones, and being positioned so close to the true being, the souls have to offer resistance to the processes of becoming and passing away in life, and the assault of changes, in order to safeguard their eternal divinity. But this would be inconsistent with the belief that souls are also what moves things, if movement derived from the soul does not signify something other than changes coming from outside, possibly inner movement of impulses, thoughts and feelings. Changes would then have their foundations in 'space.' And space really would have to mean something more than just a non-being, particularly since it is believed to exist, uncreated, alongside God, and to be a hindrance to God's work towards perfection, making the world emerge from the hands of the highest master workman only in an imperfect form – despite the omnipotence of this master workman and the absolute perfection of the models and the ideas.

The soul's relationship to the world of ideas presents us with a further difficulty. The soul is believed to extend into this world. If it is created, it can itself be only a likeness of an idea, and therefore cannot attain perfect knowledge of the ideas.

If the soul has always existed, it is impossible to comprehend how it finds its way into a likeness of the ideas, as the ideas do not do this. It is even more difficult to grasp how the soul is believed to acquire knowledge of ideas from the likenesses of them, as the entirety of knowledge can only be what is created from the likenesses, and so it is imperfect and shadowlike. However, according to other views the soul is familiar with the world of ideas from its existence outside of the body, and when alive it recollects this world (p. 225 f). But this is merely an expedient which still conveys no explanation for ontology or ideology. This is why much that is to be found in the teachings of Plato is incomprehensible, and some things cannot be reconciled with others. The great man probably did not maintain his views throughout his long life, or might have been unable to cling on to them in the light of further deliberations. And no final synopsis of his system is available to us. No doubt he did not even intend to provide a rigid system. This is because his real endeavors belonged to the ethic of Socrates. He sees the good and the beautiful as the real ideas; they might even be the deity itself. And so his name is associated with Socratic idealism in its most far-reaching sense. But first we have his order of succession: God, the world of ideas, space (and also matter), world soul (and also individual souls), and world (with individual things). The world is defined by the world of ideas. It is according to the world of ideas that God produces his creations, and he also creates the souls. If space has no significance, the whole system constitutes a kind of Monism. But this undoubtedly stretches the point: the teachings of Plato scarcely allow us to acknowledge even a dualism with any degree of certainty. However, in his work *On the Opinions of the Philosophers* Plutarch writes, “Socrates, son of Sophroniscus, and Plato, son of Ariston, share the same opinion on the universe. They specify three principles: God, matter and the idea. That is to say, God is the intellect, matter is the first object of the processes of coming into being and of passing away, and the idea is an incorporeal ‘something’ that exists in God’s thoughts and conceptions. But God is the soul of the world.” Plutarch thus actually writes of a dualism,

-----File: 261-----

in attributing the ideas and the world soul to God, or regarding them as emanations of God and having matter existing alongside God. Xenophon writes that Socrates deliberately avoided speaking about the world as a whole, and even declared those who ruminate on this to be simpletons, as there was so much more to think about with respect to humans themselves. In his later years Plato must have abandoned the simplicity of the ideas. In the style of Pythagoras, he took the ideas to be assembled from the One (the good), and from the unbounded – the great and the small. This is doubtless intended to mean that each idea in itself uniformly constitutes a good without distinction, which, in its own manner, is comprehensive. Were the comprehensive element to be taken as 'indeterminate twoness,' each idea would be oneness and twoness. This description has been adopted by others; we shall encounter it again (p. 256).

The Academy, Plato's school of learning, had many eminent men among its members, although they increasingly lapsed into number theory in the style of Pythagoras, such as Speusippus, Plato's direct successor, who sought to deduce everything from One and the multiplicity, without abandoning the world soul and the idea of good in the process, and Xenocrates, for whom the One, or the odd, and the Two, or the even, were 'father' and 'mother' respectively of the gods, and the One was even equal to Zeus and nous. 'It is by the same and the different being added to the number that the (world) soul emerges.' He regarded the forces of nature as gods. The numerical data are symbolic methods of expression, comprehension of which for the most part eludes us. We shall discuss the Neoplatonists later. The length of a cycle of world time, transmigration of souls and aspects similar to Platonic ideas found among other peoples have already been discussed (p. 226).

On many occasions Plato's most eminent student, the great scholar Aristotle (384 to 322 BC), son of Nicomachus, voiced very strong criticism of the theories of his master. He also sought to improve them. The forms (εἶδη) of things correspond to the Platonic ideas. However, in his works they are not beings in their own right, but rather only what composes things

as such. All things consist, above all, of matter (ὕλη) and form or content (μορφή, εἶδος, λόγος, τό τὶ ἐστί, etc.). Matter is not the things themselves, as Plato also writes in his works: it is a 'first matter.' But as matter can indeed become things, it has to possess the ability to do so. Matter is thus a 'dynamis,' a possibility or potential for something real. A thing is realized in form, and form thus signifies the energy or entelechy of the thing. And form is just as immutable and eternal as the idea is in the works of Plato; it is just that outside of the thing it does not denote a real thing. Form is what makes a thing a thing, and is therefore also its essence, concept and ultimate purpose. 'Whenever something becomes something, it is not only out of something, but through something,' we read in 'Metaphysics.' Matter is also eternal and it is believed to contain the inevitable, Ananke, and to involve chance, tychē, hence the imperfection of the world that Plato saw in what is 'non-being' of matter. The form must have power to subjugate matter to itself. However, this power is not sought actively in the form, but passively in matter, to which a compulsion (ὁρμή) for form is attributed. This would be a third peculiarity of matter. Aristotle thus interprets matter in more real terms than Plato does. Meanwhile, something can denote matter with reference to one thing and form with regard to something else. Bronze is therefore the matter of an ornamented column, but it is form with reference to the parts from which the column is made; thereby everything does melt into the abstract. Just as things emerge from form and matter, so do changes; these are realities of what is potential and, as such, also energies or entelechies. That which changes things is form, while that which is changed is matter.

Change is devoid of beginning and end, just as form and matter are. There must therefore be something immutable that changes things (an unmoved mover), i.e. a form without matter, a pure actuality, which, being without matter, is also the totally perfect. This form is the spirit (νοῦς), the deity, all-embracing, absolute

-----File: 263-----

reason, which, in unceasing thinking-within-itself (θεωρία), is ‘thought of thought,’ an expression which has been used a great deal by some and also misapplied by others. This last form is active only within itself, but it acts through simply being there, in that everything works towards it, and it thereby brings about life in the world in its specific order. ‘A divine will directed at the world, or a creative activity or an intervention of the deity in the course of the world is something Aristotle did not accept,’ writes Zeller. We can see that this entire approach is highly mechanical, and the last form is also, strictly speaking, redundant; it means only that the life of the world has a specific course to run from eternity to eternity. So this theory would essentially not have belonged within this topic if it had not been advisable to attach it to Plato’s vivid Theory of Ideas. The status of νοῦς (nous), once we have accepted its existence, is actually that of a particular deity who has no active part as such to play in the world. Aristotle offsets this deficiency in the deity, if it really is a deficiency, by introducing ‘nature’ (φίσις), which supplies the foundation for life and being in the world as a real force. Aristotle may indeed perhaps have departed from the pure passivity of God and interpreted the reason of God as world reason. However, he writes that nature is not divine (οὔ θεία), but daemonic (δαιμονία): it works like an artist acting on unconscious impulses. Yet his approach, like that of Plato and many philosophers before and after him, is a teleological one related to purpose: ‘Nature does nothing without a purpose’; ‘It always strives for the best’; ‘It always makes what is most beautiful within the limits of possibility.’ And inasmuch as nature is the world itself with all its events, teleology lies in nature. It determines its own development itself. This is intended in entirely modern terms. Mention should also be made of how as a third principle Aristotle ascribes privation (στέρησις) to things, doubtless to express the differences in things in dialectic terms. He also conceives of things actually being different

according to their type and shuns the mathematical constructions of the Pythagoreans and of Plato, as well as the deductions of the atomists, which we shall encounter later.

For Aristotle, the world is spherical; the Earth sits in a central position, and the sky always turns in the same manner. Everything about the sky is much more perfect than things on Earth; the celestial bodies are more perfect beings than even mankind. There is an upper sky of the fixed stars and lower skies of the planets. Alongside the universal movement of the upper sky, which takes the lower skies along with it, these lower skies also have their own movements: swaying and tilting, which would explain precisely the apparent movements of the planets, the sun and moon being counted among these. Plato also assumes the existence of a similar arrangement, from the Earth outwards: moon, sun, Mercury (Stilbon), Venus (Hesperus), Mars (Pyroeis), Jupiter (Phaethon), Saturn (Phaenon), and the fixed stars. As for the rest, everything in the world is, if at all possible, ordered in concentric spheres, just as the motion of the spheres appears to be circular and the elements (earth, water, air, fire and ether) rest above each other in spheres. Aristotle states that the better always rules over the worse. The winds of the air are thus subject to the celestial bodies, and the waves of the sea depend on the winds. The greater the increase in the number of those which govern, the less uniformity there is, so in everything on Earth there prevails the greatest degree of disarray, which is lessened the higher we ascend. For this reason Aristotle regarded the celestial bodies with the more ordered movements as being further away, and therefore he saw the fixed stars as the most distant. The particular movements of the planets are explained by Plato and earlier scholars by way of the introduction of further spherical orbits. The number of all spheres required for the sphere of fixed stars is put at 23 by Eudoxus, and at 34 by Callippus and Aristotle. But as each higher sphere would have to draw every lower one into its motion, the existence of 22 more spheres is assumed; these rotate towards the others. In all there are thus 56 spheres. Each sphere has to be set in motion by an incorporeal, unconscious

-----File: 265-----

spirit, of which there are therefore 56, the celestial bodies numbering among these. This system, in conjunction with the teachings of Pythagoras on harmony, was most likely what Cicero had in mind when he wrote his peculiar composition 'Scipio's Dream.' The world is, and always has been, eternal, and, as the forms are also eternal, there have always been the same things, such as human beings, just as Plato also assumes, despite steady development upwards. No one has analysed the life of beings so thoroughly, from the aspect of life just as much as from the spiritual viewpoint, as Aristotle did. But we are diverging from the topic here. We need only recall his well-known definition of the animal soul, following from his form theory, as the entelechy of the organic body. In addition humans possess a spirit (νοῦς), connected to the animal soul. How this works is impossible to see, particularly since at least a part of the spirit, the active part (ἀίδιος), is believed to be eternal.

Aristotle founded the school of the Peripatetics, but his true students were among the Arabians and western scholastics in the Middle Ages; for them, his sovereign rule continued throughout the centuries, until, after the advent of recent times, this dominion gradually disintegrated amid harsh conflict, although it has not yet disappeared completely. He was simply an exceptional man, achieving great things in the field of dialectic and also accomplishing highly significant work as a naturalist. We will encounter him many more times, with Plato his teacher, the real shining lights of Greek idealism-based philosophy.

FIFTH CHAPTER.

Approaches from theosophy, Deism and Emanationism

Apart from being founded on belief, theosophy and the emanation teachings most closely related to it, as highlighted elsewhere, are based much less on logical rational deductions and views related to nature,

than on inspired promptings, inner observation (contemplatio) and intuition, mostly originating from conscious feeling. This view concedes the right of this intuition, on occasions born of the greatest imagination and highest exaltation, even against the resistance of cool rationality. At the same time the mortal world as an entity takes a step back. If Pandeism linked God with the world, conversely theosophy connects the world with God. Nevertheless, theosophy tends mostly towards a certain Pandeism, a number of examples of which we shall encounter. Hence, theosophy is to be interpreted as having a double meaning, as a knowledge of God through the world and as an understanding of the world through God – the latter as a perception of how God possesses it, as absolute knowledge. Almost all schools and associations studying theosophy in this manner in the past and continuing to engage in it today, like our modern theosophists, have discussed, in secret and esoterically, the second kind of perception in its essential parts. Hence there was (and still is) associated with theosophy an Occultism which, wherever it emerges into view, appears, by its very nature, as mysticism. And this leads to Supranaturalism. Indeed, in its excesses it takes us to theurgy, necromancy and some forms of ghostly activity familiar to us from Spiritualism. This is also often the domain of secret societies whose teachings were (or still are) known only to the initiated, mystics and adepts. Whether the Greek mysteries belong here is not something we can ascertain. As we cannot make statements that go beyond our knowledge, here we shall devote ourselves solely to the exoteric teachings. They include much that is meaningful and elevated alongside many things that merely give rise to much head-shaking. I would however like to remind the reader of the understanding, particularly originating from non-pagan circles, that the essential likeness between the spirit of humans and the breath of God, free of all mysticism, is expressed in the Bible. All the theosophical approaches to be portrayed here are concerned with such essential natures in a more general sense. The original spirit will also be taken as God.

-----File: 267-----

28. Orphics and Neopythagoreans.

According to adherents of Orphism, pieces became detached from the spirit (ὅλον, universe), as if blown by the wind. Living creatures breathed them in and through this became endowed with a soul. Meanwhile, we also have more detailed material that has been passed down to us about the Neo-Orphics. According to what is termed the Rhapsodic School there exists a triad of primordial beings: Chronos (doubtless representing time), ether (the substance which glows throughout the universe), and Chaos (matter in chaotic disorder). In the ether a shining (silver) egg forms from Chronos. From this there emerges the creator of the world, in the form of a triad: Phanes, Ericapaeus and Metis. The first of these is associated with shining, the second is thought to mean 'giver of life,' and the third denotes a vigorous insight and understanding. The deities of this trinity beam out sun, moon and day from themselves, also giving rise to night, and then Uranus, Gaia, Cronus and the usual succession of gods, including Zeus. They also bear the names Eros, the creating force, Protogonos, the primary begotten, and Monogenes, the only-begotten, as well as Dionysus, Pan etc. Zeus devours everything including Phanes at the same time and then brings forth the actual world. Another school of teaching places at the forefront an 'inexpressible one,' followed by a trinity consisting of Chronos, Heracles-Ananke-Adrasteia and matter as water and earth, which together form another triad. From the trinity there emerges the second triad of damp ether, unbounded chaos and nebulous darkness. Only then do the trinity of gods in this triad bring the egg into being; in the egg is the germ of all things, and out of the egg emerges Protogonos-Zeus-Pan, corresponding to Phanes, a new world-creating being. These names help us out only a little in interpreting all this. Gruppe is of the opinion that there are several allusions to the Orient, the home of such myths, particularly Babylon, and he cites the legend of Ishtar and Tammuz (p. 197) as the source; I have not been able to grasp completely in which connection he intends this. Other details are thought probably to originate from the cult of Attis of Asia Minor. Pan is erroneously hammered into such cosmogonic theories, and likewise into the Stoic ones, solely because of his name, which was translated as 'universe' (τὸ πᾶν). Pan is actually

only a god of shepherds, and his name just means ‘shepherd’ (a contraction of Paon, according to Roscher). Ordering into triads is actually Neoplatonic, as we shall see; however, it may also have been a practice characteristic of the Orphic systems. Gruppe does not regard it as out of the question to believe such theosophies were already in vogue at the time of the Peisistratids in Greece (specifically in Athens). Similar theosophies are certainly conveyed to us by a scholar said to have been the teacher of Pythagoras, Pherecydes from the island of Syros, with Zeus-Eros, Chronos and Chthonie (Earth) as the first triad; fire, air and water (all emerging from Chronos) are the second, from which the gods then emerge and the world of Zeus-Eros is formed. Epimenides is also believed to have taught something similar. The scholars under discussion here are not so much philosophers as theologians.

In their various doctrines the Neopythagoreans concern themselves, on the whole, with the four main suppositions on the tetrad of God, soul, matter and counter-god. Some schools united soul with God and thus obtained the trinity or triad of world spirit, matter and counter-spirit. Where other schools also divested matter of its neutrality, by transplanting the counter-spirit into it, there resulted the twoness, the dyad, of sprit and matter, both active and conflicting. In terms of the latter, the number theory of Pythagoras speaks of One as the spirit and Two as matter; One is regarded as that which is perfect, and Two as the imperfect. But Two must, at the same time, form what conflicts with One; otherwise the evil in the world cannot be explained. Nonetheless, One governs Two: it does this completely as a primordial spirit, but less completely as a soul. Living creatures have a part in the primordial spirit as soul or spirit and also a part in matter, together with its counter-spirit. However, it is not quite apparent how spirit and counter-spirit do battle against each other in living creatures. Only the most rigorous ethics and asceticism seem to be regarded as agents against the counter-spirit, releasing the spirit and making it appear in its divinity. The curious miracle worker Apollonius of Tyana (4 BC to

-----File: 269-----

96 AD), an account of whose life was written by Philostratus, is among the Neopythagoreans. In his works the being is highly reminiscent of that of Indian ascetics who even credited themselves with power over the decisions made by the gods, and believed they could exert force on the gods through penance and intimate prayer, like our 'Christian Science' faith healers. Neopythagoreanism is interspersed with Platonic doctrines and ultimately crosses over into Neoplatonism. But even elements of Stoicism are not alien to it. This is because some Neopythagoreans united spirit and matter into a unity, very much like the Stoic equivalent, and actually differed from them only in the mystical and in their propensity for alienation from the world and self-mortification of the flesh. Their extensive belief in daemons, also encountered among the Stoics, conforms with their mysticism; this belief extends right back into Greek antiquity as a belief typical of primitive people. Some saw the daemons as the real regents, archons of the world, wholly in the sense intended by Hesiod in ancient times; we cite his conceptions by way of clarification here. In his works the daemons are spirits of deceased races of humans, as they are in the beliefs of primitive people. The poem "Works and Days" says of this race of beings from the Golden Age:

> Kindly, delivering from harm, and guardians of mortal men;
> For they roam everywhere over the earth, clothed in mist
> And keep watch on judgements and cruel deeds,
> Givers of wealth; for this royal right also they received.[16]

Elsewhere in this work Hesiod calls the daemons 'sacred attendants of Zeus' and specifies the number of them to be three myriads. The souls of the other generations of humans are referred to as 'mortal gods of the upper Earth' (those of the second, Silver Generation), or as neutral blessed spirits (the demigods of the fourth generation). In other places he does not give them names at all. For example, an essay on Isis and Osiris (which may have been written by Plutarch) makes reference to this. But this essay presents a very curious interpretation of the works of Empedocles, in which the daemons are also punished for their faults and misdemeanors, until,

purified, they are restored to their previous standing. We shall soon encounter these daemons again in another form. But it was possibly due to such belief in daemons that some Neopythagoreans were even inclined only to recognize matter with its deity as original and to regard good as a deity born of it later. This does indeed explain what is imperfect in the world in radical terms. We again encounter a similar idea in a very much more elevated, inverse interpretation in the works of the German mystic Jakob Böhme. First we shall turn to two conceptual spheres from the East.

29. Theosophy and Sufism in India.

Just as Hebraic philosophy is founded on the Bible, Indian philosophy is based on the Vedas and Upanishads as its holy books. And since the Upanishads substantially serve to elucidate the Vedas, Indian philosophy is particularly characterized as the Vedanta philosophy. However, the existence of Indian philosophies which lead far away from the teachings of the Vedas and the Upanishads is shown in particular by Buddhist philosophy and several others of a purely materialist nature which in India are seen as the most outlandish approaches. In Vedanta philosophy, which alone concerns us here, the view that soul and original spirit are the same enjoys substantial prevalence, whether it be that they exist separated from one another, so that every living creature constitutes a kind of minor deity which is prevented from becoming equal to God only by its connection with matter, or whether it be that the souls have a share in the original spirit. Later on this approach developed further in two separate directions. Ramanuja and his school considered the original spirit Brahman to be a true deity, and for them the deity was real in living creatures. Indeed, among many of their followers their teachings crossed over into the Pandeism discussed above, where even mere matter was connected with the deity. The world was an evolution of Brahma. Max Müller cites an interesting text from the Chandogya

-----File: 271-----

Upanishad which indicates Ramanuja's approach. Indra, who is the leader of the gleaming, divine Devas, and Virokana, the leader of the Asuras, who are in conflict with the Devas, want to know the identity of the absolute Self, the Atman, and so they turn to Prajapati, the Lord of Creation. First he explains to them that what they see reflected in another person's eyes and in water is the Self. They both subsequently construe the image to be the Self, and thus interpret it to be a different being. And Virokana is satisfied with this and uses it as the foundation for the doctrine of external appearances of the body among his Asuras. But Indra soon realizes that the image cannot be the Self. He goes back to Prajapati. He has to do this again and again, as he is given responses on increasingly elevated levels; these replies acknowledge the doubts he has each time and raise the level of his perception from stage to stage. The last answer arises from the connection between body and soul. 'Just as a horse is harnessed to a cart, the spirit (prana) is harnessed to this body.' Should the spirit be totally free of the body, it will be the 'Supreme Being' (Uttama Purusha). Who knows? – I want to think that he is the Self. Who knows? – I want to speak, I want to see; he is the Self, and so forth. The organs of the body are merely a physical medium. Even the brain is just a medium; anyone who knows that he wants to think, or who thinks, is the Self. 'He who knows this Self and understands it attains every world and every desire.' The latter means that he is equipped with the utmost perception, recognizes himself and therefore also has a knowledge of the world. Here the absolute has largely vanished, even though it is denoted as Purusha (Person).

This is found even more in the second school of Vedanta philosophy, Sankhya. The original spirit moves inconceivably far away; the souls want to have a share in it, but this is of no consequence to this approach. Sankhya philosophy thus crosses over into an accustomed dualism between spirit and matter, consideration of which no longer entirely belongs here. The origin of the soul and its connection with Brahman is apparent only in that in the real world, in the face of all events, the soul is the absolute

dormant, pure spirit. Its relationship to the real world comes about only through light from it falling on things, just as many Greeks believed that we see by means of rays going out from our eyes, and these rays then touching objects. And the restraints of our spiritual light on things are our physical sufferings and joys, if we take these as restraints. But let us see through the idea that sufferings and joys do not affect us at all, because absolutely nothing can take place in us and we will have attained the understanding that makes us free from the world and allows the soul to exist as the absolute spirit. The reader will see that this doctrine, as with any dualism, suffers from the inexplicable nature of the effects of different powers on one another. Illustrations by means of images, such as how a white crystal appears red when a red object is held behind it, are poor temporary expedients, particularly for those of us who know the physical reasons. The school founded by Shankara is one which seeks to mediate between the two schools above. The soul is Brahman itself. And the world? The world is not Brahman at all. We shall discuss this doctrine in the third volume. Here we shall merely note that asceticism, self-torment and self-immersion are supposed to lead not only to absolute knowledge but also to the attainment of great magical power. The doctrines of yoga (which teach on tension and strain) also cross over into Occultism. And is there anyone who has not heard of the superhuman deeds of Indian fakirs?

The teachings of the Persian Muslim sects of Sufi (‘the pure’ and ‘the pious’) bear a certain similarity to Orphic and Indian teachings. Here also, souls are parts of God, and are in a certain manner equal to God, but by degrees they are infinitely different from him. In the latter case the difference is in opposition to Indian teachings, according to which souls and Brahman actually signify the same thing. Sufi doctrine also says that God permeates all matter. Humans are thus to be constantly mindful of the spiritual essential identity with God, as to love God means to love oneself. For the soul finally becomes united with God. Sufism is said

-----File: 273-----

to have first been professed by a woman, Rabia, in the eighth century; numerous fine quotations are reported from her. Among many of her followers (termed 'arif) her teachings crossed over into a Pandeism and a theosophy. Some people believed themselves to be connected with God in such a way that they regarded themselves as 'persons of conviction' and declared study of the holy books to be sheer hot air. The dervishes will form a distorted image of the philosophical Sufis, just as the fakirs will do for the philosophical Vedantists. In Sufism intuition actually plays the same role as it plays in theosophy. Humility and submission drift ahead; there follows the total losing of oneself in God. The Sufis made an outstanding contribution to the passionately sensual poetry of the East. It would be a pity if all the beautiful aspects of this poetry were to be meant to be purely symbolic. And their greatest lyric poet, Shams-ud-din Muhammad, known as Hafiz (an honorary title for someone who knows the Koran by heart), is thought to have inspired Goethe to write his West-Eastern Divan.

30. Philo of Alexandria.

We now return to the West. The transition of world views to the Neoplatonists in one direction and to the Gnostics in another stems from the approach of Philo, an Alexandrian Jew (born circa 30 BC) who sought to act as intermediary between the philosophy of Plato and biblical teachings. Philo ranks among the Eclectic philosophers. Almost all of the Eclectics were, incidentally, Hellenistic philosophers in the style of the Stoa. Highly typical of his view is what he writes about the creation of the world: "In his divinity God foresaw that no beautiful imitation could exist without a beautiful pattern, and that no sensual thing would be without fault unless it were reproduced from a model and a spiritual idea. For this reason, since he intended to establish this perceptible world, he first created a world present only in thought, to enable him to effect the corporeal following an uncorporeal and godlike pattern, which itself was a later

likeness of the earlier pattern, encompassing just as many sensual things as are contained in the ideal one. The world of ideas (which corresponds to the Platonic one) is not something we should imagine or describe as present in some place or other." Philo cites the example of an architect intending to build a city, and goes on to explain, 'One should envisage it in a similar way as regards God, who, when he was considering how to establish this immense city of his, first devised the models for it, then assembled an ideal world from them, and finally created the sensory world from his model for it.' 'It is evident that the model reproduction we call the ideal world is itself the pattern used as the model, the idea of the ideas.' He names this 'idea of the ideas' the 'reason of God.' What is intended is an idea of the ideas, to provide us with the descending order of God, the ideas, the bringing together of the ideas, and the sensory world. And for this view he cites Genesis itself: 'This is specifically the supposition of Moses, not one to be attributed to myself. In relating to us the creation of man he says in express terms that man is created in the image of God. But if the part (the man) is an image of the image, it is evidently also the whole that represents the entire world apparent to the senses.' And this is how lack of perfection in the world is then explained through descending significance in the succession of creation, and also through the way God has bestowed on the finite world only a finite part of his infinite goodness. God himself is entirely outside of the world, having no relationship to anything in the world; he is the 'being.' The idea of ideas is Logos, 'the intelligible place in the intelligible world' of the ideas brought together. When 'Logos became incarnate,' to use the words of John the Evangelist, it gave rise to the sensory world. Therefore the Logos of Philo is also interpreted as an archangel, the intercessor between the sensory world and God, in that he himself is the 'reason (or mind) of God,' something radiating from God, from the absolute light.

To demonstrate this and everything to follow let us take

-----File: 275-----

an example from nature to evoke a sensory perception. The sun is, as we can say in metaphorical terms, the fundamental source of light, light itself. It radiates manifold rays of light: red, green, chemical, warming, electric etc. These rays are not the sun, but have their origin in the sun. Should the sun die, the rays of light would disappear; without it they would be nothing, but the sun would still exist without the rays of light. The individual types of light ray correspond to the individual ideas. All together they give the idea of the ideas and correspond to Logos. If we suppose that somewhere in space they bring about something that manifests itself as something new in material terms (such as the chemical composition of chlorine and hydrogen in hydrochloric acid, or the growing and flowering of a plant), we will have something similar for the bringing forth of the sensory world by means of Logos. This shows that the reproach made towards Philo and all generally who attempt to intercede between God and creation – that it is specifically intercession itself, Logos, that is also just God – is not entirely justified. It is actually the rays of light that bring forth hydrochloric acid, and make plants grow and flower; it is not the sun itself that does it, although it is the cause of the rays of light, just as God is the cause of Logos, and this in turn is the cause behind the sensory world. Further development of this leads to the theory that the various parts of the world are materializations of different ideas within Logos, and through Logos. Man is a materialization of the most significant ideas; his soul even contains something of the very ideas themselves, and the uniting of these ideas is Logos in man, i.e. his intuition, which is therefore something different from intellectual capacity. So in addition to his body, within himself a human also holds rays of God's light, which, taken individually, denote various abilities of his soul, and all together constitute absolute insight and understanding. This doctrine can be classed as an emanation theory, but is better described as one of radiation, as emanation leads one to think of discharge from an object itself, which is not what is believed to occur. A human has nothing of God himself in him: he merely has something of his ideas,

-----File: 276-----

and of his rays of light, as he has Logos uniting all ideas and all rays of light. Up to this point the system is, in my opinion, quite consistently logical. There are, however, difficulties in abundance in other aspects of the system with regard to humans and souls. As a microcosm, a human being is believed to correspond to the macrocosm, and he would thus, in a smaller form, be an embodiment of everything of Logos that is attributed to the world as a whole. His likeness to God is thought to consist in his being a kind of incorporated Logos drawn together in himself. This is difficult to grasp, as we need to envisage all the light rays that make up Logos individually sufficiently diminished. When this Logos is then referred to as nous (νοῦς) and detached from logical insight and understanding, we have to acknowledge a distinction between intuition and logical understanding and perhaps refer to the former as absolute insight and understanding (without logical thought or the faculty of drawing conclusions), and to the latter as relative. Nous alone is believed to be immortal, while the rest of the soul, which, like the actual soul for the Stoics (p. 232), is thought of in material terms, is considered mortal. But relative insight and understanding is also referred to as Logos, so how can it then be mortal? There is also the consideration that for nous to be able to separate itself from God, as Philo teaches — which is evidently assumed for the sake of those who do not believe in a god at all — is something incomprehensible within this system. However, we can also offer an analogy in physical terms for this separation. If the sun suddenly ceases to emit rays of light, those previously produced will continue to travel through space as if torn away on the inside from the sun. But even if separated from the sun, they still retain their quality, and carry on as if they were still connected to the sun, just moving further and further away both within and outwards from, it, but changing nothing in the nature of their being or their course.

Just as the idea of ideas is made into an individual person as an archangel, so is each idea, or a bundle of ideas seen individually. This results in the host of the angels, daemons and spirits. The latter are also souls; if they enter bodies,

-----File: 277-----

they fall prey to sensuality, from which they have to release themselves again in one life or in a number of lives (in which we can see that Philo is an adherent of Plato's theory of metempsychosis) if they are to regain their previous divinity. This cannot, of course, be reconciled with the principal theory. And this is precisely due to the fact that the rays of light, as forces of God, are also treated as wholly good. If matter is totally neutral, there is no place left for evil in this belief system or in any other that works on the same premise (the absolute good of God and the neutrality of matter), and insertion of this into the main theory is founded on baseless statements. But this does not affect Philo's general world view.

31. Logos and Sophia.

The concept of Logos has taken on such great significance due to the fourth evangelist making it the foundation of his system of belief. The original meaning of Logos is 'Word,' and this is how Luther translated it. But in the writings of John the 'Word' has the same role as Logos in the teachings of Philo. 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made that was made. In him was life; and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not.' This is all entirely in the sense of the Philonic approach; it is just that the 'Word' is even more closely associated with God than in the teachings of Philo. As early as Ancient Greek times Logos had the connotation of thought or logical order. Heraclitus of Ephesus is said to have taught that 'the essence of destiny is Logos, which permeates the substance of the Universe.' 'Everything proceeds according to Logos.' 'Logos is eternal.' 'The soul belongs to Logos, which multiplies itself.' The latter is a side piece to 'Character is man's destiny (ἦθος ἀθρώπῳ δαίμων).' Max Müller places this Logos in parallel with Ritam in Indian beliefs,

precisely with the compelling order. But in India the ‘Word’ itself had cosmogonic significance in Brahma, as an aphorism, whereas the teachings of Heraclitus show Logos not as a creator, but solely as always existing (ἀεὶ ἐῶν). The Stoics were the first to understand Logos as also being a creator, in that for them Logos signified the divine rational principle. This is also how they spoke, in keeping with their already developed Pandeism of a Logos in every single thing, of ‘embodied Logoi’ which represented the types of things and the ‘specific quality’ of each – all the Platonic ideas thought out in real terms. Hence, the concept of Logos, which was to be so important later, gradually developed. However, the peculiar intermediate position of Logos between God and the world seems not to have been known at earlier stages, since neither Plato’s own system of ideas, nor Aristotle’s interpretation of it, is about God as the creator; in these, a Logos does not act as a mediator between God and the world, which would allow God himself to remain totally unaffected by the world. In Faust Goethe ultimately uses ‘Tat’ (‘deed’) as a translation of Logos. This corresponds very closely to Philo’s interpretation: rather more than ‘Word,’ as the ideas in the teachings of Philo are ‘powers’ of God. (‘Kraft’ (‘power’) is a word Faust had also used previously.) Philo takes it further by calling Logos the ‘Son of God,’ the ‘only-begotten,’ the ‘first-born.’ This terminology, at least for Logos (also see page 255), seems not to have been known before Philo’s time. But it later became the most important expression. In John’s Gospel the term is applied to Christ: ‘And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father’.

A second principle in the teachings of Philo later acquired great significance: Sophia, the ‘Wisdom’ of God. Attaching the sense of the Philonic ‘Logos’ to the ‘Word’ in the Bible is a strained connection, as the ‘Word’ there means only as much as ‘call’ or ‘command,’ as in the first lines of Genesis, but not more; on the other hand, ‘Wisdom’ seems to occupy a special position. In the Proverbs of Solomon ‘Wisdom’ (Chachma) says of itself: ‘The Eternal One created me as the beginning of his transformation.’ It existed before

-----File: 279-----

the earth, sea, clouds, or sky existed. ‘There, day by day, I was his joy, the child he had fostered, playing before him, before the God of all time.’ The wording of Job chapter 28 could be interpreted in a similar way: there, Wisdom is also present at the creation. There, however, it is ultimately interpreted as ‘Prince of the Lord.’ But in chapter 24 of the Book of Ecclesiasticus (Sirach) the spiritually gifted Sirach says, quite evidently of Wisdom: ‘I emerged from the mouth of the Highest One, and like a vapor of mist I covered the earth. I took my dwelling-place in the heights and my throne was on a pillar of cloud. I circled through the vault of the heavens alone, and I strolled in the depths of the floods of chaos.’ Furthermore, we read: ‘From eternity hither, from the beginning onwards he created me, and for eternity shall I never cease.’ There follows a highly poetic portrayal of itself given by Wisdom. In the teachings of Philo Wisdom seems to share a meaning with the ‘Word,’ as the ‘intellect of God’.

32. The Gnostics and Manichaeans.

In devoting our attention to the Christian Gnostics (gnosis = perception, intuitive knowledge, revelation) we find ourselves tackling the problem that their doctrines, quite apart from their opacity, are passed on to us only in fragmentary form. The theosophy of our time devotes particular attention to these teachings. In addition to the older works of Baur and Harnack (in his work ‘The History of Dogma’) we have a two-volume book by Heinrich Schmitt, which is written with delightful enthusiasm, but which still leaves much in the dark, despite Gnosis being considered the ‘light’ doctrine, and which contains some material that appears to be a more recent product, and sadly much that is too exuberant to be of any use to us. There were two main schools in Gnosis, a dualistic one and a monistic one. The dualistic school took as their point of origin two principles, God and Anti-God (or matter, thought of as insubordinate), while the monists started their doctrine from God alone. And these theories are a mixture of heathenism, Christianity and philosophy. However,

they are essentially of benefit to heathen Christianity, although they are aligned particularly with the Philonic doctrine of emanation. We can highlight only the most significant advocates of these two schools here. I shall not go beyond sober description of the older works, and shall finally make mention of the subject matter presented in detail by Schmitt.

Basilides (an Alexandrian philosopher who lived at the time of Hadrian) belongs to the dualistic school. His doctrine constitutes a theory of emanation. The highest concept will always be known as God. God is the absolute and the unknowable, as in the works of Philo. From him there emerged reason, from reason the word, and then, in further succession, rationality, wisdom, (moral) force, righteousness and peace. There are seven levels up to God, all spiritual and ethical. Wisdom and moral force themselves are believed to have brought forth the virtues, the spiritual rulers and the angels. Everything is seen as an actual emanation of God. The angels are also called the first ones and master workmen of the world, the demiurges. Therefore, God does not create the world himself; rather, principles that have emanated from him form the world. The number of the world-forming angels, in constantly diminishing perfection, is as many as the number of days in the year, 365. The further details seem to run essentially on the same course as Zoroastrianism. For an evil principle is apparently presupposed, and as soon as it glimpses God's realm of light, as Ahriman did with the kingdom of Ormazd, it comes into conflict with the angels. There emerges a 'perplexity and mingling,' this mingling doubtless being of the forces of light with those of darkness. And as a result the angels form the world, as well as they are able to in this hubbub, from lights with darkness attached. To tally with the 365 angels there are 365 heavens or worlds. Our heaven and our world were wrought by the first of those angels. Basilides is thought to have seen the God of the Bible in this – for us real – demiurge, which is inconsistent with what the Bible itself says, as Jehovah has, and can have, no adversaries at all. This demiurge is believed to have chosen for himself a people, the Israelites, and to have subjugated the entire human

-----File: 281-----

world to them. The other angels rose up against this. And to resolve the conflict, God sent Christ, his intercessor, into the world. It is also said that in ruling over the world Christ removes the angels who are tested and found not to be sufficiently strong in the face of the darkness. So watching over the world there is a providence which has originated from God and has found its active force in the intercessor. There is no word of how the world came into being; matter seems to be a kind of mixture of light and darkness. The world would consist of a double emanation: the forces of light, working from above downwards, and the forces of darkness, from below upwards. The forces of darkness also constitute a form of evolution. The emanation of the forces of light would be the more significant one in humans. Intuition is believed to increase with this emanation. And this is why perfect adepts are also thought to be completely free, even compared with the angels. This presumption is thought to have led to moral degeneracy among many adherents of this doctrine. However, the transmigration of the soul is still taught wholly within the meaning used by the Indians and particularly that taught by the Buddha, and the punishment for conscious sins, adjuncts to the dark forces in us, is seen to take place in corporeal life. Purification is accomplished through gradual shedding of the darkness, probably in a sense as understood by the Iranians (p. 203). The Basilidians had the well-known consolation in distress that undeserved sufferings were believed to give protection, or warnings, against possible sins to which they were predisposed.

This dualism has been accomplished in various ways. One school (that of Hermogenes, Arnobius, Synesius and others) took matter to be the second primordial being. They believed everything was in the greatest state of order in God, and in the greatest state of disarray in matter (in both cases as in the works of Anaximander, Anaxagoras and other Greek philosophers). Whatever is found to be in order there, and in disarray here, is believed to be the same thing. (Motion?) Then God introduces order into the disarray of matter, but, as two primordial beings are involved, only to the point where the good in him outmatches the evil in matter, according to its degree. So forms and develops

the world, in such a way that the order in God in its own right begins to order the disarray in matter, just as an object can govern the desires. And the world consists of disarray alongside order. The soul has emerged from the ‘something’ in matter, or else it is an emanation of a higher emanation of God, which in turn is thought to remain at a distance far from God. The dualism of Lactantius consists of Christ as the principle of good and the devil as that of evil, both brought forth by God.

Lastly, but still with the dualists, I shall make mention of Manichaeism, which is close to this Gnosticism. Its founder, Mani (who lived around the middle of the third century AD), was Persian. This explains the fact that his doctrine essentially assimilates ancient Zoroastrianism. What is of interest is that every creation in the realm of darkness has a corresponding creation, formed in the same way, in the realm of light; this is reminiscent of the Iranian Fervers (souls of the good) and the ideas of Plato. We should not forget that it is said that in the battle between light and darkness light is to be found in significant predominance in some places in the universe (i.e., in the sun and the moon). And as related things attract, as the world turns back round these places work like bucketwheels and draw more and more light which is inflicted with darkness into the sphere of light. This process of attracting light through light is interpreted as a force of light (which contradicts physics). And Christ is believed to prevail above all with this force. If the Manichaeans did not otherwise view everything in physical terms, one would regard the above conception as an attractive allegory to express the function of Christ in the redemption of men. But how do the sun and the moon fit into this? The Manichaeans seem actually to have seen something of the divine in the sun, or at least to have believed its light to be a divine revelation. They believed Mani also soon turned from Paraclete into Redeemer, or into the Holy Spirit. He died in Persia, a victim of teaching his doctrine, as there it was the Iranian religion, under the influence of the rising Sasanians, that was

-----File: 283-----

diverted into monotheism, which in principle is not actually incompatible with Zoroastrianism.

The doctrine of Valentinus (who lived around the middle of the second century AD in Alexandria and Cyprus), which is termed monistic Gnosticism, is classed as an idealistic one. It begins with a primaeval primordial being, absolute tranquillity, the great silence (Sige, σιγή), and alongside the primordial being total, deep contemplation (Ennoia, ἔννοια) and the unfathomable depth, the unfathomable womb (Bythos, βυθός). By the agency of the two primordial beings, nous, or the only-begotten one (p. 266), emanates from the primordial being; this nous is the only-begotten father and foundation of all things, and is the only one that can comprehend its origin, the primaeval primordial being. Nous is believed to be absolute reason, the absolute spirit, primordial reason, as we shall call it for the sake of brevity. Together with the primordial spirit there emerges absolute truth, primordial truth (aletheia, ἀλήθεια). This is interpreted such that God is inherently beyond comprehension, and can be understood only through the aspects of reason and of truth, with which we all doubtless agree. From reason and truth there emanate the Word (Logos) and life (Zoe). And from these there originate the spiritual human (ἄνθρωπος) and the spiritual community (ἐκκλησία), the church. In Bythos and Ennoia (or Sige, according to some) we thus have four emanation pairs, or syzygies, which constitute the first order of emanation, the primordial ogdoad. Each of the pairs is seen as male-female; the male gives the being, the substance, while the female provides strength. ‘In its most magnificent scenes, Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet’ writes Heinrich Schmitt in his book cited above, ‘is also merely a device for conveying the sacred mystery of the syzygy of Valentinus.’ Yet Valentinus will simply have started out from the common earthly observation of procreation by man and woman, and will have elevated this principle into the spiritual sphere. Perhaps he merely gave a new interpretation of the Egyptian ogdoad (p. 101), which is also formed of pairs. He then continues to explain this system further. Each emanation is referred to as an aeon, a name meaning ‘that which is temporal’

as well as ‘world.’ Logos and Zoe now bring forth five physical pairs, while man and community produce six ethical aeon pairs, by means of emanation. I am not in a position to give the names, and not all of them are fixed, but among them we find terms such as mixing, permeation and desire, among others, in the five pairs, and belief, love, hope, insight and understanding, and so forth, in the six pairs. So all together we now have 15 pairs corresponding to 30 aeons. These form the well-known spiritual light realm of fullness, the pleroma (πλήρωμα). But in this realm the significance of an aeon declines with distance from the primaeval primordial being, although each aeon does still exist in a state of total bliss, entirely free of all evil. Increasing limitedness corresponds to ever more loss of insight into, and understanding of, the primaeval primordial being. Horos (ὅρος), the limiter, is thus alongside each aeon and holds it united in itself.

It is said that, out of longing for the primaeval primordial being, the last female aeon, Sophia or divine wisdom, flew into a passionate rage, turned her back on her male aeon and, storming about, desired the primaeval primordial being. She was taken back into herself by her Horos, but the aftermath of her fate remains. Now the aeon pair of reason and truth bring forth the new pair of Christ and the Holy Spirit, who consolidate the realm of fullness in themselves, such that each aeon perceives the entire pleroma in itself, and at least in this respect the yearning is alleviated, even if not the longing for the Most High. As in earlier systems, everything belonging to the sensory world is also prefigured in supersensory terms here, as we see in the pairs. The passion of Sophia, her loss of self-control, thus also holds the reason for all evil in the world, since this passion, conceived as separate from her, as Achamoth, goes into the sensory world. Therefore, without cooperation from her male aeon, it is from Sophia that the sensory world originates. This world is no longer a proper emanation, but rather an accident of the last female aeon after she had fallen away. But as it is nevertheless derived from an aeon which in itself signifies the entire supersensory

-----File: 285-----

domain, it contains everything supersensory in sensuous images, and therefore also all that which is living, the spiritual and the truthful and so forth, as well as all that is governed by passion and evil. It is difficult to comprehend how the sensory world comes into being. An attractive interpretation says that the four elements developed out of the four manifestations of passion (Achamoth): what is moist from tears, what is fiery, and lights, from laughter, the dark and rigid from sorrow, and what is agile and airy from fear. But there are a great many accounts of other things: in particular, the astounding theory that out of mercy Christ re-created in matter the thoughts of the aeon who had fallen away. The fundamental aspect remains that the world is a product which has resulted from deeds and suffering and originated from the realm of light, the pleroma, as a consequence of, and owing to, a falling away. Achamoth plays the role of the demiurge, and the world soul is created by it, as is the world. According to another theory it is even this world soul, quite unconsciously in fact, which forms the world. The world thus falls lower and lower in the ranks of the divine; it owes its formation to a blind natural force. And this natural force carries out the plan of its mother, Achamoth, even without knowing her or her plan, and instils in the world the living and the spiritual. But it is with the spiritual that man has gained something supersensory, if only as a likeness; in all he consists of matter (ὕλη), soul (ψυχή) and spirit (πνεῦμα). And there are ideas of material, psychic and spiritual types of human (hylics, psychics and pneumatics). Heathens, Jews and initiates constitute the patterns for this three-way division. Matter and soul are transient, and it is only the spirit that exists eternally. It seems as if we purely material humans are seen as discharges of particular principles, the archons (rulers), which are between the heavenly realm of light and our earthly abode, and are perhaps lower emanations of the demiurge. The daemon of Adam (the ancient Adam in us), who represents the role of the devil in the system, is among them. But the existence of a further chthonic emanation, whose archon is Adamas,

may perhaps have been assumed, i.e., the spirits and devils of hell. After the fall of wisdom Christ creates order in the world of the aeons, and unites the world ever more closely with the spiritual, the realm of light. And at the end of days he will bestow on the fundamental force of world nature the consciousness of its consubstantiality with Achamoth, in that the demiurge will ascend into Achamoth, while Achamoth will unite with Sophia. And everything material and all the souls will be burnt to destruction in a universal self-consuming global conflagration. But the spirits will float into the realm of light to the aeons prefigured for each of them and merge with these to eternal rest. The true conclusion would be reached if these aeons also entered into the universe, into the great silence, until perhaps new aeons and new worlds travelled the circle of the revelations of the primaeval primordial being. And ever thus in eternal succession.

Valentinus is believed to have been the author of the book the Pistis Sophia (*Wisdom of Faith*), which Schmitt describes as the Gnostics' gospel. In this book he has Christ himself, after his transfiguration, appearing once again in the infinite light to his disciples and revealing the mystery of the earthly and the supernatural. Adolf von Harnack holds the Gnostics in quite high regard. In 'Dogmengeschichte' (*The History of Dogma*) he writes of their doctrines, 'There thus emerged a philosophical dramatic poem, similar to that written by Plato, but incomparably more complicated and hence more fanciful, in which mighty forces appear in a disastrous association, the spiritual and the good with the material and the bad, from which the spiritual, sustained by kindred powers which are too majestic ever to be drawn down into baseness, is ultimately liberated again.' The Valentinian system in particular undoubtedly merits these meaningful words from the great theologian. However, Heinrich Schmitt actually sees in these doctrines the height of all that the human mind has contrived: true, absolute revelation, and, in Valentinus, the greatest intuitive mind. 'To doubt the living reality and truth of the pleroma,' he writes, 'is tantamount to doubting the truth of

-----File: 287-----

mathematical consciousness, for its highest forms are just perfect self-perception by the mathematical consciousness.' Here, 'mathematical consciousness' doubtless stands for formal logic, as truth in mathematics goes only as far as that in formal logic. This is the only thing that is intuitively utterly true. The fundamental elements of mathematics, axioms, are merely statements not yet contradicted by experience.

Finally, I would like to draw the attention of the reader to a curious part of Goethe's 'Dichtung und Wahrheit' (*Poetry and Truth*), almost at the end of the eighth book. God appears in this production primarily as the second being, what we call the Son. God and Son again appear in the third (the Holy Spirit). Here the Olympian Goethe writes, 'But with this the circle of divinity was closed, and it would not have been possible for them to bring forth another totally which was identical to them once more. However, as the compulsion to produce continued ever onward, they created a fourth, but this already harbored a contradiction in itself, in that this fourth should, like them, be absolutely without conditions and yet at the same time contained within them and limited through them. This fourth was Lucifer, on to whom all power of creation was transposed from then on.' Lucifer creates the angels, which are absolutely without conditions, yet are beings contained in him. 'Surrounded by such glory he forgot about his higher beginnings and thought he could find his origin in himself, and it was from this first ingratitude that everything originated, which does not seem to us to correspond to the intention and purposes of the deity.' The host of angels divides: some are concentrated with Lucifer, while the others devote themselves to where they originated. 'This concentration of the whole of creation, for they had originated from Lucifer and had to follow him, became the source of everything we perceive in the form of matter, and which we envisage as heavy, firm and dark, but which (in that, although not directly, it is still descended through filiation from the divine being) is just as unrestrictedly mighty and eternal as father and grandparents.' Goethe expresses the view that through constant concentration without

expansion the world, including Lucifer, would certainly ultimately have been destroyed by attrition. It is for this reason that the 'Elohim,' in an instant, confer 'on the infinite being the ability to extend itself, to move back against them; the real pulse of life was restored.' 'This was the epoch in which what we know as light emerged, when there began that light we are in the habit of describing with the term 'creation.' Everything discussed in this work about the expansion follows the way intended by Valentinus entirely, as it is precisely yearning (πάθη) he elevates to the heights as characteristic of the aeons, as this yearning causes Sophia to fall away, but does ultimately lead the world back to God. Movement downwards and upwards is the fundamental idea of the Gnostic, as it is of the poet, and, incidentally, also that of Greek natural philosophers. According to this German author, man is also believed to be the interceding agent between above and below. So assuredly did young Goethe explain what he was reading about gnostic teachings. The ideas of concentration and expansion occur even in the first of his Gespräche (*Conversations*) available to us. Compare with this the following beautiful verse from the later cycle 'Gott und Welt' (*God and the World*):

> What God would outwardly alone control,
> And on His finger whirl the mighty Whole?
> He loves the inner world to move, to view
> Nature in Him, Himself in Nature too,
> So that what in Him works, and is, and lives,
> The measure of His strength, His spirit gives.[17]

The gnostic doctrines are believed to have originated in the works of the enigmatic Samaritan messiah Simon Magus. Harnack writes that his existence and his great historical significance cannot be denied. He lived at the same time as Petrus, in vehement conflict with the scholar who shattered his magic through the word of God. There are, incidentally, many schools of Gnosticism, such as those of the Docetists, Perates and Ophites. Each school taught yet another unique aspect. However, asceticism, occultism, astrology and sorcery were to be found in all of them. Nevertheless, I am not in a position to consider all this in detail here.

-----File: 289-----

33. Neoplatonism.

From now on we shall turn to the Neoplatonic doctrines, which have a certain relationship with gnostic teachings, and essentially represent heathen Gnosis. They originated from an Alexandrian porter, Ammonius Saccas (who lived at the end of the second century and the beginning of the third century AD), although the true founder was Plotinus (204 to 270 AD), born in Egypt and pupil of the former; Longinus, Porphyrios and Iamblichus made revisions to the texts of Plotinus and provided interpretations of them. It is in fact the revival of Plato's philosophy we shall discuss here, but we encounter the entire system mixed with Pythagoreanism and Stoic concepts, and so constituting a theosophy, hence the analysis to follow below. As the primordial being, God stands above all thought and being. Even the consciousness does not belong to his distinctive characteristics; he actually totally lacks distinctive characteristics. To perceive him is therefore solely a matter of pure intuition. For this reason Plotinus regards everything connected with perception, and even everything to do with thought, as we know it, as totally insignificant. 'In heaven, souls do not need words; there is no intelligent thought there, nor is there the rational part of our being.' We shall encounter this again in the Middle Ages, to the point of total contempt for all science. And Kestner writes of Goethe (Gespräche (*Conversations*), Volume I, page 22), 'He strives after truth, but thinks more highly of the feeling of it than of any demonstration of it.' Perception is an affliction and a tiresome necessity for the soul, resulting from the universal sympathy of the things in the world, and life constitutes little more than a dream. Intuition is the only thing that helps: 'What supersensory truth is, is something known to him who sees it.' It is precisely this intuition that enables us to label Neoplatonic philosophy as a theosophy. And Plotinus himself claims 'to have experienced many times the blessed contemplation of the divine and union with him.' Man is never separated from God at all. 'We have the One (God), even if we do not say so' – perhaps even if we are not conscious of it. If we are conscious of it, that is where consciousness

of the self ends. This view is actually shared by the Indians, as we read in the Upanishads. Intuition is of even greater value than reason. God abides everywhere, but not in things. It is a concession to the human heart when God is called that which is totally good, and a concession to causality when he also constitutes a source (ἀρχή). In himself God has no relationship at all to anything at all. So it is admittedly difficult to understand how even intuition is to comprehend him and be one with the One. There then follows a type of doctrine of emanation. Just as a spring issues water and yet still remains undiminished as a spring, the One ejected from himself a second, nous, with which we are already acquainted: absolute reason, absolute intuition. As the second, it is less perfect than the first; it is, however, absolute reason, because it has beheld the first. Otherwise it is something that exists beyond what the senses can perceive, something living and able. Clearly, here a number of the Gnostics' aeons are united into one aeon. Something of Gnosticism also lies in how Neoplatonism introduces a supersensory matter corresponding to the sensory matter, this being nothing other than the universality of reason. Therefore reason is a unity in itself, but still a multiplicity, κόσμος νοητός, in comparison with the One, which surrounds it just as a circle surrounds its center. An emanation of reason is the absolute soul, a thought, a Logos of it. Just as reason brings together all types of thought, its emanation, the soul, brings together all types of existence, although it is on the boundary of the domain of the supersensory. Plotinus' pleroma, to speak in gnostic terms, is therefore rather restricted, for even the absolute soul encompasses many aeons in itself. So the first universe with the primordial being (τό πρῶτον) consists solely of this triad: Primordial One, primordial reason and primordial soul. Plotinus was quite simply heathen.

The absolute soul brings forth the world soul. And this soul is connected to the world in the same way as the human soul is connected to the body. But the world soul is as manifold as the absolute soul, and thus belongs to all parts of the world. Again the world, interpreted as matter, creates the second soul for itself, unconsciously, like the

-----File: 291-----

demiurge of the Gnostics. The emanation manifests itself as urgency and necessity. However, as the second soul is indeed an emanation of the supersensory first soul, and this is an emanation of absolute reason, the world has to prove itself to be ordered nevertheless as well, and as beautifully, as possible. The second soul also instils into it something of the supersensory from itself. Due to the inability of matter this can take place only gradually; it is in this gradual uptake of the supersensory that what we call 'time' is founded. As all souls are now the second soul, there is between them, and hence between things, a relationship, a 'sympathy,' which we shall encounter often and again later, in a different form, with Leibniz's monads. This sympathy ensures that nothing can befall a thing without all things sharing in perceiving it. Furthermore, souls lead a double life, as they do in Gnostic thought, originating from above and working downwards (even if only passively), to the heights and the depths. But on the whole, matter is the counterpole to the primordial being, and on the border of being there is the deficient and the evil. There are different degrees of life, but everything has a soul. We thus find a monistic idealism, which has led to a Panpsychism: even lifeless bodies, such as the Earth and stones, are allocated a soul. No dissolution of the world takes place, and once it is formed the world remains eternal. For all eternity the souls also radiate into matter, but their association with matter is only an ostensible one. As matter is also thought to be merely an emanation of the souls, it has to be assumed that the emanations actually have no intrinsic connection with each other. Only the collectivity of the final source holds them together. Plotinus actually also teaches a certain degree of freedom of will. And a craving for autonomy is indeed regarded as the origin of everything evil (as in Goethe's 'Weltbild' (*Conception of the World*)) and of everything lowly, just as plants are believed to be the lowest of all life, as each plant lives for itself alone. The purest soul belongs to heaven (Zeus?). This soul is totally drawn together in

itself and follows only its absolute, unshakeable laws. Then we have the souls of the celestial bodies. The sky and the celestial bodies are thus also treated as gods, but they have only the manifestations of the world soul, those most closely related to the first absolute soul. Their only connection with the world is through the 'sympathy between things,' but they are passive with respect to this, as with everything. The law of the world, providence, is actually to be found only in absolute reason. After the perceptible gods come the daemons and then man, animals, plants and so forth. Man's task in life is catharsis or purification of all earthly things, combined with immersion in himself, which together lead him to intuition. By means of daemons, gods and heavens every soul can reach the realm of light again. From this we see that the Neoplatonist school also taught the transmigration of souls.

We can see how the doctrines of emanation represent the emanations in such different ways. In some systems, primordial beings and emanations are ordered in triads as πατήρ, δύναμις and νοῦς (p. 255). The theologian who wrote under the pseudonym Dionysius the Areopagite (an obscure Christian Neoplatonist who may have lived around 500 AD), who exerted such a remarkable influence on mediaeval philosophers of religion, specifies as a hierarchy three triads for each of three divisions of emanations. The first triad consists of the seraphim, those from God, the cherubim, those from the seraphim, and the thrones (solid natures), which are illuminated by the cherubim. The next triads consist of the archons, virtues and forces, and the principles, archangels and angels, who continue to disseminate the divine light by transmitting it, but in an ever-diminished form, until it reaches mankind. But man can elevate himself to the level of the angels, and indeed even higher, as far as God, as he also knows how to disseminate light. The ecclesiastical hierarchy was meant to correspond to the celestial one. The concept of the church as an aeon is something Basilides had already established. In the works of Dionysius the entire pleroma appears as a supersensory

-----File: 293-----

church. A human would have to go through five stages on the way to deification: purification, enlightenment, dedication, deification, and ascension into God. These form the great mystery, which, as can be seen, reaches a conclusion typical of Indian doctrines, and has led to other corresponding mysticisms and ecstasies.

34. Transition to the Middle Ages; Augustine and Scotus Eriugena.

Long before the time of Dionysius the Church found itself obliged to engage increasingly with other philosophical approaches in its teachings, and after John the Evangelist had identified Christ with Logos it was logically consistent for Christ gradually to take on the role of creator of the world. All the same, any moves to push God out entirely and make him a totally inactive being, contrary to the clear word of the Bible, could not simply go without opposition. This gave rise to the dispute on the nature of God and the relationship between the three persons of the Trinity which continued throughout the Middle Ages and beyond, and which by its very nature could not be resolved solely by a profession of faith. It is beyond my remit to pursue this conflict of views. But in all theosophical teachings we see the role of God interpreted first as an active one and subsequently as passive. Curiously, it was always essential for this role to become passive for the people in the same way as it did for the intellectually powerful philosopher: for the former due to the drive to force God back through a series of intermediate stages, and for the latter as a result of deep consideration of the sovereignty of God as a concept. Even these intermediate stages became ever steeper the more people pushed God into neutral remoteness. And as the authority of the figure of the humanly beautiful and moving Queen of Heaven increased, and the saints, with their miracles in life and in death, were seen putting themselves around everywhere, the other persons of the Trinity both also finally had to become almost entirely passive: the more passive they were, the closer their connection with God himself was seen and believed to be. Then came along something else that pushed aside and undermined the poetic systems of the theosophists:

the constantly growing authority of the teachings of Aristotle, which, instead of the living figures in the ideas of Plato and the emanations, brought dialectic images in these forms and gave potential realities in place of light-woven beauties of nature. Nevertheless, we find teachings of emanation throughout the entire Middle Ages and see them revived extraordinarily powerfully at the beginning of the modern era and again in our times. They are simply beautiful poems and, by way of the position they bestow on human beings in the Universe, they play to their vanity and hold out the prospect of eternity. Now let us examine further details from the Middle Ages.

The great Father of the Church Aurelius Augustinus (Augustine, born 354 in Thagaste, Africa, died 430 as Bishop of Hippo Regius in Thagaste), the light of patristic philosophy, does not really belong among the theosophists. But a brief outline of his approach is necessary, since it exerted such an outstanding influence on philosophical views throughout the Middle Ages. God created the world: not from himself alone, but as an evolution in time and space from nothing. (Plato's non-being?) Hence, the world cannot attain the perfection of God. It is perfect only with regard to itself; in comparison with God it is imperfect. Yet the reason for everything, without exception, is placed in God. Only one wisdom exists; in this can be found infinite, boundless treasures of things intelligible (rerum intelligibilium); these include all the unfailing, changeless principles (rationes) of these things, and also principles of the perceptible and the inconstant, which are created through the wisdom of God. This is because God did not create anything unknowingly; however, where he has created knowingly, he has created to the extent of his knowledge. In fact nothingness is indeed without quality. Such approaches undoubtedly contain something of the Neoplatonist and the theosophical, and Augustine is also of the opinion that the pure revealing 'Word,' in the form of the Scriptures, is nothing without verification of the divine spirit within us, and so it is through intuition that reality is gained. But in the end he does leave the problem of the evil in the

-----File: 295-----

world unsolved; imperfection is not a bad thing, but our human feelings baulk at such a notion, at any rate. For if we concede that harm can arise from passiveness to others, evil will indeed be an entirely active concept for us. We would rather attribute the bad things that befall us personally in life – sickness, loss and so forth – to the imperfection of the world. But we cannot avoid also ascribing an ethical connotation to evil, and then it is not to be derived from lack of perfection in the world, particularly where it arises through a deliberate act. The teachings of Augustine are simply optimistic, and such doctrines have no explanation for all that is bad other than the phrase 'Bad or evil merely denotes deprivation of the good (privatio boni),' which is just an expression for something we cannot fathom. If we understand God from a theological and religious viewpoint and accept that he created the world alone, out of nothing and against nothing, that which is intentionally bad at least remains without explanation. And that is how it has remained in the intervening time, which has proceeded in a far more theological manner than the Father of the Church, who has been so gifted and high-thinking in the face of all superstition. His view of the world as a united whole with absolute order of development differs only in the base of unity and order from the purely materialistic approaches we are yet to encounter, as he even ranks miracles within this order, so they are included in nature. The materialist sets no base; for Augustine the base is in the creator and ruler of the world. Hence, even the angels belong by nature to the creator. And Augustine would quite like to follow those who also see in the skies and the celestial bodies nothing but objects of nature which are higher than humans and other creatures (p. 289). All this, partly oversimplified, but turned more to the abstract by the influence of Aristotelian philosophy, is also encountered particularly among the scholastics.

John Scotus Eriugena (born circa 9th century in

Ireland) supposes everything to have emanated from God. In his teachings the clarity of God, which is justifiably also referred to as darkness, is spread over everything. Unformed matter is only to signify the infinite, which, as it is without form, contains every form within itself. God formed the world from his own being. Every creature is a theophany, a self-manifestation of God. God is inherently present, just as a thought exists in a human being; he manifests himself in the world through himself, like a thought that thinks itself and by itself attains understanding. Hence, without the world God is absolutely negative. It sounds like blasphemy to say that God does not know what he is, and he is first created along with creation, in that he reveals himself in his creation, hence bringing forth creation out of nothing. This is almost as abstract as the 'tad' concept in Indian philosophy. However, it does not stay with this absolute, or pervasive, Pandeism. As with the Indian view, Scotus does have to attribute something to God; feelings of will and creatures are therefore acts of volition. The will is considered personally as an emanation from God (as Christ), just as the causal agents (united as the Holy Spirit), which Scotus views as originating from God, are emanations, and the influences which in turn come from them constitute emanations in their own right. Hence, Christ is the author and the Holy Spirit the finisher of the world (*Pater vult, filius facit, spiritus sanctus perficit*, as the familiar phrase goes). The causes must have been seen as distinct from each other, and since they should signify emanations of the same order, there exists no rank between them, and hence no consequence of their influences either. Every creature is seen as a kind of microcosm, while the causal agents can make themselves prevail in it in any order, should there be no universal order of thought. This is of course an inference which bars the way to the absolute truth, i.e. the recognition of the whole in the diverse; everyone has his own understanding of himself and the world. But as everyone constitutes a theophany, each person's interpretation

-----File: 297-----

is a real one. The world contains as many forms as there are creatures; all these forms make up the entire world. At the same time it is also accepted that there is a gradation among creatures. And as an unfathomable mystery – concealed in God having created everything according to its dimensions, number and weight – it is set out that every creature should, in ecstasy and hence intuitively, recognize God 'face to face' (*incomprehensibilem et inintelligibilem causam*) in his theophany immediately above theirs (*proxima illi theophania*). Scotus thus perceives a harmony in the world in which everything, even mere matter, simply as a theophany, is immortal: every thought, every good or bad intention; however, this is all without any 'sympathy between things.' It would make such a world more readily understandable if we, now that love of mankind has been preached throughout the millennia, had lectures delivered to us on the ethical value of beating each other to death. As the mortal world is the last of all emanations, it itself does not really create anything; it merely appears to create, and hence it is also nothing, and it will perish with everything that is in it. The only thing that is eternal is that which is spiritual, and it is through the spiritual that the returning path finds its way back to the origin, the perception of God in us (as a theophany). The system is idealistic and monistic, and so it also lacks a proper explanation for the evil in the world. Only an indirect double predestination is taught. God has preordained the numbers of the good and the bad, but with the latter solely as a necessary opposite to the good. Therefore, the concept of the good and the bad as such is nullified; only relativity arises, and this is ephemeral. Should the reader ask how the philosopher has acquiesced to the teachings of the Church, the only reply one can give him is: just like a sovereign thinker, not at all! But as he nevertheless belongs to the orthodox creed, we have an example of 'double truth,' which always occurs where belief and thought work alongside each other, and which so often has to assist against prevailing authority. Scotus emerged early in the dark Middle Ages

and for several centuries remained the most distinguished thinker in the Christian world. But his teachings on emanation have some Nordic bleakness about them: for him the Universe is not an ‘effusive light’ in the way it is for the emanationists of the south.

35. Islamic and Arabian theosophies.

Here we shall break off from our consideration of the Christian theosophy to turn first to philosophy in the Islamic and Arabian world and Jewish philosophy. Both had significant influence on the course of Christian philosophy in the Middle Ages, not only indirectly through the dissemination of the Aristotelian concepts in particular, but also directly, in that a great deal has passed over from their teachings into Christian ones. Muslims are more bound to the Koran than we are to the Bible, as the Koran contains little narrative for man to believe in, but consists predominantly of doctrine. Should a Muslim not accept this, he is simply not a Muslim. Muslim conceptions, while they are specifically Muslim, can thus relate to the particular only in domains where the Koran leaves scope for interpretation. ‘Liberal’ and ‘orthodox’ can here refer only to the interpretation of certain details. But, as everywhere, these details do relate precisely to the fundamental questions of mankind. And for these questions Mohammed produced no other answer than we find in our sacred scriptures. Hence the relationship between the Muslim interpretations and our own even where both have remained on the foundation of the creed and not diverged from the actual religious doctrine. There is, by the nature of the doctrines, a more substantial relationship between the Islamic and Jewish interpretations than between Islamic and Christian ones, as the Trinity is not present in Islam or in Judaism, both of which therefore only have to give an account of God to themselves, while in Christianity there is also a need to obtain clarity on the consubstantial unity of Christ and of the Holy Spirit with God. First, we shall discuss the concepts of two Islamic sects, which actually stand

-----File: 299-----

opposed as ecclesiastical liberal and ecclesiastical orthodox viewpoints, while both are still ecclesiastical. After our discussions on religious views in the preceding volume we would need to devote as little attention to these as to Jewish ecclesiastical or Christian ecclesiastical approaches if they did not contain certain ideas which belong particularly within this subject area.

First let us discuss the concepts of the less constrained sect, the Mu'tazila (literally, 'those who separate themselves off'). They suppose that in creating the world, which, with all its characteristics, existed in him as a potentiality, God placed everything in it, although only everything good. He also gave free will to rational beings; if humans use this for evil, God is not responsible. It is a doctrine not of emanation, but of evolution; however, it is indeed presupposed that there is something of God in things, since everything that is now present in them previously existed as potential in God. The opposite to this doctrine of the Mu'tazila was developed by the Mutakallimūn ('those who speak') as the orthodox view. We shall encounter them later, as atomists. Here we need only mention their concept of the world and mankind. Everything is created by God, but in a completely arbitrary way. God could have created every other world in just the same way. God also reigns absolutely and perpetually over the world; nothing proceeds unless instigated by God. And in every moment everything thus comes into being from nothing, as if the world were continually being created, in every moment in time. (The Mutakallimūn conceived time in atomistic terms as following from the sheer concept of 'now'.) If laws of nature are nevertheless in force, the will of God, which is of itself sovereign, is led by God's reason. This reason is seen as designating much as essential, such as the unifying of soul and body, and the moral order. And God's foreknowledge is believed to thwart him in preventing any evil or wickedness that might enter, for if he did this, it would actually make changes in his knowledge, and God is absolute. So even human acts are acts of God; but a human is also enlightened, and is then a 'discerning' instrument of God. Alongside this

relieving factor the doctrine is all the more harsh where humans are nevertheless to be punished for wrongdoing. And even the anthropomorphic aspect to the distinctive characteristics of God is not made any more tolerable by being associated with absolute, infinite power. The whole concept is based on the rigid belief within Islam which has indeed even led to the concept of kismet. The Asharites bring this orthodox doctrine to its most complete form: they deny any causality, and actually reject the idea of any connection in the world, unless through God.

Muslim science also adopted Neoplatonism, as it did with so much else from the western world. In the same way, one of its most distinguished philosophers, Avicenna (also known as Iba Sina, 980 to 1037 AD), seems to have transferred the teachings of Plotinus almost unaltered into his concepts, not only with regard to God and emanations, where his 'intelligences' are the nous of Plotinus and the two souls, but also in view of the order in the world and the position of man. Indeed, even the great Averroës (also known as Ibn Rushd, born 1105 in Cordoba, died 1198 AD) actually belongs within this circle. We shall consider his doctrine in a little more detail, as it contains much that seems to speak against the emanation theory, which he is also thought to have rejected. The world is formed by God, from matter. In God, being, knowledge and acting are absolute concepts and are on a par with him. Matter was not created by God; it exists alongside him, endowed from the outset with all the necessary capabilities to become what it is in the world, and hence to deliver a world with all its processes in place. The creation of the world by God is thus rather put down to an act of liberation, and is actually interpreted in spiritualist terms in this act of liberation, as it is, for example, in the works of Anaxagoras. And even this slightly spiritualist aspect is made almost insignificant by creation being withdrawn into infinity. However, this view is obviously not consistently adhered to; otherwise, Averroës would have to arrive at a purely physical concept of the way the world functions. But he often diverges far from this.

-----File: 301-----

Even the special position he assigns to the heavens, which in many respects is reminiscent of Neoplatonic conceptions, is very curious. To him the heavens were not, and are not, transitory. A soul is ascribed to them, and this soul also moves them; the soul is endowed with reason, in fact with such reason as is otherwise attributed only to God. It is with this power of reason that the heavens govern the movements of all the celestial bodies. And their process of perception relates only to themselves and what is above them; the heavens perceive what is below, the enclosed world, not as such, but solely from the aspect of what is above. And the heavens are thus denied for mankind what is granted for the celestial bodies, and even God himself: that is to say, providence. However, this is not in the same degree as for God, above whom there is indeed nothing higher that could evidently bring something into being; at the same time, the heavens can simply draw the course of the world from higher causes. At this point one has to conclude that he passes on this knowledge to what is below for it to perceive it; he writes that we have astrology, and everything so disconcerting that is said about the heavens is said only because of this astrology. But even the role of God is not as exclusively confined to the first impetus as seems to follow from the suppositions made on matter. The higher causes (forces), which the heavens perceive, do indeed owe their origin to God. And when we learn that man is thought to have the ability to perceive not only himself and what is below him, but also the Most High, the spirit of God really must at least be in him. And this impression is reinforced when we consider that humans are considered even to be able to attain ultimate perception, in which they perceive themselves. It does occasionally seem as if perception of the highest is not meant to denote perception of God, but merely perception of what is higher, and even higher, and so forth. But immortality is indeed also ascribed to reason. Not to the particular intellect of a particular human, which, on the contrary, dies with him, but to universal reason, of which the particular intellect is merely an accidental property in life. And this universal reason is purely homogeneous.

So in the work of Averroës we actually have a dualism of spirit and matter, augmented by the special position of the heavens, and by the position of God within and outside of the world. But much is lost completely in mysticism; what is said about the heavens really should be included here. All the more so if even an intelligible degree of collaboration in the formation of things is attributed to the heavens: hence, ‘a particular person’ is ‘brought forth from the sun and from the particular matter which another particular person presents, so that this matter might be endued with life by the productive power of the sun.’ Although the sun can give life to humanity at universal level, for it to give life to this particular person stems from it being presented with a particular form of matter which can accept only certain things. The only chance we could have of comprehending all this would be if Averroës, despite his rejection of the doctrine of emanation, had worked in accordance with its system after all; otherwise his work produces things that one might not expect from such an eminent philosopher.

Other philosophers from the Muslim world have added to this from their orthodoxy. But the great influence of Gnosis on such philosophers is revealed in the striking tendency towards mysticism even among the most distinguished of them. It is to such meticulous work and research into all that is mysterious in nature that we owe alchemy and the finest and most hair-splitting developments in astrology. And with the exception of their translations of Greek works (in particular those of Aristotle), nowhere has their influence on scholarly work in the mediaeval West been so substantial as through their sciences of the occult. We shall, incidentally, be taking several opportunities to discuss these later.

36. Jewish theosophy and Kabbalah.

As Gnosis actually developed out of Jewish concepts, because the first consistent – if not complete – system is that of Philo, it need not surprise us if it also occurs in further developed form among Jewish scholars. Above all we should highlight the greatly distinguished poet Solomon Ibn Gabirol (born 1020 AD.

-----File: 303-----

in Malaga and known as Avicebron in the field of philosophy). It will suffice for me to cite the crucial verses from a hymn written by him, 'Keter malkhut' (*A Crown for the King*):

Thou art God! And there is no divide between thy unity and thy divine nature,
And so little also between thine existence and thine original nature;
For everything flows from one source.
And though each has a different name, all have their destination in the same place.
Thou art wise. And wisdom is the fount of life and from Thee it welleth,
And by the side of Thy wisdom all human knowledge turneth to folly.
Thou art wise, more ancient than all primal things,
And wisdom was the nursling at Thy side.
Thou art wise, and Thou hast not learnt from any beside Thee,
Nor acquired wisdom from any save Thyself.
Thou art wise, and from Thy wisdom Thou hast set apart Thy appointed purpose,
Like a craftsman and an artist
To draw up the films of Being from Nothingness
As light is drawn that darteth from the eye:
Without bucket from the fountain of light hath
Thy workman drawn it up, and without tool hath he wrought.[18]

The emanations are thus wisdom, strength of will and being. And strength of will constructs the world as an emanation.

The most impressive system of Jewish Gnosticism and mysticism is Kabbalah. Previously despised and regarded as disreputable, it is now cited with enthusiasm and scrutinized for the scientific ideas it contains. The Kabbalistic system is set out in numerous treatises and other works. Its most significant scriptures are the Sefer Yetzirah (Book of Creation) and the Sefer ha-zohar (Book of Splendor), edited by Moses de León in approximately 1300 AD in Spain. The doctrine in question is a theory of emanation implemented into minute detail; it is, however, interspersed with numerology and the occult of letters to the extreme (particularly in the above work, which constructs everything in the world out of numbers and letters). The primordial being is 'The Infinite' (Ein Sof), or 'the Holy Ancient,' or the 'Ancient of Days,' and also the 'Holy Countenance.' It represents total light. There are ten emanations, in descending degrees of significance: the supreme crown or uppermost height, spiritual wisdom or spiritual insight, love or mercy, strength, justice, majesty

or compassion, triumph or the power of the spirit, splendor or beauty, the foundation, and the garland or the kingdom. There exist four worlds, in descending order. Humans are involved in everything, according to the various designations of their souls. In keeping with the terms used in the Bible, there are believed to be four of these designations: Adam, with the epithet Kadmon, as the primordial human soul, Neshama as the intuitive soul, Ruaḥ as the thinking soul, and Nefesh as the living soul (cf page 221 ff). Humans can thus rise to the highest level. The first three of the four worlds are: Aziruth, corresponding to the pleroma, and hence the absolute realm of light, containing all the archetypes of creation; Beri'ah, an intellectual sphere of subjectivity, in which the aeons wisdom and insight predominate; and Yetzirah, the world of the angels, and at their head the archangel Metatron (borrowed from the Greek, the one standing next to the throne), where beauty presides.[19] The fourth world, Assiah, is divided into a number of strata. The uppermost stratum is that of the demiurge. The next is that of the daemons, the mortal world. And then, strangely enough, we go upwards again, as the next stratum contains emanations of triumph and splendor, and in the last stratum there is the kingdom (Malkuth). Heinrich Schmitt sees in this an outstanding example of optimism, as the realm of light can be reached from even the lowest world. I have to refrain from quoting further details; on the other hand, my readers already know how so much has crossed over from Kabbalah, in the form of mysticism and occultism, into necromancy, theurgy, and many other kinds of superstition. This confronts us only with the ideational. And this is significant enough in the succession of the Gnostic and Neoplatonic systems. It even leads us out above these systems through the designated, consistently logical introduction of man into all worlds, which makes even more distinct his part in the realm of light and his destiny of being able to work his way up to this realm through a pure life and knowledge, which is indeed the real purpose of these doctrines. In this respect, only Indian and modern theosophy compares with this system. There is an immense amount of Kabbalistic literature.

-----File: 305-----

To include our writer Goethe I refer to the excellent book ‘Faust in der Geschichte und Tradition’ (*Faust in History and Tradition*) by Carl Kiesewetter, in which the reader will find much that is pertinent; reference is also made to the great book of the Faust legend compiled by Scheible, the peculiar collection ‘Das Kloster’ (*The Cloister*).

I would finally mention that sects like the Mu'tazila and the Mutakallimūn also exist among the Jews. There are the Karaites, the more liberal and the Rabbanites, and the more orthodox. Much has been written about the first. But I cannot go into this here; the fundamental essence has already been described for the above Islamic sects. However, among the Jewish philosophers of the Middle Ages, particular emphasis should be given to Maimonides (Moses Ben Maimon, also shortened to Rambam, died 1205 AD), the universally known physician of the Egyptian rulers; he tends towards the Karaites and is thus inclined to interpret writings in intellectual terms. He makes a distinction between created beings with a transitory soul and those with an immortal one. I cannot say whether he deemed all humans to be among the latter, or only the virtuous and the enlightened. Whether the world is created in finite time, or has been in existence for infinite time, is a question he regards as one that cannot be decided. The highly exceptional, noble poet Judah ha-Levi (circa 1140 AD) should, incidentally, also be included here.

37. The mediaeval theosophy of the Christian scholastics and mystics.

We now again turn to Christian beliefs, and will occupy ourselves with these uninterrupted until the end of this volume. There is a certain contrast between the views of the theosophists and the mystics on the one hand and the scholastics on the other, in that the former had to distance themselves from the nominalists among the scholastics, who, together with Aristotle, deny that the general universals or ideas of things have any existence outside of the human intellect and declare the supposition of such an existence to be pure delusion, while they might have had at least a few points in common with the realists, who, with Plato, grant absolute existence to

precisely those general ideas. Yet scholasticism also belongs under this topic, insofar as it relates to a view of the world and of life. Oddly enough, it was the nominalists in particular who believed in much that is supernatural. The doctrines of religion are, if at all possible, interpreted in dogmatic terms; philosophical aspects come to light only when they are interpreted more or less freely. God is the creator and preserver of the world, almost entirely in the biblical sense. The world is his handiwork and is tangible. The purpose of life in this world is to prepare for the life to come, where the grace of God brings to completion what it began in this world. Life, however, is governed through religious revelation. Here the transcendent therefore blends with the real, and the most real is exactly what revelation is. Therefore, teachings about belief, ethics and morality are also taken in absolute terms, dogmatically. And God is not merely creator, but also redeemer and completer: the Christian Trinity. The scholastics therefore also see the world in a further aspect as a 'state belonging to God' (the *civitas dei* of Augustine). But there does exist a distinction in the world; a human as a rational being is also an end in himself, and anything not endowed with reason is merely present. Concepts of this kind necessarily lead to almost impenetrable predestinations, e.g. that we cannot comprehend even the grace of God, as it might be absent in the world if God had created the world perfect. In other cases such concepts are forced to open out into a dualism between good and evil, matter and spirit.

An observation very much worthy of note is that, despite aligning themselves with Aristotle, the two greatest scholastics, Saint Albert the Great, Albertus Magnus (1193 to 1280, born in Lauingen in Swabia) and Thomas Aquinas (1225 to 1274) show tendencies towards the doctrine of emanation. The former is of the opinion that God can be perceived through intuition, conferred by his grace, and by means of perception in nature. He cannot be totally comprehensible, since he constitutes an infinity. God is believed to be the universal active intellect (intellectus universaliter agens). And this intellect issues intelligences forth constantly. The world is created through the will of God. This will is free. In created nature it reveals itself as only ostensibly bound by the laws that nature

-----File: 307-----

follows. So nature is continuously developing, but always subject to the will of God. However, the entire world is an emanation in descending degrees; this is attributable to the cause always being more perfect than the effect. This is why only an imperfect world could emerge from God by this means. But the world forms a firm whole, because no level of emanation is lacking; the emanations are as constant as the continuous shining of the sun. In this way God is also present in souls, just as he is in all things, as even the lowest degrees of emanation constantly connect to the highest. Therefore everything takes place of its own accord, by virtue of a share in divine will and divine intelligence. Things as such are ephemeral, as is the whole perceptible world, but anything emanated in the world is everlasting, as it originates from God. Matter is likewise created by God; it is regarded not as an emanation, but as a kind of prerequisite for perceptible creation. Matter thus contains for him the embryonic cells of all beings ever to have existed, or to exist in the future, in itself, so that, as in the works of Averroës, the development of things is a kind of evolution, yet only because God placed these embryonic cells in matter from the outset, while for Averroës the embryonic cells of matter are believed to belong inherently. Evolution from bottom to top corresponds to emanation from top to bottom, as we have seen in a number of belief systems. So humanity also develops to higher and higher degrees, in which it always retains everything from the earlier stages. How this happens is not readily understood, if the pre-formed embryonic cells (hence, acts of will of God) are not called in to assist again. Despite the theosophical and theological concept, a certain Mechanism in the implementation of this is not to be mistaken; it is revealed in the inflexible evolution of what was once placed in matter. In the same way, Saint Albert, like Augustine before him, for this reason quite naturally considered things to be miracles. The divergence of things (individuation) follows from the same principle. God has implanted it, and it evolves in matter. But Albert separates the spirit from

matter, and he treats the former substantially in spiritualist terms; God extracts the spirit directly out of his light, not out of something in the physical principles. From this he derives freedom of will, as God has absolute freedom. So here we face the same difficulty of conscious evil as Augustine and so many others have encountered.

There is little to distinguish these ideas from those of Albert's greatest student, Thomas Aquinas, the scholastic par excellence. The only difference is that Aquinas assigns an even higher position to God, and, one might say, even greater freedom. All possible worlds are manifest to God. He chooses a world according to his own goodness and perfection. But he bestows on creatures only precisely what is in keeping with the world he has chosen. Should reason be given thereby for the imperfect and the bad in individual cases, accountability would also be suspended. Nevertheless, Aquinas insinuates that there might be justification for accepting that creatures have freedom of will; therefore, even here in the lack of perfection, there remains the relationship with God. Otherwise, the works of Thomas Aquinas show the emanation being accomplished exactly as it is in the works of Saint Albert the Great. Accordingly, rational argument (ratio) in creatures, as a whole and in individual cases, is also to be found in the idea that God has of himself; it is just that this idea, being infinite, cannot be exhausted by all the rational arguments in the world, even less so by a single one. In one aspect Thomas is more consistently logical than Albert. Both regard matter as belonging entirely to creatures, not merely by chance or arbitrarily wrapped around the soul. But Thomas, who regards the soul simply as something of God, also ascribes to it the ability to assemble the body itself from matter that is otherwise lacking in distinctive characteristics. This is a breach of Albert's absolute evolution doctrine, and for spiritualist reasons at that. Reason is, however, the supreme principle. This is why the theory has been designated as intellectual determinism. Also worthy of particular emphasis is that we do not need to acknowledge the existence of an act of creation in the finiteness of time. Such a

-----File: 309-----

creation is believed to be merely a matter of belief; creation in infinity is also conceivable. By this means our scholar from Aquino apparently intended to steer round the unpleasant and impertinent question of what God did before the creation of the world. But it is evident that once creation is pushed out into infinity, the idea of creation comes to an end anyway. The world has, then, always been in existence; it is not created at all, and the activity of God is limited at best to governing the world. If we also abandon this governing activity, we arrive at the purely mechanistic physical conception of the world. And nothing is changed by the fact that creation has been differentiated from its cause, in the belief that there is no cause of God, while the world is caused by something. This could only have a purpose for creation in infinity if the world were an emanation of God or belonged to his being, the idea of which is indeed rejected. Such distinctions, which are in fact meaningless, are frequently encountered. This is why I believe Thomas Aquinas merely intended to state that we are not in a position to specify a point in time for the creation of the world, and it might be left to each of us to decide whether to adhere or not to adhere to the biblical account. And this can be sanctioned only from the viewpoint of science, which has to reckon with hundreds of millions of years for the formation and development of the Earth, although Thomas knew nothing of this. Albertus Magnus (known as Doctor Universalis) was also a great naturalist, while the scholar from Aquino (Doctor Angelicus) was highly skilled in philosophical debate. His even more exceptional compatriot Dante followed Aquinas in his concepts. And the verses right at the end of the ‘Divine Comedy’ (which was translated into German by King John of Saxony).

> O Light Eterne, sole in thyself that dwellest,
> Sole knowest thyself, and, known unto thyself
> And knowing, lovest and smilest on thyself!
> That circulation, which being thus conceived
> Appeared in thee as a reflected light,
> When somewhat contemplated by mine eyes,

Within itself, of its own very color
Seemed to me painted with our effigy,
Wherefore my sight was all absorbed therein.
As the geometrician, who endeavors
To square the circle, and discovers not,
By taking thought, the principle he wants,
Even such was I at that new apparition;
I wished to see how the image to the circle
Conformed itself, and how it there finds place;
But my own wings were not enough for this,
Had it not been that then my mind there smote
A flash of lightning, wherein came its wish.
Here vigor failed the lofty fantasy:
But now was turning my desire and will,
Even as a wheel that equally is moved,
The Love which moves the sun and the other stars.[20]

can be interpreted wholly as indicating Thomistic and also Gnostic ideas. But this work by the Florentine poet contains many such verses. And his statue in front of the Basilica of Santa Croce in his home city expresses beautifully how this man of fervor strides out into the domain of the highest contemplation beyond all measure.

The great theologian John Duns Scotus (probably a Scot from the border with England who died in Cologne in 1308) also regards the supernatural as an essential complement to our innate perception. And this supernatural element is that of God in us. However, it is in us only according to what is possible. Whether we reach it depends on our actions, which lie within our free will. Here, as on so many other occasions, free will is related to the good; in the works of other philosophers it finds itself trained on the bad, which is actually where it better belongs, from the ethical viewpoint. Everything supernatural is therefore natural so far as it is implanted by the creator into the rational soul from the outset, even if at first only in potential form. Beyond nature there is the supernatural, if it is not already present in creatures and has to originate from God each time and only then be bestowed on these creatures. God is what is purely and simply simple (simpliciter simplex). Yet we have to discern a multiplicity in him, which, according to Augustine's doctrine of the trinity, takes the form of knowledge, the mind and will, and provides models for the diversity in the world. Creation is thus a double one: the mind produces nature, while the will gives rise to reason. The diversity in

-----File: 311-----

the world is in itself haphazard; therefore, there must be something in God that prompted him to create the world in the way it appears. But this is simply the will of God, and the will of God is indeed free in relation to everything that does not belong to the being of God. For us, the significant conclusion from this would be that the world does not belong to the being of God, either directly or indirectly. Scotus is thus neither pandeist nor emanist: he simply bases his beliefs on the Bible. Notwithstanding this, though, he expresses the view that God could also have created a world opposite to this world, even in moral terms. It would follow from this that the evil in the world has also emerged through the will of God, as everything truly corresponds completely to his will. So everything appears to have been created entirely arbitrarily. The only mitigating aspect is that, since creating the world as it is, God is believed to have remained bound to it, in that God is believed to have not only an absolute will but also an ordered will. Why, is something into which we have no insight. The will of God is said to be associated with his being. But what is his being, if he can will even opposite things to happen? Neither does the whole matter become any clearer when the intellect of God is analyzed in two parts, one which is directed towards his own essence and one which perceives the world, because he wanted the world, or when it is also suggested that the first intellect intervenes in the second and the world thus emerges in keeping with the essence of God. This really just leads us perpetually round in circles, and has its root in the desire, indeed manifest everywhere in the Middle Ages, to reconcile the theological with the philosophical and with perception of nature, and liber scriptus with liber vivus, which simply is not possible. This makes the conception of God increasingly complicated and ever more difficult to understand. In other aspects, Scotus interprets the world in entirely physical terms; the heavens in particular have no special significance for him. And to him everything is ephemeral, although the divine in us naturally is not.

A philosopher with one foot in the mystics' camp is the empiricist Roger Bacon (Doctor Mirabilis, 1214 to 1292), compatriot of the even more empirical Francis Bacon of Verulamium, inasmuch as he writes of an

intuitive absolute knowledge, to which one rises through different degrees of enlightenment, to become ultimately a 'pure mirror of God.' It is in God that the active intellect of humans is to be found; the intellect of earthly things is merely a passive understanding, as Arabian philosophers also believe. Therefore, alongside our sensory experience, a supersensory one is also believed to exist. Roger Bacon's regarding of matter as containing the embryonic cells of all the development in the world also has Arabian overtones (p. 289 f). But by letting matter be created by God nevertheless, he approaches the viewpoint of Albert, that it is precisely God himself who has placed these embryonic cells in matter (p. 295).

Proceeding to the mystics themselves, we must not misrepresent such great, clear-thinking intellects as the scholastics mentioned above. The ill-fated genius who was the German Emperor Otto III was of an entirely mystically inclined nature. Mystics were all great monks and founders of religious orders. But this mysticism relates specifically to the Christian religion and the phenomena within it, and yet crosses over strongly into the visionary, as with Saint Francis, so congenial and gentle, and Bernhard von Clairvaux, who was so vigorous in his beliefs yet, despite his pure intentions, brought so much futile harm upon the world, because he did not understand the need to take into account the unhealthy instincts of the masses and the base lust for power and hunger for gold of those entrusted with leadership. It is philosophical mysticism we are discussing here. The founder of this mediaeval mysticism was the German (?) scholar Hugo of St Victor (died 1140), although Anselm of Canterbury (born 1033 in Italy) had previously shown himself to be a semi-pandeist. The world is believed to be a reflection of God. So reason is an image of God, and the revelation in reason constitutes the supernatural revelation of God. Our process of perception is a chain which leads, link by link, up to the highest, who himself is not an effect and has no cause. And we stop at him, as it is precisely our reason that presents itself as a mirror of him. With logical consistency Victor recognizes an inner theory, and thus a development outwards from itself. And this development is believed to lead on the one

-----File: 313-----

to perception of God, which is common to all people, while on the other hand it takes us to that of the redeemer, which is unique to Christianity. As reason in all humans has the same origin, one has to assume that in some humans the second power of perception lies dormant or is suppressed by a certain insubordination. This is sin, which has thrown reason into turmoil and actually takes men away from the Most High. But where sin comes from is even less comprehensible when rational creatures are believed to reflect the entire idea of God, not merely a part of it, as all other things in the world do. Of course, this statement is also a qualified one; reason is believed to progress towards the Most High. The very image of God would accordingly be merely potential and would gradually become actual and entirely real the moment a person had cleansed himself of all the dross of life. Thereupon he would perceive God by contemplation, intuitively, as pure rational deduction cannot comprehend infinity. Hugo thus writes of three eyes of the soul; one, the eye of the flesh, for sensuous matters and the body, one, the eye of reason, for recognition of the soul itself and all that is in it, and one, the eye of contemplation, for recognition of God in itself and in God. Nevertheless, the soul is a homogeneous entity. In an expression already familiar to us, but despite continual repetition still just as incomprehensible, evil is believed to serve good, in order to see through all that is good. Something not much more readily understood is the further contention, also often recurring, that the world is there because of humans, while humans exist because of God. There can indeed only be any purpose to the latter if God first reveals himself in man, which is what Thomas Aquinas states on the relationship of Christ to God. However, Hugo's idea seems more significant to me in ethical terms. And for him this idea is the outpouring of all stipulations for life, which culminate in the proposition that, in comparison with the insight of man into himself and his occupation with himself, there has to be a total diminishing of insight into nature and occupation

with nature, as if God were to be perceived only in ourselves, not in nature. The mystic therefore sees his salvation in moral purity and devout immersion in himself. The external devices of religion sustain both.

A namesake of our German philosopher, the Scotsman Richard of Saint-Victor (died 1173), is of eminent significance for us here, in that he places quite particular emphasis on the value of contemplation; to him, belief holds a very low position in comparison with contemplation, even lower than intellect, which for its part is already positioned low enough. Belief dies when contemplation begins, and when God makes his appearance, sense, memory and reason fade away. An Indian or a Valentinian might have said this. And contemplation is 'ecstasy, rapture (raptus) of the spirit, stepping outside (excessus) of oneself,' and so forth. Were one to take this literally, one would arrive at the visionary ecstasies of the saints and the ungodly, or at a way of thinking that would be typical of primitive peoples. And where should we go with the notion that God can speak to creatures in particular? This is clear, true mysticism, in which the divinity of a human is taken to extremes even within his lifetime. However, it is moderated by the acknowledgement that there is contemplation in reason and in the faculty of imagination, alongside that in pure intelligence. The reader may have noticed that, here and in all we have said above, although we are bogged down in sheer ecclesiasticism, it is still almost exclusively God we are discussing. In fact the philosophers have not been able to reconcile themselves well with the Trinity, or at least have done so only by means of the 'double truth.' Meanwhile, there is a view on this I would not wish to suppress, expressed by a mystic, the English scholar Isaac (circa 1150), a view which may be regarded as reasonable as expressed in the words of Heinrich Ritter, author of 'Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie' (*History of Christian Philosophy*): 'Everything has a share in God (the Father) provided that it exists, since God is the highest being and existence is a universal principle of all things. The manner of how this share is accomplished, making any single thing a particular being of nature, is,

-----File: 315-----

however, granted to a creature only through the Son of God, in that the Father bestows everything solely through the Son. But ultimately the natural bestowing of gifts must be distinguished from the use made by rational beings of their gifts, which only then enables them truly to share in the virtue and the knowledge of God. They succeed in using their gifts only by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit.' For the purposes of this study we shall disregard other mystics or semi-mystics, such as Alain de Lille (who lived around 1200), who was a great shining light of his time and was of fateful significance for the unfortunate Waldenses, San Bonaventura (born 1221 in the Papal States), who wrote about a journey made by the spirit to God and who shows strongly pandeist tendencies, and the French theologian Jean de Gerson (born 1363 in Gerson near Reims) and so forth; they bring nothing new to light. But one figure definitely worthy of mention is the devout Dominican 'Meister Eckehart' (born in the district of Gotha, Germany, died 1327). His concepts are substantially Gnostic, related in fact to those of Valentinus. The emanation begins with Christ, the image of the Father, and the Holy Spirit, the all-encompassing covenant of love. At the same time there emanate all the foundations of creation, of which creation is a likeness, just as the being of creation presents itself as an overflowing of the being of God.

God is 'being' itself. For God there is no time, but – and this term is of great interest – only a 'now': to him, past, present and future are drawn together into the now, so that the whole world moves in the now, for eternity and in all eternity, simultaneously with him, and can truly 'be' only through this now-being. But not in this same being, of course. For God, as the pure, absolute being, has no part in the manifold finite world. Neither does there exist for him any manifold nature, any number. Everything is One; for him there is no space either. In the core of the soul is an 'uncreated and uncreatable light,' a 'spark of the soul,' which has nothing in common with the other faculties of the soul, a germ of the divine which shines by intuition into the realm of light, enabling man to attain contemplation of the highest. A view

which is doubtless compatible with this is that outside of this ‘spark of the soul’ the world is merely semblance and nothingness. All idealistic thinkers and poets truly are convinced of the existence of the spark of God in us. ‘If the soul is to perceive God,’ writes Eckehart, ‘it must perceive him above time and above space. For God is neither this nor that, like these manifold things – God is One! Should the soul see God, it must not also set its gaze on any things that belong in time (or in space, we should add). Since while time and space and other such images (bodies) fill its consciousness (i.e., that of the soul), it cannot possibly catch sight of God.’ The soul even has to forget itself and lose itself. In God it finds itself again. This has of course led the world to forfeit its entire significance; we no longer know what the world is there for. It is with the great scholastics that Eckehart aligns himself.

The Flemish mystic Jan van Ruysbroeck (1293-1381) must have travelled far in the field of ecstasy, as he was dubbed ‘doctor ecstaticus.’ In his account of the condition of someone who truly contemplates God he goes so far as to write of ‘being engulfed in the bottomless chasm of our eternal bliss,’ in which there is an end to every thought process. ‘But where we try to probe and comprehend what we are feeling, we lapse into reason. And there we immediately find difference and otherness between God and ourselves and encounter God as something unfathomable outside of ourselves.’ Alongside this blessed unity with God through grace, in life we have a passive and active oneness in and with nature, which also constitutes an ‘encounter of our spirit with God.’ Ruysbroeck is perhaps the most consistently logical theosophist of the Middle Ages, despite his devotion otherwise to church teachings and customs. And his writing creates fine images. To him, the Virgin Mary was, and is, the ‘dawn and the daybreak of all mercies.’ ‘God has inaccessible height and unfathomable depth, inconceivable breadth and unending length, (he is) a dark silence (Sige for the Gnostics),

-----File: 317-----

a rugged wasteland, the calling out of all the saints in unity, a universal joy in him and in all the saints for all eternity.' Like other Gnostics, he acknowledges the existence of two heavens: the outer one, without time or place, for the kingdom of God and his saints, 'filled with glory and eternal joy,' without any kind of change, and the inner heaven, 'the first impetus.' This has the ring of Averroës to it. As for evil and all that is bad, these are spoken of only in allegories that bear no significance.

38. Theosophy and Emanism in recent times.

Scholasticism had, to a certain extent, exhausted the supply of available concepts and distinctions and finally reached the point of arranging its system in tables, diagrams and rows, as did Ramon Llull (born Majorca 1235, stoned by fanatical Moors in Africa 1315); these were meant to save people the trouble of thinking. The significance of such arrangement is still not to be underestimated: logical acuity of expression owes a great deal to it, and would owe it far more if Latin had remained the language of science. Much of the diligent scholarly work of the mediaeval students in the domain of precise definitions has been lost to us through our abandonment of their language in favor of national languages. It has indeed also emerged quite clearly that they by no means disregarded the real problems of humanity. It is from them that we have become acquainted with views of the world and of life that are deeply felt and profoundly reasoned. But scholasticism could not maintain the peak of its success. When the sciences awoke, there was greater understanding of the world; the treasures of the Greek mind were opened up when the Renaissance dawned, with its wealth of great phenomena, in almost all realms of human activity, and when the Reformation prepared to emancipate the spirits, the only possible way for scholasticism was a quiet existence,

which it led for a long time as if in a hidden world, only then to rouse itself to renewed strength, and subsequently to sink rapidly back into isolation. Scholasticism no longer had much that was new to say to humanity, and where it made an approach, its very nature made it leap aside too quickly, just short of natural science, or too far beyond it, and it therefore had to be rejected. The situation is different with theosophical mysticism. If, due to its poetic tinge and boundless absence of restriction, it has always been people's favorite child, it also lends itself to adapting easily to all of science. It can absorb scientific findings into itself, and by professing and endeavoring to lead science upwards and to the highest, it even appears to ennoble it. Add to this the great influence it exerts on art, which indeed is nourished by, and lives on, literature. So it should surprise no one that, with its various branches, the tree of theosophy has always blossomed abundantly, even if it is rare for this blossom to develop into fruit. And people do not always come upon this fruit.

On the threshold of recent times we encounter the imposing figure of Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (real surname Krebs, born 1401 in Cues, on the Moselle, died 1464). To a certain degree he is a pandeist. God creates the world entirely from himself (de nullo alio creat, sed ex se); by encompassing everything, he causes everything to unfold from himself, without changing himself in any way in the process. This is essentially a doctrine of emanation. But Cusa dismisses the nuances in this theory, believing that the world came into being as an entirety from God. 'By means of the universe God is in everything, and by means of the universe the multiplicity of things is in God' (Deus est mediante universo in omnibus et pluralitas rerum mediante universo in deo). And so all things without exception also belong together, and we are able to perceive an individual only as a component part of the universal, and the universal only as something emitted from God. For this reason Cusa settles the frequently raised question of whether something can be perceived from the effect or from the cause

-----File: 319-----

by saying that it can be only from the cause, and therefore ultimately only through God. The world hence gives us the opportunity ‘to read the thoughts of God at intellectual level, as in a book.’ The idea of the absolute entirety of the world, of its absolute inner coherence, is something we might readily accept; it corresponds to our knowledge of the world, and is incidentally very old, occurring in the works of the Ionian natural philosophers, Heraclitus, Plato and others. It is in keeping with a pandeist approach just as much as with a purely physical one. Cusa does not, however, interpret the connections between creatures in mechanistic terms; rather, the universal love from God connects each with everything, as in a living creature, with which, according to Plato, the world is also compared, in that each component part has sympathetic connections with all the other component parts, so that none can be damaged without all the other component parts suffering. Then when Cusanus arrives at the point of nevertheless distinguishing between three worlds (an intelligible one around God, an intelligible one around the human spirit, and a sensory one around the sensory world), this can really only have the sense that our activity is directed towards God, towards our spirit, towards the sensory world, so that only three levels of intelligence are involved, and these are directed towards three different things in the unity, as we are already aware. In the first descent from above, when he reaches the bottom man finds the boundary and has to turn back in order to move upwards. Everything thus turns first from the elevated to the sensory and then from the sensory back to the elevated. ‘This is the cycle of being and of thought. Everything thus returns to the principle from which it originated.’ Here we see Goethe’s contraction and expansion! And we are already familiar with it from other doctrines. But a bad aspect is that man actually perceives the world in himself and himself in the world, although only in human terms and by means of the world. He does not have the faculty of perceiving God and the truth directly. It is only through the world that he can perceive both. So he is still ultimately dependent solely on plausible suppositions (*conjecturae*). These

suppositions, which compose our reason, our world of thoughts, are things we create, just as God creates the world. But all our sciences are to be found only within the bounds of precision. This is exactly how a modern naturalist reasons when he disregards the empty truth of the irreconcilability of what is contradictory and takes the world just as it presents itself to him. It is remarkable that a cardinal could say such a thing, as this conjecture also relates to our understanding of God and actually also to moral laws. Only intervention by God himself allows precision to change into a certain truth. It seems as if Cusa restricts us in this way because we cannot comprehend infinity. And there are good grounds for this. Infinity as a ready-prepared concept certainly does not lie within the realm of our intelligence, which is discursive. To us, a circle remains a circle, and should its center point shift away to a certain distance from us, even with this shift in its center point we will still never see it as anything other than a circle. So there is always only one thing we know about a circle; what a circle with a perfectly infinitely large radius is, we do not know, as the answer ‘a straight line’ is incorrect, although this gentleman writer himself gave it in an academic examination. But the Gnostics do indeed contend that we have infinity in intuition. Nicholas of Cusa seems not to see things from this viewpoint. As for the rest, to him the world is in fact infinite and for infinite time, but created by God in finite time and space. And while indeed being distinct from God and not containing his infinite being, it is also imperfect ‘due to the randomness of matter present in it,’ an idea familiar to us. So here the world presents itself as at least the most perfect one possible, the best common thread, on which ‘the image and the life of God is imprinted in a way that will not fade.’ This would really be the language of a religiously devout naturalist, not of a mystic, as is occasionally contended. Cusa merely refers us to infinite development and our asymptotic

-----File: 321-----

coming nearer to truth and to God, although even in his system there is a mighty helper in Christ, as the intercessor between man and God.

A scholar who was not entirely, although almost, a Neoplatonist, known for his struggle against Aristotle and the Aristotelian scholastics, and for the influence he exerted on Cosimo de' Medici and thereby on the Academy at Florence, the Greek philosopher Gemistus Plethon (circa 1450), who has even been said to have had inclinations towards polytheism, does bear some significance. God is the One, and in him all beings, energy and capability are linked into one unity. First emanations are represented by the spirits which constitute the entire domain of reason (νοῦς), deities, divergent forms of essence, different types of energy and a faculty which is connected with essence and energy. The second emanation is the soul as a world soul, in which capacity also asserts itself as something particular. God (Zeus or Basileus) creates the world of sensory things; as something indeterminate, matter is merely a sign of the imperfection of these sensory things, not a particular thing which would already have been there before the world began. Providence and necessity govern the world, both being founded in God and cowing even deities into submission. God himself is subjugated to necessity. The deities are intermediaries between God and the world. All this makes a muddled impression; it is difficult to tell exactly what the role of the deities is if God himself creates everything, if providence and necessity rule. If the deities are merely forces of nature, why is polytheistic worship of them recommended by a Christian? Nor can one know where humans obtain the free will that they are claimed to have, and on which their accountability actually hinges. One adherent of Plethon was a student of his, the renowned scholar Cardinal Bessarion.

The founder of the Academy at Florence was Cosimo de' Medici. This was a spiritual community which cultivated Platonism, primarily Neoplatonism. Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) was one of the most prominent

advocates of this Academy. He can only be included among the Neoplatonists to a limited degree, as he completely rejects Plotinus' doctrine of emanation. Much of his work has its roots in the teachings of Thomas Aquinas; he is fundamentally a theological scholar. The fact that he also practices mysticism, and speaks of souls of the celestial bodies and their influences on earthly things (hence Kabbalah and alchemy) is not yet sufficient to elevate him to the heights of theosophical views of the world. However, he acknowledges the existence of a world soul which endues everything with life, and contends that even in our earthly existence we can occasionally contemplate God; he writes that 'the soul, released and wholly departing from the fetters of the body, for an infallible reason becomes God (fit deus); however, God and the eternity of God are the same.' Another of his wholly theological concepts is when a particular soul is attributed to each living being.

One likeable figure transfigured by his early death is a friend of Ficino, Giovanni Pico (1463 to 1494), youngest son of the Prince of Mirandola. In Rome he posted 900 theses disputing the customs of the time, against which Luther was also taking action, and challenged all to join the movement in support of these theses. He was even willing to provide fares for those travelling from far away. But thirteen of the theses had a heretical tone to them, and Pope Innocent VIII prohibited the movement. Pico was a poet and philosopher. As the latter he arrived at the view, also prevalent among many others, that most philosophers did not actually diverge much from each other at all in their views. The reader will ascertain this from all we have discussed so far in this book. A human is an intermediate microcosm. 'At his birth, man is supplied with the manifold seeds and offspring of all the forms of life by God.' Left totally to his own devices, he is able to live through everything, whether this takes him upward or downward. Should he turn his gaze upwards and retreat into the center of the universe, and thus, doubtless, into himself, he will 'become one with God the Spirit, into the solitary darkness of the Father (seclusion? Sige?), who is enthroned above everything, and will stand before everything.' Pico struggles with the concept of God no less than all the others

-----File: 323-----

before him and since him who have wished to – and still wish to – take this concept to the highest level. This is due to the way all the expressions are adapted to the sensory world. And whether we say ‘being,’ or ‘one,’ or ‘that,’ or ‘self,’ we remain in the sensory world and at least within the categories of human reason. If we say ‘yes’ to anything from God, we must for this reason also say ‘no’ to it from him. And so ‘May God be everything’ actually means the same as ‘May God be one’; ‘May God be the being’ means nothing other than ‘May God be the non-being.’ In some of its theories the work of Pico is reminiscent of that of Nicholas of Cusa, in particular in the theories of the unity of the world, the necessity of matter for the first life and perception, and the release of this matter through all-embracing love; also similar to the ideas of Cusa is Pico’s recognition of, and emphasis on, delight in the beauty of the world and acknowledgement of the works of man. What strikes me as welcome is his tolerance for every religion, in view of his own deep piety.

Following the same path we encounter our compatriot Johannes Reuchlin (born 1455 in Pforzheim, died 1522, who also Graecised his name to Capnion). He spent time in Italy and was a personal acquaintance of Pico. Now here we see a theosophist and a mystic from the depths of his heart. He also wrote a very extensive work on Kabbalah. He dismisses some of this doctrine, but does accept most of it. ‘For what else does the Kabbalist or Pythagoras intend than to draw the souls of men into gods, that is, to foster them towards perfect bliss?’ he writes. And to become like God is man’s endeavor, as the base of all reason is the final and highest truth. But this truth cannot be attained through thought, which acts only in a discursive way, but can be reached through inner revelation alone. Therefore he also has a very low opinion of thought and logic. Here he actually errs, precisely in accordance with his own view, because, as self-evident truths, the laws of pure logic are revelations, not to be obtained through any deduction. Indeed, such statements as ‘the non-being is being and the being is non-being’ only

seem to constitute a logical contradiction, as has been noted previously. He expresses the view that – and I ask the reader to forgive this digression – in mente the above statement is correct, as one can reconcile that which is opposite and contradictory, while in ratione such things would be kept as far apart as possible. However, the words mean nothing at all unless they refer to something. The statement in itself is just as incorrect in mente as in ratione. But if one applies it to something to which we attribute all positive and all negative titles equally, or for which we deny all these, it is correct. This belongs to the antinomies of our reason. But Reuchlin detests logic (and this is very typical of him), seeing it as an 'enemy of belief and of theosophists,' which poor, dear logic is not at all, unless by logic Reuchlin means the reasoning of what is known as cold intellect. This is something belief and theosophy cannot, however, need, or at least only in the sense of Cusa. Quite in contrast to Cusa, he attributes to each thing its own particular being, which it can lift from the universal laws of nature. For this reason each thing must also be studied in its own right for its most concealed characteristics. He thus arrives at sorcery, but also at natural science.

An associate of Reuchlin in theosophy and occultism was Cornelius Agrippa von Nettesheim of Cologne (1486-1535), an extremely troubled and absent-minded gentleman, who pursued every activity possible and quarreled with everyone. And yet he was certainly not an insignificant man. Despite all his propensity towards mysticism, his writing is occasionally like that of a modern-day naturalist, with respect to the fundamental elements of the natural sciences, for example, and he also endeavors to foster science. And although he, just like Reuchlin, seeks the revelation in ourselves and dismisses all conclusive sciences as supercilious and vacuous, his mysticism is still moderated by devout piety. 'It is not in the tongue but in the heart that the seat of truth lies; and it is not the intellect but the will that connects us with God.' Man's freedom is taken into its widest sense, and he can interpret the Scriptures in this way without needing

-----File: 325-----

to adhere to theological propositions. Almost all of Agrippa's writings on religion are superb; however, he ranks Luther among heretics and procurers, without this making him well-disposed towards the Pope. But all things are connected in their source. The world is threefold: the fundamental sensory one (the world of earthly things), the celestial one (the world of the celestial bodies), and the supersensory one (the world of the intelligences). In all these worlds we encounter the same, but in ascending levels of spiritualization, a concept already familiar to us from the Gnostics and Kabbalists. But God is the original model for everything. From him there emerge the allocated powers for the intelligences, the forces for the celestial bodies, and the bodies for the sensory world. Man possesses something of the divine, and he can therefore also behold the divine. Like Reuchlin, he attributes particular substantiality, qualitates occultae, to the things of the world, and with the same outcomes. What prompts him to do this is the observation that bodies act on each other, which could not be explained by matter. We are still struggling with this question today, although we no longer want anything to do with qualitates occultae. Agrippa sees life and soul in all elements, but he derives them from a universal world soul; between this world soul and bodies he places a world breath (spiritus) as an intermediary. This world breath is believed to be neither body nor soul, a kind of ether, a 'fifth essence' to follow the three worlds and the world soul. All this has the appearance of a doctrine of emanation. And through a sense of nature, which is also inherent in animals and gives them a spirit of prophecy, we are connected with the rest of the world, in a way that far surpasses human truth: 'Through it, we are in a position to discern the concealed signs of things and to make use of their secret forces.' Again this is the clearest form of mysticism, if not interpreted in scientific terms.

In comparison with such fervor, the teachings of Pietro Pomponazzi of Mantua (1462 to 1525 or 1530), who was also denounced as an atheist,

have the semblance of a sharp drop in temperature. Humans are set towards intellect and morality at a very deep level. They are not given the ability to discern what is true. To use the lack of perfection in the world to explain evil and sin is something he declines to do. He expresses the view that God created the world in accordance with all the potentialities. However, these potentialities included everything evil and, equally, everything good. 'Everything good and everything bad in nature is from God.' But this philosopher shies away from also seeking conscious sin in the world plan, just as all philosophers of religion do. He expresses the view that conscious sin is derived from human free will. It is as if by chance that the world emerged from the will of God in finiteness and ends in finiteness. The world therefore also plays only a very small role. This is a gloomy concept, brightened somewhat by the rejection of the even gloomier doctrine of predestination. The gifts of God to mankind can only go for the good, and without any compulsion at all; mankind has been given the ability to strive after what is good. If they do not do this, if they turn to evil, they have the consequences to reckon with in this life and the life to come. Here he writes entirely in the style of a theologian, and his concept of the immortality of the soul is also actually a theological one. For the soul to be without a body is inconceivable to him, and for this reason he rejects the idea of absolute immortality. But he accepts bodily resurrection, which the doctrine of the Last Judgement does also demand. Pomponatius (as he is also known in Latinized form) was an Aristotelian and accordingly down-to-earth in no short measure. He was among the materialists of mediaeval times.

The Praeceptor Germaniae and great humanist Philipp Melanchthon is a scholar whose works we could omit here. Apart from theology and fine teachings on morality, nowhere does he have his own particular firm viewpoint or produce even a phrase that might signify anything new in approaches to the world and to life. Mystic tendencies are very often attributed to Luther, and his attitude against devils and witches no doubt speaks in favor of this. But the great church reformer was too much involved in practical experience to have been able to surrender himself to fanaticism

-----File: 327-----

or new concepts. We can say at most that Augustine, the Father of the Church, who was also followed by the somber Calvin, dominated Luther's earlier years. As a philosopher Zwingli is, however, a Neoplatonist. The Reformation was, above all, not actually favorable to the development of greater concepts. To purge religion of its dross and externalities made demands on everything, and wherever there was a retreat to inwardness, it was substantially on the basis of formulae that were already old. We are well aware of how rapidly even the reformed churches ossified. First the unfettered scholarly work of the humanists, astronomers and naturalists, and the sudden broadening of man's gaze around the entire world, allowed the new era to unfold. The permeating knowledge of fine and free heathenism, the shattering of heaven and the transposition of its structures from the sphere of the spirits and angels into the mortal world, the findings gained through experiments in the fields of mechanics, physics and chemistry, and the understanding of the freely floating sphere of the Earth and of its nations, inhabitants and products enabled old problems to be treated with new ideas in abundance. But whether this could have happened so rapidly without the Reformation may indeed be called into question after the fate that met so many noble minds under the papacy even as late as the 16th and 17th centuries. The statue in the Campo de' Fiori speaks to us in very clear language.[21]

Purely theological consolidation of a view of the world and of life was accompanied by the development of a mystical view, which was vented even in the well-documented uprisings. It is natural, at such a turbulent time as that of the Reformation, for many people to want to think and act for themselves, particularly if the solution presented to them so far had only placed fetters on them again, and by no means fetters made of roses, even if they were not such harsh iron ones as those they replaced. The Reformation period therefore revealed people who wished to retreat completely into themselves in order to find God and his works there according to theosophical teachings, or who imagined that the kingdom of God on Earth had already

come and all people of all races were being called to enter this kingdom. Karlstadt, Sebastian Franck, Schwenckfeld and the Anabaptists are some of the names and terms associated with this movement. Despite all his solemnity and proficiency, Theophrastus Bombastus von Hohenheim, or Paracelsus (born 1493 in Einsiedeln, Switzerland, died 1541) came across as somewhat vociferous, but particularly confused in his ideas. He was a very troubled man, devoted to superstition in the extreme. He occasionally writes entirely in the manner of a modern naturalist and then, directly afterwards, as if he were living in a world of imagination gone astray. He cured people by means of sound chemical remedies but maintained that the fate of humans is determined in the stars. Like many others, he believed a human being is a microcosm bearing the macrocosm within itself. Therefore he points to the biblical account, that humans are formed of dust, to the effect that this lump of earth had been 'an extract from all bodies and creatures out of heaven and Earth,' a 'fifth essence,' an idea with which we are already acquainted. Most of this is trivial when it is transposed from his high-flown language into a simple form of expression, or else it is incomprehensible. 'And know,' he writes at one place, 'that the soul (seen as the immortal part of a human being in the works of Paracelsus) is flesh and blood, and must be in flesh and blood, but that there are two kinds of flesh here: the mortal and the everlasting.' The mortal is the spirit or the spirits in a human being. And Paracelsus sees spirits everywhere. It comes across as most odd when he juxtaposes with spirit, soul and body – and not merely in formal terms – the three chemical elements between which he differentiates in earlier works: mercury, sulphur and salt. His authority is a commonplace source, Hermes Trismegistos. The whole world is a chemical process, which, from the chaotic perplexity of its connections, gradually sorts out the impure to one side, to eternal anguish in prime matter, and the pure to the other side, to transfiguration and joy in God; the former represents evil, the latter good. The chemical process is not thought of in metaphorical terms, yet not, of course, within the restrictions with which we understand such a thing. For such theories to be put forward is not lacking in interest for us,

-----File: 329-----

since they do indeed illustrate how human beings endeavor to bring the course of the world and of life under a principle that is readily understandable to them; the chemist and physician, which Paracelsus first and foremost was, applies a principle based on chemistry and biology. Bernardino Telesio of Cosenza (1508 to 1588) used a different principle, the struggle between heat and cold (or, as one might almost say, between expansion and contraction). The cold is in the center of the world, in the Earth, the heat all around in the sky and the sun. God arranged them in this way, and after he had done so, it was not in any need of new intervention. At the boundary between the heat and the cold the two touch and thereby produce all the processes that exist. This is intended in physical terms, and Telesio was a physicist – a mathematical physicist in fact. As such he also denied the idea of the emptiness and tended greatly towards Materialism. But this no longer has a place within this topic. Another philosopher, in the person of the Illyrian philosopher Franciscus Patricius (1529-1597), takes corporeal and incorporeal light to be cold and heat respectively. However, for him the incorporeal light is the divine light of the Gnostics and Neoplatonists, with whose concepts he associates his own. Reminiscent of modern panspermia (p. 447) is his supposition that the whole world is filled with seeds of life, which are borne and dispersed by the light. The similarity to modern panspermia, even with regard to what carries the seeds, is much greater than it seems to be at first glance. There really is nothing new under the sun! Even the view established by a most contemporary eccentric enthusiast of the four dimensions, that bodies are dregs (faeces), had already been voiced by Patricius. He calls the Earth the discharge (faex) in the river of earthly life.

The noble martyr Giordano Bruno (born in Nola circa 1548 and disgracefully burned at the stake in Rome in 1600) needs to be included here, principally due to his concept of the connection that the world has with God. In this he associates himself with Nicholas of Cusa, but with an inclination more towards the Gnostic side. God is in fact perceptible only to himself, but he is not outside of us, and therefore we do have a sense of consciousness of

-----File: 330-----

‘All things have present within them the divine, in a concealed manner, and the unity of the all-embracing principle, even if it is dispersed in the manifold.’ According to Bruno, this principle is universal reason, ‘the innermost, most real and most characteristic capacity and the part of the world soul that forms its power. It is an identical principle that fills outer space, lights up the universe and instructs nature to bring forth her genera just as they are to be.’ (De la causa, principio e uno (*Concerning the Cause, Principle, and One.*)[22] This universal reason hence acts from the inside outwards. It is the foundation of all movement and development in the world and in all things. It is the reason ‘which does everything,’ in the center between the reason which is everything and the reason of individual things, which becomes everything. But so far we have dealt with only one part of the world soul, i.e. its power. The second part is absolute sovereign power; it governs the world, without being influenced by it at all, and bestows on it life and perfection, both of which go upwards in stages to the level of the most perfect beings. The world is designated a ‘colossal organism’ and ‘a likeness of the supreme principle.’ And Bruno reproaches those ‘who do not appreciate, nor want to acknowledge, that the world, with its component parts, is endued with life – as if God had envied his likeness.’ All the components of the world are endowed with a living soul, in fact ‘without anything of any kind being subtracted.’ Meanwhile, many (precisely those seen as inanimate) are endowed with a living soul as far as their capacity allows; they contain at least ‘a principle and a germ of life.’ This means that these things can actually enter into an emerging or existing creature endowed with a soul, without being alien within it; their facultative ensoulment crosses over into actual ensoulment, and they endue each other with life. But Bruno does seem to attribute a certain other ensoulment to the inanimate body by referring to the effects inanimate bodies produce on us, as beings endowed with souls, such as emotions that influence our behavior, along with desires, feelings and so forth. He even refers (somewhat strange for Bruno, who otherwise wrote so lucidly) to how ‘the necromancers hope

-----File: 331-----

to give rise to many things with the mortal remains of the dead, and that they believe that these retain a kind of life function, if not the same as in life, and can help them towards those extraordinary effects.' An observation on this by Lasson is well worth reading. Bruno pays his dues to his time. So he does not even dismiss the idea of treating the sick by attaching stones to them and mumbling incantations, performing sorcery or using fifth essences alongside treatment with pharmacy medicines, working on the rational principle that it is better to be healed by any means than not to be healed at all. The essential concept is, as we now know, what Bruno means by universal endowment with a soul: i.e., certain functions which still continue to exist when a creature is dead, and which actually belong to all matter – higher functions in plants and even higher ones in animals, humans and the like. Ensoulment is 'immanent' in the world. Alongside the world soul there exists a matter, a substrate, which we are as incapable of defining as the world soul. Its connection with the world soul produces things. The substantial form of things is the soul. Matter, just like every soul, 'cannot be destroyed or annihilated, which would lead it to lose its being entirely and in every sense'.

The world thus has three eternal concepts: universal reason or the universal world soul; the power of universal reason or the true world soul; and matter or substrate. In God, capacity and reality are the same; he is 'primordial capacity' and 'primordial reality.' But the world, every single component part of which could indeed be something else, just as a stone could also be wood, and a man could be one or another, does not link capacity and reality; the former is far more wide-ranging. Everything is explained as dispersed and differentiated. So the world is described as consisting of shadows, or even a very image, of the primordial capacity and the primordial reality. But this very image 'is, in specific reality, everything that it is according to its specific capacity.' 'For this reason,' we then read, 'it will not be difficult, nor will it be questionable, finally to acknowledge that,

according to its substance, it is in its entirety one.' As we climb down the stepladder of nature, we do in fact encounter a double substance, one spiritual and one corporeal, but both ultimately go 'back to one being and one root.' This is played on the most manifold variations, in that, while a corporeal and an incorporeal are distinguished in matter, both are still only matter. Interpreted in this sense, matter develops everything that it contains in undeveloped form, and 'for this reason we must designate it something divine, the most kindly ancestress, who gives birth to and is mother of natural things, indeed, according to its substance, the whole of nature itself.' Matter is the universe and a 'united, infinite, immovable one.' Explanation by all possible routes is given for these characteristics of the universe, in that the opposite is always also presented as equally consistent with the universe (p. 311). As the universe unites everything, it cannot be an individual entity. It therefore has no shape or form, no movement, neither greatness nor smallness, neither time nor eternity, neither center nor surroundings. It is immutable; individual things change only the type of being, not the being itself, and the universe encompasses every kind of being. The universe is therefore in everything. From this point of view even death is only a change of the kind of being or of the place in the universe. There is therefore indeed nothing new in the universe; what exists has already existed, and whatever comes has already been present; this is an idea also encountered in the works of Cusa, and so often illustrated in Ecclesiastes. 'You see thus how all things are in the universe and the universe is in all things, we in it, it in us, and everything thus flows into a perfect unity.' And this unity is constant and endures forever; this One is eternal. Since every single thing in the universe has within itself that which is everything in everything, it encompasses the entire world soul in its own manner. This world soul is therefore whole in every part of the universe. The worlds are also not present as if in a dimension or a place, but 'as if in an extensive, illuminating force that appears to be moving, which is encompassed by each of these worlds just as the

-----File: 333-----

entire soul is encompassed by each part of the same soul.' Another important aspect is the observation that 'it is one and the same stepladder on which nature descends to produce things, and on which reason ascends to perceive such creation, moving through the large number of middle rungs.' But the statement that 'reason traces the multiplicity and diversity of species to one and the same root' has an almost Darwinian ring to it. Primordial intelligence thus defines everything in one belief system to the most perfect level possible. And man is to strive after this to reach the 'level of no distinction'.

It is hard to say which category we should use for the doctrine of this great philosopher from Nola; it is, in equal measure, theosophical and emanistic, as well as panpsychist, and physical (Bruno was an adherent of the Copernican system), depending on which interpretation is given to his designations. The theosophical is distinguished more in other writings than in the main work cited here. One may thus perhaps think the whole system is an elevation of the physical out of its nature into the divine or an example of the divine penetrating the physical; both constitute a kind of Pandeism. Therefore, the concept of God also manifests itself as not distinct from that of the universe; God is the naturalizing force of nature, the world soul, the world force. As Bruno totally refuses to include anything against religion in his teachings, we should doubtless interpret such statements the other way round: the world force, the world soul, the naturalizing force of nature and the universe are in God. God is the force of the world force, the soul of the world soul, the nature of nature, the One of the universe. Bruno does also write about a number of parts of universal reason, primordial capacity and primordial reality. Linked to this is his view that the world is infinite, without beginning or end; it is all-embracing in the same sense as God is. But not quite like God. God is believed to be all-embracing, both for everything and for the particular, while the same can be said for the world with respect to everything, but not for the particular, as it does admit parts into itself. 'I believe,' we read in a work on infinity, 'that the entire

universe is infinite, as it has neither edge nor boundary nor surface, but I say the universe is not absolutely (totalmente) infinite, and that whatever we may take from it is finite.' And it is due to this finiteness that things are diverse and contrast with one another. The only explanation Bruno has for all ills, death and evil is deficiency and incapability. 'These occur in the above things, because these things are not all they could be, and through external compulsion they become what they have the capacity to be. As they therefore cannot be so much at the same time, they abandon the one being to enable themselves to attain the other.' This is really no more than a statement of the facts.

In the works of Giordano Bruno's universalist adherent, the Calabrian Tommaso Campanella (1568 to 1639, a Dominican friar, like the former – even if he was not burned at the stake, he was still at home in all the dungeons in Spain, and almost accustomed to all forms of torture), the theosophical comes to the fore somewhat more strongly. The world is a mixture of being and nothing. Inherent in the being, God, there are three primalities: omnipotence, infinite wisdom and universal will; in the non-being, meanwhile, there are powerlessness, lack of consciousness and malice. The divine primalities are manifest in the world as necessity, providence and harmony. How this mixture comes about is a transcendent mystery. God is that which purely and simply exists, a superbeing, a supersubstance. He has conveyed something of his being and his primalities (in the form of love, perception and volition) to creatures, like an emanation. Therefore, all creatures are, according to their truth, in God; it is just that non-being is inherent as a deficiency in them. God is of course free of this. And there are worlds which rise to ever higher levels, like emanations, and each of these worlds encloses the lower ones and is enclosed by the higher ones, up as far as God, who encompasses everything. Even the angels are much closer to nothing than God is. The distinguishing characteristic of the world as a world, as this characteristic arises from nothing, thus constitutes the bad and the evil; the creatures would otherwise be God, and everything would exist

-----File: 335-----

without distinction. Each human being is free: for good, and likewise for bad. As each primality is encircled by the higher one, actions originate from the will, have to be guided by perception and take their course towards love. All this flows from the nature of creatures. How matter, which is regarded as totally lacking in distinctive characteristics, fits into this framework, is something I cannot say. But it was God who first created the space which is to be regarded as the substance of matter, together with matter as such, as a limited unity and a fundamental element for all divergence. Finally, there are two forces which, as in the works of Telesio, are taken to be heat and cold, and which both affect all of matter and thus come into conflict. But it is through these that there emerge living beings in the individual, and the order and harmony of the world, under the governance of God or the angels, in the whole. As a result the primalities have to be imparted to beings, directly or indirectly. All this is just as inaccessible to our comprehension as it is in the works of Telesio. Actually all his general assertions are readily understood, but when we look at the details we find his comments little more than incomprehensible. This lies in lack of knowledge. Such comments, and similar ones, also rest mainly on the suppositions of the Ionian natural philosophers, which, since they have been passed on in a very sketchy form, cannot be conveyed in anything other than vague terms.

We now return to our German theosophists. We shall pass over Nicolaus Taurellus and Valentin Weigel without comment so we can immediately devote ourselves to our greatest mystic, Jakob Böhme. This man (eccentric, while highly distinguished and amiable in equal measure) was born in 1575 in Alt Seidenberg near Görlitz; he started out tending livestock, then became a respectable shoemaker. He continued in this work in Görlitz until his death in 1624. He could barely read or write. He was plagued by wondrous visions and ecstasies, and so is likely to have been a poor, ailing man. But these visions gave him cause to write his first work, ‘Morgenröte im Aufgang’ (*Red Dawn Rising, or Aurora*), in 1612. The theologians, intolerant in every discipline, agitated against him, as a result of which the municipal authorities

prohibited him from writing. After seven years, as his followers grew in number and he proved himself to be living a devout and blameless life, he was allowed to continue writing. This simple man must have heard and read a great deal; he had many scholarly connections. Like another shoemaker, Hans Sachs, who had lived earlier, he was a tremendous writer, but in his own intimate and profound manner, in that he invented an extraordinary world and wrote using extraordinary imagery. Yet he is the most consistently logical of all theosophists, possibly the only one who is truly so.

For Böhme, the means towards perception is almost exclusively sight, or contemplation. Just as the eye of a man looks into the celestial bodies, so the soul sees into the divine being wherein it is living. And it is from this seeing that his 'pen has written.' And his deeply moral nature means that, for him, everything gains a moral or anti-moral sense. So light is pleasantness, love or warmth is anger, hate is darkness and (in a manner reminiscent of Paracelsus) desire is salt, while fear is sulphur. Natural phenomena are the good and the evil, and good and evil are natural phenomena. Spirit and body become confused. And God himself is interpreted as something physical, although of quite exceptional delicacy. Böhme refers to 'the hard quality which pulls together the whole physical being of the deity, holds it and dries it out, to make it exist.' The striking nature of such a statement fades when one considers that even Giordano Bruno, so highly educated in philosophy and dialectic, has matter and soul ultimately running into one, the universal substance. Jakob Böhme expresses this solely in more sensory terms. And it is thus actually in the being of God that he sees nothing: i.e., that which is incorporeal and lacking in distinctive characteristics, as we would say. Out of this nothing of his, God creates the world, hardening it downward into something more and more robust, by drawing himself together. In God there is, above all, isolated selfhood, absolute unity. But he also shows the strong desire to manifest himself in the multiplicity. This means that God forms a polarity, a division with himself. God is thus both good and evil. 'For

-----File: 337-----

God of the sacred world and God of the dark world are not two separate gods: there is one single God, and he himself is every kind of being. He is evil and good, heaven and hell, light and darkness, eternity and time, beginning and end; where his love is concealed in a being, that is where his wrath is evident.' We read this in the 'Mysterium Magnum.' And there is no clearer way of expressing it. It is precisely out of this polarity, which is indeed simply drawn out of the world, that the world develops through God and in God, with the ultimate ethical purpose (call to mind a similar concept among the Persians (p. 202)) that in the sphere of humanity the conflict between good and evil, love and hate, kindness and anger, and so forth, is resolved in favor of the first pole in each pair. Simply to class Jakob Böhme with the usual types of Gnostics and theosophists, therefore, is not wholly acceptable, although he does actually use terms from the Gnostics. What it is about him that commands our respect is the logical consistency of his system, which shies away from nothing, and which cannot be sustained by theories which recognize only the light in the most elevated position, together with total unity, and which must also be absent anywhere that the devil, who is nevertheless so strong, is believed to originate from feeble imperfection in the world. This evil is described as fire, consuming and tormenting, when it prevails in humans. Even the devil is 'in the power of the wrath of God.' This distinctive characteristic is divided into two separate characteristics: impulse or desire, and the admittance of malicious satisfaction.

So far we have encountered two singular entities of God, 'source spirits,' which is the very beautiful name Jakob Böhme gives to describe them. A third source spirit is the acting in, and against, each other of the first two spirits, through which everything pushes its way out of the selfhood and then flows back into it, an eternal process in the cycle. This means the world seems to stream out and then back constantly, hence always coming into being and then fading away, as it does in the systems which acknowledge only the 'now' in God, not the past or the future (p. 287 and 303). In these three source spirits

Jakob Böhme sees the most terrible turmoil, upheaval and anguish, as cosmogonic concepts. The fourth source spirit, the firebolt, is believed to scatter the trouble in the world, and direct it out of the evil into the good, out of wickedness into salvation. It is thus a kind of enlightenment through the bright, clear grace of God. The fifth source spirit is the celestial fire of love, 'the true, sacred spirit, which unites everything in love.' Heinrich Schmitt (p. 267) compares it with the celestial wisdom of the Gnostics. Jakob Böhme refers to the sixth source spirit as sound or resonance. It is undoubtedly the word, Logos, but it also means the harmony of the spirits, 'like a celestial music coming from many thousands of instruments; in comparison with the divine echo of this music, which rises from eternity to eternity, the most artificial earthly music seems just like a dog's barking.' 'Here the bridegroom embraces the bride and there originates the true life of all creatures, in each thing according to its distinctive characteristic.' Therefore it is doubtless also universal reason that orders everything within itself in unison. Finally, the seventh source spirit, as earthly reason and earthly life, encompassing within itself everything sacred, leads from the celestial into the earthly. But in life all the source spirits, apart from the source spirits of fire, are diminished and obscured, and sufficiently perceptible only in the most introspective approach. Five of them are believed to serve humans as weapons against the source spirits of fire, which otherwise give rise to the evil in them. 'In the way that a fire blows up in a source spirit, it is not concealed from the soul; the soul may at once rouse the other source spirits, who loathe the fire that has been ignited, and may extinguish it. But if the fire tries to become too great, the soul has its jail, and there it can confine the kindled spirit, where the austere, hard quality (privation and mortification of the flesh, or self-denial), and the other spirits have to act as the soul's jailers, until the fire's wrath fades and it goes out.' However, it does occasionally seem as if the 'fire' is a particular thing, not a source spirit. On the subject of beholding the source spirits we read, 'But thou shouldst not imagine that the celestial light is extinguished at all in the source spirits in this world; no, that which we, with our corrupted eyes, cannot grasp is a mere gloom.

-----File: 339-----

extinguished at all in the source spirits in this world; no, that which we, with our corrupted eyes, cannot grasp is a mere gloom. But God thus took away the darkness that floats over the light, and thine eyes were opened, whence thou saw here at the very place where thou standest, sittest or liest in thy chamber the beautiful countenance of God (a Kabbalistic term, or from the apocalypse as described in the Book of Daniel) and the expanse of the celestial gates. Thou must not even lift thine eyes towards heaven, for it stands written: the Word is close to thee, that is, on thy lips and on thy heart.' What a beautiful and highly distinctive passage for the sheer introspection of the concept! A human is born three times: in the first birth (the sidereal one) he is full of the splendors of the good source spirits, in the second (animal birth) he is like an animal; in the third, at the end of days, he is born into the kingdom of heaven or into hell. The angels hold only what is good, the devils only evil. But these are not exclusive to either, as angels and devils come from God and 'God stands against God.' A kind of double predestination should not be mistaken here, yet it is within the extensive source spirit for the soul to call good into battle against evil. The fall of the angels precedes the origin of the world. 'The being of the expelled spirits ignites and intensifies to engender the new world.' Man takes the place of Lucifer. The fall of Adam begins the first time he sleeps in paradise, which would not be very flattering to Eve if Böhme did not hold the view that surrendering oneself to inactivity is a sign of carnality. For he conceives life as led entirely in terms of energy, a struggle between the good in us and the evil in us, for the triumph of the good.

Among the many concepts put forward by Schelling, which we shall encounter later, there are also some developed entirely on the foundation of the views of Jakob Böhme. God is the absolute 'neutrality,' the 'Ungrund' (*nonground*) without any title of rank at all. But God is nevertheless potentially a duality, since God must also have the foundation of his being within himself. This foundation is in him as a

singled-out existence. And, as the foundation of the being, it is, at the same time, a desire for being. But as it belongs to God himself, God beholds his very image, Logos, a unification of reason and desire for being which manifests itself as the will to create and now creates and orders the world. We see how Schelling interprets the 'self-division of God.' Reason ascends towards the perfect, while desire descends towards what is base. What follows, developed in ethical terms by Böhme, is treated more in historical terms by Schelling, who draws on his knowledge of science and history. At first desire predominates, and raw products are created and preserved, as the extinct prehistoric world shows. Reason gradually comes more and more into its own, and there emerge the higher creatures; humans appear, at first coarse and barbarian, but later in higher-minded cultures. Reason and desire are always in conflict. Reason does not advance constantly, but its influence does, with fluctuations, continue upwards. The ultimate destination is where reason becomes supreme, desire fades away, and the world is united into one identity with the divine.

Krause (1781 to 1832) also seems to align himself with the main principle found in the works of Böhme, by deriving the existence of the world from an 'inner opposition of the essence in God.' And despite being a pantheist he does transpose everything into God, making his doctrine a universe-in-God theory, and confers on God distinctive characteristics not far removed from those of the source spirits described in the works of Böhme. Some aspects do, however, adapt themselves to the ideas of the time, and specific points, it seems, conform to Spinozist Pantheism. We shall actually see that Jakob Böhme's division of God within himself has very often been used, even into the most recent times and in systems which seem far removed from that of Böhme, such as the dialectic system of Hegel.

We now look far back in time and start off from other theosophists, particularly the Brussels physician Jan Baptista van Helmont (1577 to 1644), who sought the truth in visions and dreams and, like all intuitive philosophers, despised logic and the science

-----File: 341-----

reason, yet who was at the same time not insignificant as a naturalist, in that he drew a sharp dividing line between the kingdom of God and the realm of nature. But he saw life everywhere and believed that each natural force, acting as Archeus, formed its own body itself. 'But in fact there are as many types (species) of living lights (placed in nature by God) as there are types of living creatures. Therefore, all differentiation and every distinction between the types is in these lights themselves.' Matter is the second principle of nature. In each thing there is a seed from which it develops. But development is initiated and passed on by means of an inner device, a 'ferment.' One curious aspect is van Helmont's supposition of an effect going out into the distance, a kind of radiation, for which he coined the peculiar word Blas (*blown motion*), which originates in the celestial bodies no less than in living beings and is believed to act both outwards and inwards, although this is not consistent with astrological and modern ideas. Alongside Archeus and Blas, the existence of the soul is taken as concentrated at one point in the body. The soul is positioned in the stomach orifice, while the Archeus is located in the spleen. Brain and nerves are tools of the soul; the Archeus is its governing organ for corporeal life. In addition, there is the spirit as the light of God. There are rather a lot of distinctions – Archeus, soul, spirit, seed, ferment – and one ultimately finds oneself really not quite knowing how all these things are connected to each other. Archeus and ferment, soul and spirit, in particular, are in competition. The theories of van Helmont are inconsistent with those of Jakob Böhme inasmuch as he rejects the idea of the vigorous battle in nature, which Böhme portrays in such a poetic style and so brilliantly. Nature is to him rather an ordered whole with independent individual beings. I make mention of the English scholar Fludd (1574 to 1637), a real and proper mystic, not because he used heat and cold as world-forming principles, as many did before him, but because he referred to experiments with a thermometer, descriptions of which he claimed to have found in a manuscript at least 500 years old. The results of these experiments are accurate. Blaise Pascal

(1623 to 1662) bears a certain similarity to Jakob Böhme: he comes across as a profound, religious mystic but as a sceptic at the same time. Montaigne (1533 to 1592) simply merits mention as a mystic; he is more of a sceptic. But Swedenborg (1689 to 1772) is a mystic through and through.

Theosophy still runs like a red thread through all the systems, as we shall see. In recent times it has even seen a very significant upswing, with all the paraphernalia of mysticism and occultism. Corresponding to the changed attitude people have shown on encountering the particular religions, theosophy has been associated substantially with the Indian interpretation. A work on this which is apparently specific to and fundamental for the relevant circles, 'The Key to Theosophy,' by the shrewd scholar Helena Petrovna Blavatsky (on whom Karl Bleibtreu has published a book, unfortunately distorted through needless attacks on others and exaggerations), is concentrated entirely within the domain of the doctrines, outlined above, of the wonder nation of India, as is a work by Franz Hartmann, 'Mysterien, Symbole and magisch wirkende Kräfte' (*Mysteries, Symbols and Forces with Magic Effect*). The main ideas emerge from the views on the soul conveyed on page 223, and we are also already familiar with the principle that everything, without exception, is One, Theos, Brahma etc. The same goes for the doctrine of reincarnation and the Laws of Karma, that everyone reaps what he has sown, and, further, that recognition of the 'myself' involves recognition of everything, even that of what is behind the phenomena, i.e. the transcendental in Kant's sense (p. 350). 'The self of the universe and the self of each being in the universe is one and the same self,' runs the main proposition of this theosophy. And this self is simply Theos. We ourselves are it. All this corresponds in its entirety to what we know of Indian theosophy. I have to refrain from explaining the implementation of these main concepts; nor can I give a portrayal of the seven realms (relating to the seven souls, page 223) or interpret the symbols and mysteries, particularly since a great deal of it all

-----File: 343-----

remains opaque to me. Only a little is drawn from Gnostic concepts, and even less from church or Christian ones. And it cannot be denied that, however fine these concepts might be in poetic terms, particularly the Gnostic concepts, in philosophical terms they take second place to the deeply reasoned and extremely finely wrought theories of the Indian schools. After the truly great Jakob Böhme there emerged no other Christian theosophist capable of establishing a satisfactory belief system. But in Böhme it is the morally elevated and imaginative man we admire rather than the frank dialectician. He was ruthless in his division of God within himself; however, his devout consciousness led him back again and again on winding paths to the singularly merciful and benevolent God, just as all the profusion of mankind does indeed need him alone as the God of solace and of the promise, although the speculative aspect of man can, not without inner contradiction, and faced with the so terribly prevalent bad and evil which torment us through almost our entire lives, allow these to act on him. Where the personal nature is lost, poetic charm fades away, and God may be portrayed to us as so sublime, almighty and infinite that we see him as increasingly distant, cold and incomprehensible. The reproachful but loving father is lost. Something enigmatic enters behind grey veils. Life becomes blurred as the previously held concept dissolves. Everywhere there lies something concealed, but nowhere is there anything tangible, and society ultimately has to content itself with a faint shadow and an ethical code, with a feeble life that goes on forever, if not absolute death. In the face of the unutterable inanities wrought by so many with personal religion, and considering the self-seeking ‘leaseholds’ so many take the liberty of attempting with the dear God, this reaction is no doubt entirely justified. Philosophy has always produced such a reaction against theology, hence the double truth which is actually so untruthful. At present, however, when a third mighty warrior has appeared on

the scene, in the form of cold, cogent science, which threatens to sweep away all beliefs anyway, it is only to be understood if some, ill-disposed towards what will ultimately come, take refuge in a realm which seems not to be open to attack by science, to give free range for thought and to offer satisfaction for imagination and feelings. What is more, the mystery roams before the border of this realm and, with its dark talk, promises anyone approaching the prospect of beholding something miraculous. Those of Anglo-American lineage seem particularly inclined to settle there; in Germany we are still very wary of promises. Humanity has an almost syncretic approach to religion in the present day. And when even in a higher religion, Christianity, there is almost overzealous dispute over the most important aspect, the life of Christ and his suffering on Earth for mankind, i.e. his personal work of redemption, what else remains for many than to return to the unfathomable in its unapproachability and, like Jacob, to wrestle with the mysterious phenomenon to ascertain its name! Or, unconcerned with any deity, one might regard a mortal life within ethical rules as the sole purpose of a human, if one does not actually have this same life to overcome as an evil under the same prerequisite! What is quite miraculous is how the greatest contradictions exist alongside each other nevertheless. An occasionally almost hallucinating theosophist and spiritist has as his neighbor an ethicist, optimist or pessimist who coolly weighs up everything and dismisses anything that seems to support belief in the supernatural. But something we shall see later is the gradual upward struggle towards dominion of a world view which reconciles and connects Theism (and also Deism) with so-termed atheism, i.e. Spinozist Pantheism, which shares with theosophy the idea of an all-embracing, all-encompassing something, and with atheism the concept of the autonomy of the world, its freedom from a personal sovereign sitting outside of and over it, its roots grounded in itself. In the meantime we cannot yet take our leave of Deism.

-----File: 345-----

39. Deistic rationalism.

The further development of philosophy and science was, however, initially not favorable to the intuitive and religious interpretation of the world and of life per se and needed to lead to calmer consideration of things, and thus replace intuition with common-sense rationalism and the fixed rules of reason. Socratic ethics are very rationalistic, as is Aristotelian philosophy to a great extent, alongside much else of what is presented above. (‘There is nothing greater than reason, as it is the soul of the soul’ is said to have been Scaliger’s motto.) Modern rationalism has its beginning with the originator of modern philosophy, René Descartes, or Renatus Cartesius (born 1596 in La Haye near Tours, died 1650 in Stockholm). However, in his works it must still by all means be described as mixed with Deism, as God sits right in the center of the approach. The rationalism of Descartes is based on proof of the existence of God. ‘The formal reason,’ he writes, ‘for which we accede to matters of belief consists in a certain inner light, with which, enlightened by God, we have confidence that what we are taught to believe is revealed by him, and that he cannot lie, as that light is a surer one than all the light in nature.’ This is expressed entirely in theosophical terms. And Descartes is a devout Catholic, even believing in miracles. All the same, he is a rationalist, and aims to provide proof with rational arguments at every opportunity. With this ‘light of nature’ he intends, in scientific terms, to shine light into everything natural, and only at the very last to place his trust in the supernatural light, the inner revelation, intuition. But this teaches him that in every instant God is the foundation of the world, and that the world founders into nothingness the moment God leaves it. And the natural light of God is thus also kindled in nature, as God can only be true, even in his works. This truth is intrinsically a relative one, given that God could have created and established the world in a quite different way from how he did; however

-----File: 346-----

for us this truth signifies something that is absolute in our way of seeing things. In such circumstances it appears odd that Descartes, with others before him, is nevertheless still looking around for scraps of evidence for the existence of God. Such evidence is simply part of his rationalism. He takes as his starting point the well-known proposition 'Je pense, donc je suis,' or 'Cogito, ergo sum,' or 'I think, therefore I am' – a proposition expressed long before his lifetime. This is thus a certitude: 'I am.' From this certitude he creates the further one: 'What I know for certain, or more simply, anything that encounters no contradictions in myself, is also true.' And, like so many before and since him, he confuses what is true with existence. In ourselves we have an idea of an infinite, absolutely perfect and absolutely real being. Yet we ourselves are finite, imperfect and restricted in time – as is everything around us. Therefore we cannot have created that idea either from ourselves or from nature. And consequently the idea is absolute truth, and God exists. This psychological or anthropological proof is evidently uniquely one gained by intuition. It is not incorrect, as has often been contended; it is merely inaccessible, as something intuitive, but only as ever-continued abstraction, to our discursive reason, which draws purely logical conclusions and states that neither an infinite nor an absolute is to be found ready-made in our spirit. The other proof is the ontological one. It is, strictly speaking, a complement to the psychological proof. This proof places the absolute reality of God at the forefront. Descartes expresses the view that this reality belongs to that which is perfect in absolute terms; anything that is absolutely perfect must also be real. The root of this lies in what is so often assumed: that everything that is imperfect originates in an admixture of the non-real and the non-being, which the reader has so often had to submit to in the preceding material. But this supplementary evidence is not necessary per se. The psychological proof for intuition is fully sufficient. And anyone who does not acknowledge the existence of any intuition is not helped by the supplementary evidence either, for, as Kant established, existence does not belong to the concept of a thing,

-----File: 347-----

as its other characteristic features do. If God also has no characteristic features, what is left if existence is taken away from him?

The concepts Descartes discerns in man are innate ideas (*ideae innatae, a priori*), then those acquired empirically, together with abstract ideas (*ideae adventitiae, a posteriori*), and finally ideas which have been spawned from other ideas (*ideae factae*). The first encompass the elevated concepts of God, truth, freedom etc.; the second serve perception of nature, and the last are for the purpose of going beyond what is given directly in nature, but referring to it. Humans are, above all, spiritual beings. But Descartes sees in the world, as God created it, a dualism: spirit and matter. In conceptual terms both are designated 'substance.' Each of them has an 'attribute': for the spirit this is constant thought, while for matter it is dimension. The individuals are 'modes': in the spirit these are the thoughts, and in matter the bodies, with shape, size, movement, repose and so forth. These two substances are totally separate; each exists as ordained by its type, the spirit according to the spiritual type and matter according to the mechanical type. Things without a spirit have only mechanistic (or, rather, physical) life. Hence, for example, our bodies, in which everything takes place in a purely mechanical manner, as in lifeless bodies and in machines. Animals and plants are just the same as inanimate things – they are machines. But humans also have the immortal spirit. This means that the world, without the spirits, is also a colossal machine. It was created as a solid mass. God shattered this mass and set its parts (like nous in the works of Anaxagoras) into whirling motion. Then these parts pushed and rubbed against each other, and there emerged a fine, a coarser and a rather coarse matter. The fine matter was dispersed the furthest into the universe and, through an inner whirling motion, gradually formed the sun and the fixed stars. The coarsest matter produced the Earth, planets, moons, comets and so forth. The intermediate matter still whirls around suns and planets and other bodies and swings the planets around the suns, and the moons around the planets. A certain degree of order among all the bodies

is produced by their pushing and rubbing against each other, just as the three types of matter split from each other through pushing and rubbing. In his dualism Descartes is, as we can see, a theosophical deist with respect to God and spirit, but a mechanist as regards the corporeal world after its formation and that of its imprinted movement.

But how does the soul act on the body? Such an effect cannot take place per se. What Descartes writes about this is simply modelled on his mechanistic concepts. The soul is located in the pineal gland, in the center of the brain. The finest blood (spiritus animalis) streams through the nerves leading to this gland. The gland thereby enters into vibrations, which are taken up by the soul. With the process in reverse, the soul has to cause the gland to vibrate, and these vibrations regulate the functioning of the finest blood and thus exert an indirect effect on the body. This coarse interpretation might please one of the mechanists of the most recent times, but cannot provide an answer to the question. This is why Geulincx (1625 to 1669, originally from Antwerp) calls on God for help. For each corporeal process God arranges a psychological one, and for each psychological process a corporeal one. God thus governs the soul in accordance with the body and the body in accordance with the soul. It is only ever the first process that is free, as the second is always arranged and triggered by God. Therefore God acts as the occasion arises; this is an example of occasionalism which gains a higher significance if God does not intervene to regulate events each time, but has tuned soul and body towards each other in such a way from the outset that they, despite being reciprocally totally alien, do respond to each other. The Parisian philosopher Malebranche (1638 to 1715) interprets the relationship, in accordance with the process developed by Geulincx, in this way. But both have introduced into the philosophy of Descartes the expression that the spirit is of God in the first place, while matter is, of course, not. This dualism then crosses over into another dualism between God and the world, and it is pandeist at least in that God is present in spiritual things, possibly even in those that are not spiritual, where processes are concerned.

-----File: 349-----

It is the usual practice to couple the teachings of Spinoza with these reflections, to represent the ultimate development of the work of the Cartesian to some degree. Yet Spinoza's ideas are purely monistic and in no manner deistic. Spinoza himself interpreted the writings of Descartes and may also have regarded his own system as having developed from the work of the Cartesian. But nothing more emerged than did from the system of Cartesius, arising from any of the earlier systems of God, spirit and matter. And hardly anywhere is the rationalistic to be found in the works of Descartes apart from in such 'proofs,' one of which is cited above, which do indeed have their foundation in intuition alone. For, as was noted earlier, although it is to God that Descartes attributes natural light, with knowledge taken from what is present, he is still filled with doubt as to the effectiveness of this light. But he does occasionally express fear that this light might originate from an evil daemon feigning what is certain with what is false. He is thus ultimately left with only the intuitive, as the one sure thing, to which his principle of the existence of God belongs above all, and in conjunction with this, the principle of one's own existence, which accordingly would have to say: I behold God, therefore I am (*contemplor deum, ergo sum*). And Descartes is actually also quite inclined to regard the spirit as an emanation from God. Another aspect connected with the Deism of Descartes is that he conceives the world as infinite in space and infinite in duration, but finite in its emergence and formation, and that, where he becomes ill-disposed to his Mechanism, it is not only the creation of the world that he ascribes to God, but also its perpetual maintenance and governance. Descartes shows a great lack of certainty on the question of free will. As a mechanist he has to deny its existence. As a deist he can leave a certain amount of room for it. And it is doubtless in the wavering between Mechanism and Deism that the uncertain and the self-contradictory elements in the concepts of Descartes are actually to be sought. Spinoza's system, which we shall encounter later, is entirely consistently logical. And the specialist terms he uses from the system of Cartesius have quite different values.

-----File: 350-----

40. Pre-established harmony, determinism, monads, corpuscles, reals and seeds.

At a number of places we have already spoken of the concept of a ‘sympathy between things,’ which would enable us to explain the connection between things in the world. Pre-established harmony, in conjunction with monadology, represents the culmination of theories of this kind. We find a preliminary version in the works of Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont (1618 to 1699), the son of the physician we encountered earlier. In regarding the soul in Stoic terms, he actually works out a kind of Pandeism, in that God is thought to be distinct from all things, but still not detached or split off from all things. As God himself exists without time, without space, without change, and without multiplicity, his connection with things can be understood only in that he constantly, without end, creates the world, by again and again adding new things to what is already in existence and at the same time destining everything to changeability. This is conceived in emanist terms: the intermediary is the finest light going out from God and the light which fills the universe, and the world is a diminished form of it. And Christ is actually the center inasmuch as he can be changed only for good, not for bad, while created beings tend towards both the good and the bad. Meanwhile, created beings are also granted the possibility of infinitely drawing closer to the good, and it is in this that the infiniteness of creation is founded. Created beings have good within them as a germinal part received from God, and each created being is an infinity per se, in that it forms a spiritual succession without end. Every creature thus reflects God himself in a certain respect, although in a form infinitely less perfect than God. Just as we perceive light when it is reflected on a body (in ourselves, when it strikes the retina, as we should say), the light of God reaches our consciousness as it encounters a dark substance, the matter in the body. For this reason the body is also essential to consciousness of God, just as when light becomes conscious of itself

-----File: 351-----

as it encounters a body that obstructs it. We have already mentioned theories of how it is only in creation that God actually knows himself. And the light also radiates from God into infinity in all directions. It is through this that the connection among all things is accomplished, in that every single thing simply sends spiritual emanations to each other thing, and through each other thing. However, this would only achieve a kind of universal stasis. It is solely by means of God's collaboration that van Helmont manages to arrive at the dynamic forces in the world. The world consists of innumerable, indivisible monads, which presuppose physical life, but each of which is entirely an individual in itself. The monads are connected through universal sympathy derived from God (undoubtedly conceived in emanist terms, just as the connection of God with the world is), and their influence on each other is exerted through potentiality, implanted by God, for movement of one monad with respect to the others. Hence, everything is attributable to God, infinity in each individual towards good, finiteness towards evil, sympathy of each one towards the other, and influence from each on all others. Corporeal and spiritual things are aggregates of monads, under the control of one monad, the soul, which, as the central spirit, encompasses all individual monads, in particular those of the thing in question, but also those of the rest of the world (by means of sympathy?). And just as, once created, no monad can be destroyed, neither can the soul. Other writings on a number of worlds delve into the mystical. There are four worlds in existence: the uppermost is Christ as the 'light universe.' The next, the world of creation, is doubtless conceived as a kind of Platonic world of ideas. In the third world, the world of formation, the good of ideas is realized in the upper stratum, the imperfect in the lower stratum. The imperfect materializations become solid in the fourth, mechanical, corporeal world of forming and fashioning. Hence, the body belongs to the fourth world, the spirit to the third, and the soul to the second. This again places the actual world (mundus factionis) in a very low position, unless the rays of light from God reach into it and so make an upwards development possible. This development, however, includes the transmigration of souls,

the ‘revolution of souls.’ Each soul forms its body for itself from the monads in accordance with the governing force determined by its state. In this way its body develops with the soul’s own development, and it can thus ascend from the lowest existences to the highest, but it can also fall from the highest to the lowest. When it has reached the highest existence on Earth, it enters the first world and does not come back; there it continues to develop. The souls of children are monads of their parents, hence the inheritance of good and evil alike. The whole theory is evidently not very readily understood: it contains too much towards one side, that of perfection, and too little towards the other, that of what is bad, the latter being a deficiency we have encountered everywhere, except in the works of Jakob Böhme. We do not have a true harmony here, let alone a pre-established one. But the structure for it undoubtedly exists, particularly in the monads conceived as being filled with life.

This brings us to one of the great scholars, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. He was born in Leipzig on 21st June 1646, son of Leibniz, a professor of ethics. He died on 14th November 1716. His work is of exceptional significance for almost every branch of science. Here we shall discuss just one of the achievements derived from his view of the world and of life. In one of the many views he airs about his system, in the work ‘De la nature en elle-même’ (*On Nature in Itself*) Leibniz refers to the known peculiarities of bodies, which are attributed to ‘inertia,’ and is rightly of the opinion that this inertia should not be understood solely in terms of the dimensions of things or their mass, but that it is rather more a question of something else attributed to things. ‘And this material principle,’ he writes, ‘which is called the soul in living organisms, while in other beings it is termed the material form which, together with matter, forms an actual substance, but constitutes a unity even through itself – this principle is what I call a monad.’ The monads are simple, having no parts, and cannot be formed or destroyed by any being but God. Each monad is an object in its own right;

-----File: 353-----

any impact on its being or in its being by something external, except by God, is totally out of the question. ‘The monads,’ we read in his monadology, ‘have no windows through which something could force its way in or climb out.’ Any change in a monad comes from inside itself. The monads are created and endowed with their changes at the same time. Each of them is a unity of a multiplicity of individuals, which thus form a type of relationship. This multiplicity in the unity in the circumstances at any time, shifting in the transitory conditions, is perception, and it is appetition that brings about the shift from one perception to another. Such things have to be deduced from our soul life, as we are conscious of our unity, but also of the multiplicity in the activities of our souls. Therefore, perception is the discerning, at any moment in question, of all inner activities, while appetition is that of the shift between the activities. This means one can also regard the monads as souls or as entelechies (p. 250): the latter, because they possess a certain perfection of functionality. But Leibniz reserves the term ‘soul’ for monads whose perceptions are more differentiated and accompanied by memory. That is to say, monads differ from each other in perception and appetition. But every soul itself behaves – sometimes clearly, and at other times indistinctly – with consciousness; it is just that in the soul the indistinct perceptions are transient, while those in the simplest monads are lasting. Monads without any form of clear perception are described as ‘quite bare’ (*monades toutes nues*). The monads are thus graded on a scale from complete bareness up to the level of the human soul, with understanding of the fundamental and perpetual truths, and with consciousness of self and of God. All monads have the foundations of their perfection and lack of perfection in themselves. Corresponding to the degree of perfection there is activity (*actio*), and to that of lack of perfection, there is suffering (*passio*). Each monad has a consciousness of what is contained in the other monads; a monad is graded as the more perfect, the more it can a priori give account to itself of what is taking place in the other monads, and it is in this that its influence

on them consists. The monad behaves passively if the root of what is taking place within it is located in what is recognized clearly in another, precisely in that monad.

This means that reciprocal influence exists only as an ideal. This influence intrinsically lies in God, in that, when creating things, God was actually mindful of each monad with reference to all other monads. It is in God's mindfulness of all other monads during the creation of each monad (which explains their ordered influences on each other in accordance with the perpetual laws) that pre-established harmony is founded. In fact, each monad acts only according to its type, but from the outset this type is constituted as required for consideration of all other monads, so that each monad occupies its specific position in the world, according to its own type, from the outset. Each monad thus has consciousness of the entire universe. Nevertheless, time and again this is within its type. Therefore, the world looks different, and different again, from the viewpoint (*point de vue*) of each monad. But just as a city offers different sights from different viewpoints and yet always remains the same city, so it is with the world. There is only one world, even if it is interpreted differently by the different monads. But God is the universal foundation of all things; in him each thing appears as it really is. And the way it is, is how it had to be by the nature of God, who could have created the world not according to an arbitrary plan in any old way but just the way he created it, when God had to create. For God is absolutely perfect; what he is capable of, what he knows, and what he wills (or for the monads subject (property), perception and appetition) is totally without limit. And because these characteristics are absolute, it could not be a question of the 'choice of something better,' which does indeed denote finite knowledge.

All things are composed of monads. As the influence of the monads on each other is only an abstraction of thought, placing them together does not signify that they hold together, but rather that these monads have a clearer consciousness of each other than of other monads not belonging to the relevant thing. When monads separate themselves out from

-----File: 355-----

things, it is because there is a shift in consciousness of the other. Therefore all growth is merely an increase of monads with consciousness of what is in existence, and in the consciousness of what is in existence. And this also works the other way round: any diminishing is just a removal of monads with such consciousness, and in such consciousness. Therefore spatial form and matter are also merely such states of consciousness. All this lies in the monads and in pre-established harmony. And the world is a 'phainomenon bene fundatum,' a colossal machine, whose individual parts, the monads, are identical machines. We shall encounter this comparison again later on a smaller scale, in the works of the biologist and philosopher Driesch. The world has never been interrupted at any time or at any place; it is continuous and lives continuously in accordance with the harmony of God. The imperfections are found in the finiteness of the monads, with respect to their subject, their perception and their appetition, this finiteness of course being fundamental, should a world be in existence at all, as, if this finiteness is reversed, everything is indeed God. Leibniz's renowned work Théodicée (*Theodicy*) is dedicated to the glory of God and to the relationship humans have with him. The monad in a thing possessing particular consciousness of all other monads is the central monad, the soul in living creatures. Only provided that such a central monad is present can we speak of a 'body,' otherwise constituting nothing but monads, mainly in the consciousness of the soul. There is therefore no body without a spirit. But there is also no spirit without a body, as that would mean that a monad would have no consciousness at all of other monads. This would mean that each body is actually boundless like the universe, so that the whole world and everything in it would intrinsically be soul and body, and what we call the body would denote only the particular part which has attained consciousness. This difficulty can only be avoided if we accept that the monads have practically no consciousness at all of certain monads. As a problem it is, however, also inherent in all panpsychist and pandeist views of the world and of life. As the monads

-----File: 356-----

have no dimensions, and as the world exists as a continuum, according to this concept things are not only divisible into infinity, but actually organized into infinity. But something characteristic of Leibniz, in whom we do also have a great mathematician and physicist, is that, after harmony has been pre-established, he has only the universal laws prevailing and a persistent intervention by God (when this intervention is present) always manifesting itself only in the laws of the universe. And his interpretation of nature is a mechanical one; he rejects the idea of sudden influences, such as the Newtonian attractive effect which travels into the distance, which he declares to be a perpetual miracle. This belongs in the next volume of this study. It is clear how one has to start from the Leibnizian concept to arrive at the immortality of the soul, and how one can arrive at the transmigration of souls. But it is equally clear how the meaning of immortality is quite different here from its theological sense. The mortal personality cannot remain in existence at all if the central monad has split from the other monads, from the body, and so has lost clear consciousness of them. It can, then, have no inner consciousness of them other than in the life of the monads that do not belong to its body, i.e. only the universal consciousness of the world, which, compared with the consciousness of the body, barely exists at all.

Finally, allow me one more observation. It has been contended a number of times that perception, introduced by Leibniz, is purely unconscious visualizing, in contrast with apperception. In my opinion this is incorrect. It seems to me that by perception Leibniz means merely a passive, automatic kind of visualizing, which rises in stages from total lack of consciousness to the highest level of awareness. Leibniz did not, however, express himself sufficiently definitively. Nonetheless, his entire pre-established harmony would indeed have no particular value at all compared with the simpler mechanistic approach if by perception he had actually meant only a concept of the absolute unconscious. Furthermore, one could not, as Leibniz does, speak of distinct perceptions; if something is unconscious it cannot be distinct. I think the

-----File: 357-----

introduction of the concept, which is certainly believed to be unconscious, has become confused with the concept itself, which can pass through all levels of lucidity.

Two books by Drossbach which are well worth reading, 'Die persönliche Unsterblichkeit' (*Personal Immortality*) and 'Die Genesis des Bewußtseins' (*The Genesis of Consciousness*), transpose the monad theory of Leibniz into the atomistic and extend it to a not insignificant degree. But I have to limit myself to this mere reference. The great scientist Kepler (1571 to 1630) placed a 'Harmonie der Welt' (*harmony of the world*) at the forefront of his concepts, albeit more in the Pythagorean and mathematical sense.

It was already recognized during the lifetime of the distinguished scholar, 'Professor of Humanity' and great philosophical systematician and polymath Christian Wolff (born 1679 in Breslau, died 1754) that his final elements of things, corpuscula derivativa, are equivalent to Leibniz's monads, while his determinism corresponds to Leibniz's pre-established harmony. But instead of spiritual consciousness, visualizing and knowledge of the world he aims to attribute to the monads more forces, through which they act and are acted on; however, these are forces that bear no resemblance to what we normally call force, and do not really lend themselves to comprehension in terms of physical nature. Therefore it is really only names that are changed from the theories of Leibniz, but this does not turn out to the advantage of the system. However, this philosophia corpuscularis is believed to present the true basic cause of the particular phenomena, as these are founded in the qualities of the corpuscles and the way in which these are connected to each other. The poetic beauty of the Leibnizian system is absent here, as, actually, is its logical consistency. However, the moment discussion turns to the influence between body and soul, Wolff acknowledges pre-established harmony to be the best explanation.

Another philosopher who was a determinist in the Leibnizian sense, as far as his orthodoxy allowed, was Moses Mendelssohn (born 1729 in Dessau, died 1786 in Berlin). However, his views were determinist only on condition of immortality. If there were not the hope of this, man would be the most wretched creature on Earth and nothing would remain for him but to vegetate in

torpidity and to despair. How he endeavored to provide proof of immortality and to persuade with all the skill of a theistic and noble disposition is shown in his work The Phaedo, primarily intended as a translation of the dialogue of the same name by Plato, but then departing from the model and fighting for our souls even more rigorously, and with better weapons, than Plato's work does. But Deism emerges at every opportunity in his works and contemplatio plays a much more substantial role than ratio. It is strange that, although he himself reveals tendencies towards Pandeism, the extraordinary philosophy of his spiritually colossal fellow Jew Spinoza was so abhorrent to him that his struggle against the conviction that his friend Lessing had become a Spinozist in the final years of his life broke Mendelssohn's heart and sent him to an early grave.

It is possible that Lessing did actually ultimately turn to the Pantheism of Spinoza; however, he was originally a Leibnizian, particularly with respect to the final beings and harmony. What God thinks, is; when he conceived himself as a whole, there became flesh the son identical to him, Christ. When he presented himself divided into his perfect attributes, the world thus came into being. This therefore has to be the most perfect of all possible worlds, and it constitutes the entire gamut of perfect attributes. The immediate objects of this creative activity are simple creatures; everything that is assembled is merely a consequence of this creation. Everything that takes place in the world is to be explained from the harmony of simple creatures. Simple creatures are 'restricted gods, so to speak.' What differentiates them from each other is greater or lesser consciousness of their perfection. The law of humans is 'Act in keeping with your individual perfect attributes.' There is actually a fragment of Pandeism here, in the way the world is: the perfect attributes of God regarded as divided into many pieces. And Lessing also writes that he could not conceive the reality of a world outside of God. Nevertheless, this is not Spinoza's Pantheism. Like Plato, and Indian cultures, among others, he regards immortality as a means to constant refinement. And

-----File: 359-----

likewise the transmigration of souls. In paragraph 93 ff of 'Die Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts' (*The Education of the Human Race*) we read, 'Precisely the route by which the race attains its perfection must first have wended its way through each individual human (some earlier, others later) ... Why could each individual person not have been in this world more than once? ... Why should I not come back just as often as I am sent to acquire new knowledge and new skills? Do I all at once take so much away that it is perhaps not worth the effort to come back? Is that why? – Or because I forget that I have already been here? ... And whatever I have had to forget up to now, have I forgotten it for all time? Or because so very much time would be lost to me? – Lost? – And what have I to miss then? Is not all of eternity mine?.' This counter-balances a thousand lines of reasoning from a dry theologian. Something difficult to reconcile with the theory that the individual progressively perfects itself is Lessing's view that perfection of the world is not progressive but rather (by and large) stable, which would simply follow from the fact that God created it. Are backward steps correlated to progress? It goes without saying that it took a figure such as Lessing to divest the Leibnizian theories of heaven and hell of orthodox thought. We count Lessing among the popular philosophers and also among the philosophers of the Enlightenment.

Among the works of Herbart (born 1776 in Oldenburg, died 1841), at least the 'reals' have a place in this discussion. In that they are believed to be absolute units, indivisible, without time or space, and things are believed to constitute aggregates of them, the reals resemble the Leibnizian monads. They are also primordially distinct from each other. Each real is believed to keep its quality constantly and for all eternity. The only thing that constitutes its inner life is purely and simply 'self-preservation.' This asserts itself in the face of 'disturbances' from other reals, and it is in this self-preservation that all life and passing away in nature is to be found. Therefore, all our mental activities, such as thought, feeling, volition and so forth, are merely acts of self-preservation against

other things; the consciousness is the embodiment of all these acts of self-preservation. Things are, as in the works of Leibniz, a togetherness of reals, but not in its spiritual sense, as the reals have no conception, but rather a more haphazard relationship of being together. If different rows of reals have a common point of origin, we understand them as a thing. In contrast with the clarity of the system of Leibniz, we can barely feel our way through this. As the reals are believed to be entirely simple and without any conception of others, without any kind of change to what is inside them, how does a soul experience 'disturbance,' i.e. the presence of another soul? What else can self-preservation mean but activity towards the preservation of something already existing, quite simply the self? But how is this to be reconciled with absolute, simple changelessness? What brings the reals together? Herbart also writes about conceptions. In his work 'Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Leibniz' (*History of German Philosophy since the Time of Leibniz*) Zeller expresses the view that the logical consistency of this system is 'that the form in which the reals appear to us, their connections and the changing of these connections, is founded not in themselves and in their objective relationship, but only in our subjective interpretation.' But even this cannot be true. We ourselves are, after all, reals; how then do we arrive at interpretations, whether subjective or objective? In Herbart's natural philosophy the evils of these incomprehensible things assert themselves so forcefully that ultimately (precisely through total lack of any ideal or real connection between the reals, through which even a space and a time, albeit one only considered 'intelligible,' is precluded) even potentialities for reals to be together, first as images and then as reals themselves, are treated as geometric configurations; this also leads us to assume that the reals are partially penetrable. I may stop here, for I really do not know how we are to arrive at a clear view of this system. The only other thing I should mention is that Herbart postulates God through a teleological rationale. Does God introduce the connection? And if so, how?

-----File: 361-----

THIRD BOOK.

Metaphysical and physical approaches to the world and life.

In this volume we shall compile all the concepts of the world and of life in which God is either totally abandoned as the creator and preserver of the world, or else in which he is put to the least possible use. On many occasions here, theory contradicts practice; there thus exist concepts in which either there is simply nothing said about God, while he is still at work in the background at least as a primary cause, or in which whatever is argued away in theoretical discussion is adopted again in practice. All this is to be elucidated in detail. But many actually prefer a blind coercive mechanism to a Sovereign Lord who allows so much evil to take place in the world. The entire range of the views of the world and of life is divided into the metaphysical and the physical. Metaphysical views arise from studies in eschatology, on what is actually true, while physical ones emerge from the reality that surrounds us. Yet this distinction is valid only for the extremes; otherwise, the metaphysical and the physical are woven through and into one another.

SIXTH CHAPTER.

Views of the world and of life within idealism.

When we take things, and ourselves also, in the way they appear to us, and posit the presence of nothing more behind them than behind anything else, we speak of a realism. But if we regard things as merely phenomena concretized by ourselves, behind which either there is nothing else present at all, or

there is something else present, but simply as something else, we speak of an idealism, and what might lie behind things constitutes the transcendent. So, for us, things are objectified transcendents: these are either nothing or objects withheld from our comprehension, transcendent realities. I shall refrain from explaining the numerous kinds and varieties of idealism in particular; they will soon emerge in our discussion.

41. Phantomization (illusionism), Eleatics and sceptics.

Indian peoples held the view that the entire world, including all living organisms, was merely a dream dreamt by Brahma. Everything comes into being with this dream, and when Brahma awakens everything has faded, just as the images in our dreams come and then drift away without a trace. For we are phantoms, and the sky, celestial bodies and Earth are also phantoms. A more moderate version of this perception is seen in another approach to this belief, which has the dream placed only in humans, which thus means that it is in us ourselves that the world exists only as a dream. We exist, but the world exists only in us. Our earthly life consists of dreaming. If we are liberated from this life, there is no world; it is only us. In this form, more easily accessible to our comprehension from the analogy of our real dream worlds, this doctrine occurs widely. We encounter it even among the matter-of-fact Chinese. Lao-tse, for example, writes that life is an illusion of a confused dream.

However, the above view does not provide us with a philosophical system at all: it comes across as simply too frivolous in metaphorical terms. But in studying Indian peoples, at the first turn we encounter doctrines belonging in their entirety to such a philosophical system. There is one sole being: Brahman (p. 230). This One is eternal and unchanging, not possessing any form of quality, an absolute One. Added to this One we see ignorance (avidyā), or self-delusion (maya), something unfathomable, and within the latter the One has become a multiplicity, the world, comprising all things and all the changes that occur. This is a Pan-

-----File: 363-----

theism, but only as a phenomenon, not as reality; transcendent reality is solely the One, Brahman. In practical terms, things and processes are real in the form of illusion, but are nothing in terms of transcendent reality, or rather are Brahman. This is why we read in Shankara's teaching on illusion in Vedanta philosophy (p. 259):

"In half a couplet I will declare what has been declared in millions of volumes, Brahma is true, the world is false, the soul is Brahma and is nothing else."[23]

There thus exists a double Brahman: the absolute transcendent reality, the One, Param Brahman, and illusory reality, the phenomenal Brahman, Aparam Brahman. This means the world has reality and also has none. But in practical terms it is entirely real. Shankara was obliged to teach the latter, as otherwise all basic ethical principles and religion, together with all gods, would be lost, and for Shankara the Veda was a sacred scripture. We are not told why the illusion supervenes, or where it originates from. But it is sometimes described in such real terms alongside Brahman (or perhaps in Brahman?) that, as maya, it reaches the level of personhood, and even joins the company as the wife of Brahman.

Readers who are familiar with Greek philosophy will have noticed the extraordinary resemblance between the above explanations and those of the so-termed Eleatic school. Xenophanes (p. 231) is designated as the founder of this school; he was an Ionian who settled in Elea in southern Italy. He was the originator of the well-known quotation that, if horses and oxen 'could paint and could fashion artworks as humans can, the horses would paint and fashion god figures in the form of horses, while those of the oxen would be in the form of oxen, just as the god of every species would take on the appearance of its very self.' So he rebuked the Greeks, not only for their anthropomorphism of the gods, but also for their multitude of gods. There is only one God, a One, an Eternal One, an Everlasting One. And this One is the world in its entirety. No more is reliably known of

his general teachings. It may even be nearer to conjecture that he saw the world in its entirety in God, as everything else he says about the world is purely physical and can scarcely be said to be in keeping with the dignity and honor of a deity. Parmenides of Elea (born circa 544 BC) expresses his teachings in more certain terms: 'We need to say and to think that what is, exists, as being (τὸ ἐόν) is, but nothing is not.' 'So we are left with only knowledge of a way for 'what is' to exist. There are many marker posts along this way. Since it is not born, 'what is' is also everlasting, whole, only-begotten (μονογενές), imperturbable and without any (temporal) end. It has never been and will not be, because it is now absolutely everything.' 'Neither can it be divided up, because it is completely uniform in nature. Nor does there exist anywhere, for example, anything more intense such as might hinder it in connecting, nor anything lesser; 'what is' is totally fulfilled by 'what is' ... After this it lies motionless bound in strong fetters, without beginning, without end ... persisting as the same in the same, it rests in itself and persists with such steadfastness right there. For the strong compulsion (ἀνάγκη, Ananke) holds it in the bonds of the limits that lie all around it. Therefore, being cannot be incomplete, as it is flawless, and it would be totally flawed if it were any different ...' (This is taken from Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (*Fragments from the Pre-Socratics*) by Diels. Here and in the discussion to follow, as in the preceding references in this book, I have used translations of such works, but, in keeping with my purpose, have adapted them as precisely as possible to the wording of the original.) Just the conclusion of this shows that Parmenides deemed being to be a reality. What he goes on to say shifts this reality almost into the material: 'But since a final boundary exists, being is completed on all sides, comparable to the mass of a well-rounded sphere, equally strong on all sides going out from the center.' This would also be the Sphairos (sphere) of Empedocles (p. 231). But there is nothing more than this timeless, absolute being: uniform and at rest within itself, confined on all sides. 'And everything people are talking about is thus also empty noise, although they are convinced it is true: that is to say, coming into being as well as passing away, being as well as

-----File: 365-----

non-being, shift in place, and change in color and, in fact, in properties.' The focus of the actual doctrine is to be found in this latter statement, which has tormented philosophers endlessly in the past, and still does. It fundamentally consists of two propositions: 'No being can come into being from non-being' and 'No non-being can emerge from being.' In that any event of something coming into being is taken to signify that beforehand non-being was where being is now, while passing away means that non-being is now where being previously was, there could actually be no change, as only being is believed to be there. We know well how the leading dialectician of the Eleatics, Zeno (born a little after 500 BC), also from Elea, used these propositions to demonstrate that there is actually not the slightest change in nature. Not even motion is possible, as everything is composed of rest, and rest is not a change; however, the transition from one state of rest into another is inconceivable, as this would mean that a being would disappear and a non-being would emerge. 'Anything that is moved does not move itself, either in the space in which it is situated or in that in which it is not situated.' This does not belong to this topic; everything basically amounts to a 'becoming' and 'passing away' being seen as not comprehensible separately in conceptual terms and being believed to need absolutely to be composed of non-being and being or of being and non-being. Heraclitus took exactly the opposite angle as his starting point (p. 238): for him there was only 'becoming' and 'passing away.' Even the subtleties of the Eleatics – like the well-known line of reasoning that Achilles could never catch up with a tortoise, because, every time he manages to forge ahead, the tortoise also covers some distance, and so is always ahead of him – are based on suppositions of inconceivability of the kind that require contradictory elements to be placed together. Oddly enough, the formula 'becoming = being + non-being' still haunts many minds today. The Eleatics also repudiated any form of spatial dimensions or of dividing – in short, everything that portrays the world as being manifold in space and time. The only thing whose existence they acknowledged was being. So what is the world? It is purely and simply the semblance of something,

nothing but this semblance, in precisely the sense understood by Indian peoples. And when, for example, Parmenides speaks in quite great detail about how the world came into being and its order developed, he observes that it really is a question of a 'figment of the imagination' and 'delusional thoughts.' According to Melissus of Samos (circa 440), this is because things are many and they change. But where does the semblance, the illusion, come from? The Eleatics produced no supposition on this, and were therefore considerably behind the Indian peoples, who have at least posited a principle for it, even if this does say no more than that semblance, in the form of ignorance and deception, is a separate thing in itself, which, together with the absolute, produces the world. In fact even the Eleatic doctrine is monistic in words only; in implicit terms it proceeds along dualistic lines, as semblance is not existence, yet both are present. The so-termed Megarian Eleatic school (founded by Euclides of Megara, an admirer of Socrates) also actually belongs within this grouping: this school accepted the existence of only one being, i.e. good, declared everything else in the world to be non-being and mere semblance, and used Eleatic dialectic as evidence for this contention. Otherwise the brilliance of the Eleatic doctrine is not to be denied. Melissus writes, 'It (i.e., being) is thus eternal, and infinite, and one, and an everything that is uniform within itself. And it could not just perish at some time or other, nor does it feel pain or sorrow.' 'Nor is there anything that is empty, for what is empty is nothing; consequently, whatever is indeed nothing cannot exist.' Therefore, One just exists, everywhere in time and space, never changing, in itself without any differentiation.

It is to these doctrines that those of skepticism (Greek *skepsis*, meaning doubt) are attached in objective terms. We can discuss these only in brief here, as they do not actually provide us with an approach to the world or to life. Experience of how much is uncertain and contradictory leads to the view that nothing can be stated with certainty, and can result in the exaggerated opinion the sophists were guilty of holding, stating that that one can claim anything about anything, which in their method of argument, i.e. eristic, led them to such shrewd debates,

-----File: 367-----

but also to such pernicious doctrines. Protagoras (480 to 410 BC), Gorgias (484 to 375 BC), Prodicus and Hippias were the most eminent representatives of Sophism, a school still situated within both science and ethics. We may leave the host of other sophists without comment here. The enormous influence of the sophists as teachers, i.e. of practical statecraft, is well known. Some of them were by no means inferior to Machiavelli. The aphorism 'Of all things the measure is man: of the things that are, how they are, and of things that are not, how they are not' is attributed to Protagoras. This statement is evidently of actual importance for Idealism, especially in its form as critical philosophy. By the very nature of philosophy, skepticism is encountered everywhere within it. Pyrrho of Elis (365 to 275 BC) introduced it into the Academy. One distinguished advocate of skepticism was Arkesilaos (315 to 240 BC), who contested every possibility to achieve discoveries by means of experience or reflection, and so detected no characteristic feature in the world for truth; therefore, probability (*eulogon*) had to serve as the guiding principle for all his propositions and actions. But the real leader of the so-termed New Academy was Carneades of Cyrene (224 to 155 BC), the unrelenting critic of the dogmatists, substantial numbers of whom were recruited from the school of Stoicism. An extremely astute man, he had the capability to attack all dogmatic doctrines on God and truth by means of sound reasoning and to combat them, by uncovering contradictions, and assumptions that could not be proven, everywhere. Well, humanity has always suffered from this. Were this not the case, there would be no science, but instead knowledge, of the world and God. For this reason some take shelter in dogmatic theology, others in belief, still others in probability, and many in intuition. 'What is truth?,' Pilate is said to have asked. This question is always posed, and always has been. And studies in more recent philosophy are directed precisely towards the criteria for truth, and towards establishing a truth, in order to be able to attach everything else to it, just as Descartes believed he had found such a thing in the state-

ment ‘I think, therefore I am,’ and as did Fichte in his own statement of the ‘I.’ There remain many more sceptics for us yet to encounter.

42. Idealism of phenomena.

The idea that things are not actually as they appear to us occurred from ancient times and throughout the Middle Ages, expressed to a greater or lesser degree of clarity. In more recent times, the Irish-born English philosopher George Berkeley (born 1684, died 1753), a great thinker and naturalist, was the first to shape this idea into one system. He was a fierce opponent of Materialism and Spinozism and described his theory as Immaterialism. His system actually also contains much that is theosophical, as he simply adopted a great deal from the mediaeval theosophists and mystics. He was convinced of the true reality of God in the Cartesian sense. This means that perception and reason cannot actually lie and deceive. He is therefore also a nominalist. But then he expresses the view that perception should by all means be separated from what is perceived. ‘As we perceive that various sensations accompany each other, these become delimited by a name and thus presented as a thing.’ ‘Sensory things are therefore nothing other than so many sensory qualities or combinations of sensory qualities.’ But all these qualities are, as we perceive, only in our soul. Beyond God and the soul there are no phenomena. As a phenomenon is entirely something internal, things cannot resemble phenomena, and phenomena are not copies of things. Throughout his works Berkeley cites new findings in physics and physiology, which are entirely applicable. So he is also correct in saying that we cannot attribute our perception of extent to things, as there is something else that is extent in the perceptions of sight, and something else again in those of feel; they are confounded only because they constantly accompany each other. Berkeley’s Sensationalism is therefore something internal, a Phenomenalism. And

-----File: 369-----

it is to be understood in this way when he describes things without manifestations within us as inventions of fiction, like the abstract figures and numbers in mathematics. Here I may allude to corresponding comments made in my book 'Philosophische Grundlagen der Wissenschaften' (*Philosophical Foundations of the Sciences*). Berkeley thus also wrestles against the supposition of an absolute substance, matter, which no one knows and no one can know; in order to arrive at the concept of a world we are forced to attribute to this matter a large number of concealed properties whose existence would otherwise again have to be denied, such as motion instigated from within matter, which is indeed inconsistent with the concept of inertia. Only the spirit is absolute substance; it alone is active, and where it behaves passively, this follows from the limits set for it. It is not that bodies 'are,' but that they 'become' – through our perceptions. Hence, they exist merely as 'secondary and dependent'.

However, Berkeley's system is not one of pure semblance, let alone of nothing. The principle of causality intervenes in his works. There must certainly be some form of reason for perceptions. He sees this reason not, as peoples of India and Eleatics see it, in ourselves, but outside of us, in a spirit outside of our spirit. This is the divine spirit. We are certain of it, simply from the perceptions in ourselves, i.e. from the natural phenomena and the way they are ordered. 'The great motive force and originator in nature constantly reveals himself to the eyes of humans through sensory intervention by arbitrary signs (just as humans reveal their spirits through arbitrary signs and language), which have no resemblance to, or connection with, the things to which they refer.' This was said by many scholars before Berkeley and is also in the Bible, in manifold variations. But this is about cosmological evidence of the existence of God. And God is thus the naturalizing force of nature, the one who acts everywhere and at all times. Everything has true reality only in God as the One. What we know and recognize are likenesses of this truly real being. Our spirit acts like God does. It is only that God has no limitations at all, and he thus creates at will, and what he creates belongs to eternity. So a certain free will follows from our godlike nature. But what about

anything consciously evil? This is not stated, unless it is seen as belonging to how things are ordered. Despite all the semblance, the world is real. ‘All things together may constitute a universe, made one through their connection, relationship and order with respect to their individual parts, all of which is a function of the mind.’ But purely within the realm of what can be understood by the mind and not by the senses, things are immovable and unchangeable. We can see that only the intervention of God, who is absolutely real, enables a transcendent reality to be present behind the semblance. And from the same intervention there emerges Berkeley’s Rationalism and the possibility offered by the sciences, fundamentally just as we read in the works of Descartes. But transcendent reality, inasmuch as its existence should be acknowledged, is interpreted almost in pandeist terms, while our relationship to it, and hence to God, is conceived as a theosophical one. But Berkeley’s Phenomenalism is essentially pure semblance. Kant calls this empirical or dogmatic idealism.

Fichte’s later approach bears great similarity to that of Berkeley. God is immediately posited as the absolute being, just as the Eleatics imagined this being. Everything else is merely knowledge as an image of the divine being: a being of God outside of his being, not God himself, but his schema. In this image, being is manifold. But since, even if it is an image, it is after all a divine image, it must portray a divine world order. Yet nature is, as in the works of Berkeley, merely the limit of consciousness, and in itself a futile and insubstantial phenomenon that exists only in our conception. In the same way again as in the works of Berkeley, nature is positioned between God on the one side and spirit and consciousness on the other. Later we shall see that in his first philosophy Fichte, working the other way round, derived God from the world order, actually declaring the world order to be God. This Idealism, which dissolves the external world into a semblance and can redeem it only through acceptance of God and his absolute true reality, was taken too far all together, directly in accordance with the works of Berkeley, by the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711 to 1776), who even cast doubt on the authority of our

-----File: 371-----

own power of reason. For our faculty of reason is not something that remains the same; it is constantly changing, a consequence of the substance of our consciousness, not conscious content that actually exists, and so it cannot be claimed that there is a constant existing ego. Only the continuous linking in this succession arouses the semblance of such an ego; in reality we live such a life without ego. Our psychology has no subject, no soul; it consists solely of associated internal phenomena, a statement we shall encounter again later with respect to modern psychologists. Therefore there cannot be said to be something real anywhere in the world, either outside of us or within us; everything is semblance and manifestation, here just as it is there. What the manifestations and the association between them bring forth in us is something we simply do not know. The internal manifestations appear just as they might on the stage at a theatre, but the stage and the director of the play are unfamiliar to us; there is nothing we can state about them. And anything that is asserted about this nevertheless is pure delusion. It is a kind of interpretation of Heraclitus' doctrine in the Eleatic sense, and on this angle of his philosophy Hume can perfectly well be described as a sceptic. Yet he also established a realist system, which we shall encounter later (p. 407 ff), by disregarding anything we cannot lay eyes on, adhering to semblance, and treating this semblance just as he would treat something he took to be solid.

43. Kant's Transcendental Idealism; organized beings and natural purpose.

'What we thus intended to say was that our entire perception is nothing more than the concept of manifestation: that the things we behold are not in themselves what we see them as being, nor are the relationships in themselves between them created exactly as they appear to us; if we suspended our subjective self, or in fact just the subjective structure of the senses, then all structure and all relationships between objects in space and time (and, indeed, even space and time) would vanish, unable to exist as manifestations by themselves, but only within us. We still have no

knowledge at all of how the question might stand with objects, both per se and isolated from all this receptivity in our sensory perception. We know nothing other than our way of perceiving them, which is specific to us, which is also not necessarily given to every creature, although it must be endowed on every human being.' ('Kritik der reinen Vernunft' (*Critique of Pure Reason*), page 66, passage quoted from the excellent edition of this work published by Reclam.) Kant himself calls this conception Idealism, and provided that everything is nevertheless regarded as real he terms it Transcendental or Formal Idealism, while Dogmatic Idealism disclaims aspects of Material Idealism, although Skeptical Idealism merely casts doubt on them. Kant is a transcendental or formal idealist. Space and time (or rather, spatial position and temporality) are the two well-known 'forms of intuition' of reason. 'Of necessity they purely and simply adhere to our sensory perception, a form of which sensations may also be.' Space is the form of intuition of the sense directed outwards, while time is that of the sense directed inwards. In the book mentioned above I believe I have analysed the meaning of these findings to the most meticulous degree, and have proven that the properties of space cannot be exhausted without the concept of causality, and that the peculiar quality of time in events is to be interpreted as a projection of the internal consciousness of change in our activity of the soul outwards. I need to refer to this book, as within it readers will also find certain other distinctions with respect to the different types of space and time. Although space and time are held to be inescapable forms of our intuition both outwards and inwards, they still cannot teach us anything about either the world or the soul. As base concepts, i.e. spatial position and temporality, they are present a priori, 'i.e., prior to all real sensation'; they are 'pure perception.' Sensation, on the other hand, is 'that in our knowledge which causes itself to be termed knowledge a posteriori, i.e. empirical perception'.

-----File: 373-----

A priori base concepts, the significance of which as a priori has so often and so vigorously been denied in the past and is still denied today, play a major role for Kant. I myself believe them to be absolutely indispensable; an external or internal life without, for example, the base concept of causality seems to me to be totally impossible. No animal would eat or drink without this base concept, and no animal would have any sensation at all in response to a stimulus. It is in fact correct that we are not always conscious of the base concepts, but this is irrelevant here. Consciousness simply does not belong to all physical actions. We use many activities of the soul, such as volition, to more or less conscious degrees, but sometimes quite unconsciously. It is true that a great deal takes place within our consciousness that afterwards seems to us to have occurred outside of it, as we had no interest at all in remembering it: for example 'animal' actions, walking, eating, etc., and also logical ones, such as arithmetic done by 'habit.' But if the actions of an animal or a child might also take place unconsciously, by 'instinct' or 'impulse,' the reason for this undoubtedly remains instinct or impulse. And if we do not specify any cause, instinct and impulse remain a priori, innate, and we have gained nothing except something we later drop again in the light of more developed intellect. There needs to be something that actually causes beings to live at the level of the animal, the world and the mind. They have to be equipped with this right at the outset; otherwise, none of these lives is possible as actual life, at least not for anyone who does not see living beings as mere machines coerced into action. Such a view does not need a priori activities of the soul. I need to express myself carefully in saying that there is a necessity for certain a priori activities of the soul, which enter ever more into the consciousness from the lowest creatures upwards and from birth to old age, in both phylogenetic and ontogenetic terms; these activities become increasingly clear, like a thought, a conception, a will, a sensation and so forth, all of which do also begin in a blurred haze and can ultimately come to shine in sharply focused rays. 'Acquired' and 'learnt' are just empty

expressions here, as we will always have to ask where the capacity for acquiring and learning comes from, and will then simply find ourselves back at the a priori. We can give a doll human form and guide it to walk as we wish, but it will not walk by itself, as it does not have within it the ability to do so. But those who also see in living creatures forced external and internal automata (a group to which even the occasionalists really belong) do not, as observed earlier, need the a priori, nor do they need derived concepts, or experience, or anything at all for that matter. I shall round off these comments later (p. 474 f), and will need to cite them then, and so now refer only to what was said earlier (p. 222 f) about the categorical or regulating soul. This is because the a priori is a categorical, regulating factor. It is among Kant's greatest merits that he taught that the innate should be so sharply differentiated from the acquired, by proving how the former must be the unavoidable prerequisite for the latter. He did not emphasize the requisiteness for life in the first place, but it does follow directly from this.

Consequently, there exists a world. It is transcendent. The soul interprets it according to its own categories. What kind of categories these are, apart from space and time, is not something I shall explain at length here. Pure reason tells us that the concepts combining ethical and religious aspects such as God, freedom and immortality do not belong within these categories. They are subject to, among other elements, the antinomies (contradictions) and paralogisms (delusions, conceits and subreptions) of reason. We shall come back to this. Kant often emphasized that the world is real and does not, as we read in the works of Berkeley, dissolve into a semblance of God with which we are inoculated. 'If I say that there appear in space and time both perception of external objects and also perception of one's own disposition, as well as perception of how this disposition affects our senses, i.e., how it presents itself, this does not mean that these objects are merely semblance. This is because objects

-----File: 375-----

in their manifestation, and indeed even the qualities we confer on them, are always regarded as something actually pre-existing; it is just that, provided such a quality is dependent only on how the subjective self is perceived in the relationship to him of the given object, the object in question is differentiated from itself as a manifestation as an object per se. So I am not claiming that bodies merely seem to be outside of myself, or that my soul seems to be present only in my self-consciousness, if I contend that the quality of space and time (i.e. the quality in accordance with which I posit both space and time as a requirement for their existence) is to be found in how I perceive things and not in these objects per se. I would be to blame if I made what I should count as a manifestation into sheer semblance. However, this does not occur in accordance with our principle of the ideality of all of our sensory intuitions,' but, as Kant goes on to explain, precisely in accordance with the principle of the objective reality of the forms of intuition. And he expresses no surprise that Berkeley arrived at the suspension of all objectivity for objects through opposition to this objective reality of the forms of intuition, in that he declared such objective reality to be a mere semblance. He would even have had to pronounce his own existence to be mere semblance. Kant expressed the view that no one had yet been guilty of the latter incongruity; for the peoples of India it was not even incongruous. Kant often voiced the same opinion, and quite emphatically, with respect to the reality of the world, even if it is a transcendent reality and impossible for us to comprehend. The fourth paralogism does relate directly to rejection of the existence of the illusory world. (See below.) Hence, there are things-in-themselves, noumena; these, as they appear to us, are phenomena. All our experiences relate to the latter, whether they are things outside of us or within us. The transposition of our knowledge and suppositions from phenomena to noumena gives rise to those four well-known cosmological antinomies, which can be demonstrated in the statement, the thesis, as well as in the anti-statement, the antithesis, with the same evidence, as in 'The world has a beginning in time and limits in space' and 'The world has no beginning

in time and no limits in space.' Everything consists of simple parts, and only simple things exist; nothing consists of simple parts and nowhere does anything simple exist. Alongside laws, freedom is also fundamental; there is no freedom, there are only laws. There is an absolutely fundamental being, God, who belongs to the world; there exists no being that is absolutely fundamental to the world. In the domain of inner life, this process of transference leads to the four paralogisms, the subreptions, which follow. The soul is not something that can be used to determine any single thing; it is absolute substance. The soul is simple. The soul is personal. There is doubt as to the existence of all objects perceived by external senses (Skeptical or Dogmatic Idealism). The antinomies relate, respectively, to: creation and end or non-creation and non-end of the world, and non-limits or limits of the world; the state of being one or manifoldness of the world; accountability or non-accountability of humans (or good and evil and non-good and non-evil) in the world; God a creator and lord of the world or God a non-creator and non-lord. Again respectively, the paralogisms apply to: existence of a soul to be distinguished from all perceivable objects; immortality of the soul; soul as a special being; non-reality of the world. These are the key discussion points at issue. Only the fourth paralogism leads to a positive outcome: that the non-reality of the world is merely a subreption of the mind. The antinomies are not questions we can resolve. The first three paralogisms amount to a negative. There is actually nothing to be accomplished here with dialectic either; however, science offers some means to enable us to resolve these questions in one sense or another. This will be discussed later.

Let us again return to cosmological circumstances. In the thesis the four antinomies relate to states of completeness, i.e., those of duration and limits, of composition, of existence, and of the absolute. Kant is thus discussing four transcendental ideas. They are cosmological when they relate to the integrity of the conditions

-----File: 377-----

in the world of sensory perception, i.e., the world of phenomena. But the moment we relate them to what is beyond this world of sensory perception, to the noumena, they become to all intents and purposes transcendent. Cosmological ideas are not to be presented *in concreto* for any phenomenon, as they constitute the completion of an empirical sequence. But the transcendent ideas actually diverge from experience; they are based solely on concepts a priori. Nevertheless, writes Kant, it is above all the fourth idea, that of God, that compels us to relate a great deal to a transcendent reality at least, and hence to accept the existence of such a reality. Provided that something can be determined, or has already been determined, through the idea alone, *in individuo*, and hence as an individual, Kant refers to it by the Greek term prototypon (ideal). Certain ideas have creative force, even it is not like Plato's idea of the divine force, but they also have practical force as a regulating principle, and the ideals corresponding to them are 'original models' for these rules. 'These ideals,' writes Kant ('Kritik der reinen Vernunft' (*Critique of Pure Reason*), page 453), 'whether or not we wish to grant them objective reality (existence) in the same way, are not to be regarded as wild notions just because of this; on the contrary, they provide an indispensable standard gauge of reason, and reason requires the concept of what is quite complete its own manner, to enable the degree and the deficiencies of what is imperfect to be estimated and measured accordingly.' And he warns specifically against confusing them with, for example, the created beings of the imagination, 'which, so to speak, amid diverse experiences, make up a floating sketch rather than a definite picture,' or monograms, as he puts it. Such a transcendent ideal is the thing-in-itself as the universal property of reality, *ens realissimum*, in that it forms the basis of universal determination, which is, of necessity, encountered in everything that exists. This ideal 'is, however, also the only real ideal of which human reason is capable, because it is only in this single instance that a concept of a thing that is universal in itself is universally determined in terms of itself, and recognized as

the concept of an individual.' Such as ideal is thus the prototype of all things which, as after-images (ectypes) all together, take material from the ideal according to whatever is possible for them, and while they might approximate to the ideal to a greater or lesser degree, they still fall infinitely short of becoming perfect copies of it. In reason there is the 'possibility of all things,' and hence the 'primordial being (*ens originarium*),' the 'highest being (*ens summum*)' and the 'being of all beings (*ens entium*).' 'The concept of such a being is that of God conceived in the transcendent mind.' However, this again does all lie solely in reason; the objective existence of a 'being of such exceptional virtue' is something we cannot regard as certain at all. And, although Kant thus acknowledges the existence of the necessity of such an ideal in reason – this ideal, however, actually being nothing other than the single idea of all reality – he still presents his well-known reasons against all supposed 'proofs' of the existence of God. And this is where we remain with regard to pure reason. Our 'hypostatizing of this idea of the embodiment of all reality occurs because in dialectic terms we transform distributive unity in the use of experience of the mind into collective unity in an entirety of experience, and conceive of this entirety of the manifestation as a single thing that contains all empirical reality within itself, which then, through ... transcendent subreption, becomes confused with the concept of a thing which is in the forefront of the possibility of all things; it is for the universal determination of all things that this thing presents the real prerequisites.' The sequence runs thus: realization, hypostatization, and then personification. 'Reason is driven by an inclination of its nature to go beyond the application of experience, to venture out in pure application, through bare ideas, to the outermost limits of all new knowledge, and only to find rest in the completion of its circle, in a systematic whole existing in its own right.' But this simply does not provide any objective existence; that is to say, it is not proven. Some scholars – materialists in particular – have expressed the view that Kant actually rejected God, the soul, etc., and that he demonstrated that in the face of pure reason they

-----File: 379-----

cannot exist. This is a total misunderstanding. He merely explained that the existence of these elements cannot be proven from pure reason. Nowhere did he say that these things are not in existence at all even as things-in-themselves; this would go as far as to be inconsistent with his transcendental viewpoint, which he so often emphasizes. This is because all this does belong to transcendent reality. If for this reason he makes use of it in 'Kritik der practischen Vernunft' (*Critique of Practical Reason*), and discusses those things as regulating principles in practical terms, he remains entirely within his system and does not diverge from it in any way. Something characteristic of this is how he speaks of free will. If we could track all human actions back to their reason, we would find a continuous sequence of cause and effect, and even be able, from the conditions for each action, to predict whether it would be an essential one. Therefore, 'there is no freedom in respect of our empirical character.' Nevertheless, we also have transcendent 'intelligible character'; as there is no question of a natural causality here, these same actions can, in line with their cause, be completely free. We can just not prove that, interpreted in this way, they are free, as the transcendent lies beyond all experience. But to demonstrate that they are not free, as understood in transcendental terms, is something we cannot do either, for the same reason. And this is true of all high ideas and high ideals, and also has a bearing on Kant's 'Categorical Imperative,' and Schiller's 'Du kannst, denn du sollst' (*You can, for you ought*). Incidentally, the great philosopher himself acknowledged that his system constitutes a dualism; this is to be found in its distinction of the transcendent world from the empirical, in the supposition that both worlds exist, and also in practical terms in the acceptance of the existence of God and the world, or the existence of the spirit and the world, and so forth.

The third great critique, 'Kritik der Urteilskraft' (*Critique of Judgement*), also contains a cosmological regulative principle: teleology, the concept of purposiveness. This principle relates to the ordering of things (e.g. in families, strains, species, genera, etc.) and to the transition of the divisions into one another,

the ordering of events – those of state, individual events, electrical ones, etc. – and lastly the ordering of causes. This means that the term is fundamentally intended to simplify our overall view of nature through the pulling together of divisions and the establishing of connections between them, and through interpretation of the world order from the viewpoint of a uniformity and a purpose. Such a concept of the intellect itself is not required, but it is necessary for there to be a concept of the power of judgement; where this concept determines a condition a priori under which alone things can become objects of our acquired knowledge, it constitutes a transcendent principle. However, the principle of judgement is a subjective one, for it is not to nature as such that the concept of purposiveness is subjected, and it is not specified by nature; rather, the power of judgement pre-sets for itself a law for reflection on nature. 'The judgement to which this principle relates is not one of determining or defining, but merely one of reflection. The only thing desired is that (while, in accordance with its universal laws, nature may be set up in any arrangement it will) one must trace the empirical laws of nature entirely according to this principle and the maxims based on it, because it is only within the same scope as is occupied by this principle that we can use our intellect to make progress and acquire new knowledge.' We see how exceptionally cautiously Kant introduces this principle of teleology. By no means does he present it as a principle of nature itself. He does not even rank it among his categories. Purposiveness is not a constituent principle of the derivation of the products of nature, not a new causality, which would make it belong to pure reason and serve the purposes of intuition, but just a regulative principle, only for reflective judgement. The concept of causality compels us to contemplate nature; that of purposiveness enables us only to make an evaluation of it. To the extent that discernment can be traced back to sensations (inclination, aversion, beauty, unsightliness, etc.), purposiveness is subjective (or formal) and is the object of aesthetic judgement. But if it is founded on intellect and reason, where it is a question of specific conditions 'in which something (e.g.

-----File: 381-----

an organized body) is to be evaluated according to the idea of a purpose of nature,' purposiveness is termed objective (or real). We know that man has always concerned himself with both kinds of purposiveness: the world and life are to be directed on the one hand towards a harmonic beauty, and on the other to purposeful development and order. In another form the principle is carved up into the three principles of regularity, more restricted purposiveness, and purpose, and its application is allocated to the intellect, to discernment and to reason. All the above follow from the universal transcendent principle. I have to pass over the further distinctions, which are tremendously sharp, fine ones, as I lack space to comment on these.

I would like to emphasize just one concept: that of organized beings. These are seen as 'things as purposes of nature.' Such a thing has to 'behave reciprocally towards itself as cause and effect.' But a thing is a purpose of nature if its parts 'are possible only by means of their relationship to the whole,' so that, just as any part 'is there only by means of all the others,' it also exists as a 'producing organ' 'for the sake of the others and the whole.' This definition excludes any artificial products. We can make ourselves a machine, complete with boiler, firebox and throttle valves, which keeps itself in action by continuing to pump water into its own boiler, pouring more coal into the firebox and also regulating its own working: a total automaton. It functions and (indirectly) causes its effect. Indeed, we can even think of the machine as set up in such a way that, at the levels of physics and chemistry, it replaces, removes and produces parts. Does the above definition make it an organized being? Not at all! It resembles one such as man in external activities, such as walking, turning and so on, and in the uptake and discharge of materials, as well as in the regulating of external functions, although in this case only to the extent that force is required or surplus and this force is regulated through the absorption and discharge of materials. Ultimately it also resembles an organized being in aspects such as the adding and removing of parts and the

replacing of them with artificial ones. But what is lacking is the essential thing: the creating of each part from itself, the creation of the form, and its growth and maintenance, in every aspect, from itself. It is in making this specific requirement that Kant elevates the organized body, which is indeed also a machine, to the level of an organized being, a being endued with life, which no machine can be. Much unnecessary argument would be avoided if the modern adherents of automata among the materialists and philosophers would take the lucid explanations of Kant to heart. Not even the simplest and least important living organisms are automata, let alone humans. Descartes was completely wrong to explain away plants and animals as such, and modern mechanists and sensationalists make an even bigger mistake when they also include man in these discussions. In his informative book 'Philosophie des Organischen' (*Philosophy of Organic Matter*) Driesch treats the matter much too indulgently when he explains that, if a living organism were to be a machine, then each of its parts, even the smallest, would have to be the same machine, and that, in conjunction with the correlation between these parts, such a machine the same as it, composed of an infinite number of identical machines, is inconceivable. What is critical is how effectively organized beings function from the inside outwards and their effect on themselves, on their own form, their own existence and their own life; this is not even achieved by the small machines that each cell might be taken to be, or even for each part of a cell, as in unicellular creatures, and (this being the main point) neither is it possible for a machine (e.g. a locomotive, the wheels, pistons, tank, throttle valves etc., of which would all be locomotives, entirely and in every part in the same way), which would be something else inconceivable to us. This is because, as Kant yet again emphasized, since our method of thinking is discursive, not intuitive, we are not capable of deducing the construction process from the complete finished form according to laws. This is precisely where purpose makes an entrance, and in the finished form we have a natural purpose for power of judgement, as an organized entity if this organized entity corresponds to the above determinations of Kant, and an entity that is not organized if emergence, growth,

-----File: 383-----

and maintenance take place from the outside as positive or negative processes, as in a crystal or in pseudo cells.

It is always the stable final form of the living organism we consider, not the one emerging, the one developing or the one maintaining its existence. In a finished form some things may appear like machines, whereas development and maintenance switch the machine off completely. This observation, supported by Kant's interpretations, is of tremendous importance for the fundamental distinction between the world with life and that without, and may also totally uncouple both the former and the latter from external conditions, even if this takes place in accordance with Darwinian principles, in their most highly exaggerated form. 'But inner completeness of nature,' writes Kant ('Kritik der Urteilskraft' (*Critique of Judgement*), edition with explanations by von Kirchmann, page 249), 'as is found in things that can only possibly exist as natural purposes and are therefore called organized beings, is not to be conceived or explained by any analogy of any physical (i.e. natural) capacity known to us – indeed, as we ourselves belong to nature in the broadest sense, it cannot even be interpreted through a precisely commensurate analogy with human skill.' And this is valid, despite all the empty phrases produced on the part of the mechanists and others and all the allusions to machines of by far the most marvelous kinds and degrees of perfection, and references to crystals and artificial cells. Anything originating from the inside outwards, and anything produced from itself towards the outside (even if through ingested materials being utilized) is always absent and according to our concepts cannot exist unless something new is added to the physical, i.e. simply the psychological, which accomplishes the natural purpose from the inside outwards. Driesch distinguishes a threefold harmony in the development of beings: harmony in the circumstances in which the parts develop into an individual whole, even if they develop independently of each other, as with the muscles and nerves in the human body; harmony of causality, where the formative causes affect precisely the parts developing towards the final form, although each of these

parts can develop along quite different courses; and harmony of function, which means that all functions engage with each other to produce a uniform effect. These three harmonies constitute Kant's natural purpose. Their effect appears to be physical, but their function in development and maintenance could under no circumstances be interpreted as physical in the usual sense of the word. Even a machine is an automaton only when it becomes a finished object, since it did not build itself; it was built by humans and they have to maintain it. If one also sets out to rank the psychological among the physical, so be it. It does belong to the world. But what does not impinge upon the special position of the psychological is that it simply creates from the inside outwards, and creates inwards and outwards, since everything else only draws itself from the outside towards the surface, and from the surface outwards. At best, spontaneous physical and chemical reactions could be cited as similar instances. But apart from the fact that even in this case the similarity is only a very superficial one, of the kind anyone could work out for himself, we shall see later how entirely different the life process is from the reactions described – indeed, how in part it runs precisely counter to these. And this also emerges even from the fact that those reactions are simply reactions, but organization is directed towards, and achieves, the opposite: perpetual creation of the same and maintenance of the same, although through physicochemical assimilation and dissimilation. This will be discussed further later.

Natural purpose should not be confused with purposiveness; something totally inappropriate to our meaning may also be a case of natural purpose, such as a totally helpless child not being given assistance to live in its first few months. This is because the purpose has not yet actually been attained, or has been attained only as far as this thing itself is concerned, but not yet as far as its relationship to the external world demands. Even in this regard, although Kant expresses himself in definite terms, he does so very carefully. The example of organized nature leads to the implicitly

-----File: 385-----

subjective maxim of natural purpose being extended and expressed thus: ‘Everything in the world is good for some purpose, and nothing exists in the world for no reason; the model nature provides for its organic products entitles us – indeed, calls upon us – to expect of nature and its laws nothing other than what is simply functionally appropriate.’ And he intends this to be understood as a whole, for he also cites as examples things that are not functionally appropriate for anything individual, such as toxins, vermin and so on. We are thus called upon to expect functional appropriateness in toto. What Kant lacked in his time, i.e. the incorporation of purposiveness into natural science, has been partially made up for in recent times. Through his studies, unsurpassed and still unparalleled in their completeness (as far as possible at the time) and comprehensive depth, he himself alone performed tremendous preliminary work on the composition and structure of the world. He also prepared the ground for modern developmental science, for which he was even referred to and enlisted as a precursor of Darwin. We now take our leave of this great man, whose system belongs as a critical element to every system, and must belong there. Eugen Dühring’s comments on Kant are totally unfathomable for a man who is himself of such intellectual eminence.

44. I and non-I; thesis, antithesis and synthesis; natural philosophy.

Under this heading we shall discuss the approaches of the immediate Post-Kantians. Yet these can be covered very quickly, as they are not a fruitful continuation in the development of the teachings of the master, but actually an abduction of his doctrines into the undergrowth of dialectic. In his first philosophy Fichte (1762 to 1814) presents himself as more of an idealist than Kant. He takes the ‘I’ alone as his starting point, regarding it as the first principle; a ‘non-I’ then has to correspond to this as the second principle, while the third principle is the reaction of the I against the non-I. We thus have an unconditional truth: I is I, or I am. This provides identity or reality:

it is the thesis of identity (reality). It is this thesis that reveals every internal activity. The I posits itself, solely by means of itself alone. The second truth runs thus: non-I is not I, and so this truth leads to negation. The second truth is no longer unconditional, as the first is, since alongside the non-I there is posited an I, which has to be present; however, this truth is absolute according to form, and according to content, the precise moment the I is posited. The third truth provides delimitation, in that the oppositeness existing between the first two truths (the word 'contradiction' is even used, although I see no such antagonism, the truths actually being merely coordinated and having no connection at all with each other) is counterbalanced. This truth runs: I partly non-I, if non-I partly I. This is pure symbolic mathematics. This truth gains value only through instances of empirical definition, and is thus also drawn from and objectified through empirical consciousness. Either the non-I is a separate active agent and, in causal terms, the reason for the 'suffering' of the I, or it does not exist per se, but rather the I switches in its activity, is limited, and interprets this limitedness as being subject to a non-I. The latter instance leads us to dogmatic idealism; the former is thought to represent dogmatic realism, although I am unable to understand why it should not be capable of constructing Transcendental Idealism. The feeling of limitedness (p. 338) is like a reflection of I activity back to the I. And it is through this that there emerges the concept of there being something else outside of the I, against which the I cannot be extended. In deciding in favor of this interpretation of Idealism, Fichte in fact places Kant's thing-in-itself in the I itself, and instead presenting the unfathomable in the limitedness of the I as a new element, which achieves nothing for the simplification of the approach. Furthermore, we might ask in vain how an I existing alone could ever have any consciousness of such limitedness. If an I exists alone, it really is totally complete. It is

-----File: 387-----

quite probable that this ultimately pushed Fichte entirely towards Berkeley's deistic Idealism, his subsequent philosophy, which has already been discussed (p. 358). But in his early philosophy Fichte proceeds on a path even more radical than that of Kant in some respects; he even leaves God aside completely. 'The moral world order is that of the divine whose existence we accept.'

Of the many concepts in the works of Schelling (1775 to 1854), his first aligns fully with the views developed by Fichte. He later conceded an objective existence for the thing-in-itself in the sense of Kant, and even went so far as to claim close similarity between this thing and the idea in ourselves. Where he did determine the idea according to the thing, he still arrived at the customary dogmatic realism. Where he did the opposite, aligning the thing to the idea, the result was Idealism in the style of Kant; however, where he stayed neutral between the two, he strayed on to Spinoza's approach. The latter is what he did, so he also represented Spinoza's approach in the philosophy of identity, which we shall encounter later. We have seen that in developing his concepts further Schelling also became an adherent of mysticism and subscribed to Jakob Böhme's theosophy. He finally even aligned himself with Positive Philosophy. All this should not lead us to reproach him; it was simply that he did not find satisfaction in any approach, and his aptitude, which fundamentally erred towards the methodical, was not sufficient to enable him to create an approach of his own. However, we can blame Schelling more than the scholars Hegel and von Herbart, whom we shall discuss in a short while, for the somewhat chaotic preoccupation with scientific knowledge, and also for the arbitrary analogizing of the intellectual with the physical, due to which, as is well known, this whole philosophy and particularly its most significant part, natural philosophy, fell into total disrepute, so that it was precisely the naturalists who turned away from it in loathing, and natural philosophy was still frowned upon up until almost recent times. What is still of value today is, also following the works of Fichte, Schelling's distinction between this natural philosophy and transcendental philosophy. In the former nature is posited as the first thing, and the question is how it permeates into

what is intelligent in the subject; in the latter the intelligence of the subject is the primary thing, and it remains to be decided how nature comes into being from this intelligence. The answer to the first question is contained in Kant's Principle of Judgement (p. 367), while the second question is answered in his Transcendental Idealism. Schelling proceeds more empirically; he elevates an empirical principle, the inner necessity of which is recognized, to the level of an a priori statement: 'Empiricism, extended to the point of absoluteness, is natural philosophy.' Not many will agree with this definition. Otherwise, a theoretical natural philosophy must be distinguished from a practical one; the former is once again transcendental philosophy, since in general everything that is absolute is transcendent. Schelling does however contend that one can even recognize the absolute in nature. I would not know how this could occur in empirical terms. Even we who have pursued study of the uniformity of the processes and materials in nature to a fine level of detail in this way cannot ascertain any absolute unity in nature; we cannot even establish probability for everything, including the psychological. Consider how even the law of inertia is now faltering, and how universal gravitation is falling into doubt; even the law of substance and energy is no longer a certain truth. Knowledge about nature can simply never reach the point of unconditionality: perhaps not only because experiences are always incomplete, but simply because the world changes constantly and it is always only the 'now' that is at our disposal, not the 'before' or the 'after.' A natural philosophy can thus be only transcendental or empirical. In the former case it actually belongs with transcendental philosophy; in the latter it is an ordinary empirical science. We unite both types in our 'natural philosophies,' but only for the sake of the greatest degree of completion possible, and because of the maxim of purposiveness of the power of judgement, which, as we know, presupposes nothing, and acts only as a guide.

The way in which Hegel (1770-1831) develops the various levels of the spirit is very informative, but his work also gives this illustration more of a

-----File: 389-----

methodical value, just as his entire philosophical system is actually basically methodology. He also posits real and ideal worlds. But the way they function by themselves and their behavior towards each other is interpreted in terms of the logical idea forming the basis of the world, and of development in accordance with this idea. This logical idea is not the nous of Anaxagoras, nor is it Logos, which is well known from other contexts. Logos acts in a specific way, i.e. in compliance with the three principles of Fichte, or perhaps more correctly in accordance with those of Jakob Böhme. We have seen how, in this man, God disunited himself from himself, and how what had become disunited should then rise again in its development towards identity. Quite appropriately, Hegel expresses the opinion that every concept becomes disunited from itself and thus turns into its opposite, so as to balance out with it in a higher unity. The concept posited is the thesis, and that produced through turning into the opposite is the antithesis, while the balancing out in the higher unity is the synthesis. The universe thus proceeds in constant development from thesis to antithesis, then to synthesis, and from this eventually to new antithesis, synthesis etc. Such circular processes are no doubt familiar to the naturalist. But this is not how Hegel intended it. His view is purely transcendental: the idea is turned around completely in nature – or partially, insofar as there are things in nature that do not follow natural laws, and are perhaps subject to chance, where such a random thing is an idea. Both idea and nature are united in the higher entity of the spirit, which is dependent on nature, is in contrast with nature, and perceives nature. Accordingly, the spirit constitutes the idea which has returned into itself from its own externalization. Just as, owing to its dependence on the idea, the essence of nature is necessity and randomness, that of the spirit is freedom, with independence from everything external. But the spirit develops on three levels: as the subjective spirit, with respect to its behavior towards nature (neutral, passive, or opposing); as the objective spirit, which relates to what is universal in the expressions of human common life (ethics, morality, justice, and behavior towards the state, society and family, etc.); and as the absolute spirit, which as a perspective relates to art and science, as a concept refers to

religion, and as reason is associated with the formation of concepts (philosophy). As good as these distinctions may be, they do not really teach us anything with respect to what is fundamental. There is nothing we can do with statements such as 'Nature is the 'idea in the form of otherness'.' Where does the idea originate? How are we to interpret it: as transcendent reason of all being and thinking, approximately like the 'reason of God'? How is the way it turns completely into its opposite to be interpreted in nature? Are we to use the concepts based on Gnosticism and theosophy for this, or is it all, in its entirety, simply something posited? This has more meaning when religion is described as thinking of the absolute, as 'being in God's knowledge with him,' so that knowledge of God ensues. When it is then determined more precisely that religion is 'knowledge by oneself of the divine spirit through the intervention of the finite spirit,' the divine spirit has to be fixed within us, and were it not for the 'idea,' which so suddenly appears, we would have a normal form of Pandeism. I have already stressed that methodology is what is essential to Hegel's system, and it was in methodology that Hegel achieved something of great significance. His scientific processes of systematization can therefore not simply be rejected. But none of this belongs within this topic.

The theologian Schleiermacher (1768-1834), a man distinguished in his thinking, is a figure I should mention immediately here. This is because he also writes of something like thesis and antithesis, but in a more empirical way, in that he expresses the view that, as our thinking is bound up with perceptions, it is always moving in opposites and never reaches the stage of there being no opposite, i.e. the ultimate synthesis in the sense found in the works of Hegel. Alongside Kant he acknowledges the existence of a transcendent reason of all being and thought, although he continues more within the interpretation of Spinoza's system, which he places at a very high level. But his doctrine of individuality is like an excerpt from Leibniz's monadology. Each individual, each human being, constitutes a being for itself, a 'specifically peculiar and original representation of the world.' But it is for this reason that a human is also a 'compendium' of his entire genus, of humanity, so that in this humanity he 'beholds his own ego multiplied, more clearly distinguished, and eternalized, as it were, in all its changes.'

-----File: 391-----

‘The spirit is the first and the only one, the whole world merely the spirit’s self-created mirror (p. 370), simply the great shared body of humanity.’ It is difficult to understand what this is supposed to convey; perhaps it is to be interpreted in Spinozist terms.

45. The world as will and representation; Pessimism, philosophy of the unconscious, and modern Idealism.

Arthur Schopenhauer (born 1788 in Danzig, died 1860 in Frankfurt am Main), a quite exceptional man, is the only philosopher really to have succeeded in enhancing Kant’s system. As in the work of Kant, he sees the world as a transcendent object. The only things we have of it are our concepts. Schopenhauer believes he is a more vigorous advocate of this viewpoint than Kant. The reproaches he makes in this work, claiming that in the second edition of his ‘Kritik der reinen Vernunft’ (*Critique of Pure Reason*) Kant had abandoned his transcendent and idealistic viewpoint, are, however, unjustified. Even in the second edition of Kant’s fundamental work the thing-in-itself is not an object that is ever bound to world view and categories; rather, it is what is transcendent behind the concepts, and what is real. Schopenhauer reduces all categories to causality. The thing-in-itself is in fact the fundamental category (p. 361). Together, causality, space and time are thus the prerequisites, a priori, of all concepts. And the world is, above all, an idea under these conditions. ‘The world is my representation,’ begins Schopenhauer’s masterwork ‘Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung’ (*The World as Will and Representation*). However, this alone cannot treat objects exhaustively. The philosopher returns as a naturalist, which he indeed also is, to the part of the world which is the human body. And there he finds that, alongside the idea, there exists something else with respect to this body through which it is interpreted in various ways in *toto genere*. In my book ‘Philosophische Grundlagen usf.’ (*Philosophical Foundations, etc.)* I chose the term ‘Körperbewußtsein’ (*body consciousness*) for this concept. According to Schopenhauer, it is will. The body is entirely subject to what we know as will in ourselves, in particular: it moves, and parts of it move. But this is by no means to be understood as

the will being the cause resulting in the body moving; rather, the two are totally connected with each other. Movement and will are one act. ‘The act of will and the action of the body are not two conditions objectively recognized as different, connected by the bond of causality, and they are not in a cause-and-effect relationship, but they are one and the same, just produced in two completely different ways: one quite directly and one in the perception for the mind. An action of the body is nothing more than an objectified act of the will, i.e. one that has entered into this perception.’ Indeed, the entire body is nothing other than the objectified will, i.e. that which has become the idea (= perception). Schopenhauer thus interprets the body as the ‘objectivity of the will.’ Hence, the body is a dual entity: a mere idea in space, in time and according to causality, and an objectivity of the will. Schopenhauer also draws other things into this objectivity of the will, as he ranks feelings such as inclination and aversion, pain, contentment and so on within the objectification of the will. ‘But we would be completely wrong to call pain and sensual pleasure ideas: by no means are they ideas, but first-hand ‘affects’ of the will in its physical manifestation, the body: a forced instantaneous volition or unwillingness from the impression the body undergoes.’ Earlier in his work he expresses the opinion that there is ‘on the other hand each influence on the body, and also influence on the will in direct terms: as such we call this pain when it is contrary to the will, and a feeling of wellbeing or sensual pleasure when it is in keeping with the will.’ I admit I cannot quite follow this. From the impression that unquestionably exists, unwillingness and volition seem to me very different from perception itself, more a concomitant phenomenon than the very object. But this might be the case, as Schopenhauer evidently conceives will in a very broad sense, alongside the mind (which is the ideas),

-----File: 393-----

as a second element in the ego. I do not know whether objectivity between body and will is not also regarded as a reciprocal objectivity, body being objectivity of the will, and will being objectivity of the body. But it may well be something to be posited. For he goes on to say, 'I perceive my will not in the whole, not as an entity, not totally according to its essential nature, but I perceive it solely in its individual acts, and hence in time, which is the form of the phenomenon in my body, as it is in every object; therefore the body is a requirement for the perception of my will. Consequently, I really cannot conceive of this will without my body.' This would thus indeed make body and will into objectivity, or still requirements, one of the other. This perception can only be proven if 'elevated to knowledge of reason, or transferred into perception *in abstracto*.' But by its very nature perception cannot be demonstrated, as it is itself 'the most direct' element. And perception is all the more significant when it relates to two quite incommensurable things: the body, which is 'a vivid idea,' and the will, which 'is not an idea at all, but something distinct from an idea in its entire character.' This is just like the relationship between body and spirit we see elsewhere. He calls that knowledge 'the philosophical truth (κὰτ' ἐξοχήν).' He brings into connection with the objectivity of the will what Kant referred to as natural purpose, and it emerges from this perhaps even more clearly that machines are not to be compared at all with organized beings (p. 369).

The parts of the body have to correspond completely to the main desires through which the will manifests itself; they have to be the visible expression of these. Teeth, pharynx and intestinal canal are objectified hunger, and the genitalia are objectified sexual drive, while gripping hands and swift feet correspond to the more indirect striving of the will, an activity they represent. Just as the universal human form corresponds to the universal human will, the individual incorporated body corresponds to the individually modified will, and to the character of the individual; this individual incorporated body is thus distinctive and deeply expressive throughout and in all

its parts.' The latter does of course hold true even more as we go from species to species, from genus to genus and so forth.

Up to now we have spoken of things that have idea and will. What is the situation with other things we designate as inanimate? This requires a more precise discussion of what 'will' means. Will totally lacks condition or reason. It is subject neither to causality nor to any perspective beyond its objectification. 'But the thing-in-itself is solely the will.' 'It is from the will that there arises everything connected with ideas or related to objects, together with manifestation, visibility, and objectivity.' Will is hence the transcendent described by Kant. In objective terms he conceived in the most distinct possible way that which we usually call will, or the will of man. This distinction between will per se and objective will in objectivity provides Schopenhauer with the opportunity to unite transcendent freedom with objective lack of freedom in the same way as Kant does. Furthermore, as will per se has no foundation, it is not led by ideas, although it is accompanied by them. Hence, will-in-itself should not be confused with objective conscious will. It is will, whether in conscious or in unconscious actions. This is of great significance when we consider how much in our bodies, and even in our mental activities, takes place unconsciously. Therefore, what we call impulse and instinct are also just will-in-itself that has entered into the phenomenon. Objective will has always been compared with the forces in nature. Schopenhauer turns the relationship round and places the forces beneath the phenomena of the transcendent will. He intends to 'know every force in nature conceived as will.' By doing this he believes he has attributed a less-known thing to a more well-known one. We have to concede this without argument. Now, although we can speak of neither freedom nor lack of freedom for the transcendent will, freedom is impossible for the objectified will, as will is of course the object of something else, so the forces also act according to rigid laws without any freedom. This then clears the way for the rest of nature.

-----File: 395-----

The manner in which the body behaves towards the will is actually just how nature behaves towards the will, which occurs in a phenomenon as objective will or as such forces. Hence, all of nature is objectivity of the will in its various manifestations. And just as body and will per se are incommensurable, so, in fact, are nature and will. 'This is because there is something in each thing in nature for which no reason can ever be specified, no explanation can be possible, and no further cause is to be sought: this is the specific type of way in which it functions, i.e. simply its type of existence, its being. In fact there is a cause to be demonstrated for every individual effect of a thing, and from this cause it follows that the thing had to act at this precise time, at this precise place; however, there is never a demonstrable cause for the thing actually acting, or acting precisely in this way.' In the form of weight, impenetrability, magnetization, etc., a thing shows 'that unfathomable something'; 'however, in my view this 'something' is to the thing what a human being's will (the transcendent) is to him, and, just like the will, in accordance with its inner being, it is not subject to interpretation; indeed, it is as such identical to the will.' This philosopher then compares the character of the individual human being with the essential quality (*forma substantialis*) of an individual thing, and interprets this quality exactly as he does the human character. Schopenhauer also writes that the will is only one entity, the thing-in-itself, 'the being-in-itself'; the multitude as we perceive them, i.e. the phenomena, arise from the forms of perception that constitute space and time. The objectification of the will therefore has countless levels, revealed in the innumerable individuals, and 'existing as the unaccomplished patterns for these individuals or as the eternal forms of things, not themselves emerging into time and space, the medium of the individuals, but established, not subject to any change, always being, never having become, while the former (i.e., the individuals) come into being and fade away; they are always becoming and never are.' And these levels of objectification, writes Schopenhauer, are nothing other than what Plato calls ideas, a concept he illustrates in yet more detail. But the levels of objectification lead from the lowest to the highest, from the inanimate, through plants and animals, to

mankind. And the world order, in terms of the individual as well as relations between each individual and every other one, stems from the fact that there is indeed a will, to which all the levels of objectification belong, and this will objectifies itself in everything. Schopenhauer says of this being, 'whatever it might be,' that the infinite extent of the world belongs entirely to the manifestation of this being, 'whereas it itself is present, wholly and undivided, in every single thing in nature, in everything that lives.' His approach is not far removed from those of the three greatest metaphysicians: Plato, Spinoza and Kant. But his immortal renown is derived from how he breathes the life familiar to us into the transcendent being through the 'will'.

All of nature is thus one colossal life, filled through and through with will to live. 'Everything presses on and drives towards existence,' we read. It becomes apparent particularly in animal nature 'that will to live is the prevailing tone of this nature's being, the only immutable and unconditional characteristic of nature.' Using the knowledge of his time, Schopenhauer even ascribes a *generatio aequivoca* to this tempestuous urge, especially the urge for organic life. He also attributes to it 'the dreadful alarm and furious turmoil found in it (i.e., in matter) if, in any kind of individual manifestation, it is to drain from existence, particularly where this existence emerges in clear consciousness. This is no different from the entire world being wiped out forever in this individual manifestation.' The will to live is therefore 'what cannot be explained any further, but has become legend formed on the basis of every manifestation.' And this will is 'like the absolute, the infinite, the idea and similar other expressions, far from being an empty torrent of words.' The will is the 'single most real thing' known to us, indeed the 'kernel of reality itself.' But what is just as lacking in foundation as the will is this striving and rushing for life. And rage against life thus seems never to be satisfied and it seems it never will be satisfied, blindly pushing through the tide of the manifestations. This is why the world is incomplete. More than that, it is an evil world, not the best one, according to Leibniz, but the worst of all.

-----File: 397-----

This philosophy thus fades into Schopenhauer's peculiar pessimism and his loathing of life. Such as attitude was apparently sustained by his philosophical system, but particularly by his somber frame of mind, which he did indeed share with so many great men who, nauseated by all that goes on in the world, plough their own lonely furrow through the days. His acquaintance with the teachings of the Upanishads must also have contributed to this pessimism. He was very enthusiastic about these doctrines, as anyone who perceives their depth has to be. But he cannot have found any solace in his system, as Indian peoples, and Buddhists in particular, do, because when we read his teachings on the struggle of the will to live his system shows that this struggle is a lost cause. The world is simply the will to live, since the beginning and for all eternity. And the only thing that could be the 'miracle' that would put this will to rest would be the annihilation of the will itself, which would indeed be out of the question for a transcendent thing-in-itself working without an even higher being, on which the world does not depend in Schopenhauer's system.

Schopenhauer's doctrine constitutes philosophy of identity, but not true Monism. I have not been able to find correlations to the philosophy of Fichte in every part of it, as has been claimed. We also know how deprecatingly Schopenhauer behaved towards the Fichte-Schelling-Hegel triad and was obliged to react with his life-based philosophy against the almost meaningless dialectic of these predecessors, whom he quite often mocked. The phenomenal composer Richard Wagner might be described as having been an adherent of Schopenhauer.

It is well known that the will plays a very prominent role in the system of Friedrich Nietzsche (born 1844 in Röcken, died 1900). But as this author working among philosophers deals almost exclusively with mankind and with life, he regards the will as having significance only in respect of mankind and with regard to life. And even here, the will refers only to how individual humans behave in life and how the whole of humanity conducts itself. However, the outstanding things this great man wrote about do not belong to this domain. In purely philosophical

matters Nietzsche is also probably to be ranked among the phenomenalists and the philosophical naturalists, whom we shall discuss later. He even declared the internal world to be phenomenalistic (p. 356), assuming this was not intended in metaphorical poetic terms. However, he seems to me to be more inclined towards the mystics in the sense of Indian doctrines, i.e. according to Schopenhauer's interpretation. What he writes about the recurrent repetitive cycles of the world has a ring of this approach to it. However, Nietzsche did not imagine these cycles quite in the same sense as the Indian peoples, with whose doctrines we are familiar, as they believe the world perpetually repeats itself in exactly the same manner, so that everything would go through the same existence over and over again for eternity. Max Stirner (who wrote under the pen name Kaspar Schmitt, died 1856) is designated a forerunner to him in his own actual domain.

In the preface to his 'Philosophie des Unbewußten' (*Philosophy of the Unconscious*) Eduard von Hartmann (born 1842 in Berlin, died 1906) writes, 'I gladly confess that it was reading Leibniz that first prompted me to undertake the studies recorded in this work.' If this is to be interpreted ad verbum, we would owe Hartmann's philosophy to a misunderstanding: see page 344 above, which discusses the unconscious in the teaching of Leibniz. This philosophy is actually no continued development of Leibniz's doctrine, particularly not in its central point; it is the doctrine of Schopenhauer, with a further principle, although not included in Schopenhauer's teachings, but therefore directly complicating it greatly, i.e. that of the purposiveness of the whole, while the full expression of the will in the individual is entirely in the style of Schopenhauer, as he does equate this expression with the ideas of Plato (p. 383). The two principles of Schopenhauer, idea and will, are also principles of Hartmann: he distinguishes between the conscious and the unconscious in the world and finds that consciousness is 'the possibility of the emancipation of the intellect from the will,' while idea and will are 'linked in inseparable unity' in the unconscious. In the unconscious 'nothing that is not ideated can be willed, and nothing that is not willed can be ideated.' Yet

-----File: 399-----

will and idea are both unconscious. It is of unquestionably great credit to Hartmann that he pursued and explored the role of the unconscious so painstakingly via the organic world, which is indeed a principal consideration here. He refers to all the knowledge available in physiology, biology, anatomy, physics etc. and processes it exhaustively. The conclusions are the following.

1. It is the unconscious that forms, maintains and restores the organism and also directs all its activities and their application for the conscious will.
2. The unconscious gives the living organism the instincts for perception through the senses, and for the formation of speech and states, etc., for which conscious thought alone is not sufficient.
3. It maintains the species through the sexual drive, adapts living organisms to their conditions and humans in particular to their narrative, and takes completeness to the highest degree possible.
4. It often guides the actions by means of presentiments and feelings.
5. It fosters conscious thought through its promptings (intuition?).
6. It produces pleasure in the being, through a sense of beauty and by means of artistic creation.

All this depends on whether it relates to everything, as we are quite often in doubt as to what takes place in ourselves unconsciously and what consciously. And when Hartmann expresses the view that the conscious is accompanied by memory, while the unconscious is not, this is of course a very misleading criterion. But either the other criteria are of no use to us because they are unverifiable, such as unconscious thought being possible only in a non-sensory form, or else they are not accurate, such as the criterion that ‘the unconscious cannot err.’ It very often errs, as we can see in abundance in miscarriages, malformations, logical fallacies in dreams, false impulses when one is awake etc. But what he means is: it does not err under the given conditions, which is in fact correct, but then we simply have something else we cannot verify. So not all criteria are always accurate or verifiable. And when we read (Philosophie des Unbewußten (Philosophy of the Unconscious), 9th Edition, Volume II, page 4) that ‘unconscious thought can only be of a non-sensory kind,’ and then (p. 30) ‘since even the unconscious must have had a concept of the form of sensory perception’,

or else it could not have created this form ‘so appropriately,’ we find ourselves no longer really knowing what the unconscious is after all. Thought in the unconscious is held to be non-sensory, and yet it is believed to have had a concept of the form of sensory perception? And Hartmann thus ultimately draws the crude materialistic boundary between consciousness and the unconscious: ‘the oscillations in the brain, and more generally physical motion, as *conditio sine qua non* of consciousness.’ At the same time, the unconscious ‘must by necessity be regarded as something immaterial’.

But this question is made more complex by the view that ‘will and idea’ are in fact in the unconscious, but do not themselves constitute the unconscious. It is assumed that will and idea are ‘what is common to unconscious and conscious representation.’ The form of the unconscious is posited as ‘the original one,’ ‘while that of consciousness is taken to be a product of the unconscious mind and of physical influence on the mind.’ From a choice of alternatives Hartmann decides in favor of this supposition. The second element of these alternatives is ‘that in fact the unconscious mind has an existence independent of matter and self-contained, while the conscious mind is an exclusive product of physical processes without any participation by the unconscious mind.’ He rejects this element, due to the ‘identical essence of conscious and unconscious mental activity,’ but fails to see that on the other hand he has matter acting on something immaterial. When he later demonstrates the ‘identical essence of mind and matter,’ he simply annuls every real difference between the conscious and the unconscious, with the exception of where words are concerned. I do not think it is possible to introduce consistency and sharp lines into the distinctions Hartmann made; the system travels round in a circle back into itself. And this does simply follow, since the unconscious has to be used as a criterion for the conscious, as does the conscious for the unconscious. If we therefore let all this go, there remains only the transcendent ‘unconscious mind’ as that which forms the world, in the sense as understood by Schopenhauer. But while only will represents this mind in Schopenhauer’s theory, Hartmann adds idea to it; whether in conscious or unconscious terms, idea can

-----File: 401-----

hardly be thought of as anything other than sensory. This is perhaps the reason that Hartmann presents his system as Transcendental Realism. In Kant's view such an approach constitutes Dogmatic Realism.

Schopenhauer's system would have undergone a quite substantial backward step if it had not dealt with 'purposiveness' and 'purpose' in the world. For Hartmann the world is in fact as bad as it could possibly be; it is an 'unhappy' one. However, he has made the world emerge, if not as an end in itself, as a purpose; that is to say, it achieves what is not, as we have seen, possible in Schopenhauer's system, in that it is able 'to release the will from the unhappiness of its volition.' This means that something blind, an 'alogical thing,' is seen in the will itself, whereas in idea we see a 'logical thing' that becomes the highest intelligence as conscious reason in the highest potency. This is why the world process has the appearance of 'a perpetual battle between the logical and the illogical, which ends with the defeat of the latter.' But this defeat can only coincide 'with the temporal end of the world process, the Day of Judgement.' The lifespan of the world is limited; at the end of days there will come the redemption of the world, the end of the illusion, 'the suspension of all volition into absolute non-volition.' As much of humanity as possible must be present at this, because it is they alone who are capable of denying the will and elevating reason over it. And besides, it is necessary for this humanity increasingly to 'be permeated with the folly of volition and the misery of existence, and for humanity to have been overcome by such a deep yearning for the peace and freedom from the pain of non-being,' and everything that speaks for volition and existence would thus be recognized as vanity and futility. This is all evidently drawn from humanity itself. How this is to be applied to the transcendent unconscious mind cannot be understood unless the whole theory is transferred into pure pandeist theosophy, God is made out of the unconscious mind, and will and idea

become two manifestations of him, over which he has particular control. The moment one end to the world is predicted in contrast to a different one, there must be something there precisely to bring about this end. One also incidentally observes that, if it is not the case that the world ultimately consists entirely of rational beings, everything inanimate has actually been transformed into something endowed with reason; such an end is not possible. Or is the world to end as a crude cadaver? This entire philosophy would then be something to be applied only to the world with life after all. But in the final chapter we shall consider the end of the world from quite different viewpoints and see that a gradual development of the universe towards pure endowment with a soul is not actually out of the question (p. 479 f). Hartmann's philosophy is, however, inconsistent, and on the whole does not improve on that of Schopenhauer; in some respects it even serves to make the latter more nebulous.

Many of the modern philosophers are also to be found in the territory of idealism. We shall encounter them in the discussion to follow. Their method is rather more a scientific and inductive one; this, unlike the analytical, deductive method of the earlier metaphysicians, was one Kant had previously introduced and often applied. The mind is nevertheless granted outstanding supremacy, just as it is in the works of philosophers such as Rudolf Eucken, and this supremacy enables it to ascend to the absolute as an independent entity in the world.

SEVENTH CHAPTER.

Spinozism and Neo-Spinozism; Neo-Idealism.

Spinozism is, fundamentally, Idealism driven to the extreme. Despite its designation as Pantheism, it has nothing to do with religious convictions. Here, God alone is the transcendent thing-in-itself. If there has been – and still is on certain sides – fear of Spinozism as a form of atheism, that has its justification for those who could, and still can, only think of God as

-----File: 403-----

endowed with personal characteristics. In its pure form Spinozism totally excludes the possibility of a personal god. But for this very reason modern science has been able to adapt to this system. Therefore, in recent times it has attained a significance which, in association with the transcendental approaches of Kant and Schopenhauer, far exceeds the significance of all other philosophies and, in the form of Neo-Spinozism, gradually soars to scientific dominion. This is another reason Spinozism has not been discussed until this point. Besides, my intention was to separate Spinozism outwardly from Cartesianism, with which it has no relationship at all, as we have discussed earlier (p. 337), except that it follows Cartesianism and its originator eagerly engages himself with it and frequently makes mention of it, availing himself of its nomenclature.

It is difficult to separate Neo-Idealism from Spinozism, so we shall deal with them together.

46. Spinoza and Pantheism.

Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza was born in 1632 in Amsterdam and died in 1677 in The Hague. He was the son of a Portuguese Jew (or perhaps originating from Espinosa in Spain?) and is among the few about whom Eugen Dühring speaks with high regard, even directly, in his admittedly very astute but occasionally excessively harsh history of philosophy. The masterwork of Spinoza we shall discuss (I use the edition translated into German by Berthold Auerbach) is the treatise ‘Ethica’ (*Ethics*); after his death it was published by his lifelong friend, the physician Ludwig Meyer, and it contains a portrayal of his system completely in mathematical form. It begins with definitions of the most important concepts. Cause, by its own nature, is that whose being is contained within existence, or that whose nature cannot be conceived as anything other than existing. Substance is what exists per se and is conceived of by itself, and thus has no need

of being formed out of anything else. Attribute is what the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of the substance. Modes are the dispositions of the substance, or what there is in another thing that also enables us to comprehend this other thing. God is the one who purely and simply exists infinitely, 'that is, the substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite being.' These are the five principal ideas of Spinoza's system. Anything infinite is ascertained in inverse terms through what is of finite extent: something that can be limited by another thing of the same nature is described as finite within its own kind. Existence itself is eternity, provided it alone is understood according to the definition of the eternal thing. This means the attributes of God are not limited by anything, and are eternal through the being of God. A thing is free when it exists solely by the very requisiteness of its nature, and its actions are determined by itself alone; a thing that is not free is one which another thing forces to exist, or to exist and to act in a certain way. These definitions are followed by axioms, one of which contains the statement of causality: a certain cause has an effect by necessity, and no effect can ensue without a cause. Perception of the effect implies perception of the cause. Likewise, we should cite a few of these statements. Things which have nothing in common with each other cannot be reciprocal causes. If Eduard von Hartmann had paid heed to this very clear statement he would never have arrived at his grossly inconsistent theory of the end of the world. Existence and infinite nature (non-limitedness through another thing of the same nature) do by necessity belong to the nature of a substance. It is only through a substance itself that we can gain a grasp of its attributes.

By necessity, God exists. Apart from God there can be no substance, and no substance lends itself to our comprehension. Everything that exists is in God, and without God nothing can exist or be comprehended. God is absolutely free, and acts only from the laws of his nature. The existence, power and true essence of God are one and the same.

God is the acting cause not only of the existence, but also of the true essence of things. The world is, by necessity, the way it is; no thing is free, and nothing in the world takes place freely, nor randomly. Everything is induced by the requisiteness of the divine nature to exist and act in a certain way. Things are modes, states of existence of God, in accordance with two attributes: extension (corporeality) and thought (mind), which are their formal essential nature. The statements in expanded type above contain the system of Spinoza: colossal, highly consistent and therefore almost eerie in its rigor. As the reader will see, his system is actually a pantheistic one: it is only possible to comprehend any particular thing from the attributes of God, and each thing constitutes only a state of existence of God. It is thereby a question of a coercive system, with nothing being anything other than it should be, and nothing acting in any way other than it should act, and the series of causes being taken into the infinite. There is no purpose acting in the world. The ordering and associations of ideas are the same as the ordering and associations of things. This important statement establishes the parallelism between body and mind. There exists no connection per se between the two formal essential natures of the world and of humans, except that the corresponding attributes (things being states of existence of these) are attributes of God, the one and only substance. But because they belong to this one essential nature they can only be states of existence of a parallel kind. Body and mind are thus parallel phenomena and act in parallel.

This is expressed with such rigor that Spinoza even writes, ‘The body cannot induce the mind to think, and nor can the mind induce the body to move or rest, or cause it to do anything else.’ Only this parallelism shows body and mind to be interdependent on each other. The mind as such is only a mind and the body only a body. But owing to their parallelism and the way attributes are affiliated to the One, there do exist in the mind adequate ideas of the body and of the corporeal world.

For this reason Spinoza was also able to contend that the object of the idea which makes up the human mind is the body, or a certain mode of extent present in reality. He was therefore able to go on to ascertain that everything actually exists, and, above all, our bodies exist, just as we perceive them. In this, Spinoza's philosophy touches upon that of the positivists, the philosophers of reality. And when Spinoza goes further to conclude that the human mind conceives of an external body as actually existing only through the ideas of the dispositions of its own body, we see before us one of the chief statements of the sensationalists. We even encounter the transcendent in this system, inasmuch as the ideas in God of states of existence as essences (essentia) are separated from the real states of existence as existences (existentia), and hence ideal things are divided off from real ones. Things do not differ at all from each other in their formal essential nature, but only in their states of existence. Everywhere the mind is thus like the human mind, and everywhere the body is like the human body; only the way in which both actually make up things varies from one thing to another. Hence, the world per se is entirely uniform. It follows from this that Spinoza's system is a Monism. Body and mind are in fact distinguished and even separated completely from each other; they are, however, parallel states of existence of the same one primordial being, so to speak, according to absolute laws, so that they form things entirely as an entity, and their formal essential natures proceed from the attributes of the same one primordial being. Humans are also merely a part of nature, and suffer as such, and live and die as such. It is not in their gift to change themselves by their own power, as they constitute only a state of existence.

Spinoza's system is the preliminary foundation for his real subject, which is purely ethics. It is not our task to address this. It has been much attacked and much reviled, on account of the cold intellect that prevails in its interpretation. But very few will be

-----File: 407-----

able to refrain from privately acknowledging that it contains what a human ethic free of empty talk and conceits needs to contain. One might rather reproach it for not always following the system itself and sometimes crossing over from Pantheism into a Deism. But who has ever followed a totally consistent line of reason in such things? What is of significance for us is that Spinoza also teaches immortality. He writes, 'The human mind cannot be completely annihilated with the body (i.e., with the life of the body); rather, there remains of it something that is eternal.' This follows from the concept that even if it is only a state of existence, it is precisely the mind that is still, in any case, contained in an attribute, an idea of God. And the same is of course also true of the body. But because in its own existence the mind is simply only a state of existence, it cannot be able to remember what it was previously. Spinoza writes that 'Thought which expresses the essential nature of the body in the form of eternity is a certain mode of thinking which belongs to the essence of the mind and is, of necessity, eternal. Consequently, it is impossible for us to remember having existed before the body, as the body retains no traces of this; nor can eternity be defined in terms of time or can it have any relation to time.' This nullifies personal immortality. But 'we nevertheless think that the mind is eternal and experience it that way. For the mind perceives the things that it comprehends through the intellect no less than those it has in the memory. For the eyes of the mind, with which it sees and observes things, simply are the evidence. If, for this reason, we also do not remember having existed before the body, we do still perceive our mind as being eternal, inasmuch as it contains the essential nature of the body in the form of eternity, and this, its existence (i.e., that of the body), cannot be defined in terms of time or interpreted through duration.' It is not easy to find one's feet in this line of reasoning. But it is no doubt meant to convey that, because

in ourselves we have the concept of the eternity of matter as belonging to the essence of matter, the eternity of the mind is also ensured, doubtless through the parallel behavior of the two attributes in the states of existence which converge into one. Ethics also interprets God in more personal terms than would correspond to this system. However, ethical thought is fundamentally correct when it directs all knowledge towards the knowledge of God and deems this knowledge to be true. We are indeed states of existence of God, and the soul is a limited state of universal thought as an attribute of God.

47. Neo-Spinozism and Neo-Idealism.

Due to its unrelenting rigor and consistency Spinoza's system has, as mentioned earlier, long run against humanity. It has also, I am sure, not always been correctly understood. But we see in the example of Goethe, who, even early on, devoted attention to it, that great minds were inclined towards this system. Lavater tells how eagerly, on 28th June 1774, Goethe regaled him with talk of Spinoza and Spinozism and how meaningfully he spoke about it (Conversations with Goethe, Volume I, page 75). Later Goethe dedicated more and more attention and interest to Spinozism, so much so that he has even been described as a Spinozist. In recent times Spinozism has experienced a great influx from naturalist circles and, oddly enough, also from materialist groups among them. I can deal with only some aspects here, as I must reserve something of conclusive significance for the final chapter. I have already mentioned that Schleiermacher became a Spinozist in his essential concepts. Neo-Spinozism is above all linked to the names Fechner, Wundt and Häckel. But first we shall look at a spiritualist Spinozist.

As a naturalist and physician, Lotze (born 1817 in Bautzen, died 1881 in Berlin) was an adherent of Atomism and a physicist, although only in matters relating to bodies, and to our bodies, and the processes between them and within them.

-----File: 409-----

But the soul is entirely distinct from the body, despite the fact that body and soul have an influence on each other. This statement would remain unintelligible if things were not modes of a universal substance, a world spirit. The behavior of this world spirit towards things corresponds to our behavior towards our internal activities; such behavior is thus immanent, a singularity of the world spirit. The world spirit is in itself logically consistent, and in the world of phenomena this signifies orderliness. Hence, despite the multitude of their characteristics, the unity of things is founded in natural law. All this might possibly have a ring of Spinozism to it, as does the correspondence of states and changes in things instead of dependences, as this correspondence is reminiscent of Spinoza's parallelism, particularly where all uniform things are taken to be souls or minds. However, where there is divergence is that on the one hand the world spirit, God, is elevated above things, while on the other hand things are made more independent. The strict Monism of Spinoza thus crosses over almost into a dualism of Theism and Deism. And in the monad theory of Leibniz being applied we find ourselves with what is, rather more, a brilliant eclecticism of Materialism, Spinozism, Cartesianism and monad theory as a coherent, solid system. But the whole entity is processed with intimacy and precision. This can be seen particularly in how, on the one hand, monads are interpreted more in terms related to physics with actual interactions between them, although such interactions do not actually exist in Leibniz's monads, or in Spinoza's modes, while on the other hand, as in Spinoza's system, monads are regarded as modes of the universal substance, meaning they would emit beams in three directions. Both attributes of the universal substance can be discerned in each monad. The soul is merely a single unit (Greek μονάς, monas), and the body consists of many monads. It is from the partial independence of the monads from the universal substance – how this independence arises is regarded as an unanswerable question – that there emerges a certain freedom of the will, and with it a freer ethic, which, in association with a concept of the world having a purpose, constitutes Teleological Idealism. Unity comes from everything—

even logic and metaphysics—being taken to relate to ethics. We see the trend of modern times expressed in this.

Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801 to 1887) was a naturalist, inductive idealist, Spinozist and mystic all in one. Together with Zöllner, who was such a significant figure as an astrophysicist, he even embraced spiritualism for a while. This makes no difference to his work. He was an eminent scholar: he founded the science of psychophysics and enhanced it with a law which has become well known. Soul and body are forms of a substance, a real. But he takes this Spinozism into the transcendental of Kant and Schopenhauer. For us, the world is not the modes themselves, but the manifestations of these in our consciousness. Spinoza had earlier drawn a distinction between essences and existences. The latter were the manifestations, or phenomena. Yet the world is not, for example, a vision, like a ghost, but a reality, even if it is a transcendent one. This is demonstrated in the order and regularity we find in our consciousness of the world. Order and principle are the essence of the phenomena. Consciousness of these is the higher consciousness, or reason. And as we are, in Spinoza's sense, modes of the existence of God, God is the highest being, consciousness of whom encompasses all phenomena and all correlations. Some see a contradiction with Spinoza's system in the reciprocal relationship of body and soul along the lines pursued by Fechner, which was also taught by Wilhelm Wundt (p. 399 of this volume). This is not the case, as such a reciprocal relationship as the parallel existence of body and soul exactly in accordance with Spinoza's perspective, which is simply psychophysical parallelism, is unavoidable. We are merely arguing over words if we try to distinguish between separate reciprocal relationship and parallel relationship. If the former is as immutable as the latter, both count for just as much as the other. The advantage in Spinoza's theory does lie precisely in that it does not accept the existence of true relationships between two totally distinct attributes, but rather posits parallel relationships, from the way the attributes are affiliated to the universal One. Fechner, due to

-----File: 411-----

these reciprocal relationships, also describes his own theory as materialistic. Moreover, not only should no spirit be without a body, but neither should any god be without a world – a thought we have already encountered often. Fechner's mysticism is expressed in his assumption of the existence of beings higher than humans, i.e. spirits. These spirits are believed to form beings with the celestial bodies in some cases, or with the astronomical systems on an even higher level. The French astronomer Flammarion also considered the Earth to be a large animal. But we observe that this would ultimately actually lead us to view the world as a whole, like a living organism, with subordinate cosmological systems, worlds and so forth as individual living organisms which make up the world, just as organic beings are in fact assembled out of living organisms, whether visible or concealed. This logical conclusion was one Fechner also drew for the Earth; he also went further to say that it is always the more extensive soul that has knowledge of isolated souls, while souls separated off from each other have no knowledge of each other. But the significance of a soul is not set by its extent, and the human soul thus remains at its level of elevation even in comparison with the more extensive souls. For what is critical is the size of the consciousness, in the sense found in the works of Leibniz: i.e., the distinctness of this size, and this distinctness does not need to be related to extent. The theory of the threshold of the consciousness is what is at issue here; this theory enables us to assemble a kind of consciousness scale, like a musical scale. Fechner also wrote a volume on the souls of plants, titled 'Nanna oder über das Seelenleben der Pflanzen' (*Nanna, or About the Inner Life of Plants*); the ideas contained in this work are now increasingly forging ahead. But Fechner did dispute the existence of Leibnizian monad life in the smallest parts of matter, i.e. atoms.

Wilhelm Wundt (born 1832 in Neckarau), a brilliant leading figure in psychophysiology, whom we touched upon earlier, has established his views in roughly the same territory, apart from the mysticism of Fechner. As a physiologist and a psychologist he has undertaken research to a fine level of detail and has attempted to prove that all the functions of the soul are linked to bodily functions. Personally, I regard such proof as feasible

only in the roughest interpretation, and doubt that it would be possible at all to produce his main proof, in the form of cause and consequence, as time is eliminated in such transcendent questions. But studies like these help us gain a great deal towards experience, and the proof that body and spirit as phenomena are actually inseparable is of the utmost significance. We shall touch upon this in the final chapter. Wundt sees life in its entirety as comprising never-resting internal events that contain nothing that does not change. He believes we arrive at anything that persists just as it is only by projecting the external world into our internal world, and we obtain consciousness just as we obtain space with respect to the external world, in that we need a place for anything persisting as it is that has been gained falsely from that projection, and so we imagine such a place, which is simply consciousness. Consciousness as such reveals nothing except that we have an inner life, and this is not distinct from the other internal manifestations of life. Not that the will is really singled out in Wundt's works. Evidently, a conclusion can equally well be drawn on the entire domain of what is described as a regulating or categorical soul (p. 222 f). Such a soul would therefore not be something specific, and we would have an associative psychology (p. 359). Rejection of anything at all that persists as it is follows the vein of the teachings of Heraclitus. But I do not know how its existence in inner life might be rejected, without inner life being dissolved into nothing but shadow play, since rejection of consciousness as something persisting as it is (e.g., in my opinion, rejection of the existence of an organ in the internal world, just as the sense organs exist for the external world) is accompanied by rejection of individuality, and also rejection of forms of intuition. The existence of the world would thus also be something to be rejected. Then all that would remain would be maya as found in Indian doctrines. This is another aspect we should discuss later. Yet the world is understood as an entirety, i.e. as the complex unity of the activities of the will. The activities of the faculty of conception correspond to these and order themselves in accordance with them. Wundt conceives of thought in Spinozist terms, with more precise specification of the attributes. Only the concept of God seems to have been treated separately. Something else of significance is Wundt's distinction

-----File: 413-----

between an instance of quantitative transcendency, such as when the extent of an object or of a concept is extended outside the limits, and qualitative transcendency, where the act of departure results in something that is actually distinct. In all metaphysical problems we have to deal with both types of transcendency. They are evidently related to the attributes. I need only make passing mention of the great significance of Wundt as the scholar responsible for creating order in the philosophical sciences. Another philosopher who is undoubtedly to be ranked among the Neo-Spinozists is Alois Riehl (born 1844), although he has a strong transcendental and idealistic inclination, declaring the 'common source of nature and intellect' to be transcendent and also separating the psychological world completely from the physical world. But parallelism imparts a 'philosophical Monism' to his theory. It is a similar situation with the genial philosophical writer Adolf Lasson (born 1832). Häckel's Spinozism is something I can discuss only within the context of Energeticism.

EIGHTH CHAPTER.

Empiricism, Sensationalism, Realism, Naturalism and Positivism.

We now approach the physical view of the world and of life. This transition in our study, although one related not to time but rather to substance, involves all the views listed in the title above. The terms used convey the subject areas in question. We only need to point out that we should understand Sensationalism as external, not internal Sensationalism, the internal form being Phenomenalism, which we have already explored (p. 356 ff). These ways of viewing the world and life do not need any assistance in presenting themselves to us; they merit discussion only inasmuch as they are reasoned out in philosophical terms. Of course, we encounter them among every population and in every period of time, including the Greeks (with the Cynics, Epicureans, Stoics and other schools). However, it is only in recent times that such approaches have been developed towards one system, and here we shall discuss solely the views featuring in this. In dealing with Idealism we have been able to remain almost exclusively within Ger-

many, while the subject matter to be presented here substantially relates to English and French thinkers. Those from Germany have largely been disregarded until recent times, and are still seen as being in the second rank for originality. On the other hand, in Ernst Mach we have one of the most consistent sensationalists.

48. The English triad: Bacon, Locke, and Hume.

Among the English triumvirate, Francis Bacon, Baron Verulam (1561 to 1626), the renowned founder of the empirical scientific methods, is of only minor significance for us; he did not develop any new, distinctive view of the world or of life. He merely made strong reference to the inevitability of judgement of the world and of its events based on experience. The more recent empirical approach as a method of study has its true beginning in the sciences with Bacon in particular. He rejects the proposition of final causes, since he says there is nothing we can do with them: they belong in theology, not in real science. Nature should be explained through its own processes and causes, and thus empirically, not metaphysically, a viewpoint supported by many before him, and even held by Aristotle. His method is the inductive approach. But Bacon is not a pure empiricist; he is rather an empirical panpsychist, as his theory endues all matter with life. He also accepts the existence of a universal law that is believed to govern nature. He even acknowledges the existence of intuition. And yet he frightens us with phantoms and idols thought to pursue us constantly through our universal nature, but also through our individual type and our unthinking delusion, in the form of tradition and the knowledge we acquire.

John Locke (born 1632 in Wrington, died 1704) is one of the great men in the realm of thought. His masterwork ‘An essay concerning human understanding’ (quoted in the German original text from the Reclam-Verlag edition) is the universal foundation of Empiricism. But Locke is not merely an empiricist; Idealism, Sensationalism and Realism are also represented in his works. He is an empiricist with regard to our ideas, an idealist in

-----File: 415-----

connection with matter, in fact transcendental and a sensationalist wherever association of ideas with experience is concerned, while he is a realist with regard to bodies and processes. The ideas (sensation, idea, concept and so on) are, without exception, acquired from the phenomenon. No idea is innate, a priori, to us; all ideas are a posteriori. 'Some people,' he writes, 'have established in their minds the opinion that the intellect contains certain basic concepts innate to it, certain original ideas, κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι, which are, in a manner of speaking, writings imprinted on the human consciousness, which the soul receives at its first step into existence and brings with it into the world.' But he contends that this is not the case: 'They are not embossed on the spirit by nature, since children, idiots and the like have no knowledge of them.' No child or idiot would have the slightest concept of them. And it seems to him 'that we would almost be expressing a contradiction if we were to say that the soul had been embossed with truths it did not perceive or understand.' 'For it seems barely comprehensible to me that something might be imprinted on the spirit without it reaching its consciousness.' Reason does not detect ideas either; it forms them only gradually from the impressions it receives. Locke distinguishes the internal experience (reflection) from the external one (sensation). But he does not accept the existence of an internal experience without an external one. As for the Stoics and many others, for him the soul is at first a tabula rasa, a 'blank slate.' The senses let 'ideas in first, then the mind incorporates them into the memory and provides them with symbols and names. Then, as it progresses further, it abstracts concepts from them and gradually learns more universal names. This is how it acquires materials for its faculty of thought. We thus have merely the ability to form ideas; we do not possess these ideas at the outset. Not even logical concepts are innate: children recognize neither statements of identity nor those of contradiction. The idea of God is not innate. Nor is the idea of matter. The child and the idiot know nothing of either. Everything connected with ideas

is derived from impressions alone; ideas are acquired empirically. This is also stated, with stronger foundation, by the basic practical principles, and likewise in part by the moral and ethical ones. These are definitely not innate. Thoroughgoing evidence for this is provided from the life of the individual and that of mankind. There is indeed apparently sufficient substance for such evidence. All ideas are acquired from sensation and reflection. ‘External objects provide the spirit with the ideas of sensory properties, which consist of all the different perceptions they bring forth in us, and the spirit provides the mind with ideas of its own activity.’ But the ideas of reflection are acquired later, and the soul begins to have ideas when it begins to perceive things. Perception is one thing that the spirit does, and reflection on these perceptions is the second. But without perceptions there is no reflection either. Perceptions are therefore what is fundamental. This is pure Empiricism. But perceptions are what they are only insofar as we consciously comprehend them. Therefore our internal activity is a prerequisite for our perceptions. A mutual dependence thus develops: no reflection without sensation, and no sensation without reflection. But the latter lies within the territory of Sensationalism. It is only our internal functions that make perceptions what they are. And as such, in our internal workings they are entirely real.

Whether they also have objective reality is a question in which association of perceptions, influenced by reflection, is the determining factor. We then see that some perceptions are not inherent in things themselves, but are created in us only through impressions of them, in the form of colors, sounds, smells, warmth, cold etc. On the other hand, Locke attributes objective truth to other perceptions, such as solidity, extent, shape, state of rest and motion; they are real. Even space, time and number are included. Here we have a Realism blended with Positivism. ‘Since our senses are unable to

-----File: 417-----

detect any dissimilarity whatsoever between an idea that has originated within ourselves and the composition of the object that produces this idea (i.e., the object itself, not the thing-in-itself, as the editor of this work writes), we are well disposed towards the concept that our ideas are exact images of something contained in objects and not the effects of certain forces lying in the modality of their primary properties; ideas originating within ourselves bear no resemblance to these primary properties.' The latter does have a ring of Idealism to it. And in a completely different place in his writings we read, 'The spirit evidently does not perceive things directly, but only through the ideas it has of them. For this reason, our knowledge is real only as far as there exists agreement between our ideas and the reality of things. But what can serve as a criterion for this? If the spirit perceives nothing but its own ideas, what can enable it to perceive agreement between ideas and things themselves?' Locke believes it will help to take into consideration the type of each idea. Right at the beginning of his book he distinguishes simple ideas from complex ones, and ranks among the simple ideas all those corresponding to perception either through the external senses (i.e., one sense or several senses all at once), or through the internal sense alone (thought, feeling, etc.), or through both types of senses together (such as desire, pain, force, existence and unity). He bases his teachings on these simple ideas. According to Locke's theory the spirit cannot create any simple ideas from itself; the spirit is involved only at the level of a reflex, and these ideas owe their origin to impressions. (See above.) They must therefore 'by necessity be the product of things … which, by a natural course, have an effect on the spirit and create within it precisely the perception for which they are defined and equipped by the wisdom and will of the creator. It follows from this that simple ideas are not inventions of our imagination but the natural and consistent products of things outside of us which exert an actual effect on us;

in themselves they therefore bear all the similarity that is meant to be, or that is required for our state of perception.' The introduction of God as proof of the reality of things corresponds to the method of Descartes (p. 337). Even complex ideas, with the exception of the idea of the substance (matter), are believed to lead to the same conclusion. By intuition we are certain of our own existence. The existence of God is something we can perceive with certainty. And the evidence for this is, as always, drawn from the characteristics attributed to him. However, it is also derived from the world; such evidence is thus ontological and cosmological. In all other cases it is solely reason in association with perception that is the determinant factor.

Space is regarded as a separate real entity, and therefore the existence of space free of bodies is also acknowledged. Time is arrived at as an outcome of our own ideas. The line of reasoning we see here is of great interest. First we have within ourselves the idea of succession; a certain thing enters our consciousness, while something else fades away. The interval between the parts of the succession is duration. By further 'perception with our senses of certain phenomena in particular regular durations, we acquire ideas of particular lengths or measures of duration, such as minutes, hours, days, years and so forth.' Now, if we can retrieve durations in our minds, we reach the point of 'envisaging a duration where nothing really endures or remains.' By continually joining together measures of duration we arrive at the concept of eternity. Ultimately, 'through consideration of some portion of infinite duration as something demarcated by periodic measures we reach the idea of what we generally call time.' Internal and external aspects are at work here. To my mind, nothing shows so clearly to what minimal extent innate ideas can be dispensed with as this laborious dissipation of time in its outward and inward waves. If reflection is to be linked only to perception, one might grant reality to time. But it seems that time can – equally justifiably – also be interpreted in idealistic terms, as reflection actually is, again, a requirement of

-----File: 419-----

perception, and hence also of sequence in the sensations. It is said that we have ‘generally speaking no clear idea’ of the nature of matter. This is because when it comes to physical substances, ‘such as a horse, a stone, etc., we talk about them and think of them, and our idea of each of these is simply the association or uniting of a large number of simple ideas of sensory characteristics, which we are used to finding united in the things we call horses or stones; however, because we cannot envisage how each should exist in its own right, or how one should exist by means of the others, we assume that they exist through a common subject which bears them, and we refer to this supporting entity by the name ‘substance,’ although we undoubtedly have no clear or distinct idea of what we are assuming.’ So the substance as such is thought of in idealistic terms. On the other hand, the idea we have of the ‘spirit’ is ‘just as clear an idea as that we have of the body.’ The same right we use to ascribe reality to the body also allows us to state that the spirit is real. The spirit seems to be thought of almost in material terms, as we attribute mobility to it. Locke writes, ‘Since my soul, just like my body, is an actual being, just like the body it can certainly vary the distance it keeps from another body or being, and is thus capable of movement’.

David Hume (born 1711 in Edinburgh, died 1776), who is acknowledged to be the most distinguished philosopher England has produced, has already been discussed in another context (p. 358). What is important here is his Empiricism and Sensationalism. In this respect he does not go as far as Locke when he acknowledges concepts also on an a priori basis. His principal work to be considered in this context is ‘An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding’ (cited here from the German edition held in the Philosophische Bibliothek (*Library of Philosophy*)). Of importance in Hume’s concepts is his distinction between impressions and thoughts, the latter of which he terms ideas. Impressions are ‘all our more vivid concepts,

gained when we hear, see, touch, squeeze, wish, or want.' Thoughts (or ideas and perceptions) are the less vivid concepts, 'of which we become conscious when we call to mind one of the above perceptions or emotions.' Ideas are therefore always 'modelled on an impression of the same kind.' There are exceptions to this rule, in that the imagination is able to complement ideas in a succession of ideas even without any preceding impression from adjacent ideas, for example a particular previously unseen color in a range of colors in which it is missing. Hume cites this very instance; however, he attaches no importance to these exceptions, perhaps because such complementation is simply achieved by averaging out the surrounding ideas that are already known. If by 'innate' one understands that 'which is original, i.e. is not the likeness of any preceding concept, we can doubtless contend that all our impressions are innate and our conceptions are not innate.' We would be going round in a circle if we did not now want to say the opposite: there are activities of the soul that are innate, such as perceptions, desire and the will (Hume's mode of expression is too vague to enable us to continue the succession in the sense he himself intends), which we call impressions. There are also activities that are not innate, but are likenesses of those activities; these are called thoughts or ideas. But Hume apparently attaches no importance at all to the distinction between innate and non-innate. Just as impressions are the foundations of ideas, they can for their part again give rise to impressions, while these in turn instigate concepts, and so on. It is from impressions that facts follow. All acts of thought that concern facts 'seem to be based on a cause-and-effect relationship.' But Hume writes, 'I venture to contend as a proposition without exception that in no instance is knowledge of this relationship acquired through acts of thinking a priori, but that knowledge is derived entirely from experience, where we find certain objects to be constantly

-----File: 421-----

in connection with each other.' However, the examples Hume chooses (a man with a completely unfamiliar object set in front of him would not be able, despite the closest examination, 'to discern any of its causes or effects,' while Adam could not have 'deduced from the fluidity and transparency of water that it would suffocate him, or from the brightness and warmth of fire that it would consume him') show clearly that for Hume it was a question not of the concept of causality, but of objective cause and effect alone. Hence, in no manner do his contentions contain a denial of the concept of causality, but only that of the possibility to recognize specific causes and effects from reason alone. And we all have to agree on that. Causality outside of experience does not say that such and such will take place from this and that, but that whatever happens, has happened and will happen is a consequence of something. We regard everything as a consequence of something, not that we expect this as a consequence of that. This can of course only be justified by experience. Indeed, one has to agree with Hume when he goes on to say that we would also have no right to use experience alone to draw conclusions on specific effects from specific causes, even if we have seen the effects appear every so often. 'We would claim in vain to have grasped the nature of bodies from past experience. Their latent nature and all their actions can change without any change to their sensory characteristics.' And he goes on to say, 'This linking (by which, in a succession of instances, we constantly see events in their context), which is perceived in our mind, this habitual transition from one object to what usually accompanies it, is therefore the feeling or the impression according to which we form the idea of force or of essential linking. There is nothing else to it.'

Yet I think scholars go too far in claiming Hume rejects the concept of causality as such. As we observed earlier, this concept is not discussed at all in his

works; he dismisses only the possibility that we can ever ascertain linking between phenomena without experience, and that, where we have detected links, we can ever claim with certainty that they exist, either in the past or towards the future, for instances not yet established by our minds. For this reason cause is also defined differently, as an 'object which another follows, the appearance of which invariably leads our thoughts to that other.' Consequently the relationship between cause and effect is either a pure statement of the facts (e.g. this sound comes after this vibration, and sounds of the same kind come after all vibrations of the same kind) or a series of thoughts (this sound comes after this vibration, and when this vibration occurs the mind anticipates it and forms the idea of the sound). In Hume's view, with the exception of these two perspectives we have no concept of the relationship between cause and effect. The former perspective is aimed at what is experienced directly, the latter at what is anticipated. Even Hume regards the latter as relating to a mental act. In the same way both perspectives are believed to apply to psychic phenomena. He sees a kind of habitual process of drawing conclusions by the mind as encompassing both instances. From the same aspects, what Hume writes about 'miracles' is extremely interesting and significant. Here reason does not have anything at all to say; only belief does. He calls 'dangerous friends' or 'hidden enemies' those who have taken it upon themselves to defend the Christian religion with the principles of human reason and are still defending it. 'Our most holy religion is founded on faith, not on reason.' The same repose of thought sustains the studies on providence and on existence into the future. Both are referred into the domain of belief. In rational terms we have no right to defend these concepts. In studying the providence which encompasses the world order the only things we encounter are facts which we have no means of justifiably tracing back to a universal cause. In the same way, the only things prompting us to accept the existence of an afterlife are the facts of there being

-----File: 423-----

much that is not appropriately rewarded or punished, with even good being punished and evil rewarded. Hence all the fruitless efforts to account for the phenomena of evil in nature and to salvage the honor of the gods (Hume has an Athenian speaking), while we still have to acknowledge the fact of evil and turmoil, in which the world abounds.' As links between concepts, in addition to causation and effect we also have resemblance (together with contrast) and contiguity in time and space. These are the three principles of association.

Hume's entire approach is a fact-based one, in regard to both external and internal life – a Positivism. Almost nothing is conceded to pure reason. Everything is an accumulation of external associated phenomena and internal associated ones. Just as no universal cause is claimed for external facts, no universal soul is claimed for internal facts. I have already discussed this subjectless psychology (p. 359 and 400). Only a kind of 'ego' is acknowledged and the world is posited just as it presents itself. This approach is sensationalistic, since all ideas are held not to be lacking impressions by any means. These impressions do however also include psychic ones, so that the Sensationalism we see here is not actually complete, as it overlaps with Idealism.

49. Further development.

The mighty streams of the concepts within Materialism and Idealism inhibited further development of the approaches discussed above. This is why we can present only one sensationalist of greater renown from earlier times who was not at the same time also a materialist, Étienne Bonnot de Condillac (born in Grenoble 1715, died 1780). And even he does not belong here fully, as he bases his judgement not only in the sensationalistic but also in the idealistic. Our mind develops

from our needs for our lives, and to these is added the need to satisfy our curiosity. We have no innate concepts; in fact, concepts only serve the purposes of classifying things. Our mind has nothing peculiar to itself (e.g. perception, thought and volition) existing as an original characteristic. Such capabilities are instead interpreted as acquired proficiencies and habits (*habitudes acquises*). Our senses are the principle of our knowledge; it is with the senses that it begins and through the senses that it perfects itself. Attentiveness is a sensation emerging in the tangle of sensations, and hence a higher level of the vividness of a sensation. This is also consciousness in its arbitrary shades. Our sensations cannot just exist at the same time, but they follow one close upon the other, in that one leaves behind its trace; thereupon we have memory. But this is merely a comparison. So we arrive at Locke's reflection alongside sensation. Condillac's intention is thus to simplify beyond the point to which Locke does and make reflection originate from sensation. This attempt clearly has to be described as an unsuccessful one, as 'alertness is a vivid sensation' and 'sensations leave traces behind' really go no further than empty expressions. This emerges even more clearly if our minds are allowed freedom in the combination of sensations. But the only things available to us to follow are our senses and what they direct towards us, i.e. nature. Consequently we can never arrive at the reason for the phenomena; the sole foundations of all science are just facts. Even our sensations through the senses are only such facts. The simple ideas they offer do not lend themselves to interpretation. Only complex ideas can be unwound from each other and analyzed. All sensations are just modifications of our ego. An internal Sensationalism enters into this as Phenomenalism: 'It is the soul that perceives, to it alone belong the sensations.' 'Our sensations do not exist outside of ourselves.' Condillac's Positivism is thus also associated with a dualism, and even with Deism, since on the one hand there is a distinction between body and mind,

-----File: 425-----

while on the other everything determinant, of matter and of the soul, is believed to come from God. As body and mind are thought to be totally distinct and not even unified in God, Condillac arrives at an occasionalist (p. 336) Sensationalism and a free belief in the psychological. One should think that the ego has a particular significance. Not at all! The ego is discerned solely from the sequence of sensations, and is merely 'a collection of sensations that it experiences, and of any such sensations as memory causes it to recollect.' To demonstrate how the external world is discerned, Condillac devises his well-known example of a statue which he gradually endows with all the senses. He finds that only the sense of touch makes us feel certain of the presence of an external world; the rest of the sensations cannot do this. Not even our own body consciousness is capable of ensuring us of the existence of our body; only when we touch it do we have it. Despite this model of the corporeal world being very flawed, Condillac regards it as certain; in this he is a dogmatic realist. It is astounding what a vast range of things one can be as a sensationalist – even if one has such a methodical mind, as Condillac is seemingly shown to have in every part of his punctilious analyses and syntheses.

The sensationalists also include Hemsterhuis, Montesquieu, and indeed Rousseau, although rather in the style of scholars who think sensationalistic thoughts but do not construct sensationalistic systems. Perhaps the well-known predilection for the original state exhibited by Rousseau (born 1712 in Geneva, died 1778) is to be traced back to his Sensationalism, together with his hostility to reflection, which he places far back towards sensation but which he still embraces at every opportunity, just as he does human feelings and elevated thought. Among the philosophers of the 19th century it is above all Beneke (1798 to 1854) who is to be seen as a realist in the style of those listed above. Even he sees no innate concepts per se, but there is the ability to produce concepts. His view is that up to this point we have erred 'in hypothesizing that the forms emerging in the developed soul are already present before experience, or more specifically, before the development of the soul

(i.e., innate). To do this is incorrect: the forms existing primarily for perception originally emerged in the development of the soul, prior to this being only predetermined in innate predispositions and relationships which inherently bear quite different forms.' This interpretation, which is after all not new, has drawn many enthusiastic supporters, particularly in more recent times, because Ernst Mach, the main figure among modern sensationalists, has acknowledged it. But in my opinion, just how little it explains and how much it is actually mere word play does emerge sufficiently clearly from what we stated earlier. Since Aristotle devised his potential characteristics and bestowed them on the world they have haunted every branch of science, even in the more exact domains, despite the very specific clarifications Kant provided about them. I posit no more for a real entity than for a potential one that becomes reality. And a potential entity that does not become reality has no value at all for interpretations or insights. It is no more than an argument over words, prompted by misunderstanding, as if we should have the same intensive knowledge of everything within us, at every moment and in its entirety. In this way everything is potential for us, and in every moment at that; us, the world, impressions, the way we walk and stand, etc., as all this is definitely not always present in the same way for us, and there is actually no point in pondering over anything. In the most highly developed state we only ever use what is individual; we are occasionally not conscious of our bodies, or of our whole environment, and follow an alien volition, a latent feeling. Yet everything is indeed there in our souls, and we use it as soon as we are forced to, or want to. We then immediately feel with the senses, and these sensations are spatial and temporal and causal. As soon as it is born a child feels hunger, thirst, pain, satiation and so forth. It does not yet make logical judgements, but it does make causal ones: it has a conception of space, as it directs objects towards its mouth and seeks the breast of its mother. This is just as true

-----File: 427-----

of a child as it is of an animal. It is simply innate. Abilities would be of no use to a child. If it did not have the concept of causality, even after first suckling from its mother's breast it would not know that it needs to keep on suckling to satisfy its hunger. The fact that for a long time we do not think to use what we possess is nothing to do with whether we possess it. Acquisition tells us absolutely nothing at all, only giving expression to the fact that like generally resembles like. There are simply things in the world that one cannot trace back any further, because they are already in the simplest form possible. But there really must be something, even if it is only the means for us simply to exist, and actually to have perceptions, feelings, thoughts, etc., at all. If this 'something' is not present from the outset, no beginning can ever be made, since such a beginning, as uncertain and dark as it may be, does have this 'something' that essentially belongs to it. As badly as someone might be able to walk, he does actually need to have legs to achieve it; if he does not have legs, or else has only the potential for them as they are stuck within his body, he cannot make even the smallest, most atrociously performed step. Without innate characteristics there is no beginning to life at all. Life would perish immediately. Which characteristics are to be accepted as innate, and whether these are the same in all beings, is open to debate. However, what is not arguable is whether characteristics in general are to be taken as innate (p. 362).

To return to Mach, he traces all psychological processes back to basic processes. The gathering of stimuli, i.e. sensation and perception, produces 'primordial capacities' of the soul; restructuring of these stimuli creates new primordial capacities; the processes of association and resonance in the gathering of stimuli give rise to others; combination yields still more. These capabilities, and their functioning – both alone and together – constitute the soul. Hence, once more we see a kind of associative psychology, but with an ego, albeit one that acts in the background.

Auguste Comte was born, in Montpellier, in the same year as Beneke; he was the true positivist of the 19th century, before he lapsed into mysticism

due to sickness, which led to his death in Paris in 1859. His 'Philosophie positive' (*Positive Philosophy*) is a fundamental work. Metaphysics, with its ideas and categories, is dismissed right at the outset; it is merely a pseudoscience, a kind of theology. Comte names three consequences of thought. Firstly, we see personalities in and behind things. We are already familiar with this condition and explored it thoroughly in the first volume. The personalities later gradually lose all that is personal and finally they – or their remains – change into metaphysical concepts. 'It (that is, pseudoscience) posits its categories in place of daemons, but it keeps on presupposing the existence of entities, i.e. invented essences, in the background to the phenomena' (Eugen Dühring, Geschichte der Philosophie (*History of Philosophy*)). This is no doubt meant to relate to things-in-themselves. In the third stage, his thinking turns to what exists, in purely positive observation of the world. Comte discusses the best-known branches of science (mathematics, mechanics, physics, chemistry, astronomy, physiology and social science) from the base of this viewpoint. There is a 'hierarchy of the positive sciences': the sciences are presented in terms of positive induction. This produces scarcely anything towards a view of the world and of life; the only thing that merits specific mention is the fact that Comte separates spiritual life from physics and chemistry. He merely acknowledges that physical processes arise as 'moments' in this life. But life itself is something other than these processes, not to be understood from them, and to be studied as something separate according to its positives. Comte was emulated by many in France and England, and also in Germany.

The most distinguished German positivist scientist is Eugen Dühring (born 1833), a man as astute in his critical studies as in his scientific discoveries; physics owes one of its most infallible and finest laws to him. His 'philosophy of reality' observes everything: space, time, and the world as we envisage it, subject to all the senses acting together. The 'Gesetz der bestimmten Anzahl' (*Law of the Specific Number*) allows us to conclude that, if space

-----File: 429-----

is believed to be unlimited, the world of things certainly is limited, and also that it had a beginning in time, at least as far as processes are concerned. Before this beginning there thus existed a being without processes. In this primordial state there could, however, have existed differences in things and in states, but temporal sequences of such differences could not have existed. These differences originated from this state and still continue to develop further. But we are to regard everything that persists as it is, or pushes towards a state of persistence, as having crossed over, or remaining, from this primordial state. If there once was a beginning to the events of our world, then beginnings can still adapt themselves to new events. But the whole represents a sequence of development, in fact one originating from nature itself, without the aid of a higher power. And all of nature is one united whole. We are unconsciously reminded of the concepts of the Ionian natural philosophers. There can be an end that corresponds to the beginning, and this end may be a state analogous to the primordial state. Yet we cannot exclude the possibility of what has occurred in the past being repeated eternally. Dühring's view does not acknowledge the soul as existing as a special object, but particular forces are possibly assumed to exist in nature. There exists a parallelism between the internal world and the external world. Some things are interpreted in mechanistic terms, such as that all subjectivity is thought to originate from sensations of resistance, and consciousness is taken to be derived from an antagonism between mechanical forces. The most curious element is the 'primordial state.' A philosophy of reality does not allow us to go beyond this state. But who can content himself with this? We will discuss this later. I have to refrain from taking us further into Dühring's philosophy, as it relates rather more to contemplation of life itself.

Of the most recent sensationalists and positivists I would name only Ernst Mach (born 1838) as being predominant. His works are (like those of Poincaré, who holds similar views) filled with brilliance and an overwhelming number of facts. Where he has a definite view he takes his lead from Hume, Kant, Beneke and Wundt in particular. But while he dismisses the more profound studies as 'pseudo problems,' he is still unable to provide any satisfactory system, despite his Positivism

and Sensationalism. And if so many parrot his teachings, the reason is that his 'scientific economics' is such a convenient solution. The author himself did not practice it at all; he did not even succeed in dodging the pseudo problems. (This is something that absolutely no man who is serious in his thought can do, unless he is willing simply to be guilty of gathering ideas from others.) But in his footsteps there follow a coterie of scholars, who, misunderstanding and exaggerating the words of their teacher, condemn almost everything that resembles an offence against 'scientific economics,' and persecute all conjecture and speculation with the most foolish irony, because they believe they have a free pass issued by their master stating that they do not need to go beyond the positive, and indeed, they are not meant to go beyond it. I can only join Max Planck (p. 442) in his judgement of the Positivism and Sensationalism of Mach. But first a few comments on this. I quote most of this from Mach's opus magnum 'Erkenntnis und Irrtum' (*Knowledge and Error*). 'We are just such things as the things of the environment as seen through a physicist's eyes, and we also become acquainted with such things through ourselves.' But a certain stability is ascribed to us, and thus a kind of ego. This ego is the entirety of the interconnected ideas, and hence 'that which exists solely for us alone.' This would be an internal, associative interpretation. But stability of thoughts, i.e. the ego, is interpreted as enabling us to draw conclusions from the stability of the facts; it demands this stability as a requirement, and is a part of this stability. It is clear that these three stipulations do not amount to the same thing. The third even contradicts the first two, as when something is a part of another thing, it cannot demand it as a requirement, nor allow conclusions to be drawn from it. A piece of a body is a part of it, but the piece does not allow me either to draw conclusions from the body or to demand it as a requirement. The difficulty and unfathomability here lies precisely where it is generally found in materialistic approaches. So as not to say the same thing twice, I refer to the comments made in the last section of this book.

Ego and the world are considered as one entity: 'The iso-

-----File: 431-----

lated ego's existence is possible to just as small an extent as that of an isolated thing. Thing and ego are provisional fictions of the same kind. The physical and the psychological contain common elements. It is true that the 'solipsistic position,' i.e. Phenomenalism, as such, is rejected. But we have 'the elements of the real world and the elements of the ego together before us. The only other thing that might be of interest to us is the functional interdependency (in the mathematical sense) of these elements on each other.' This functional interdependency can be termed a thing. Hence, both we and the entire world can be called things; they are a functional sequence of dependence. The sensory perceptions form the foundation. All intellectual life originates from them, and it is to them that it returns. Sensory ideas are 'psychological workers,' while concepts, stemming from these and their association (they also represent the summarizing of facts), are 'stewards and foremen,' who set those hordes of workers 'in their places and assign their duties to them.' 'Sensory perceptions are simply the actual original motors, while concepts refer solely to these sensory perceptions, often only through other intermediate conceptual links.' If this is not meant to be taken as mere poetry, internal life must automatically be interpreted together with external life. In fact, Mach also writes, 'Elements that are firmly defined, regular and automatic form the fundamental characteristic of animal and human behavior,' and, naturally, a fortiori the behavior of the world. The automatic automatically adapts itself to the automatic, which it receives channeled in through the senses. The existence of a free soul can indeed not be refuted, but to accept it as a 'scientific hypothesis' or to undertake research into it is 'methodological folly.' Mach's thinking on innate ideas and causality is quite similar to that of Hume. As far as I am capable of seeing, his views on space and time resemble those in the teachings of Kant. His distinction of the various concepts of space and time in conceptual, physiological, mathematical and other terms is of interest; I have given this thorough treatment in my book 'Philosophische Grundlagen usf.' (*Philosophical Foundations, etc.*).

The sequences of thought found in Mach's theories are those of every exaggerated Sensationalism; everything in them is purely subjective, and no one can state anything for himself, or naturally even less so for anyone else, nor can anyone contradict it. Every pure Sensationalism destroys itself, of necessity, by its own doing. And this is certainly the case with Mach's Sensationalism. Verworn, whose discussions on nerves and the brain provide us with interesting reading material, seems to emulate Mach's philosophical thinking.

Here we are dealing with an agnosticism of a type similar to that represented by Herbert Spencer. But in his Deism, which despite Positivism and Materialism is almost ecclesiastical, Spencer is far removed from Mach. As a positivist he is an evolutionist in the sense of Darwin, but for him this is in regard to all of nature, and with a strong inclination towards the views of the Ionian natural philosophers, in that concentration and dissipation (and also evolution and dissolution) play a major role in his works. The absolute is the unknowable, a transcendent substance in itself. The essential nature of the world is actually beyond our recognition.

NINTH CHAPTER.

Views of the world and of life in physical terms.

If we separate the world and life, we will have one view relating to the world and another to life. But if we consider the whole of nature, with and without life, solely from the one viewpoint of everything that is material and of forces and processes acting in and between materials, we will be subscribing to the universal physical view of the world and of life. There is no assumption of the existence of supernatural or spiritual effects or processes, either for the world or for life, nor is it supposed that there are materials possessing properties other than those we know about in matter. Although electricity, magnetism and electric current are not usually included within what we commonly call inert matter, we shall attach them to it anyway, since when we consider matter, we take to be material anything we know

-----File: 433-----

to have exclusively physical properties, i.e. physicochemical ones, and invariably find this to be the case. But as far as processes are concerned, we may first rank them into three types: motions, inductions and chemical reactions. We have nothing to discuss about motions and chemical reactions. The inductions include processes such as the generation or neutralization of electricity, magnetism and current. In speaking of energy conversions in general terms we intend to think of these inductions as associated with chemical conversions. And if we take all three types together we will be dealing with mechanistic processes, without intending to say thereby that they belong to ordinary mechanics: they could also be attributable to electromagnetism or another domain of phenomena. New consideration has also been given to the energies recently, and so we need to discuss a further type, that of energy conversions. It is for science to ascertain whether these – now four – types can be transformed into one type, and if so into which (for example, motion energy or the energy required for conversion); for the present we do not know anything for certain and it is better to keep the energy types separate. It makes no difference to our studies here whether we take one or all of the types as the starting point. The sole essential thing is the physical. However, it is because the type of energy required for conversion presents us with so many unusual qualities, and has attained such extensive intrinsic importance in science, that we shall examine it separately later. Therefore, uniting these first three types, we shall speak of a mechanistic view of the world and of life, but use an approach from Energetics with regard to the fourth type, and, where both perceptions are connected, an approach based on Mechanism and Energetics will be applied. We describe an approach as a materialist one if everything in it is founded on matter. Such a view must be divided into two classes, according to whether the soul is treated as something specific, yet material, or not, while in the case of the latter the existence of a soul is not

at all possible: these classes are Psychological and Physical Materialism. Neither of these names reveals much, but since they are defined, they may, as is customary, remain as they are. As the reader will know, the history of pure Materialism is discussed by Friedrich Albert Lange (1828 to 1875) in an extensive work. I may therefore restrict myself to the most significant details and instead devote this space to critical comments.

50. Materialism and Mechanism; Atomism.

As we have already verified, we need to separate out the particular type of Psychological Materialism that originates from views of life and the world typical of primitive peoples. Scientific Materialism of this kind first appears among the classical Greeks. I have also already spoken of it in several places above, and it suffices to point out that the soul is regarded as material, like the body, albeit of a more delicate kind. Therefore, all effects between soul and world are the same as between the bodies in the world. With the effects between these bodies being regarded as purely mechanistic, without any direct or indirect influence from a preternatural or supernatural being, and even without any rational reason, we arrive at the most consistently logical materialistic system, that established by Democritus (from Abdera, born circa 470 BC, died circa 390 BC), which is an almost complete materialistic Monism. Impact and pressure are the forces, while separation and association, together with motion, are the processes. Neither purpose nor accident exists; it is solely the reason for something (λόγος) and necessity (ἀνάγκη) that prevail. Other Greeks have supposed love and hate, and attraction and repulsion, to be acting causes, and impending, unavoidable disaster (εἰμαρμένη) to be the reason. Accounts of this are, for the most part, very obscure and vague. As the Greeks knew no rules for the effects of their forces, names were ultimately no more than names if they did not stem from a universal principle, as in the works of Empedocles, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras and others. Pressure and impact in the works of Democritus – indeed, impact alone – is familiar to modern science

-----File: 435-----

still serves as the base for the most alien-looking calculations on force.

However, before we continue, we must make mention of Atomism. It seems to have first appeared almost simultaneously in the works of a number of scholars, although in different structures. It is of significance that Empedocles (from Acragas, 483 to 423 BC) divided materials into the four elements (stoicheia) – fire, air, water and earth – which should be distinct from each other, in accordance with how they are constituted. He believes all bodies consist of the mixing of these four elements, the processes occurring in bodies being mixing and de-mixing, instigated by love and hate. 'For first hear the fourfold root of all things: Zeus (fire) the shining one, and Hera (air) the life-giver, and Aidoneus (earth), and Nestis (water), whose tears make the mortal life-spring flow.' 'For it was from these elements that there issued everything that has existed, exists and will exist: trees and men and women and animals, birds and fish nourished by water.' Even gods, 'long-lived and abounding in honors.' 'There is no birth in any of all mortal things, and no end in ruinous death. Rather, there is only mixing, and exchange among what is mixed together': if Empedocles were not at the same time a great mystic, his world and life view might lead us to regard him as the first quite apparent mechanistic materialist. For mixing and de-mixing are mechanical processes, and love and hate (or conflict) differ little from attraction and repulsion in their meaning. But all this is believed to form the foundation for the entire development of the world, including life. However, the elements, just like the various forces, are simply portrayed in mystical terms, just as even so-termed Ionic natural philosophy is actually a mystical one (p. 231). Anaxagoras (p. 243) took the subdividing of bodies much further. All materials are thought to be composed of the tiniest particles. These particles, called seed particles (spermata, σπέρματα), and later homogeneous parts (ὁμοιομερῆ), are all the same size, but they

are like the bodies from which they came with respect to how they are constituted. In flesh they are particles of the flesh, in the air they are particles of the air, and so forth. Leucippus (a contemporary of Anaxagoras) had the opposite concept of these particles: they should be the same in the way they are constituted, but different in mass and form. He also established that these are indivisible and thus arrived at atoms, a concept we now make use of; it is from this idea that the monads, reals and so forth have originated, even if expressed in quite a different way, if they do not correspond more closely to the seed particles of Anaxagoras. I must not omit to add that atoms (paramanu) were also known of in India; the teachings of the school of Vaisheshika describe them as assembling perceivable bodies. However, even these seem to resemble the homogeneous parts (ὁμοιομερῆ) of Anaxagoras. Atomism has even been transposed onto time by Arab scholars and others (p. 287).

Let us return to Democritus. Atoms are divided by empty space. They are infinite in number, and their weight and form are just as infinitely different. The finest atoms are spherical. The soul is composed of these finest of atoms; it is therefore something extremely delicate and mobile. Real bodies are believed to be aggregates of atoms and mixtures of these, and even include those finest atoms, which is why bodies can actually also be regarded as endowed with life to some degree. The atoms are thought to be held together by areas of roughness, sharp points, tiny arms, etc., as molecular forces were not yet known in Democritus' time. All actions are based on movements of the atoms against each other, i.e. impact and pressure. Even the effect of the body on the soul and of the soul on the body is no different. Democritus is believed to have written prolifically; we do have some of his writings, quotations which are in parts quite beautiful (Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (*Fragments from the Pre-Socratics*) by Hermann Diels, I^2, page 398 ff), but unfortunately scarcely anything of his natural philosophy remains. So we are dependent on the accounts of others, which admittedly exist in abundance, but still leave the most important thing unresolved, i.e. the question of where the irregular lateral motion of atoms comes from, as dissimilar

-----File: 437-----

masses only produce regular motions in parallel lines or towards centers, not random ones in all possible directions, all of which has to be assumed because we receive sensations from all possible directions, our actions are in all possible directions and we see motions travelling in all possible directions. The system of Democritus, with or without a soul composed of specific atoms, gained a great many adherents in antiquity, especially among the sophists and Epicureans. Epicurus (341 to 271 BC), from Samos, who displays nobility of thought and teaching throughout, adopted this system almost without adaptation in support of his well-known view of life. But he did improve on a few elements. We were able to see that the impacts of atoms are essential to any effect. The ancients had no knowledge of universal gravitation, nor molecular attractions, only how bodies fall. But, as the astute naturalist Aristotle recognized and contended, as all atoms must fall at the same velocity in empty space, despite their differing masses and forms, there can be no collisions, and therefore the very thing that is necessary cannot take place. For this reason Epicurus granted atoms a predisposition to diverge a little from a straight course of their own accord. They can then indeed collide, whirl around and so forth. It was also apposite to the teachings of Democritus that Epicurus considered an infinite number of worlds to be admissible, since for an infinite number of atoms an infinite number of distributions of movement and aggregations are possible, not only those such as compose our world. Epicurus was as meticulous as his predecessor in his rejection of the teleological approach. The emergence of living organisms from the Earth, from mud, was something he taught, just as so many others did. Otherwise he was a most pure sensationalist, so much so that he did not even hesitate to state that sun and moon were exactly as large as, or only slightly larger than, they appear to be to the eye.

The system which developed from the teachings of Empedocles, Democritus and Epicurus has maintained its completeness through the works of the Roman poet Titus

Lucretius Carus (probably 99 to 55 BC), whose didactic poem ‘De rerum natura’ (*On the Nature of Things*) develops concepts that differ only in minor aspects from those in the modern kinetic theory of bodies. In his history of Roman literature Bernhardy declares this didactic poem to be ‘one of the loftiest monuments of that literature,’ and praises the poet as ‘an intellect surpassed by few in wealth of thought and profundity.’ The concept of purposiveness and of the beginning and the end is quite remote; the concept of a particular soul having an otherworldly, supramundane power is also a distant one. It is solely the atoms, with their constant movements and collisions, that form the world. The atoms themselves are assumed to be as Democritus posited, their divisions and connections as Empedocles described, and the agglomerations of bodies as detailed in the works of Epicurus. All differences between bodies are explained in terms of the number of atoms, their forms and their apposition. Atoms are also in perpetual motion within bodies, and we are prevented from seeing this only because the atoms are so small, just as we cannot distinguish the movement of individual animals in a herd from a distance. Another respect in which Roman follows Greek is the development and subsequent disintegration of worlds after other worlds, as a result of the constant motion of atoms. Lucretius has the worlds ceaselessly continuing in their formation, since everywhere in space – around us, beside us and between us – there are still innumerable atoms that have not yet gathered themselves into bodies. Hence, the worlds form an infinite cycle of perpetual growth and decay, as we have also seen in the works of Heraclitus and other philosophers. Infinities and other infinities struggle against each other and lead to more infinities. The soul (anima) and the spirit (animus) are themselves physical objects, consisting of the finest, roundest and most mobile atoms. The soul is contained in the warmth and breath of life of the body, and the spirit is a particularly delicate part of the soul. In death all these atoms leave the body, or at least most of them do; in life they absorb in

-----File: 439-----

particular all atom impacts from the outside and, in turn, produce impacts outwards. As atoms are viewed solely in terms related to physics, no atom itself can possess characteristics of the soul or the spirit, and so it cannot have feelings or sensations either. So where does the faculty of feeling and sensation in living organisms come from? This is explained solely in terms of how the atoms gather themselves into the body. This accumulation of atoms holds characteristics not attributable to the individual atoms, such as how an atom has no color, but a body composed of atoms does display color. We can cite such analogies and many similar ones. So everything has to be explained from how the accumulations of atoms are themselves formed. As even our modern world of science is scarcely able to derive such explanations for some of the simplest characteristics of bodies out of atomic theory, and for the most part has to be content with the statement that these characteristics are induced by the motion and distribution of the atoms and the atomic bonds, just as the ancient atomists contended, it should not surprise us if the same ancients ultimately simply said that motion of the atoms constitutes feeling and perception. We shall discuss this principal dogma later. It goes without saying that Lucretius had to reject the concept of personal immortality. Death completely nullifies the personality, which is indeed founded in the delicate soul atoms by means of the specific complex of the body. Once the soul atoms have left the body they can no longer exert an effect on it, and the body can no longer exert an effect on them. Soul and body are now two separate clusters of atoms. Only when these clusters of atoms permeated the body did the whole entity display what we call life, precisely because it was a whole entity. So there can be no afterlife either. All dread, all fear, all pain and all sorrow – with death they are over, and nothing from life remains behind in life. This is why fear of death is foolish and should be spurned. Some solace is offered by insight into the way nature works, in its inescapable necessity and its total indifference towards everything without exception. Of course, neither God nor gods can exist in any kind of personal form. Humans have come to accept the existence of gods only out of ignorance

of the true fundamentals of the world. Lucretius is inclined to derive religion from veneration of nature, and therefore sees original religion as a highly pure form. It began to deteriorate only at a later stage. We are already aware to what extent this is true. Lucretius' poem contains many more beautiful and profound thoughts, but we have to leave it without room for comment here.

In the second volume of this work I explained the views on materialistic and mechanistic approaches that prevailed in the Middle Ages. No system was developed, among either Christians, Arabs or Jews; religion and mysticism were equally obstructive. But we have seen that some systems in these populations verged closely on the mechanistic. More recent and modern times have brought about only slight changes to the foundation of ancient Materialism and Mechanism and have merely adapted these approaches, and the observations attached to them, more to the scientific knowledge gained in the interim. Here we need to place stronger emphasis on the distinction between the world with life and the world without it. Materialism and Mechanism have attained increasingly wide acceptance for the world without life since Copernicus produced his great concept of how the world is constructed and Kepler and Newton performed their calculations of movements in the heavens, inasmuch as these two views relate to what actually exists. At present anyone who has a knowledge of nature will no doubt regard it as unwise to accept the existence of unverifiable extra-terrestrial or supernatural interventions into the course of nature. But the conditions for the world without life become different the moment there is discussion of its beginning, or of a plan for it. It is characteristic of Materialism for no beginning to be acknowledged at all, nor for it to be conceded that there might be a plan to the world. The former amounts to the world always having been there; it did not come into being. The latter rejects any concept of the world having a purpose, as the world is a perpetually running mechanism. With the world, and in the world, nothing is intentional, and the world does not lead up to an endpoint. If we were discussing an ever-running clock, without hands or a face, we would not speak in terms of a plan or a purpose for the world either. And if we see that order

-----File: 441-----

still prevails in the world all the same, processes comply with certain rules, worlds develop and so forth, this simply all belongs to the world and to its course, just like the proper arrangement of the wheels, springs, etc., of a clock, with all its parts enmeshing into each other, and as, for example, particular parts occasionally come into action. It is logical only if such a concept dismisses the existence of specific forces. The world is a structured arrangement and a process; all individual processes are no more than this one process, just as all the parts of the clock are the clock, and all the individual rotations, vibrations, etc., in it are the functioning of the clock. Hence, as the wheels turn, they must turn, and as other parts vibrate, they must vibrate, everything being determined by the functioning of the clock. And we need not hesitate to transfer this concept to the world. Some might want to see in the course of the world itself both the plan for the world and its purpose. But all this also fades away if there is no beginning and no end. Many scholars since antiquity have associated themselves with this type of mechanistic Monism with respect to the world without life. And an unmistakable and very weighty advantage to a lifeless world is that it simply requires no forces, not even those we term natural, physical ones. Room is left for the existence of forces, but only symbolically; coincidences are not considered possible at all. If we can foresee and predict some things in this way, the situation is the same as with, to stay with our example, the clock, where we know in advance which cogs will engage with which others in the wheels, and we can predict that (and when) a pin somewhere will take another part along with it, or trigger or obstruct something, because we know the parts and have a clear overview of what causes the compulsion for each movement. We thus also know the parts of the world accessible to us and have an overview of what causes the compulsion for change in them. And it is with this overview that we can proceed. We approach the world as we do a clock, although the world is far more complex than a clock, with an immense number of processes and bodies involved. This view, however, does not touch upon the fundamental essence of the subject. Nevertheless, we can regard the world as a coercive mechanism.

But now we turn to ourselves, the living creatures. Here the paths trodden by mechanists concerned solely with the world diverge even from those of the life mechanists. As we know, world mechanists see in life something specific that is not mechanical, while life mechanists actually incorporate life into the mechanism of the world. In the same way, life is the process performed in the world, a forced process like all other individual ones in this universal process, differing from these individual processes not in its essence, but only in its manifestation; this is exactly the same as how we have countless types of motion, all of them still simply being motion, even types which no longer resemble motion in the slightest, such as molecular movements in bodies in the form of heat etc. What we consider to be free expressions of life are just single processes that have to come and go in the process of the world, exactly as the heavenly bodies have to move. What we call thought, volition and feeling are also merely processes of this kind, for instance (and this is something almost all materialists and pseudo-idealists, such as Eduard von Hartmann (p. 388), have dogmatically adopted from the ancient mechanists wherever the interpretation according to Energetics predominates up to the present day) movements of certain entities in our bodies, in the brain, and in the ganglia. Here, just as in the world without life, the reason we are not able to demonstrate the presence of any compulsion and we still have to speak of functional elements and freedom is that our knowledge is incomplete, just as we are also obliged to abandon the concept of common accident, because we have no clear view of the reasons for it to occur, although even a proponent of Psychism might not acknowledge the existence of accidents as such. For knowledge of the world also to appear to us as if it were self-evident, and for non-knowledge of life to emerge in the same way, is mere illusion. Despite its monstrousness as a whole, the world is simple, but life per se really is overcomplicated. However, the moment we begin to study it in detail, we see much of the world, such as its atomistic structure, as something we do not recognize. And statements of this kind are all the more critical when there is no acknowledgement at all of any fundamental distinction between

-----File: 443-----

living organisms and things that are not endued with life: at the lowest level there is believed to be a transition between living organisms and forms without life. In other words, in its beginnings, life is extremely weak and there is no characterization, so that it is no longer to be distinguished from non-life; the range of inanimate things is thus seen as forming a continuous succession with the ranks of living creatures. Only the extremes are greatly different from each other. However, they are nevertheless joined by a continuous chain, which gradually leads downwards to things such as stones, and upwards in increasing levels of complication and branches into processes of such different kinds which manifest themselves as psychological and mental activities, such as consciousness and thought, but which when going downwards gradually diminish to nothing. This – more or less – is the approach of those holding consistent mechanistic views of the world and of life. We shall discuss this approach later and also see then which other suppositions it necessitates. We know that even philosophies of ideals, although they may not be able to lead us to a coercive physical mechanism, can still open out into a compulsion towards the world and life, as they have done in the past. The purely religious approach itself, interpreted systematically, leads to such a compulsion, and indeed must lead to one. But here it is a question of the physical coercive mechanism, not the divine or spiritual or transcendent.

Pierre Gassendi (born 1592 in Provence, died 1655) is not a total materialist in the sense described above. The degree to which he adheres to the letter of the Bible shows that, despite better discernment, he favors the Tychonic cosmological system over the Copernican one, because the Bible states that the sun moves. So he has God creating the world and everything in it. After the creation, however, he acknowledges the existence of nothing more than physical processes, following the model of the ancients in particular: i.e., the linking and splitting of atoms. To these he imparts an internal ability, that of movement. Gassendi's attitude to the world of life is the same. He admits the existence of an immortal spirit, but at the same time also accepts the existence of a soul as understood by Democritus and even seeks to demonstrate that this soul can actually achieve what is required of it. He thus gives

with one hand and takes with the other: an odd mixture of the spiritualistic and the material-mechanistic from the ‘double truth.’ His main campaign was aimed at Cartesianism; in this he was successful. But his own teachings are as inconsistent as they possibly could be, probably because he was not allowed to express them in a systematic manner. The Copernican system owes a fine experiment to him. Its opponents had argued that, if the Earth moved, a stone thrown high into the air could not fall to the same place from which it was thrown. This argument is accurate if we disregard the inertia which causes the stone also to follow the movement of the Earth when it flies into the air and returns. But Gassendi demonstrated this by dropping an object that was already on another moving object, i.e. from high up on the masthead of a ship, with the expected outcome that the object landed at the foot of the mast, not behind it.

In this context we also need to make mention of Thomas Hobbes (born 1588 in Malmesbury, died 1679), who surpassed even the harsh custodian in the story of Antigone in his interpretation of reason of state. Sensations are explained in terms of Mechanism, in just the same way as the materialists of classical antiquity interpreted them. Movements are passed on to the sense organs and cause movements there; these go into the brain and thence into the heart. Recollection and memory are merely residues of movement actuating the brain in this way, and likewise the association of ideas is a concatenation of such dispositions in the brain triggered by movement. Every form of matter has within itself the capacity for perceiving sensations. It is therefore quite understandable when, in what seems to many to contradict his mechanistic approach, Hobbes also explains reason as something innate. Innateness of an ability is not at all in contrast with Mechanism; such innateness does indeed rest in the fundamental assumption of the existence of a specific individual atomistic soul. It is by means of this corporeal soul that all beings endued with life have simply gained the facility for ‘life.’ There is therefore no need for Hobbes simply to dismiss out of hand even the possibility of innate concepts

-----File: 445-----

and the ability to formulate and to form such concepts. The innateness lies in the atoms which have been unified into soul and spirit, in their form, motion and arrangement – if one can grasp this. But Hobbes may himself have lapsed into inconsistencies. No materialist, in particular a serious one who thinks in serious terms, can quite keep hold of this thread, just as the idealists occasionally drop their thread once they are sufficiently established as naturalists. Judgement of sensations is thought to be based on change in movements in conditions of concurrent perpetuation, while experience is believed to rest on judgement of such movements according to similarity or dissimilarity to what has previously permeated into the soul but has not yet ceased echoing off the atoms there. A system of motion must recognize another one as similar or dissimilar to itself – perhaps by being added to it without resistance or otherwise offering resistance to it. We set down such judgements in names, and it is only these that give us the resources for an ordered sequence of ideas. How this works is really not to be understood. In any case, everything psychological and spiritual is to be derived from changes in the body (*mens nihil aliud erit praeterquam motus in partibus quibusdam corporis organici* (*Reason will be nothing more than a motion in certain parts of the organic body*)). And therefore everything is caused from outside through motion. 'Nothing takes its beginning from itself: its origin comes from the effect of something acting directly that is outside of itself.' But everything has the ability for this in itself if movement gives rise only to movement. Knowledge is therefore the perceiving of movements and of how they are associated – or self-perception, as we should arguably say. In general, materialists regard space and time as real. Hobbes nevertheless writes, 'Space is the phantasm of an existing thing, in the form of something existing' and 'Time is the phantasm of an existing movement, in the form of something existing.' Therefore, neither can exist apart from things. When Hobbes goes on to contend that a human being would project the world out of himself, from the movements of his soul atoms outwards, even if no such

world yet existed, he can intend this only assuming the human has already been given movements from a world, otherwise his Materialism would dissolve into pure belief in phantoms, and he could completely disregard the movements precisely believed to be necessary for understanding of the connection between our world and a real external world. Furthermore, Hobbes has God still being considered to be a particularly delicate and pure, infinite corporeal being. A type of Deism is linked with this supposition. A Deism of this kind can even withstand Materialism, as God as a corporeal being belongs only to the world itself. I would not like to decide whether this was actually Hobbes' intention. But this unfeeling scholar would certainly be capable of this. He also offers this interpretation: 'Fear of invisible forces comes from these forces gaining publicity from fabrications or stories, and this fear is religion; if the existence of such forces is not publicly acknowledged, the fear is superstition.' Religion therefore has no distinguishing feature, except that it is acknowledged by the state; otherwise, it is just sheer superstition. The most modern materialist is not less considerate in his thinking. The difference is that, unlike Hobbes, modern materialists would hang anyone who rejects the state religion. All the same, the concept of God in the teachings of Hobbes is an elevated one. Hobbes regards atoms as different not only in terms of form and size, but also in their essence, so that even atoms without weightiness, i.e. imponderabilia, are believed to exist, considered in corporeal terms to be the finest entities for the spirit and for God.

Robert Boyle (1627 to 1691) belongs to this domain only as an atomist who introduced atoms into chemistry and physics with a great degree of precision. His atoms are, like those of Descartes, the debris of fragmented matter. We need to name Newton (1642 to 1727) here, but only as the great founder of mechanics of the universe. Neither was a materialistic mechanist.

Materialistic Mechanism underwent its most extravagant development in the 18th century. The philosophy of the Enlightenment, which in Germany sprouted to produce such beautiful ideal blossoms in the works of Lessing

-----File: 447-----

and Herder among others, also bore the fruit of encyclopedism in France, in close proximity to the substantial endeavors of Rousseau and Voltaire. Diderot and d'Alembert were also moderate naturalists and materialists. But Baron d'Holbach (from the Rhenish Palatinate) and the French philosophers Mirabaud and La Mettrie rank among the most extreme materialists, without the knowledge of nature of that time really making them qualified for this. Materialistic works were shooting up like mushrooms from the earth in that period. These works would not have been so bad if they had not also endeavored in part to steer world views towards almost common egotism and Utilitarianism, which in themselves have nothing at all to do with materialistic observation of the world and of life. If those unfamiliar with it often suspected Materialism of being a doctrine of immorality and self-interest, that suspicion seems to have been justified towards the end of the 18th century. But the revolution swept away this ethical Materialism, together with other things, and humanity doubtless has it to thank for this. Materialism was then able to become pure science again, as it was in antiquity and is in modern times. 'Système de la nature ou des lois du monde physique et du monde morale' (*System of Nature, or, On the Laws of the Physical World and the Moral World*), published in London in 1770, is regarded as a more serious masterwork of encyclopedic Materialism. Mirabaud is given as the name of the author, but it has long since been established that Baron d'Holbach of the Rhenish Palatinate actually wrote it. It is true that this book is primarily directed at customary religion, but otherwise it seems to teach neither self-interest nor immorality. It even strikes a blow for virtue. The Materialism found in it moves along paths we already know; it apparently follows the teachings of Hobbes in particular. But it is heavily equipped with mysticism, as atoms are endowed not only with dimensions and mass, but also with distinctive, mysterious powers and peculiarities, such as sympathy and antipathy, and love and hate. Atoms are themselves composed

of the smallest corpuscles, and it is probably in these that the above particular characteristics are installed. Our modern science has incidentally robbed atoms of the tiny hooks, projections, little arms and other things they were earlier believed to use for holding on to each other and interlinking, but on the other hand has been forced to introduce into them characteristics that are not far removed from those listed above, such as attraction, repulsion, polarity, affinity and so forth. So far we have not been successful in our endeavors to find a universal expression for these characteristics, although we are convinced that there will be one, and we may also believe we know the route that leads to it. The splitting of atoms into even smaller particles we call corpuscles also corresponds to modern concepts. What relates more to Mysticism is when atoms are also endowed with their own internal striving for motion. Here something like von Herbart's 'self-preservation' becomes apparent. We read, 'Maintenance is hence the universal purpose towards which all energies, all forces, and all capabilities of the creature seem to be directed constantly.' Maintenance is identified with inertia and in fact belongs to a universal great law of nature. Nature in its entirety is life, life derived from the material forces of nature, for which the services of the well-known phlogiston are also enlisted. For only matter and motion exist: with no beginning, no end, no accident or chance, no freedom, and no creator, just as it is viewed by a materialist adhering to strict observance. And there is no exception. Man merely imagines himself to be something different from nature after all. Even he, with all his physical and psychological and mental activity, consists solely of matter and movement, and he is governed entirely by the same necessity as is every other thing in nature. Gods and God were just invented through superstition, and thereby idleness of thought, prejudice, intolerance and mania for persecution in the world were conjured up. Anyone who has a knowledge of nature needs no deity, any more than he needs a soul and a spirit as something specific. But if we speak of a cause in nature that moves things, this may well mean God. 'If we wish to attribute another sense to the word 'God,'

-----File: 449-----

we will find that this word cannot denote anything other than the sum total of the unknown forces that endue the universe with life.' Nature is then also 'the necessity for itself,' which is also said of God in exactly the same way. And seen from the same aspect, virtue, reason and truth are named the 'honorable daughters of nature, which is the sovereign of all beings' and described as 'forever our only deities.' The word God is thus a hypostasis of nature, despite all the times we see it interpreted as merely matter and movement. It is from this nature that there emanate all moral instructions in the form of rules founded on love of self. Here, the whole approach crosses over into a kind of lofty Epicureanism, maintaining its cheerful enjoyment of life. In this respect d'Holbach writes like our modern materialists, who teach an ethic which develops out of itself; this ethic, alongside a healthy egotism, contains gracious altruism, not the almost penitentiary-like, compelling religions Hobbes writes about, or a war in which everyone is against everyone else. The 'système' is hence a quite modern work, and a humanely sound one at that, in which the limits on one side and the other are not exceeded. And where it is not such – as yet unresolved – things that prevail (as predominate in the most important question, i.e. whether atoms have their base in themselves and nature constitutes a multitude composed of these individuals, or whether nature is an absolute entity, with even its atoms having a kind of pseudo-life), so that there is no place anywhere for individual existence, then, as in Pandeism and Pantheism, everything amounts to compulsion and fatalism.

The development of mechanistic Materialism culminated at a peak of ruthlessness in a work by Julien Offroy de La Mettrie, 'L'homme machine' (*Man a Machine*). His system is older than the one of d'Holbach discussed above, but almost surpasses it in logical consistency. Humans are entirely dependent on their bodies. 'A nonentity, a small fiber, some such thing that the most delicate anatomy cannot reveal, would have made fools of Erasmus and Fontanelle.' This is a truism substantiated by La Mettrie via a host of examples in the above work and the earlier

works ‘Histoire naturelle de l'âme’ (*Natural History of the Soul*) and ‘Traité de l'âme’ (*Treatise on the Soul*). In this respect humans are no different in any way from animals (or plants). If, as Descartes says, animals are machines, humans are as well. He then pursues in detail what it is that makes a man a machine. There is no need for us to demonstrate this in more precise terms. However, La Mettrie seems not to have regarded man as a machine as an entire whole, but rather in all his parts: he finds life in every part of the organism and provides illustrations of how animal parts that have become detached from their bodies can continue to live, how polyps that have been cut up grow back into whole organisms, etc. But he does not arrive at the idea that would follow from this, that a living organism is a machine that is the same in its every part (p. 369 f); he distinguishes between creatures solely according to the level of complication of the way they are equipped mechanically. ‘Man is to animals just as a planetary clock designed by Huygens is to an ordinary clock mechanism.’ For him it all depends on the number of parts, wheels and so forth. But we know that it does not depend on this alone. No machine, however complicated, can be compared to a living organism; this follows directly from the reasons La Mettrie gives as justification for life everywhere in the body. We will have to skip over other the ethical issues he raises in his writings, still with a certain ‘willful impudence’ (Lange, Geschichte des Materialismus (*History of Materialism*)). I would incidentally like to allude to the comprehensive appreciation of this nevertheless quite remarkable man in the above work by Lange, who tells us that a great deal of bitter injustice was done to La Mettrie, who became a kind of ‘whipping boy of French Materialism’.

A statement by Ludwig Feuerbach that has a real ring of La Mettrie to it is ‘Was der Mensch ißt, das ist er’ (*What a man eats is what he is*), although Feuerbach was more a positivist and an empiricist than a materialist, despite his rejection of the doctrine of immortality. Apart from this we have no need to pursue modern Mechanistic Materialism further. It is linked to the names Karl Vogt, Büchner, Moleschott, Czolbe, du Bois-Reymond (in his early period) and so on. Neither is it as consistent as classical or Anglo-French,

-----File: 451-----

Materialism, nor does it offer new angles, or could it offer any. Only due to the growth in knowledge in astronomy, physics, chemistry, physiology and descriptive sciences have more solid pillars of support for the materialistic approach been gained. We shall discuss this in the context of the following topic. But we shall bypass anything that is far too trivial, such as the preaching of Büchner. The Materialism of the brilliant and profound David Friedrich Strauß in 'Der alte und der neue Glaube' (*The Old Faith and the New*) is something I can explain only in terms of a kind of enjoyment at acquiring something from an unfamiliar domain and overvaluing the results achieved in the sciences, which, by their very nature, were not adequately familiar to him.

51. Universal and specific laws of nature; theory of evolution.

Experience has taught us that all phenomena and processes in the physical world are, above all, governed by three general laws, which we shall refer to as cosmic regulative principles: the law of conservation of mass, that of conservation of energy and that of inertia and concordant effort towards a specific end state. The first two laws are simple, if one has grasped the concepts of mass and energy. I have to assume these concepts are familiar to the reader. The third statement, insofar as it speaks of inertia, is also simple; it merely says that states that already exist will change only through cause or constant force. If the cause is sufficient to change the state at a continuing level, and to transfer it into another, the first state was unstable. If a constantly acting force is required, so that the change always takes place only through submission to a force, that state was stable. Whether a state is stable or unstable depends both on the state itself and on what is prevailing in the surroundings, and hence generally in the world, if we interpret the world as an entity. This means even the second part of the third statement is easy to understand, as the end

state contained in it will be a stable state. The deduction that it cannot be an unstable one is drawn from the observation that a stable state can be re-established if the force changing it has ceased to have an effect; on the other hand, an unstable state cannot. A ball at the lowest point of a vertical loop is in a stable state. If one pushes it away from this point, it will return to it or swing back and forth around it. If laid at the highest point of the loop the same ball can also be at rest there, but the slightest thing will cause it to fall and it will not return again. Science has also found a certain mathematical determination for the end state, i.e. that something called entropy reaches the highest possible value, with the result that all changes in nature serve to increase this entropy, unless they leave entropy unchanged. The third statement is therefore also called the Statement of Entropy. This statement can also be expressed in another way. We are able to envisage the processes in nature such that they can also run backwards, for instance when a body can ascend into the air and then fall from there, and we can see cases where this is not admissible, as when a stove warms a room but the room is not capable of giving its warmth back to the stove. Consequently, processes are either reversible or irreversible. We know of no process as such that is totally reversible. Strictly speaking, all processes in nature are irreversible. But be this as it may, the third statement means that there always remains a vestige of any process that cannot be reversed. Hence, the world gradually reaches a state which cannot be redressed.

Finally, we should make mention of another pronouncement in the statement attributable to Boltzmann and Planck, i.e., that nature leads all changes, such that at each point in time the state prevailing is that which is the most probable under the given conditions. Of all the states the world could attain, it strives for the one that is the most

-----File: 453-----

probable for it in the way in which it manifests itself as being established at that point. Therefore it depends on how precisely we should consider the world to be established. Thoroughgoing studies by the above scholars have demonstrated that this level of establishment must be taken as meaning that in the final individual parts, in space and time equally, there is absolute disorder. The final individual parts are the atoms or molecules of matter in its motion, or phenomena such as myriad light oscillations of every possible kind, each followed at infinite speed by the next, which compose a ray of natural light and other entities. In atoms or molecules, disorder relates to motions in bodies, atomic and molecular motions; these motions cannot exhibit any order for all atoms or molecules in space, or for one molecule in time, with respect to either direction or speed. In phenomena such as natural light the innumerable single rays composing it, each followed at infinite speed by the next, do not have to show order in any of their characteristics, such as color, polarization, curve of oscillation, or strength. Absolute disorder must prevail, so that everything is to be expected and nothing is to be assumed. But, to emphasize again, this relates to the final individual parts, which compose a whole (a body, a beam of natural light, warmth, etc.). Therefore we can speak of elementary disorder. This is a rather odd outcome for the way our world is arranged: order in whole entities, disorder in their elements. But Lucretius Carus earlier wrote about disorder in atoms, and Bernoulli, Krönig, Clausius, Maxwell and others used this specific disorder to establish the well-known kinetic theory of bodies and heat, just as the same disorder in rays of light was used by Fresnel in the theory of natural light. All individual elementary parts are also believed to be totally independent of each other in their disorder. If this is not the case, and their systems are linked in changing their states, i.e. coherent, like

two beams emitted by the same light source location, the third law does in fact also remain in force for individual elementary parts within the entirety of phenomena and processes, but there do occur changes in particular which block the effect of this law, thus stalling it by running contrary to it. The above law states that if two beams of light of the same temperature are converted into other forms of radiation they should exhibit no difference in temperature; yet they do cause a temperature difference to emerge nevertheless, provided that they are coherent. I refer here to Max Planck's paper 'Die Einheit des physikalischen Weltbildes' (*The Unity of the Physical Conception of the World*), which, although brief, is very substantial in content.

We take the authority to extend to the whole universe known to us these statements (which, of course, can only be tested on the Earth) from the fact, proven in particular through spectral analysis, that the celestial bodies consist of the materials our Earth also provides. It would be quite a random practice, and rather unscientific, for anyone to contend that the fundamental properties of materials and of the processes that exist between them are different on other celestial bodies and follow laws different from those on Earth. However, we have to concede that on Earth we are not yet able to produce certain conditions in which these properties occur on the celestial bodies. But we accept those laws simply as being independent of the specific conditions, since they are shown to be thus on Earth, insofar as investigation is possible here. The existence of any possible coherence has no influence on these laws: in no respect at all for the first two, and not in the final outcome for the third, if, as observed, the presence of coherence can block and stall the course of action that would follow from this law.

If these three laws govern all physical phenomena and processes in the world without exception, there also exist specific laws and rules for the single phenomena and single processes. Some of these are of such universal significance that they also relate to the entire world. Hence

-----File: 455-----

we see gravitational attraction according to Newton's formula, which makes exceptions of no tangible substance and which seems to be totally immutable. We thus also encounter the rule according to which, for all non-coherent systems, heat always streams away and radiates from itself towards cooler bodies, and never the other way round, i.e. towards the warmer one. On the other hand, others are specialized laws, such as the formulae stating that bodies attract or repel or turn each other when electric, magnetic or current influences emerge, or other formulae which determine – among other things – the diffraction, reflection and refraction of rays of light and sound, and the compressibility of bodies, such as that of gases. Such laws can also be dependent on the environment for their effects. But be that as it may, let us take the liberty of extending these laws to the universe, i.e., to apply their validity to every instance where there is opportunity for them to be enforced, not only on Earth. We are almost totally certain that the law of gravitational attraction and that of the diffusion of heat to colder places apply universally.

We can thus assemble a world for ourselves in accordance with this, so that it corresponds to our earthly world, and might transfer knowledge we have of this world on to the universe: all materials, all phenomena, all processes, all laws. And in this way mechanistic Materialism is to be understood as primarily relating to the physical universe. For the same reason we might again deduce the systematic order in the skies, in space and time, from earthly experiences. This is how Kant's tremendous theory of the cosmological system and its development emerged, after efforts had not ceased since ancient times to construct such a system, and Descartes had used his theory of a whirling motion in the heavens to derive a system that was very curious and did not correspond sufficiently to the facts. Here we have the birth, the life, the destruction, the resurgence, etc., of the individual systems in the universe according to specific principles.

All this holds true for the physical world. But what about the living world? When we consider the bodies of living

organisms, we find nothing to be different from how it is in the physical world; they are subject to the universal laws, as they are to all individual laws, and no living being can distance its body from these laws; they apply as rigorously here as in nature without life. As far as their bodies are concerned, living beings can be included in the universe without further discussion. The situation with respect to the psyche will be discussed later. Here we shall merely make mention of what is insignificant for the psyche, but very significant for life and its development. Within the domain of these phenomena, alongside the categorical laws we also know of two other laws: the law of self-preservation and that of the preservation of the species (heredity), i.e. the preservation of the individual body and spirit and the preservation of offspring in the specific configuration of this body and spirit. If we disregard all psychological effects, in a totally unchanging environment both laws could be implemented rigorously. We are clearly able to envisage a state in which, according to how it is adapted, a creature lives and dies and produces other creatures of exactly the same kind, so that the succession of creatures is always composed of rings of the same type. Then only one single type of creature is conceivable, and always has been, and always will be. We do not know whether this occurs anywhere in the world; should that be the case, it should be limited to either beings without mental activity, or those possessing a high level of reason. The reasons for this are easy to appreciate. Granted, such a state is by all means conceivable. With conditions on the Earth as they are, self-preservation, like the preservation of the species, remains in a perpetual struggle with the whole environment. Living organisms seek instinctively, or in a planned way, to adapt the environment to their own species, but also to adapt themselves to the environment. The latter is done mainly by instinct, unconsciously. We shall learn the significance of this later. We are to understand by the term ‘environment’ not just nature without life alone, but also nature with life. But it follows from adaptation to the environment that both laws of conservation

-----File: 457-----

can only be fulfilled up to a point, i.e., with this environment being taken into account. In the life of the individual there thus occur changes within itself and, consequently, according to the second law of conservation, changes in type. It is on these fundamental ideas (we must leave aside the details here) that the theory of evolution of life-endued beings was constructed by Lamarck and Darwin, following which intellects such as the Ionian natural philosophers, Kant, Goethe and others have all considered it to have definite authority to a greater or lesser degree. Whether this theory of evolution, phylogeny, has an entirely reliable pillar of support in paleontology and in the study of growth, i.e. ontogeny, has now again become the subject of doubt. But it is quite inevitable for a species to have to change where the environment changes, even if it does not, even by a long stretch of the imagination, follow from this that all the species, like the branches of a tree, must have originated from one living organism. This is universally related to how living organisms emerged.

I shall make only one or two comments on this and the theory of descent and of the origin of species. Firstly, it is perfectly possible that great classes of living organisms took their origin from different primordial beings. The structure of an insect is, despite the corresponding organs, such as the stomach, lungs, feet, eyes, etc., so immensely different from that of a mammal that, if there were not absolutely compelling grounds in paleontology that provide proof of a creature, at some point in the history of the Earth, which could develop to the level of the mammals or, equally, to that of the insects, we would proceed on a more scientific level to trace insect and mammal back to different primordial beings. This would lead us to lose nothing at all with regard to our principal focus, i.e. the theory of evolution. Even restricted to species that actually correspond to each other, it still maintains its elevated significance and does not need to struggle much with lack of time. But it may be that there is more interest in knowledge than in recognition, for it does not touch upon the psychological at all. And the foolish cries of

people afraid of the theory of evolution taking their godlike quality away from them are based on deliberation that is too limited. We resemble God, whether with or without development, if we have consciousness of him. Evolutionary theory per se cannot create spirit and soul from the world. And if it describes a kind of Mechanism from external physical influences, it is telling us nothing new in itself, but only something that human beings have always known, i.e. that they are entirely dependent on such influences. Hence, we can comfortably let the theory of evolution exist without anything happening to our souls. Even evidence that psychological organization increases with physical organization in the succession of development would be of no consequence. But how is such evidence to be given, without the most egregious contradictions and unfathomable questions being encountered? Flora has existed for as long as fauna, but does even the highest plant (be it that plants may, as the most recent studies have taught us, not lack sense organs or nerves, or perhaps even perceptions) bear resemblance to as much as a snail in psychological terms? An ant, which is inferior to so many insects with respect to physical organization, not to speak of mammals, shows much higher levels of mental activity than some of the highest mammals. Species which are quite near neighbors in physical terms can display entirely different mental signs. Mental differences even within the same species are thus still immense even if we disregard pathological conditions and consider only what is normal.

The second comment I would like to make is much more important. Where did the primordial being – or the primordial beings – come from? The two main views on this were already being voiced in antiquity. According to the mechanists it must have been formed exactly as every inanimate body is formed. This is associated with so-termed *generatio equivoca*, self-procreation, something in which even Schopenhauer believed. But some Greeks had living organisms simply growing out of mud or earth by the effect of the

-----File: 459-----

heat of the sun on this mud or earth. It is modern science itself that has demonstrated that self-procreation is a hollow concept – but only in the conditions we have the capacity to reproduce, according to materialists adhering to strict observance of their theory. But what would happen in other conditions? This is not something we can debate, as it goes beyond scientific method. But to preclude any misunderstanding I refer entirely to the definition of living organisms we owe to Kant, which will doubtless be considered valid even by the most strictly adherent materialists. The second supposition, which was known even in antiquity, is one more recently referred to as panspermia. Germs of every single thing, even of life-endued beings, were thought to be scattered throughout the entire universe, and if these germs found themselves in the appropriate conditions, they would develop into the corresponding living organisms. Development was sometimes conceived according to the evolutionary theory more recently strongly advocated by Albrecht von Haller. In every germ cell (in the egg cell in the predominant view, but in the sperm cell according to others) there is the creature in its smallest form, and in this enveloped creature there is another in turn enveloped, and so on, so that every germ of life contains an infinite number of creatures of one species, each encapsulated within another. A germ of life thus has the capacity to unwrap an unlimited succession of creatures of a species, through perpetual propagation, and it was sufficient even if only one germ of each species had always been present. Since the publication in 1759 of a dissertation by Caspar Friedrich Wolff we have known that this evolutionary theory does not hold true in this form. Even in another form, provided for the theory by Weismann, which for a long time enjoyed high regard in biology (i.e. that it is not whole creatures but the final parts from which they are formed that are present in the germs of life, so that it is a case of these parts dividing and then growing), this theory of evolution must be rejected for the time being. This is because the present thinking is that creatures develop through budding or division from a cell, amid very complex phenomena

working on the basis of metabolism, a theory referred to as epigenesis, in which everything originates through development from certain attributes of the germ parts. But panspermia nevertheless retains its significance. One main difficulty about it was something the ancients did not know, i.e., the very low temperature of the universe, which can fall to -150 °C. For this reason modern scholars such as William Thomson and Helmholtz regarded it as just possible that germs of life might have been transported accidentally by meteorites, which would have enabled dispersal from one celestial body to another. Arrhenius has, in accordance with the research of more recent times on radiation and electrical pressure, subsequently demonstrated that even without meteorites small germs of life can be flung from one celestial body to another, and that the travelling velocity in this process can be so great that in travelling from one body to another germs can survive the immense cold of space. We must now concede that dispersal of life through the universe is thus actually possible, particularly if we allow germs of life to exist for all species, especially ones that can develop in conditions quite different from those that prevail on Earth, such as on the moon, where creatures which need to breathe in our sense of the term cannot exist. And so on. I would not know what might be an obstacle to this. The existence of atoms of all kinds is indeed also accepted, and we are familiar with how little in the structure of germs of life is involved in making them develop along quite different lines; the germ cells (e.g. egg and sperm) of the most widely different living organisms can sometimes scarcely be distinguished from each other. Yet they must each have something particularly characteristic that prompts them to develop precisely into a specific creature. If germ cells are introduced at some point, there is no longer any need for this characteristic element, as such cells then develop further and further as the vital functions progress, as has been described, through budding or division, so there is no need for the intervention of a new primordial cell.

All this relates to the development of the whole range of creatures, phylogenesis. The development of individual creatures,

-----File: 461-----

ontogenesis, would be very simple if evolutionary theory had proven itself to be accurate: the germs of life, with their creatures of the same species encased within each other into the infinite, would always have existed, or have been created, and what would follow would relate only to 'unwrapping,' as it were, from the casing in which the primordial germ of life in question would be passed on and on from generation to generation. Only the conditions under which this unwrapping would take place, the manner in which it would occur and the way growth would then proceed would present difficulties, although admittedly quite substantial ones. However, we are to deal with epigenesis, and here it is a case of not only these difficulties, but also the question as to why it is always a creature of the same species as its parents that develops from an egg and, in some cases, a sperm cell. Here the law of heredity applies, and it is therefore regarded as having been demonstrated that to a certain degree the development of individual creatures in the first stages reflects that of the entire array of creatures in existence. Phylogenesis is reflected in ontogenesis, or more strictly speaking, ontogenesis is a recapitulation of phylogenesis. The studies on this are exceptionally complex. For this basic law of biogenetics I refer to the writings of the venerable German scholar Häckel, a source of pride to the country; only crass thoughtlessness, not to use a stronger word, highlighting minor errors and oversights of the kind that cannot be avoided even in the most painstaking work, has falsely attributed deliberate inaccuracies to these works. To what extent ontogenesis actually repeats phylogenetic processes in the process of palingenesis is certainly still a controversial issue. Häckel himself pointed out that some stages in ontogenesis are missing, while others appear in shortened form and many stages are supplementary acquisitions, i.e. are kenogenetic ones, and are not present in phylogenesis. But all this would only ever demonstrate that whatever exists continues to be maintained if at all possible, even if it has long since vanished, and even more so if it is still thriving. There are innumerable facts on heredity; the theory of the origin of species has made them almost common property. But what prompts heredity to ensure that creatures of different species cannot even

produce offspring together? The reason must lie in the elements out of which living organisms develop, i.e. egg and seed. But the essence of this reason is something we do not know. The contents of egg and sperm cell (protoplasm, nucleus, chromatin, centrosome and perhaps many more structures) have an exceptionally complicated structure. Even more complicated is this development itself, except in the single-celled organisms and amoeba, even though we have ascertained the nature of typical processes, such as gastrulation in particular. There also seem to come into play polar forces for which we do not yet have terms, as well as differences in structure and the way the contents of the elements are constituted. In the meantime the law of heredity is therefore just a paraphrase for a range of facts. Yet this law must function with an exceptional amount of energy, as, even with an infinite number of eventualities, it always permits only a given thing and even continues to maintain things such as rudimentary organs which are of no benefit or are even harmful to the creature, a subject on which Darwin wrote in such great detail. And heredity works by extending itself not only to the whole, but even to the smallest particulars: all the organs, all the limbs, all the nerves, muscles, bones, etc., and all this in the finest histological intricacies, are passed on. We shall term this heredity the morphological type, and place alongside it the biological kind (in that heredity also refers to the succession of development of individual parts), as well as functional heredity, which refers to the activities of these individual parts.

However, heredity even touches upon the sites within the egg from which development proceeds; certain sites develop in a certain way that is always the same, providing that development proceeds undisturbed. This is localization-based heredity. For this reason, Driesch speaks of morphological significance for the individual sites in the egg, where significance constitutes what develops from this site under conditions of undisturbed development. Heredity ensures that it is always the same process that ensues here too; now, this is all the more marvelous in the light of more recent biology establishing practically without doubt

-----File: 463-----

that a great deal more can develop, and in certain conditions actually does develop, from the same site, and that sites can take over and maintain the development of other sites. For this reason, the same scholar also speaks of a morphological potency of these sites, which is much more wide-ranging than morphological significance. Of all the potencies of a site, in normal conditions heredity therefore always forces only one of these out into actuality and into significance. And then we see yet another marvelous element: if the conditions for development deviate from the normal, despite the change this necessitates in the realized potencies of the individual sites of the egg, the development that occurs does still bring to light something that is on average a normal proper creature. The law of heredity is as potent on the smallest scale as it is to a larger extent. It is a law of morphology that commands compelling authority. Heredity thus governs shape and form, development from the smallest forms into the smallest creatures, into great ones and into the whole, and also the course of development, the effective functioning of all parts, as well as mental activity, as is commonly known. It is a liberal law, as it permits variations, without detracting from what is essential. As a law of conservation it bears a certain degree of contrast to the law of adaptation, but also acts together with it, in that it always preserves anything that the law of adaptation says has arisen.

I would like to make another comment on morphological potency, as follows. This potency is above all interpreted in ontogenetic terms, and so relates to the same particular characteristic – in fact, to one specific cell. But if we bear in mind that ontogenesis is correlated with phylogenesis, we might almost believe that morphological potency has a significance that is still much more universal, i.e. phylogenetic. Potency would then mean that every possible creature can come into being out of the contents of an egg itself. Right at the outset the contents of an egg would have the capacity to produce not only everything appurtenant to the relevant individual from each site, but also any arbitrary individual of any

arbitrary species. The contents of an egg are thought to be completely universal in morphogenetic terms, and phylogenetic development is believed merely to amount to potencies of the contents of an egg manifesting themselves more and more widely to develop into ever more new forms. This would be a type of phylogenetic evolution, but not of already existing forms, nor of differentiations from existing building blocks, but of potencies which are inherent from the outset in the protoplasmic material which forms the contents of an egg: potencies which, just as they relate to all the parts of an individual, in the same way apply to all creatures of any arbitrary species in the whole array of creatures. An approach of this kind would shed light on the correlation between ontogenesis and phylogenesis and would relocate the emergence of the various forms of creatures into the course of the development of a creature and into the completion of this development induced by external or other influences. Existing creatures would not be fully developed ones, but rather stages in the more universal development of the total potency of the protoplasmic substance. And ascent in the succession of creatures would be brought about by the completion of stages arising later and later. But we are actually aware of living organisms which directly constitute stages in a specific development and spend their entire existence as such, if they do not go on to continue this development. Some even regard women as creatures who have remained at an earlier stage of development than men. It is possible that there is not only one type of the material in question in existence, but two types, with differing phylogenetic potencies: one for the animal kingdom, the other for that of plants. Perhaps the existence of several types of protoplasmic material should also be assumed for the kingdom of animals itself. In such a tremendously complex subject we are justified in expressing even ideas that are universal. But may this remain at the level of such expression itself; it is left up to the imagination to dream up how many new creatures could still come into being as an additional conclusion of development arising later from the protoplasmic material.

A further law of conservation can be seen in restitu-

-----File: 465-----

tion included within regeneration in specific exceptional cases; such restitution involves living organisms restoring their whole bodies or replacing parts. Examples of this sometimes touch upon the astounding, such as when parts severed from some animals grow into entire animals of the same kind, either directly or after they have undergone a reverse change almost back into their initial state, or when certain cells of a plant grow new branches or leaves, or even a whole new plant of the same kind. The higher we go up the order of living organisms, the more the body loses the ability to restore itself. But this ability is not yet quite extinguished, even in humans. And where direct physical restitution does not occur, in us or in other organisms, there occurs at least supplementary formation, restructuring, further development, or transferal of functions. One example of supplementary formation is adventive restitution, in which another organ develops near to an organ that has been lost, as is the case in plants. This also includes the formation of new organs alongside only partially removed organs, such as 'the limbs and tail in amphibians, the head in planarians, and the root tip in plants.' Restructuring might be that of scales into leaves in plants, or that of injured eyes into antennae in certain crustaceans. Further formation through compensatory hypertrophy manifests itself in the enlargement of organs where the accompanying organ is lost, as occurs in a kidney after the loss of the other. Finally, transfer of functions often occurs in brain disorders, where, for example, other parts of the brain gradually take over the facilitation of speech after the speech center has suffered paralysis.

In addition to these laws of conservation there is also a law of morphological and biological order, the law of harmony, mentioned above and dealt with in Kant's discussions on natural purpose (p. 369). This law brings about accord among all parts in their order, cause and succession, and also in their effective functioning. But in such an exceptionally murky and difficult area,

in which even the specialist experts find that observations are simply not even remotely sufficient and therefore allow the most diverse interpretations, it is dangerous to speak of particular laws branching along particular courses.
This is why I have presented only the material that seems to me to be the most reliable currently, although there is doubtless a great deal more that is no less significant. And, as the reader will see, it all relates principally to the body and its functions. The laws are a form of regulation for the body and its functions, morphological and biological regulation, in fact not only for individual creatures, but also for the whole array of creatures in existence, i.e. in ontogenetic and phylogenetic terms. We shall see later what the situation is with the psyche. But we also need to complete our discussion of the above.

52. Approaches in Energetics; Ostwald and Häckel.

It must be emphasized that there exists no process in nature without any changes in amounts of energies or conversion into other energies. In general we speak of conversion of energies. A stone I am holding has gravitational energy. If I drop it, some of this energy is transformed into kinetic energy; if the stone falls to the ground, the kinetic energy is transformed into heat or energy as it smashes, and so forth. The school of the students of Energetics, led by Wilhelm Ostwald, substitutes all processes with conversions of energy. The world contains particular total amounts of a certain number of energies; life in the world constitutes the constant conversion of these energies here and everywhere, the total amount being unchanging and always preserved. Processes of motion, light processes, heat processes, chemical processes and so on: everything is merely conversion of energy. This is thought to be equally true of the processes of life, in fact not only of animal life, but also of psychological and intellectual life. In his book ‘Die Energie’ (*Energy*) Ostwald writes, ‘I believe I might interpret this relationship (between the concept of energy and that of the mind) such

-----File: 467-----

that events in the mind are comprehended and interpreted as ones involving energy, just as all other events are.' We see illustrations of this theory in the facts of everyday life. Firstly, what is purely animal presents no difficulty: the processes in the body are certainly the same as elsewhere in and on any arbitrary body. If the processes in the physical world are actually merely conversions of energy, this is also what they are in the bodies of living organisms. Sensory perceptions are likewise thought of as merely constituting such conversions. Energies get onto and into our sense organs; there they are converted into other energies (e.g. just as light energy in rhodopsin in the eye is converted into chemical energy), then they are conducted through the nerve (in its axis cylinder), as 'nerve energy.' Ostwald himself states that we are not yet able to determine what type of energy this 'nerve energy' is. Once it has reached the central organ, brain or spinal cord (in the ganglia), the energy undergoes renewed conversion into 'psychological energy' (perhaps energy from chemical decomposition or catabolism). Part of it becomes a sensation, while the rest returns as nerve energy, is converted in the organs of the body and there instigates the energy conversions that we see in movement, excretion and so forth. Hence, only conversion from energies into energies is involved. And Ostwald writes expressly 'that the mental processes in all their diversity must be conceived of simply not as concomitant phenomena of the relevant energy, but as this energy itself.' All psychological activity is therefore energy and its conversion. (The mechanists, incidentally, claim the same in regard to motion: psychic activity is motion and its conversion. Ostwald interprets Mechanism differently, in that he sees psychic activity as a concomitant phenomenon of motion, but in my opinion this was not the perception of Democritus and those who succeeded him.) I shall present all that is to be said on this in the next section.

Here I intend to emphasize just one of the most interesting points about Energetics. Ostwald voices the opinion that the most fundamental ener-

gy in us is chemical energy. This devises and presents chemical structures which perform repeated processes more easily than those taking place for the first time. Ostwald compares this with the memory in living organisms with regard to both individual existence and heredity, thus comparing the chemical and the psychological faculties of memory. By then going on to put consciousness of the ego into memories and the faculty of memory in the same way, he creates a connection between this consciousness and chemical memory. He continues, 'Here Energetics immediately protects us against the childish notion of the 'storing of memory images' in the cells of the brain, by positing the corresponding processes in place of the images, i.e. positing a temporal sequence of reactions in place of a conceived spatial diversity, for which no substratum can be proven to exist; this temporal sequence alone can fulfil the requirements for the temporal nature of the mental processes.' Ostwald is undoubtedly right in replacing space with time, in the instance of anyone actually accepting the existence of images in space. But a believer in psychic activity does not do this; he places these images in the soul, which has absolutely nothing to do with space. The mechanist, however, has to accept the existence of movements distributed in the brain. The student of Energetics actually nullifies the concept of space (and this is how one doubtless has to understand the work of Ostwald), by annulling the concept of mass. More on this later. All the same, it is difficult to understand how memory and powers of recollection are to arise from the sequence of reactions. Each step in a reaction really has vanished as soon as it is over; it leaves nothing that remains precisely as a result of it. How, in the course of a sequence of reactions, is a step from the past to manifest itself? We develop a line of reasoning, and all this would constitute a sequence of reactions. We can develop this only if we keep all the steps in this line of reasoning in front of us constantly; the moment we do not have a step right there before us, we will have lost the thread, so to speak. Therefore, at each step a sequence of physical reactions is to represent the entire preceding reaction at the same time. This is fundamental; the simple aftereffects of

-----File: 469-----

reactions, as seen in physics and chemistry (such as where the way a rubber band stretches when it has previously been stretched is different from how it does when it has not been) are not sufficient. The whole past reaction has to be present again and again at every step in the reaction. This is an aside to the explanation of the organized bodies as machines which have machines that are exactly the same as the smallest particles of them. I do not know how we are to understand this. Or, indeed, even powers of recollection. Here, a reaction of any kind is believed to give rise to long-past sequences of reactions, which sometimes do not bear the slightest resemblance to this reaction, just as when one hears a sound and finds oneself recollecting a color or an object or an incident. According to this theory, concepts without any substratum also have to be sequences of reactions of energies. I emphasize these misgivings at this point. Ostwald has given no view of his own on the interpretation of our mental activities, our feelings, our forms of intuition, and our categories (whether acquired or not acquired) in terms of Energetics; he has even acknowledged that most of this is still very obscure.

In his Energetics Ostwald has broken up the concept of matter into that of energies. I have to go into this here, as we need to know what this dissolution really means. It is also of the greatest importance for his theory. Every type of energy is disunited, a product of two factors, intensity and capacity. Readers who have no background in physics will understand best if I provide an example. Active force (mass multiplied by square of a velocity) is an energy. If we climb to the top of a tower and drop a kilogram weight from our free hand, when this weight reaches the ground it will have a certain velocity and a certain active force, or energy. If, instead of one kilogram, we take a two-kilogram weight, this will reach the ground at the same velocity, but its active force will be twice that of the first weight. At three kilograms the velocity will still be the

same, but the active force will be three times as much, and so on. Hence, the receptivity, i.e., the capacity, for this energy is governed by mass. This is the one factor. Now let us climb to the top of another tower that is four times as high and drop the one-kilogram weight into free fall again. We find that, with the velocity at which the one-kilogram weight reaches there now being twice as high, the energy down on the ground is increased fourfold. If the tower were nine times as high, we would see the kilogram weight reach the ground at three times the velocity with nine times the energy within it, and so on. Hence, the decisive factor here is velocity, which – or rather the square of which – is the second aspect of energy, its factor of intensity. So what is the connection between mass and velocity? We can allocate any arbitrary velocity to every mass. But mass and velocity are united into one product in the energy in question. A corresponding rule applies to all energies without exception. They all lead a disunited existence which diverges along two paths.

We have, in a manner of speaking, a Spinozist substance with two attributes: intensity and capacity. This would be quite adequate. But these attributes are totally independent of each other; each per se can arbitrarily remain constant while the other varies, or vary while the other is constant; if both vary, each varies entirely only in itself, with no regard at all to the other. Not even a parallel variation, as in Spinoza's attributes of substance, is present here. The dependence of the energy is also only relative, since if the energy varies, only one of the attributes needs to vary with it, and if both attributes vary reciprocally, the energy remains constant. It follows from this that none of the attributes is broken up into energy. Both attributes, capacity and intensity, exist entirely independently alongside energy. In the most important processes, mass is such a capacity. Consequently, mass must remain. It has only changed its name; as capacity, it is subordinate to a universal concept, to which belong volume, form, electrical charge etc. There has been

-----File: 471-----

as little real simplification as there has with mechanical processes, with the introduction of the torque moment, which, in the same way, has capacity and intensity, mass and velocity. And Energetics does not manage to avoid all the difficulties that arise from the concept of mass, particularly all dualisms; they remain difficulties and manifest themselves immediately the moment we actually track the energy conversions in physical processes. What is changing here: capacity or intensity? Or do both change? What do capacity and intensity mean in an individual process? If we do not inquire into this, we will not know how the energy changes: whether it remains unchanged in its type or converts into a new type, i.e., whether we remain within the one phenomenon, and this just rises or falls in intensity, or whether we are actually gaining another phenomenon. So we remain unenlightened on the most important aspect. But if we look at this in detail we immediately get stuck again with capacity and intensity, e.g. the mass and the square of the velocity etc. And the eternal problem of how variation of a mass can in any way influence psychological processes, e.g. strengthen or weaken them, thus remains unsolved, as is the case in general in materialist theory. For the answer ‘because the mass is the capacity of the energy’ does not convey anything at all with respect to the problem; it merely changes the name, exchanging capacity for mass. Viewed from this aspect, Energetics achieves no more than Mechanism. It leaves the most important questions open.

Yet we might concede that, if there is nothing else to say against it, Energetics is to be preferred over Mechanism, since it does present itself in far more universal terms and encompasses everything physical, and also because work and energy are much more suggestive of psychological elements than motion is. It is just that it does not actually achieve what it promises to accomplish: capacity (including mass) and intensity each remain separate, with both alongside energy, just as how Mechanism has mass and velocity separate, with both alongside torque moment. When a proponent of Mechanism says all psychological

processes are conversions of torque moments he is speaking just as the proponents of Energetics do. But what about the law of conservation of energy, which is always valid for energies, but only in exceptional cases for torque moments? This law has no significance at all for the types of processes involved. There is absolutely nothing that can be drawn from it for this process type. It is totally irrelevant to the basic question. According to Energetics, psychological processes are conversions of energy. This teaches us that they are subject to the principle of conservation. But what changes in this, and how it changes, is something we cannot experience at all, although we really must experience it if we are not just to be replacing one word with another, and if we wish to differentiate between the different psychological processes. If one thinks we cannot yet do this and the future still has to reveal it for us – so be it! But Energetics must be readily able to reveal the roles of capacities and intensities as well as Mechanism does. It has to show directly why, if a mass varies in the brain, e.g. there is a decrease in its water content, fatigue and unconsciousness can result. The answer of 'because a change in energy is associated with it' teaches us nothing. This is because, firstly, it does not have to be the case, since the second factor, intensity, can cancel out the change in energy through change in materials, in terms of both strength and type. Secondly, such a response is one in words only, just as it is in Mechanism. The two factors of energy have been forgotten about too much, although they certainly can fluctuate in such a way that the energy does not fluctuate at all, in either strength or type. What actually takes place then is something we can easily envisage: life in its entirety might be destroyed. But what does Energetics tell us happens in psychological terms? Nothing at all!

My point in making mention of all this was not to throw Mechanism into relief against Energetics (in my opinion, in the domain of psychological processes Mechanism is far less serviceable than Energetics), but to make clear exactly what we have in the doctrine of Energetics, which appears as a somewhat pretentious theory, in that it leaves us

-----File: 473-----

in the lurch, just as all physical theories do. The content we shall cover in the next section will lend great weight to what we have discussed above.

Häckel has not gone as far as Ostwald has: he gives matter its due and attempts to explain everything in terms of conversions of matter and energy. Häckel is a materialistic Spinozist. Like Spinoza, he posits a thing-in-itself, along with attributes for this thing. For one of the attributes, corresponding to physical extent as in the works of Spinoza, he posits matter. He takes energy as the second attribute. However, he feels obliged to split this attribute into two: energy of the kind we usually call energy, i.e. the usual physicochemical energy (or physical energy, to which it tends to be shortened), and energy which he refers to as psychoma. This approximates to the psychological energy found in Ostwald's works. However, while Ostwald describes this energy in such a way solely because he wants to leave open the possibility for there to be other types of energy at work in psychological processes than those we currently know of, Häckel's psychomas have more of a separate significance. They change like the other energies, and with the other energies, but they maintain themselves, without these other energies. In this they are clearly separated from them, and they are a third attribute of the thing-in-itself, the universal substance. In his volume 'Die Welträtsel' (*The Riddle of the Universe*), excellent and magnificently written in itself, a book which undertakes the only real attempt to unravel the secrets of the world on the basis of modern science, Häckel writes, 'The three fundamental attributes of the substance (i.e., of the thing-in-itself) are: a. how it fills space, or its extent, which is material (= matter); b. motion or mechanics, which is force (= energy); and c. sensation or world soul, which is spirit (= psychoma). These attributes are consequently quite general fundamental properties of all bodies.' And (something which is hence of particular consequence) the law of conservation of energy that he accepts as applying separately to each of the first two attributes, matter and energy, he describes as applying to the third attribute,

psychoma, in exactly the same way, once more separately, setting down in wide-spaced text the statement ‘The sum total of sensation in infinite space is invariable.’ The three attributes are therefore positioned alongside each other: a trinity of the world, as Häckel also calls it. He is a materialist only in that he gives the third attribute the characteristic of the two other attributes, which would also correspond to the theories of Spinoza. But by speaking of phased difference in the succession of bodies, acquisition in development (ontogenetic and phylogenetic) and heredity for this third attribute, he shunts it even further away from physical energy, for which there exists no such thing other than would follow from becoming independent alone. His theory is, however, a theory of evolution in every way. All that has been said about this theory and how it relates to characteristic psychological features is thus totally applicable in every respect here. And Häckel himself does come to meet this with the special status of the attribute of psychoma. But in everything he says about the development of consciousness, finely worded as it is, we actually see nothing but a pursuit of the states of consciousness through the organic succession. Nothing is said about how these states have physically come into being and how they physically develop. And it is precisely this that is the central point for us. The slightest psychological impulse is revealed to be so profoundly different from any physical force, any physical process, or any physical conversion, that it seems like a miracle, and that it is of no assistance at all to us if we are offered the explanation that there is a continuous scale between our mental activity and that of the lowest level of living organisms. We can acknowledge that. But where did even just the first, lowest level of activity of the soul come from? The question remains unanswered, as does that of where the first, lowest level of organized being came from (as in the works of Kant). If Häckel had not felt this himself, he would not have segregated psychoma off completely from energy as the third attribute of his being, and would even have declared psychoma to be inheritable.

Ostwald and Häckel are the original creators of

-----File: 475-----

Energetics of the psyche, along two quite different lines. Their adherents have added nothing substantial, and it has not been rare for them to misapply the teachings of their masters through substantially misunderstanding them. I need only point out the work of the renowned physicist Felix Auerbach, but l shall leave discussion of him for later.

53. On physical world and life views in general; the end of the world and immortality.

We now arrive at a final discussion of the views of the world and of life which have been expounded above. First, we shall look at the world as it was before life arrived. It is entirely a question of the beginning, as only here can something preternatural and supernatural be possible, while for everything that follows, we see everything entirely from the viewpoint of the physical. Now, we certainly know nothing about the beginning. But we can draw conclusions about it from the end, provided we assume that the world does not have infinite amounts of matter and energy. We shall make this supposition on the limitedness of matter and energy, which corresponds to the approach of Eugen Dühring (p. 417); whether this supposition can be justified will be explored later. We have encountered three regulating principles, but only the third is considered a possibility. A consequence of this principle is that all processes (forced and free together) which take place in a totally self-contained system are directed towards producing a specific state in this system: in this state, the only processes that are possible are those that run back precisely into themselves and can be reversed, such as the movement of bodies on paths that constantly remain the same. Where there are elements of resistance present and where there come into play energies which are only converted into other energies to a limited extent, there is no possibility for processes that can be reversed precisely. In these cases, the end state crosses over into a state in which no processes at all are present any longer; the system is, as we might say, physically dead. And – the most important aspect – this system can never again attain life solely by its own means; it remains in the same state

of inertia for all eternity if something does not intervene from outside. If we extended this statement to the universe, it would mean that, those named conditions being met, the universe must also at some point undergo physical death and pass over into a certain state of inertia. Now we do actually know of energies which, according to the conditions as they exist in the universe, are convertible only to a limited extent. One of these is the most important form of energy: heat. Of course, we do not know whether outer space has resistances occurring everywhere or whether there are only limited numbers of them. But we do know that enormous masses of small bodies and of dust clouds commonly occur everywhere. We also know that celestial bodies very often collide. Finally, we find ourselves increasingly obliged to accept that space is filled with a material, aether, which would exist quite apart from everything material, if it did not offer resistance – albeit only slight – to the movement of bodies through it. The nature of aether is, however, something that is still much debated among scholars. We do, in any case, have resistances in the universe, and if – although there is hardly any likelihood of this at all – somewhere a system were actually to move totally without resistance for eternity, it would be simply in the end state of persistence without change that the movement of this system would be found. But not one of the lost processes could arise again from the world alone. I deliberately express myself very carefully here. Others conceive the ‘end of the world’ in much stricter terms. Here, the end relates either to all processes or at least to certain processes.

But if a process has an end, it must have begun at some point in time in a finite world. It may have arisen from other processes, just as thermal motion originates from collisions of bodies. For it is these other processes to which we need to adhere. Hence, we can go back further in the succession. Now if the world is finite, we have to arrive at something in finite time beyond

-----File: 477-----

which the succession can no longer be continued, since a finite world cannot have an infinite number of states. But this means that, at some time or other, processes must be created out of which all the processes in our world have developed; these ultimately lead back to inertia. How many processes are thought to have been created is insignificant, as an act of creation is an act of creation, whether millions of processes are involved or only one process. This is true of the entire world, even where coherences (p. 441) occur. So – as science teaches us – for a finite world one we cannot get by without a beginning, i.e., an act of creation of processes. As we know (p. 417), Eugen Dühring also assumes the existence of a primordial state of the world without processes. He dismisses the idea of an act of creation for the processes, or at least for one process. But it is totally impossible to understand in purely scientific terms how he then intends to arrive at a world with processes. Creation, whether by God or through a world soul, is quite unavoidable. A state of absolute rest can never bring forth a process from itself. Influence from the outside is by all means required for this.

In conceptional terms it makes no difference whether we speak of a creation of processes, or of bodies, or of a type of matter when we speak of an instance of chaos. But it is certainly advisable not to make claims that go further than the theory can demonstrate. Yet I would like to add the following. More recent science has increasingly led to the view that what we call final particles of matter – atoms, corpuscles, etc. – constitute dissimilarities in the world aether, like small eddy dissimilarities in a body of water. This makes bodies amount to accumulations of such dissimilarities. But dissimilarities can emerge and then disappear. If resistances exist in the material containing the dissimilarities – in this case the world aether – the dissimilarities must have once come into being, i.e. they must have been created. Then the beginning is diminished to the aether alone, alongside the creative power. And dissimilarities ultimately have to fade away. All together this means that the world of matter

is created and then gradually disintegrates. This is not in contradiction with the principle of the conservation of matter, taking the aether into consideration, as the dissimilarities simply disperse; the aether remains in them. As regards the energies, in the beginning these must thus all have been so-termed strain energies – that is to say, if matter was also created, they must have existed as these in the aether. The great British physicist James Clerk Maxwell acknowledged the existence of energies of this kind in the aether. They are attached to matter, either actually or merely apparently, if matter itself is simply aether in a specific state. It is from these original strain energies that the other energies have then arisen through events, and these other energies will return into these strain energies when the physical world has met the end described, which also applies to bodies. The end is the beginning. Incidentally, this is an idea that occurs in writings as early as those of the ancients.

Is the world really finite? All we can do is apply conjecture to this. Most people will be of the view that it is not. However, William Thomson (Lord Kelvin) and his research student Ritter set up calculations on the possible velocities of the celestial bodies in the universe; it emerges from these calculations that the material world cannot really be assumed to be infinite. I may refer here to my book ‘Die Entstehung der Welt’ (*The Emergence of the World*) and so forth. If this world were infinite, either it would have to have been created and existed for only a finite time, or the celestial bodies would have to show enormously greater average speeds than they actually do. William Thomson goes as far as to estimate the number of the celestial bodies, gauged by the size of the sun, at one or ten thousand million at most. Of course, such an estimate is not of decisive significance, as we cannot dive into immense depths of space, while at the same time our knowledge of the speeds at which the celestial bodies travel really is only very limited. But while the antinomy of reason per se balances infinite

-----File: 479-----

nature and finite nature as equally probable, an argument from reality is at least provided for finite nature, while infinite nature can only be represented in terms of a supposition. We have to acknowledge this anomaly. Finite nature of the world is thus more plausible than infinite nature, and creation thereby more probable than the absence of a beginning.

To avoid such a creation (as a consequence of the end), which would certainly be disastrous for Materialism, Häckel suggests that the same third principle of the world is in fact valid for isolated finite systems, but not for the universe, as there can occur in infinite nature some things which breach the principle. (I do not know whether he thought of the Boltzmann-Planck coherences in this, although these do not breach the principle in the universe in particular.) This does mean actually to acknowledge the existence of processes in the universe which one totally denies to be any form of finite components of the world. We admittedly do not know much about the universe, but its uniformity is a well-established fact. Furthermore, if we intend to concede the existence here of specific processes which are not permitted in the part of the world known to us, all the laws of nature will then collapse, particularly the two laws of conservation relating to matter and energy, which we are able to test only within a very restricted domain. So there is a serious inconsistency here. One cannot on the one hand make the contention in monistic and materialistic terms that there is total uniformity in nature while on the other hand repudiating for the whole world a law that is thought to be valid for other such great, such appropriate systems in the world, without adopting the very thing the materialist struggles against the most, otherworldly interventions.

Let us turn to the world in which life is present. We need say nothing about Mechanism itself in the form in which it might be presented; motion, impact, pressure and radiation are familiar to everyone. In a work titled ‘Das Leben im Weltall’ (*Life in the Universe*) Zehnder gave what is perhaps the most complete and most thoroughly worked-through materialistic and mechanistic system for the structure and the formation of liv-

ing organisms. I can only make most particular recommendation of this excellent and stimulating work. But the reader will soon gather from the discussions above, and those to follow, that nothing is accomplished towards answering our questions, despite the depth of this study, just as, in my opinion, nothing at all can be gained by this route. But alongside the foamlike structure of the protoplasm assumed by Quincke and other scholars, lasting merit might perhaps also be accorded to Zehnder's concepts of the tubule structure in the smallest elements of organ tissue.

I must speak about Energetics in more detail. We shall apply the subject matter to be discussed to Mechanism, to the extent that there are further observations to be made about this system. Physical life is thus thought to consist of conversions of energy. There is no mention of the types of these energies or their conversion. But we can establish something in relation to this, and have to, if we are not to reject Energetics right from the outset. That is to say, the consequences of the influencing energies are sometimes in no proportion at all to the intensity of these energies, which really ought to be the case according to the principle of conservation. The only thing that helps us out here is that immense effects can be triggered by quite insignificant causes, such as a spark making a powder keg explode. The spark might only tear two atoms in the heap of gunpowder apart, but that is enough for all the atoms in the heap to scatter from that point onwards. With its energy the spark has released the strain energy in the heap of gunpowder, with the result that this strain energy is converted into formidable explosion energy.

I think that, if we are to see the activities of the soul as energies at all, we have to regard them as triggering energies. It has long been surmised and contended that the will acts like a triggering activity. But in my opinion all other activities of the soul also reveal themselves to be merely triggers in the same way. Let us cite a few examples by way of clarification. A tear or a cut

-----File: 481-----

to our bodies can involve no greater physicochemical energy than is required to cut apart the tissue in question. This energy produces the feeling of pain. And what enormous amounts of physicochemical energies can be expressed by this pain: screaming, weeping, flailing around, spasms in all the muscles, even self-harm, etc., energies which each in themselves far exceed the energy originally used to make the tear or cut. If only one conversion took place, the sum total of these energies could, at the most, be only as intensive as this one energy. So, through the 'pain' activity of the soul, quite new quantities of physicochemical energy are brought into being; these can only be triggered into existence. Consider also how, to a certain extent, we are even able to suppress these energies by our will. We hold out bravely, or else feel ashamed to let ourselves go in this way, and so the energies are not released: an antagonist against pain, the will, has inhibited the release of these energies. We can cite countless corresponding examples: think of the enormous transformations of energy which can – and do – bring a sense of honor, desire for revenge, love and so forth in their wake, while the amount of physicochemical energy needed to influence us (a word, hence a sound, which comes into contact with our sense of hearing, or light, beamed into our eye from a much-loved figure, and similar sensations) can be infinitesimal. Moreover, we are capable of performing innumerable movements simultaneously with the same will. As a boy in my home town I admired travelling musicians who made up an entire orchestra; instruments were played by hand and foot, head and mouth, in short almost every part of the body, and it was not rare for all the instruments to sound at the same time and make an unholy din. We are capable of carrying out any number of detonations, even from one control center, at the same time, triggering everything. For the last example one could of course say that to accomplish more, or a great deal, takes a correspondingly increased performance of will, just as the analogous example in physics shows us that the

number of electric sparks required increases as the number of detonations does. We still possess no decisive objective measure for the intensity of our activities of the soul; anything that comes to light from these outwards has no relation at all to them, as does indeed emerge from the fact that even in such intense internal excitation we can suppress every form of expression of this, so that there appears to be no activity within us at internal level at all. It is possible that ways and means will be found to detect and track in physicochemical terms even the activities of the soul proceeding internally. Brilliant methods are already being used to examine the effects of stimuli on the central nervous system. But in the meantime, it is best that we turn to ourselves. And on this point I believe that we can in fact strengthen and weaken our will, not by doubling, tripling, quadrupling or subdividing it, but by using the same will to clear out other activities of the soul such as apathy, sloth, moral erring, misgivings, fear, etc. – in brief, antagonists or inhibitors. Anyone who is 'proficient' certainly needs no more than a relatively small amount of will to develop the physicochemical external energy that anyone lacking proficiency does not accomplish despite such intense aspiration, since the activities of the soul simply do not yield to each other at will, not to speak of the given physiological conditions, as (even if the histological structure or chemical composition or behavior recognized in physics proven for 'accustomed nerve pathways' should be different from that for unaccustomed pathways) they do ultimately again lead back to psychological conditions.

The above discussions may still leave room for doubt, but on the whole, they will certainly vindicate the claim posited: that the psychic energies are ones that act as triggers. The question of how the psychic energies behave towards each other will be discussed later.

However, the psychic energies also have quite different functions to fulfill other than merely to act as triggers for energies. Four classes of interplay between physical and

-----File: 483-----

psychic energies are to be distinguished: physical energies against physical ones, psychic energies against physical ones, physical energies against psychic ones, and psychic energies against psychic ones.

In fundamental terms the first class offers nothing more of particular interest at present. As has often been pointed out, there is no doubt that all processes related to chemistry and physics in the bodies of living organisms take place totally in accordance with the laws of physicochemical processes in general, just as they unravel in the world without life. The great German physicians and physiologists Johannes Müller, du Bois-Reymond and Helmholtz, along with many others, have demonstrated this unequivocally.

It is even more difficult to gain a clear view of the second class. It is a question of the effects of the psyche on the body. Simply following accustomed practice, we term these motor effects. Not only do they in themselves give rise to movement, but they are actually also very varied, according to their type. There are movements, such as those of the individual limbs, some by the intestines, and others by the heart, the eyes and so on. Here, the will releases active forces. Then there are excretions and secretions, such as those in the digestive organs and the glands. Associated with such effects are the processes involved in the uptake of materials into the body, by direct introduction, absorption, osmosis and so on: in brief, everything that serves the purposes of growth, nutrition and maintenance of the body. These effects are no longer of a purely motor kind; chemical energies and specific ones related to physics come into play here, but it is still a release of energies that is involved. But then there are effects of the psyche on the body, which are purely regulatory. We can rank among these effects hunger, thirst, difficulty in breathing, and the urge which causes secretion and similar sensations, which function in a way analogous to the centrifugal governing factors for our steam engines. They control the material content, and thus also the energy content, of the body. Even more important is that activities of the soul force the physical energies to manifest themselves and to change

in a quite specific manner. The most important example of morphological and biological regulation has already been discussed (p. 453 f). Other examples can be found in the regulatory activities, by means of the vagus nerve and other nerves, acting on the heart, diaphragm, glands, intestines etc. So here it is no longer a question of conversions of energies into each other, but of inducing certain conditions in these conversions. Here we can say above all that the behavior of the psyche with regard to the energy principle is exactly the same of that of the physical regulative principle, which likewise governs conversions of energy within the energy principle. The energies as such do not regulate their conversions themselves; the only thing that is assured is that their sum total remains constant. But a sum total can originate from the widest ranges of summands. For a certain range of summands to form requires a far-reaching principle. In physics and chemistry this is simply the third physical principle. One could say that the third principle of the world intervenes likewise in the phenomena of life. It certainly does this. But what is the purpose of humans having feelings and nerves that act as regulators? The external conditions alone should certainly be sufficient, as in processes related to physics and chemistry, to regulate the conversions. But every time the conversions adopt a course unfit for the development or maintenance of life, regulation through specific activities of the soul sets in. We simply have two regulating processes: one purely physical regulation in accordance with the physical principle, determined by the state of the body, a process which acts entirely mechanically, as in an inanimate body, without any reference at all to life, and one regulating process aimed directly at life. This is a new addition found in beings endued with life. Our thinking is discursive, not intuitive. If we have parts that assemble themselves into a whole in front of us, we know how the whole has arisen from them, but if we have only a whole, the way it has been formed from the parts will remain hidden from us. Kant thereby establishes in his ‘Kritik der Urteils-’

-----File: 485-----

(*Critique of Judgement*) the principle of purposiveness. The materialists do not want to acknowledge this; they dismiss it as something people have thought up. But I do not know how, in terms of pure Mechanism or Energetics, one is to make comprehensible psychological regulation in the development of the body from the countless possibilities on a quite specific course (p. 450 f), and in the body; this regulation doubtless consists of something particular alongside what is physical, and, I would say, always changes the conditions such that the physical regulative principle performs all – and only – the regulation necessary for the maintenance of the body. This is indeed already apparent in chemicophysical assimilation and dissimilation of the materials in the cells (e.g. in the ganglia), which are always kept in balance, and in the need for rest, the moment that dissimilation has, through physical or mental activity, become predominant. Therefore, if the psychological activities release physical energies, they will also constantly trigger the physical regulative principle for the processes between the energies. In this instance can one still actually regard the psychological activities as physical energies? As observed earlier, physics and chemistry show energies doing nothing of the kind. They are capable only of triggering and changing into each other, nothing more. This is the most accommodating expression for the relationship between psychological and physical regulation. Some will even be inclined to view psychological regulation as a form of combat regulation against physical regulation. And they would be right, as the moment psychological regulation is absent and the physical prevails freely, the body perishes.

This class also includes those instances of triggering that serve as an expression of our activities of the soul from the inside outwards, such as those of the physical energies in the act of speaking to express thoughts and wishes, in changing of the facial features to give expression to sensations, and in many other movements to express impulses, feelings etc. Here, the relationships are again apparently simple ones: physical energies appear as a result of psychological ones. The importance borne by these processes is based

mainly on accord, as with language. In other cases it is a question of natural defense or flight. In yet others, such as screaming or howling in pain (so common throughout the animal kingdom), laughing and singing through enjoyment, and weeping, it is difficult to trace back the significance of the mode of expression.

This brings us to the third class. It encompasses the sphere of activity of the sensory nerves: stimuli in the physical energies bring forth psychological phenomena, in fact almost all of these – or according to the physicians, all of them. If we divided the psychological phenomena into perception (physical and psychological), envisaging (looking, fantasizing, recognition, remembering, etc.), perception (feeling, desire, etc.), thinking (drawing conclusions, believing, etc.), and volition, in extreme cases all these phenomena could be produced by physical energies. We would not say anything to contradict this; everyone knows it. And if the body is believed to be in connection with the outside world, this is how it must of course be. The question is simply, how? If someone grasps our hand when it is closed into a fist and tries to open it, this energy triggers our will, which in turn triggers physical counteraction in our muscles against the assault. This is simple: an exploding stack of gunpowder can be accompanied by manifestations of fire, which reignite the extinguished spark that caused the explosion. Similarly, physical energies in the sense organs would produce psychological sensory perceptions, such as the five familiar to us, and also sensations of cold and heat, pain perception, sense of balance, and a sense of perception of the body, in which there is no need to decide whether the differences between some of these sensations are specific ones or only differences in degree. This becomes more difficult to grasp if stimuli trigger recognition, remembering, thinking and feeling, and even more troublesome if this occurs with several activities of the soul of vastly different types at the same time.

In my observations so far, I have not separated the unconscious activities of the soul from the conscious ones, but there is all the more need to make a distinction now.

-----File: 487-----

The assertions made about the relationship between these unconscious activities and the physical energies cannot be tested, as no internal study has been performed in this area, let alone an external one. But we have internal investigation at our disposal for the conscious activities of the soul. I think I can safely state here that something else invariably works its way in between a stimulus and the triggering of an activity of the soul: causality. We know that the physical world view does not acknowledge a priori properties of the psyche. For all categories, causality is believed to be acquired, derived from the experience of each individual or of a number of entire species, and abstracted. Hence causality itself, as with all categories, is insubstantial in psychological terms, as the activity of the soul is the process of drawing conclusions, not the end of this process, i.e. the conclusion drawn. Neither can the physical view of life have a different aspect by any means. From this viewpoint, causality, as with every category, follows the activities of the soul triggered by stimuli. This topic is an extremely difficult one. But, as I commented earlier, I believe my book 'Philosophische Grundlagen der Wissenschaften' (*Philosophical Foundations of the Sciences*) has done from a scientific perspective what Kant accomplished in philosophical terms: to demonstrate that stimuli do not trigger conscious activities of the soul at all without the cooperation of causality, and that this cooperation – if not actually 'pre-operation' – is the unavoidable requirement for every form of conscious life in the physical world. In this respect causality assumes the same status for life as consciousness itself. No doubt we could indeed say that there is no consciousness at all of the unity of the ego in relation to the external world and the diversity of the internal world without causality, as without causality any recognition of both what is different and what is the same is totally impossible, as is, therefore, recognition in general, along with any form of connection. I think I have also demonstrated that even the concept we have of the peculiarities of space could not have been acquired without causality, particularly where we are speaking in scientific terms. But does this all apply

((cf also pages 409 and 414 f) to how are we to envisage the link between causality – and this is also true of all the other categories – and physical energies? Can we speak only of a triggering in this instance also? In my view, there is no more than we encounter in the perspective of time and space. And this perspective is something we have ceaselessly in the conscious state, but causality first appears here every time a stimulus is exerted, and then the relevant activity of the soul ensues in response to the stimulus.

Finally the fourth class, which comprises the connection the psychological activities have with each other. Häckel simply writes, 'Each form of psychoma can be transferred into another form of it.' Hence conversion of psychic energies into each other. Much seems to speak for this. We feel the sensation 'hunger'; we eat, and this sensation gradually diminishes, and the sensation 'full up' takes root; this can increase to 'too full' – one or other of these being the equivalent of the lost sensation of hunger. Sometimes a feeling of reverence thus also changes into that of indifference or even of contempt, that of love into hate, and so forth. Meanwhile, we also know of instances in which it simply cannot be a case of a conversion from the one into the other. It seems as if the activities of the soul are to be divided into groups that keep a distance apart and do not drift into each other. What could consciousness move into, as it does indeed have to be near at hand everywhere and, just as the eye sees objects, it views the other activities of the soul from a position completely outside of and above them? Anyone who recognizes categories, such as causality, will also find they place him in a predicament. They are the regulative principles for all internal activities of the soul, such as perception, thought, etc. Let us now look at a plainer example. Through ignorance or superstition, or a particular change of mood, a man thinks he sees a ghost. It is an internal sensation. He is gripped by fear, dread and anxiety, and these feelings remain for as long as the sensation lasts. There has been no conversion of sensation into these

-----File: 489-----

feelings; the sensation can even outlast them. I think we should gather from this example and similar ones that psychic energies, to speak in terms of energy again, are also merely triggered, and that the conversions are solely apparent ones, in that there is always something else in between, such as the stimulus exerted by food, which suspends the one sensation, hunger, and triggers the other, 'full' or 'too full,' and new sensations of the object of one's adoration, love, etc. But I also think there are here, as with the third class, phenomena that present themselves as regulating factors and are not attached to any type of physical energy.

We can summarize all that has been discussed above as follows.

1. If the activities of the soul are seen as physical energies, we should regard them as triggering energies. They can then find their equivalent only in each other, which is not generally the case. Otherwise they may have their equivalent in the physical energies in the relevant nerve cells (ganglia and ganglia clusters in the brain, spinal cord and solar plexus), and in the 'psychoplasm,' as Häckel claims. The proponents of Materialism and Energetics are, by nature, mostly inclined to maintain the latter. But have they provided experimental proof of this claim? The answer to this can only be no. The established fact to which they always refer, that body and spirit constantly influence one another, is no proof. It is true that, due to disassimilation, the brain of a tired person holds more of certain materials and less of others than the brain of someone who is not tired. Do these conversions therefore have to be equivalents of the energies of thought or feeling? Could they not have arisen indirectly? Consider the following case. The will forces a muscle to contract or to extend. During the state of contraction or extension lactic acid forms in the muscle as a disruptive material, so the muscle becomes fatigued and finally, so to speak, saps the will. But under other nutritional conditions, the

the contracted or extended muscle stands opposite its normal state! This change in the nutritional conditions has induced the change in the composition of the muscle – the change is no equivalent of the will. Similarly, there is scarcely any activity of the soul that fails to influence the heart and other parts of the body. The physical changes induced by this must therefore bring about changes in the nutrition of the cells. I think we can use all this, with great justification, to counter that apodictic contention while there is no specific evidence presented. And there is still a lack of such evidence, even though it can be acknowledged that study particularly of fluctuations in current in the nerves and of material conversions in the ganglia may hold out some things in prospect.

2. The activities of the soul offer phenomena which are not to be encountered in any form of physical energy, in that they in particular act as regulators for the development and maintenance of the body as a living object. On this subject I have nothing to add to what we have discussed above.

3. There are activities of the soul to which it is not feasible to attribute the character of energies. These include most notably the perception of time and categories such as causality in particular, regulative principles of internal life and of life in, and with, the external world. I would also rank consciousness among them as an organ for the perception of internal life.

Finally we should consider the following: What more are we to expect of the physical interpretations of psychological activities?

4. All physical processes must be perceived as united into a whole; this corresponds to our consciousness of our ego and to what we have discussed on page 455 f about this and Ostwald's sequences of reactions.

5. Furthermore, each physical process must be recognized as a process in its own right, and in itself.

6. Each physical process must recognize and detect each other process, as each elicits, and provides

-----File: 491-----

correction for, the other, such as how the sensation of pain elicits the will to cry out.

7. No physical process should be disturbed by the addition of new processes or by the disappearance of existing ones. This can be understood most easily in physical terms.

8. Each physical process must anticipate other processes, of any arbitrary type, even ones opposite in nature, for we are familiar with our internal and external actions and know what it is within us that follows upon each process, even as far as a certain mental image or, indeed, sensation.

Anyone who thinks he can concede all this for physical processes might make the world of the psyche equal to the world of physics. I personally consider such a concession to be quite inconceivable. Automata, even those of the most fanciful German writer, Ernst Theodor Amadeus Hoffmann, are undoubtedly no longer cited as examples by anyone. Superficial analogies are to be encountered everywhere. These are not what are at issue. What we see here is a specific process of rendering a subject intelligible, enabling us to say with discernment: quite so, the situation can indeed be like this. But Mechanism and Energetics are infinitely far removed from here, even if one disregards the contradictions in which they, despite themselves, become entangled and among which the most significant contradiction is that of the counteraction between physical and psychological regulative principles. The physicochemical laws act in life just as they do in the world without life. But they are not the only laws in life: there are also other additional laws, particularly regulatory ones, which do not exist in the world without life, as far as we know, the function of which in counteractions directly opposes those laws of physics. Even physicochemical phenomena do not deplete life; in life there exist yet more phenomena not encountered in the world without life, such as the wondrous manifestations of phylogenetic and ontogenetic development that ensue from the innumerable possibilities in existence (p. 448 ff). Life simply contains more than the inanimate, i.e. that which is characteristic and particular.

Just a few thoughts remain to be expressed on this. Physical views of life and the world apparently entail there being no talk of God, nor of freedom or immortality. But I shall just say something about the last of these, immortality. As an entire concept it is not a possibility in physical terms. But perhaps some aspects of it are possible? We know that in nature heat can be regarded as immortal. All processes in nature are associated with generation of heat at some point. Heat can be converted into other forms of energy only to a restricted degree; therefore there must always ensue a net increase in heat. And the amount of heat in the universe thus rises to a specific maximum, where it must then remain (but cf page 440). If the psychic energies should also contain such types of energy that are, similarly, convertible only to a limited extent, these must show a constant increase. Without conversions, such energies are life without activity; hence, this life must undergo constant growth in the universe. Ultimately, of all the psychic energies it is these energies alone that remain in existence, and we have only life without activity, no other life. This is strikingly reminiscent of the Buddhist concept of life in nirvana. It is a life, but without activity. And should perhaps even the energies in nature that are otherwise convertible to only a limited extent be convertible without limit to and from these psychic energies, which is by no means impossible, the final energies would, after all, be just life, without activity. Life in nirvana would founder into the aether, where it was at the beginning of the world before being transformed into physical life through a mighty act, only for it to return into the aether at the end of days. I hardly need to point out that this theory of immortality is not the one we see in spiritualism, which does relate to the individual, but here instead is a question of the whole, with respect to which Häckel establishes the theory of immortality directly in his law of conservation for psychoma. But something individual is indeed also inherent in this theory of immortality if psychomas are simply convertible only to a limited extent. It seems almost a pity to have to reject a theory which could lead to such substantial consequences for immortality. But at present it seems

-----File: 493-----

to me that every view of life and the world that is based on a purely physical foundation is a lost cause.

Just prior to writing I have become aware of the existence of a paper by Felix Auerbach, 'Ektropismus und die physikalische Theorie des Lebens' (*The Principle of Ectropy and the Theory of Life According to Physics*). It might have been better if the second part of the title had been omitted, as no theory of life in relation to physics is given, or even implied, in this work. It might just emerge from the text that the author is an adherent of the Energetics of Ostwald. But he writes of spirit and will as if he were writing of particular entities (he calls them the 'divine' in humans), as opposed to the phenomena in nature without life. It is thus merely a question of ectropy. Ectropy is the opposite of entropy. As we know, and as Auerbach establishes, entropy means the equalizing, dispersal and degradation of energy. Hence, ectropy relates to the separation and concentration of energy and the increasing of its quality. Entropy alone comes into being by its own means, while the only way ectropy can ever arise is through action from outside. The process of heavy bodies falling is thus entropic: bodies fall of their own accord. But the process of heavy bodies going upwards is ectropic, as they have more energy in each successively higher position. And they do not go upwards of their own accord; they have to be lifted or pushed upwards by an outside force. Auerbach is of the view that beings endued with life act in accordance with ectropy. This in itself is not new; is anyone still unaware that living creatures protect and store up energies prior to dispersion, e.g. as plants do in their structures? But Auerbach accords a higher significance to this fact, making it analogous to the significance of regulation (p. 451). Life is a regulative principle against the death of the universe, which the principle of entropy says will inevitably come to pass; if it is not a remedying principle in absolute terms (if I understand Auerbach correctly, he does actually intend to go this far), it is in any case a retardative one. He also ascertains that there is the most precise link possible between beginning and end, and I therefore cite the exact wording of his main statement, insofar as it applies here. He presupposes a primordial state in a sense

similar to that found in the works of Eugen Dühring, and calls it chaos, in which all energy was thus entropic (or was there no energy at all there?), as no processes existed. Through an act of creation this primordial state was suddenly taken to the highest possible degree of ectropy: 'In the beginning the cosmos (thus, the world of processes) came into being out of the chaos. The chaos was lethargic and inert; the cosmos is strained and turbulent. The chaos is empty; the cosmos is filled with energy. The quantity of this energy always remains the same, but its quality is subject to perpetual change. What the role of the transformations underwent is something lost to the cosmos. Tension and motion diminish; the energy is bound and dispersed, thrown into disarray and degraded, and it moves towards a maximum. At this point a new phenomenon appears on the scene: life. In nature in which there is no life it is energy discharge that prevails, suppressed only minimally by its cultivation. Where there is life in nature, development predominates, and this development strives to oppose the discharge of energy that is also active here. The success of this endeavor is only gradual and restrained within modest limits. But ectropic ability to order and trigger processes can emerge and develop only gradually and not overtly. And it is in the human race that it celebrates the occasion of its liberation in glorious splendor.' Life is like a 'watchman' who incessantly intervenes and 'sifts away' what is 'harmful' (i.e., the entropic). If the reader transposes this into our simple language, he will find it to be not far from the ideas expressed here, at least via one course, as Auerbach does not discuss the other forms of regulation, which could almost be said to be even more important. Something that is curious is that Auerbach connects with the origin and formation from chaos of the cosmos the origin and formation of even the greatest degree of orderliness, which gradually crosses over into un-orderliness in terms of entropy (p. 441). Life intervenes again as a regulating factor; it creates orderlinesses out of the un-orderlinesses. How life does this, how it actually leads the battle against entropy through ectropy, is something on which Auerbach says nothing specific. A few asides might enable us to draw the conclusion that he is seeking life in certain selected properties of the protoplasmic

-----File: 495-----

materials, in an approximate analogy to the selected property of some materials described as semipermeable, which let through water from a sugar solution but do not let the sugar through. But the mechanistic view, in all its coarseness, ought not to have any real connection with his system. For further conclusions regarding the behavior of humans and humanity I refer the reader to this very interesting text. The statement 'The cosmos (and with it, its representative, the state) has a direct interest only in a strong and ectropic individual' certainly has a Nietzschean ring to it.

Everything we have elaborated on in this section is associated with Vitalism and Neovitalism, e.g. as in the works of Reinke. I have avoided using these terms; their meaning goes too far towards the one side, the physical, and comes much too close to becoming cornered on the other side, the psychological, in this instance the intellectual. No word that has, quite justifiably, taken on such an unscientific connotation as Vitalism should be revived. I shall conclude this volume with some observations on the world riddles in general.

In du Bois-Reymond's now famous 'Ignoramus et ignorabimus' (*We are and shall be ignorant*) speech, which Häckel attributed to a psychological metamorphosis, but which resulted from du Bois-Reymond's progressively heightened realization that Materialism in any form does not suffice to solve the 'world riddles,' just as this realization indeed gradually made its presence felt among many other scholars in the same way, he established seven such world riddles. Three of these are thought to be unsolvable, 'transcendent': the origin of matter and force, the origin of motion, and the development of simple sensory perception and of consciousness. Three others are believed to be solvable, if difficult: how life originated, the (apparently intentional) purposiveness of nature, and grounded thought and the origin of the language associated with it. One riddle remains undecided: the question of freedom of the will. Did the subsequent development of the physical

approaches contradict his theory? I think not! On the contrary, such later work seems to me to have made the riddles even more transcendent than how he interpreted them. We see that even the far better resources of Energetics do not bring us a single step closer to solving these riddles, or that we at most relate them to other things, e.g. in the case of the first world riddle, rather than applying it to matter and force, instead relating it to energy with its two factors, and for the second riddle, rather than applying it to movement, relating it to energy conversion. 'Ignorabimus' is the only thing I would dismiss. It is no lack of knowledge in any way when we have convinced ourselves that the world does actually contain something more than an individual entity in the eternal monotony of existence and change. It is true, we search everywhere for simplification, and indeed we should search for it. But when simplifications lead to no more than figures of speech without furthering insight into the essence of the subject at all, merely stacking more riddles and incomprehensible phrases on top of riddles, these simplifications represent no gain at all and should be dropped as soon as it becomes clear that they are unserviceable. I believe this is the case for the purely physical approaches to life and the world. The totally materialistic approach is something no longer popular with anyone. The view from the aspect of Energetics, as attractive as it is, will, I am convinced, share its fate. Spinoza's approach in association with Kant's Transcendentalism seems to me to do best justice on all sides, insofar as human foresight and understanding can contend anything. It also offers the huge advantage that we can so easily continue and extend it, as Häckel's example shows. We must in fact now state that at least three attributes can be ascribed to the universal substance for our world: mind, energy and matter (or what can represent matter). The universal substance is indeed believed to have an infinite number of attributes. So there is nothing to exclude the possibility that our world actually does amount to these three, or possibly more, attributes. And together with these attributes, still others in any arbitrary number can constitute other worlds dreamed of as far in the past as the ancients. Hence, anyone who acknowledges the existence of a thing-in-itself with an infinite number of

attributes must concede the existence of an infinite number of worlds and perhaps also transitions and overlaps between them. And he may even trace the sequence of life (p. 221) through these various worlds. Even such an interpretation as this constitutes a Monism and belongs among the concepts of the extensive German Monist League. However, some of it does stray into the mystical, where Kant was also led by his ‘Träume eines Geistersehers’ (*Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*), since we do indeed have knowledge of nothing other than our world alone.

-----File: 498-----

Name and Subject Index.

A

Superstition 27, 434.
Reflection, the world as 300, 379.
Defense formulas 190.
Achamoth 273 ff.
Adam 150.
Adam of Bremen 93
Africa 20 ff., 57 ff., etc.
Agnosticism 420.
Agrippa Cornelius 312.
Egyptians 100 ff., 129, 132, 155, 158, 165, 180, 184, 188, 198, 219, 228, etc.
Ancestral Cult 43 ff., 46, etc.
Aion 271, etc.
Academy 248, 355.
Commercial 289.
Alanus 303.
Albertus Magnus 294.
Alchemy 290.
d'Alembert 435.
Allegory 98.
Old woman from day 291.
Altruism 437, etc.
America 17 ff., etc.
Ammonios Sakkâs 277.
Amulet 40.
Ananke, ἀνάγκη 250, 352, 422.
Anaxagoras 243, 269, 423.
Anaximander 237, 269.
Anaximenes 236.
Andrée 164.
Animism 36 ff., etc.
Illustrative forms 360 ff., 475 f., etc.
Anselm 300.
Antinomies 363 ff.
Apocastasis 253.
Apollonios of Tyana 256.
A posteriori 360 ff.
Appetition 341 ff.
A priori 360 ff.
Arabs 108, 208.
Archeus 329.
Archons 257, 273.
Archytas 242.
Ariost 18
Aristotle 249 ff., etc.
Arkesilaos 355.
Arnobios 269.
Arrhenius 179, 448.
ἀρχαὶ 7 ff.
Asharites 288.
Aeschylus 185.
Assimilation 372, 473.
Association principles 359, 400, 411, 415, 418.
Assyrians 108 ff .; s. a.
Babylonians.
Astrology 109, 188, 290.
Atheism 154.
Ether 465 f.
Atomistics 422 ff., 465 f., etc.
Attributes 335, 392 ff., 461 f., 484, etc.
Auerbach, Felix 463, 482 f.
Resurrection 192 ff.
Enlightenment philosophy 347, 434 ff.
Augustine 281, 315.
Australia 17, etc.
Automatic 419, 428, 479, etc.
Averroes 288, 295.
Avicebrol 291.
Avicenna 288.
Avidyia 350.
Avatars 169.

B

Babylonians 108ff., 130, 134, 153, 158, 160, 161, 178, 183, 196.
Bacon Roger 299.
- by Verulam 402ff.
Bards 95
Basilides 268ff.
Bastian Adolf 66ff.
Baur 267.
Conceptual deities 141f.
Animation 32ff., 424, 436, etc.
Beneke 413.
Berkeley 356ff.
Bernhardy 426.
Bernouilli 441.
Summon 54, 190.
Customization 36ff., 319, 382ff., 390, 424, 436, etc.
Obsessed 56.
Bessarion 309.
Moment of motion 459.
Consciousness 400, 474ff., etc.
Mind Leader 399.
Threshold of consciousness 399.
Bhagavad-Gîtâ 115, etc.
Bible 106f., 157, 177, 184, etc.
Basic biogenetic law 449.
Blavatsky, Helene Petrovna 330.
Böhme, Jakob 323ff., etc.
Boltzmann 440.
Bonaventura 303.
Boyle, Robert 434.
Brahmaism 120.
Brugsch 100, 146, etc.
Bruno Giordano 317ff., etc.
Buechner 438.
Buddha 215, etc.
Buddhism 120, 122, 214.
Citizen 55.

C

Calvin 315.
Campanella 322.
Cartesius 333ff.
Caesar 88f., 94, 97, 216.
Centrosome 450.
Chachma 266.
Chamberlain 83.
Chauvinism 83
Cherubim 280.
Chinese 120 f., 143, 164, 210, 235.
Christian Science 257.
Chromatin 450.
Chrysippos 233.
Cicero 99, 253.
Civitas dei 294.
Claudius, Emperor 95
Clausius 441.
Comte 40, 415 ff.
Condillac 411.
Constant, Benjamin 29
Contemplatio 304.
Cooper 23
Curtis 50 f.
Cusanus, Nicholas 306.
Czolbe 438.

D

Demon Belief 43 ff., 53, 257.
Dante 206, 297.
Darwin 445 ff., 450 ff.
Deism 253 ff.
See also pandeism.
Delitzsch, F. 153.
Demiurg 268 f., etc.
Democritus 423 f.
Dennis 205.
Dervishes 261.
Descartes 333 ff., etc.
Descendant Doctrine 445 ff., 449.
Determinism 296.
Dharma 215.
Diderot 435.
Floorboards 352, etc.
This fasti et nefasti 191.
Thing-in-itself 365, 390 ff., 461 ff., etc.
Diogenes of Apollonia 236.
Dionysius Areopagita 280.
Dissimilation 372, 455.
Docets 276.
Driesch 343, 370, 450 f.
Droßbach 345.
Dualism 13, 148, 267, 458 ff., etc.
Dubois Reymond 438, 471, 483.
Dühring, Eugen 416 ff., 463, 481.
Duns Scotus 298.

E

Eckehart, Master 303.
Edda 93 f.
Egoism 435.
Egg 450 ff.
εἴδωλον 37, 193.
Unity of the World 16 ff.
Eclectic 261.
Ectropia 480 ff.
Eleates 351, etc.
Elements 423.
Elysium 204.
Emanation theory 253 ff., 263 f., 278, etc.
Empedocles 220, 423.
Empiricism 376, 401 ff., 454 ff., 483.
Finiteness 363 f., 464 f.
Energetic 454, 483.
Energy 421 ff., 454 ff., etc.
---- psychological 455 ff.
Energism 420 ff.
Angel 261, etc.
Entelechie 250, etc.
Entropy 440 u. a. ok
Development theory 443 ff.
Encyclopedia 435.
Epigenesis 448.
Epicurus 425.
Iranians 110, 131, 139, 148, 159, 162, 166, 174, 202, 216.
Conservation principle 440.
Eristik 354.
Eschatology 71 ff., 192 ff.
Eschmunazar, king 108.
Essene 276.
Ethical deities 138 f.
Etruscan 205.
Eucken 390.
Euemeros 52, 97.
Eucleides from Megara 354.
Euripides 96 f., 183, 244.
Evolution 258, 269, 282, 295, 420, 447 f., 452.

F

Fakirs 261.
Fan custom 42.
Fatalism 138, 234, 437.
Faust 54, 266.
Fechner 398f.
Purgatory 192ff.
Ferment 329.
Fervers 111, 208.
Fetishes 39ff., 90, 104, etc.
Fetishism 36ff.
Feuerbach, Ludwig 438.
Feuth, Ludwig 113.
Spruce 358, 373f.
Flammarion 399.
Florence, Karl 124.
Fludd 329.
Flood saga 161ff.
Fohi 121.
Foism 122
Shapes 249, 383, etc.
Frank, Sebastian 316.
Saint Francis 300
Freedom 182ff., 367, 393, 479, etc.
Fresnel 441.
Frobenius 5, 42, 57ff., 74, 79.
Frohars 111, 208.
Function transfer 453.

G

Ganglia 455, 473.
Gassendi 431.
Gastrulation 450.
Counter deities 148 f.
Object deities 127 ff.
Secret societies 57, 254.
Secret Doctrine 189.
Spirits 55
Ghost belief 48 ff., 53.
Intellectual events 455 ff.
Generatio equivoca 384, 446.
Germans 88ff., 136f., 140, 156, 158, 167, 173, 206.
- North 92ff.
Gerson, Johann 303.
Ghosts 53
Geulincx 336.
Gilgamesepos 109, 188, 196.
Uniformity of Humanity 11f.
Gnostics 267ff., 277, etc.
Goethe 266, 275, 277, 307, 396, 445.
Gorgias 355.
Belief in gods 56.
Divine oath 185.

Idols 48.
Idolatry 43 ff.
Graßmann 103, etc.
Gray 4, 53.
Greeks 50, 95 ff., 130, 137 f., 143, 162, 167, 171, 203, 230, etc.
Grimm, Jakob 37, 45, 73, 75, 90 ff.
Group 255 f.
Gubernatis 114.

H

Chop 401, 449, 461 ff.
Hades 204.
Hafis 261.
Semi-cultural peoples 4.
Haller, Albrecht v. 447.
Hammurabi 110
Hanusch 86
Harmony 241.
---- Law of 453.
---- Pre-stabilized 338 ff.
Harnack, Adolf 267 ff., 274.
Harpies 73.
Hartmann, Eduard v. 386 ff.
---- Franz 330.
Hebrews 49, 106 ff., 144, 156, 177, 192.
Hegel 376.
Heimarmene, Εἱμαρμένη, 239, 422.
Hel 206 f.
Helmholtz 448, 471.
Helmont, Baptist van 328.
---- Franz van 338.
Hemsterhuis 413.
Henotheism 144, 147 ff.
Herakleitos 238, 353.
Herbart 347.
Herder 435.
Hermogenes 269.
Herodotus 45 f., 50, 89, 106.
Hesiod 158, 172.
Witches 53 ff.
Hierarchy 280.
Heaven of Earth equal to 17 ff.
Celestial bodies 466, etc.
Hinduism 119
Hippias 355.
Hobbes 432 f.
Hoffmann, E.T.A. 479.
Holbach 435 ff.
Hell 78, 192 ff., 208.
Homa 96, 155 f., 171.
Homer 112.
Homoiomeres 423.
Horatius 188.
Hugo of St. Victor 300
Hume 358, 407 ff.
Hylodeism 236 ff.
Hylopsychism 235 ff.
Hylozoism 235 ff.
Hypostasis 366, 437.

I

Ideal 365.
Idealism 349 ff., 360 ff., etc.
Ideal philosophy 253, 349, etc.
Ideas 244 ff., 264, 335, 364 405, etc.
Association of ideas 43, etc.
Identity philosophy 385 ff., etc.
Idolatry 50 f.
Theory of Illusion 350.
India 113 ff., 132, 135, 139, 156 f., 161, 162, 166, 176, 187, 200, 211, 228, 258, 350 f., 424.
Indifferentism 234.
Individuation 295.
Induction 402.
Incarnations 169.
Intelligences 288.
Intelligible things 282, etc.
Intensity 457.
Intuition 263, etc.
Irreversibility 440 f.
Isaac 302.
Istar's Hell Ride 197.
Italian 158

J

Jamblichos 277.
Japanese 123 f., 133, 164, 210, 235.
Yehuda Halevi 293.
Beyond the cultural peoples 192 ff.
---- ---- primitive people 71 ff.
Jeremias, Alfred 110, etc.
Jezira 291.
John, apostle 265.

K

Kabbalah 290 ff.
Kalpa 201.
Kant, Immanuel 359 ff., 484, etc.
Capacity 457.
Cara 293.
Karlstadt 316.
Karma 215, 330.
Karneades 355.
Cadastralism 34.
Categories 222 f., 360 ff., etc.
Categorical imperative 367.
Causality 409, 414 f., 474 ff., etc .; s. also categories, regulatory.
Seed particles 423, 447.
Celts 94 ff., 208, 216.
Kepler 345.
Kiesewetter 293.
Kismet 138, 288.
Klopstock 150.
Coherent systems 441, 467.
Principle of constitution 366 ff.
Copernicus 321, 428, 432.
Kosmos, κόσμος 238, 240, 481, etc.
Forces as Will 382 ff.
Krause 328.
Criticism 355, etc.
Krönig 441.
Culture 80 ff.
Cultures 4, 6, 80 ff.
Cyrenaic 355 f.

L

Lability 439 ff.
Lactantius 270.
Lamaism 122.
Lamarck 445.
Lamettria 435 ff.
Lange, F.A. 422, 438.
Lao-tsse 210, 220, 235, 350.
Lasson, Adolf 319, 401.
Lavater 396.
Life 16 ff., 482, etc.
Life view, explanation 1 ff.
Life series 220 ff.
Fate of life 182 ff.
Emptiness 240, 424.
Leibniz 340 ff., etc.
Lessing 346, 434.
Leukippos 424.
Liber scriptus 299.
Liber Vivus 299.
Kingdom of Light 272.
Lilith 150.
Lippert 40 ff., 84 ff., 90 ff., 102 f., 112, 124 ff., 131.
Littauer 85, 87, 164.
Livingstone 74.
Locke, John 402 ff.
Logos 142, 262, 265 ff., 422, etc.
Longfellow 21
Longinus 277.
Lotze 396 f.
Lucanus 95.
Lucretius Carus 426 ff., 441.
Lullus, Raimundus 305.
Luther 265, 314.

M

Mach, Ernst 414, 417 H.
Magician 112.
Maimonides 293.
Malebranche 336.
Mandaeans 276.
Manichaean 270 ff.
Manu 213, 217.
Fairy tale 22
Marsilius Ficinus 309.
Machines 369, 457.
Materialism 420 ff., 467 f., 477 ff., etc.
Matter 246, 279, etc.
Maui 4 ff., 21.
Maxwell 441, 466.
Maya 350.
Mayan peoples 125
Mechanism 420 ff., etc.
"Medicine" 42 ff.
Melanchthon 314.
Melissos from Samos 354.
Mendelssohn, Moses 345.
Human sacrifice 46, etc.
Messiah Idea 169.
Metamorphoses 37.
Metempsychosis 214 f.

Metensomatosis 214 ff.
Mexicans 124
Meyer, Ludwig 391.
Milton 150.
Mirabaud 435.
Mode 335, 392.
Mohammedanism 208.
Moleschott 13, etc.
Monads 339, 340 ff., 397, etc.
Monism 13, etc.
Monistic League 484.
Monolatry 70.
Monotheism 151 ff.
Montaigne 330.
Montesquieu 413.
Morphological-biological regulation law 453.
Morphological Law 451.
Moses de Leon 291.
Motakhallim 287.
Muatazile 287.
Müller, Johannes 470.
---- K.O. 205.
---- Max 20, 24 ff., 33 f., 38, 81, 115, 211, 217, 265.
Multism 13
Mysteries 57.
Mystics 290 f., 293 ff., 300 ff., etc.
Mysticism 254, etc.
Mythology 56.

N

Nature 251.
Naturalism 401 ff.
Natural Laws 439 ff.
Natural philosophers 231, etc.
Natural philosophy 376.
Nature religion 56 f.
Primitive peoples 4, 16 ff.
Nature purpose 369 ff.
Necromancy 254.
Nephesch 292.
Neschamah 292.
Neoplatonism 277 ff.
New Pythagoreans 255 ff.
Neospinozism 396.
Neovitalism 483.
Newton 428, 434.
Disorder, elementary 441, 482.
Irreversibility 440 f.
Nietzsche 385.
Nicholas Cusanus 306.
Nirvana 211 ff., 226, 480, etc.
Nominalists 293f., etc.
Noumena 363.
Nucleus 450.
Nus, νοῦς 243, etc.

O

Objectivation 379ff.
Occasionalism 336, 413, etc.
Occultism 254.
Revelation 30, 294.
Ontogeny 445ff., 449.
Ophir 6i.
Ophites 276.
Oracle 189.
Orcus 205.
Organized things 369.
- essence 369 ff.
Orphics 255 f.
Ossian 95.
Ostwald, Wilhelm 454ff., 462, etc.
Otto III, Emperor 300
Ovid 100.
Oceanic peoples 17ff.

P

Palingenesis 449.
πᾶν, τὸ 231, 255.
Pan 255.
Pandemonism 56.
Pandeism 227 ff., 254, etc.
Panpsychism 235 ff., etc.
Panspermia 317, 447.
Pantheism 227, 390 ff.
Pantheos 234.
Paracelsus 316.
Paradise 78, 159, i92ff., 208.
Paraclet 270.
Parallel, anthropological 10 ff.
Parallelism, psychophysical 393, 397 ff., etc.
Paralogisms 363 ff.
Parmenides 352.
Pascal Blaise 329.

Patristic philosophy 281.
Patritius 317.
Paul Diaconus 45
Pausanias 97.
Peraten 276.
Peripatetic 253.
Peruvian 125
Perception 341.
Pessimism 384 ff.
Peters, Carl 61.
Phenomenalism 356 ff., etc.
Pherekydes 256.
Philolaos 242.
Philon 261 ff.
Philostratos 257.
Phoenicians 108
Phylogenetic Evolution 452.
Phylogeny 445 ff., 449.
Physical energies 468 ff., 473, etc.
Physizism 420 ff.
Pico Giovanni 310 f.
Pistis Sophia 274.
Planck, Max 418, 440, 442.
Plato 217 f., 221, 244 ff., etc.
Pleroma 272.
Plethon Gemistos 309.
Plotinos 277 ff.
Pluralism 13.
Plutarchos 257.
Poincare 417.
Polarity 324, 450.
Polygnotos 204.
Polylatry 70 f.
Polynesian 66, etc.
Polytheism 127 ff.
Porphyrios 277.
Positivism 394, 401 ff.
Potentiality 250, 414.
Potency, morphological 451.
Prana 223, 230.
Predestination 285, etc.
Predetermination 414, etc.
Preacher 186.
Prussia 87.
Primalities 322.
Principle 7 ff., 367 ff.
Prodikos 355.
Prophets 107.
Protagoras 355.
Protoplasm 450 ff., 468.
ψυχή 36 ff., etc.
Psychic energies 454 ff., 468.
Psychology, associative 359, 397, 400, 411, 415, 418, etc.
Psychom 461.
Psychophysics 398.
Psychophysiology 399.
Psychoplasm 477.
Pyramid Texts 198.
Pyrrhon 355.
Pythagoreans 217, 239.
Pythagoras 239.

Q

Qualitates occultae 313.
Spring spirits 325 ff.
Quincke 468.
Quinta essentia 313, 316.

R

Rabbanites 293.
Ramanuga 258.
Rationalism 333.
Ratzel 61.
Room 246, 360, 433, etc.
Real 347.
Realism 349 ff., 401 ff., etc.
Realists 293 f., etc.
Regeneration 453.
Regulation 454, 481.
---- biological 454.
---- morphological 454.
Regulative 360 ff., 365 ff., 439 ff. 471.
Reincarnation 211 ff.
Reinke 483.
Religious origin 23 ff., 434 ff.
Rephaim 193.
Restitution 452 f.
Resurrection 79.
Reuchlin, Johann 311.
Reversibility 440 f.
Richard of St. Victor 302.
Riehl 401.
Rigveda 20, etc.
Ritter, Heinrich 466.
Romans 50, 98 ff., 129, 143, 172, 203.

Rousseau 413.
Ruach 292.
Rudimentary organs 450.
Runes 94.
Ruysbroek 304.

S

Salomon ben Gabirol 291.
Seed particles, seed particles 423 ff.
Sankara 260, 351.
Sankhya 259.
Satan 149 ff.
Shamanism 39, 44 ff., 122.
Scheible 293.
Schelling 327, 375.
Deities of Destiny 136 ff.
Student 367.
Schleiermacher 378.
Schmitt, Heinrich 267, 271, 274.
Scholastics 293 f., 305, etc.
Schopenhauer 379 ff.
Creator 131, etc.
Creation 464, etc.
Schwartz, W. 132.
Swivel field 316.
Scotus Erigena 283 f.
Soul 36 ff., 45, 71 ff., 343, etc.
Soul types 221 ff.
Soul cult 43 ff., etc.
Soul activities 221 ff., 473 ff., etc.
Soul Walk 211 ff., etc.
Self-maintenance 347, 436, 444.
Sensualism 356, 394, 401 ff., 425, etc.
Seraphim 280.
Shintoism 123.
Sige 271.
Simon Magus 276.
Sirens 73 f.
Skepticism 354 ff., etc.
Slavs 85 ff., 208, etc.
Zohar 294.
Socrates 219, 248.
Soma 117.
Sophia 267 ff., 272.
Sophists 354 f.
Food bans 191.
Spectral analysis 442.
Spencer, Herbert 420.
Speusippos 249.
Spherical harmony 242.
Skewer 77.
Spinoza 337, 390 ff., 484, etc.
Spinozism 390 ff., etc.
Spiritism 254.
Stability 439 ff.
Master assumptions 7 ff.
Root terms 360 ff .; s. also categories.
Stephens, John 126.
Steresis 251.
Stars, Carus 113, etc.
Stirner, Max 386.
Fabric 250.
Stoics 232 ff.
Strabon 112.
Chieftain 52.
Substance 335, 392 ff .; s. also thing-in-itself.
Sufism 258.
Sunda Islands 17 f., etc.
Fall of Man 159 f.
Supranaturalism 254.
Swedenborg 330.
Sympathy of things 277, etc.
Synesius 269.
Syzygies 271.

T

Taboo 48.
Tacitus 88 ff.
Tangaroa 69 ff.
Tao 121, 143, 210.
Taurellus 323.
Teleology 251 f., 367, 397.
Telesius 317.
Teufel 37, etc.
Thales 236.
Themistocles 97.
Theogony 131, etc.
Theosophy 223, 253 ff., 286 ff., 330, etc.
Therapist 276.
Theophany 284.
Theromorphism 101 ff.
Theurgy 254.
Thomas Aquino 296.

Thomson, William 448, 466.
Thrones 280.
Totemism 39, 47.
Treatment of the dead 41 f., etc.
Book of the Dead 199, etc.
Totenkahn 72 ff.
Death Cult 72 ff. a. a / 0.
Dead Land 73 ff.
Judge of the Dead 192 ff.
Dead birds 73 ff.
Inertia 340, 436, 439 ff.
Transcendentalism 359 ff., 484, etc.
Transcendence 350 ff., 400 f., etc.
Dreams 43 ff.
Twesten 138.
Tylor 34 f., 49.

U

Survivor 55.
Reversibility 440.
Unconscious 386 ff., 474 ff.
Infinity 363 f., 464.
Universals 293.
Immortality 192 ff., 204, 220 ff., 395, 479, etc.
Underworld 171 ff., 192 ff.
Upanishaden 201, 211 f., 385.
Primal Beings 446 ff.
Original state 417, 481.
Utilism 435.

V

Vaiseshika 424.
Valentinus 271.
Vedanta philosophy 212 f., 258 ff.
Vedic religion 119.
Inheritance 444 ff.
---- biological 450.
---- functional 450.
---- Localization 450.
---- morphological 450.
Tangled 420.
Virgil 206.
Vischer, Friedrich 35.
Vitalism 483.
Vogt, Karl 438.
Folk Etymology 98.
Voltaire 435.
Imagination the world as 379 ff.

W

Truth, double 285, 331.
Divination 189.
Walhalla 207.
Weigel 323.
Weinstein 150.
Weismann 447.
Prophecies 107.
Beginning of the world 416 ff., 464 ff., etc.
Worldview, explanation 1 ff.
World building 170 ff., 252.
World tree 110, 132.
World origin 63, 67 ff., 155, 240, 335.
World Redemption 389, etc.
Weltgang 440 ff.
World Laws 439 ff., 467.
World puzzles 461 ff., 483.
World soul 247, 278, 313, 321.
Doomsday 166 ff.
Common sense 243, 278, etc.
World repetition 237, 346, 386, 416, 425 f., etc.
God Against 267.
Anabaptist 316.
"Wilde" 70.
Will, the world as 379 ff.
Windischmann 174.
Philosophy of Reality 398, 416.
Reality, transcendent 350 ff., 360 ff., etc.
Wolff, Caspar Friedrich 447.
----- Christian 345.
Wollheim da Fonseca 200.
"Word" 265, p. Logos.
Faith 21, 283.
Wundt, Wilh. 399 ff.

X

Xenocrates 249.
Xenophanes 231, 351.

Y

Yamazaki-Ansai 235.
Yelch 62, 73.

ὑλη 236.
Yoga 260.

Z

Number 240 ff.
Zalmaweth 193.
Magician and magical creature 53 ff.
Zehnder 46 ff.
Time 360, 406, etc.

Time atoms 287.
Zenogenesis 449.
Zenon 353 f ..
Zöllner, Friedrich 398.
Chance 182 ff.
Forced mechanism 428 ff., 435 f., etc.
Expediency 372, 472 f.
Zwingli 315.

EDITOR'S NOTES

[1] *Translator's note*: Other sources have typically referred to this culture as "Mesopotamian." This translation, however, follows Weinstein's usage of "Babylonian" throughout.
[2] Translation by William Stewart Rose.
[3] Ferdinand Freiligrath's German translation was given in the original.
[4] Translation by Albert G Latham.
[5] Translation by Edward Philip Coleridge.
[6] Translation by Edward Philip Coleridge.
[7] Translation by Edward Philip Coleridge.
[8] *Translator's note*: A "nome" is a territorial division of ancient Egypt.
[9] *Translator's note*: Weinstein uses the variant name, Eabani, which was in use at the time, to denote Enkidu.
[10] *Translator's note*: Weinstein provides a translation of the English text into German by Robert Boxberger; the text provided here is the original English text, also as provided by Boxberger.
[11] Translation by Ephraim Avigdor Speiser.
[12] *Translator's note*: The English translation given here is based on the German translation provided by Weinstein.
[13] *Translator's note*: This appears to be an unorthodox definition on Weinstein's part, as a 'kalpa' is usually defined as a period of 4.32 billion years, ten times the length indicated by Weinstein.
[14] See previous note.
[15] *Translator's note*: The Greek word cited more accurately translates as 'anger,' but Weinstein translated it into German *Mut*, meaning 'courage' or 'bravery.'
[16] Translation by Hugh G. Evelyn-Whyte.
[17] Translation by Hjalmar Hjorth Boyesen.
[18] Translation by Israel Zangwill.
[19] *Translator's note*: 'Aziruth' does not occur as a name for a Kabbalistic world in other sources. Other names given are Atzilut and Atziluth.
[20] Translation by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, substituted for the German translation originally used by Weinstein, from King John of Saxony.
[21] *Translator's note*: This referenced statue is of Giordano Bruno, who was executed in the Campo de' Fiori in Rome.
[22] German translation by Adolf Lasson cited in original German text.
[23] Translation by Fitz-Edward Hall.